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Abstract	
	In	 recent	 years,	 synthetic	 biology	 –	 an	 emerging	 science	 that	 promises	 to	‘democratize’	bioengineering	–	has	emerged	as	a	key	site	of	regulatory	interest	and	concern.	In	the	United	States,	in	particular,	these	concerns	have	largely	been	voiced	in	relation	to	synthetic	biology’s	perceived	capacity	to	enable	an	act	of	bioterrorism.	This	thesis	examines	the	regulatory	response	–	a	 ‘risk	management	process’	–	that	has	 been	 mounted	 to	 address	 this	 contingency,	 and	 which	 seeks	 to	 ‘secure’	 and	‘sustain’	a	science	characterized	by	sharply	contrasting	expectations.			In	 particular,	 this	 thesis	 engages	with	 the	 discursive	 and	 non-discursive	 practices	enacted	by	diverse	scientific	and	technical	experts	determined	to	assess	and	manage	‘risks’	that	threaten	to	exceed	the	very	capacity	of	risk,	as	a	‘calculative	rationality’,	to	tame	chance	and	legitimize	responsible	action.	Yet,	in	the	face	of	uncertainty,	and	in	stark	contrast	to	the	‘risk	society’	thesis,	this	thesis	underlines	that	uncertainty	is	not	 an	 inhibition	 to	 risk	 management,	 but	 a	 call	 for	 more	 intensive	 and	 more	creative	ways	of	 organizing	uncertainty,	 enabling	 action	 in	 the	present.	 Indeed,	 in	the	 case	of	 regulating	 synthetic	biology,	 risk	management	 is,	 above	all,	 tailored	 to	finding	practical	‘solutions’	to	seemingly	intractable	policy	‘problems’.		In	 addition	 to	 its	 contribution	 to	 recent	 scholarship	 that	 has	 drawn	on	 Foucault’s	concept	of	‘governmentality’	to	examine	how	diverse	social	problems,	ranging	from	climate	 change	 to	 terrorism,	 are	 ‘governed	 through	 risk’,	 this	 thesis	 critically	examines	how	biotechnology’s	pairing	with	the	perceived	threat	of	bioterrorism	is	influencing	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 modern	 biology	 is	 understood,	 represented,	practiced	and	controlled.	Thus,	the	case	of	synthetic	biology	examined	in	this	thesis	not	only	provides	a	lens	through	which	to	advance	risk	theory	in	sociology,	but	also	serves	 as	 a	 vector	 through	which	 to	 explore	 changing	 configurations	 of	 ‘risk’	 and	‘risk	responsibility’	in	the	contemporary	life	sciences.		
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1.	Introduction	
	
1.1	Synthetic	biology	Described	as	“another	transformative	innovation”,	synthetic	biology	promises	to	be	the	next	generation	of	‘genetic	engineering’,	one	“that	will	make	it	possible	to	build	living	machines	from	off-the-shelf	chemical	ingredients”	(Tucker	and	Zilinskas	2006,	p.	25).	A	distinctly	reductionist	view	of	biology,	the	science	is	grounded	in	the	belief	that	it	is	possible	to	transition	from	ideas	for	biological	‘things’	–	proteins,	genomes	or	 (micro)organisms	 –	 to	 the	 genetic	 sequence	 information	 that	 describes	 those	things	 –	 a	 series	 of	 A’s,	 T’s,	 G’s	 and	 C’s	 representing	 the	 four	 nucleotides	 that	comprise	DNA	–	and	from	genetic	sequence	information	to	the	things	themselves.	In	brief,	 synthetic	 biology	 suggests	 the	 possibility	 of	 designing	 and	 constructing	 life	‘from	scratch’	(Rasmussen	et	al.	2004;	Garfinkel	et	al.	2007).	According	to	its	most	outspoken	 advocates	 –	 the	 scientists	 who	 are	 presently	 imagining	 synthetic	biology’s	methodologies,	vocabularies	and	assorted	techniques	–	the	aim	is	to	make	biology	 ‘simple	 to	engineer’	 (Endy	2005),	 enabling	scientists,	 and	 in	 time	 ‘anyone’	with	 an	 innovative	 idea	 for	 a	 biological	 application,	 to	 design	 and	 build	 novel	biological	entities	that	can	be	applied	to	all	sorts	of	societal	needs.	Emerging	 as	 a	 more	 or	 less	 coherent	 ‘field’	 only	 within	 the	 last	 ten	 years	(Balmer	and	Martin	2008),	synthetic	biology	(as	a	science	and	a	source	of	seemingly	boundless	expectations)	 is	still	very	much	in	the	process	of	being	imagined.	At	the	forefront	 of	 this	 process,	 a	 number	 of	 pioneering	 ‘synthetic	 biologists’1	 seek	 to	differentiate	 a	 new	 domain	 of	 biotechnology,	 setting	 their	 science	 apart	 from	‘traditional’	approaches	to	genetic	engineering.	In	particular,	it	is	with	a	view	to	the	increased	 productivity	 and	 rapidly	 falling	 cost	 of	 automated	DNA	 sequencing	 and	synthesis	 (Carlson	 2008)	 that	 synthetic	 biologists	 claim	 an	 enhanced	 capacity	 to	‘read’	(DNA	sequencing)	and	 ‘write’	(DNA	synthesis)	the	so-called	“building	blocks																																																									
1 See de Vriend (2006, pp. 41-44) for an overview of some of the “[k]ey players in the 
scientific community” (ibid, p. 41) who have been instrumental in establishing the ‘field’ 
of synthetic biology, including Drew Endy (interviewed for my research).  
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of	 life”	 (deoxyribonucleic	 acid	 or	 ‘DNA’)	 (Garfinkel	 et	 al.	 2007,	 p.	 5).	 In	 the	 first	instance,	 advances	 in	 DNA	 sequencing	 technology	 are	 credited	 with	 enabling	 the	identification	of	the	complete	genome	sequences	of	numerous	organisms,	providing	a	growing	repository	of	genetic	sequence	information	that	is	freely	accessible	online	(NSABB	 2006,	 2010).	 In	 the	 second	 instance,	 and	 of	 particular	 importance	 to	 the	realization	 of	 synthetic	 biologists’	 engineering	 goals,	 advances	 in	 DNA	 synthesis	technology	 are	 credited	 with	 permitting	 increasingly	 large	 strands	 of	 DNA	 to	 be	‘printed’	 from	 raw	 chemicals	 and	 digital	 sequence	 information,	 enabling	 the	construction	of	 bespoke	biological	 entities,	 ranging	 from	 single	 genes	 to	 complete	genomes	(Bügl	et	al.	2007;	Garfinkel	et	al.	2007,	2008;	Carlson	2008).		Underpinning	 an	 approach	 to	 synthetic	 biology	 known	 as	 ‘synthetic	genomics’	 (Garfinkel	 et	 al.	 2007,	 2008),	 advances	 in	 these	 so-called	 ‘foundational	technologies’	 (Endy	 2005)	 represent	 the	 cornerstones	 of	 a	 science	 that	 seeks	 to	make	the	project	of	engineering	life	a	realizable,	if	not	practical,	goal.	Indeed,	in	light	of	 advances	 in	 DNA	 synthesis	 (an	 activity	 increasingly	 outsourced	 to	 companies	specializing	 in	 gene-	 to	 genome-length	 ‘synthetic	 DNA’),2	 as	 the	 authors	 of	 one	prominent	 report	 on	 synthetic	 genomics	 assert,	 “we	 take	 as	 a	 given	 that	 now,	 or	within	 a	 few	 years,	 any	 virus	 with	 a	 known	 sequence	 can	 or	 will	 be	 able	 to	 be	constructed	 in	 a	 relatively	 straightforward	manner”	 (Garfinkel	 et	 al.	 2007,	 p.	 15).	The	 expectation	 being,	 ‘synthetic	 microorganisms’	 of	 this	 kind	 can	 be	 used	 as	 a	platform	for	the	production	of	various	“bio-based	products”,	ranging	from	biofuels	to	 new	 vaccines	 and	 pharmaceuticals	 (ibid,	 p.	 10).	 Moreover,	 and	 of	 no	 less	significance,	 continued	advances	 in	 synthetic	genomics	are	not	only	anticipated	 to	make	 it	 increasingly	 feasible	 to	 reproduce	 known	 biological	 entities,	 but	 also	 to																																																									
2 In this context, the term ‘synthetic’ does not necessarily mean that ‘synthetic DNA’ is 
structurally or chemically different than its naturally occurring counterpart (although 
some branches of synthetic biology are investigating ‘novel nucleotides’). Rather, it more 
precisely refers to the process used to assemble DNA. That is, it refers to DNA that is 
chemically synthesized and assembled using a ‘DNA synthesizer’ (a piece of laboratory 
equipment) as opposed to DNA produced through normal cell division. In the scientific 
and technical literature, this is sometimes referred to as ‘synthetically derived’ as 
opposed to ‘naturally derived’ DNA (see, for example, NSABB 2006, p. 4). 
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produce	 new	 ones	 –	 genetic	 constructs	 and	 forms	 of	 life	 that	 are	 not	 simply	‘replicated’	 or	 ‘modified’	 but	 ‘created’	 through	 the	 de	 novo	 synthesis	 of	 “any	specified	DNA	 sequence”	 (ibid,	 p.	 6).	 From	 this	 perspective,	 in	 contrast	 to	 genetic	engineering	(or	‘recombinant	DNA’)	techniques	developed	in	the	1970s,	which	rely	on	 the	 transfer	 of	 individual	 genes	 between	 organisms,	 synthetic	 genomics	 could	provide	a	pathway	to	entirely	new	forms	of	biological	diversity.	In	 addition	 to	 claiming	 an	 enhanced	 capacity	 to	 carry	 out	 the	 de	 novo	synthesis	of	genes	and	genomes	using	DNA	synthesis	technology	and	‘off-the-shelf’	chemicals,	synthetic	biologists	aspire	for	a	more	intuitive,	rational	biology	that	will	enable	 more	 people	 to	 engage	 in	 advanced	 bioengineering	 work.	 At	 the	 heart	 of	these	claims	is	the	so-called	‘parts-based’	approach	to	synthetic	biology	(Benner	and	Sismour	2005;	Endy	2005;	Purnick	and	Weiss	2009).	Under	this	approach,	synthetic	biologists	strive	 to	produce	 ‘standard	biological	parts’	 (characterized	sequences	of	DNA	 that	 ‘code’	 for	 specific	 proteins	 or	 basic	 biological	 functions)	 and	 ‘genetic	circuits’	 (multiple	 ‘parts’	 linked	 together	 to	 produce	 specific	 biological	 processes	that	 control	 cellular	 behavior),	 akin	 to	 the	 transistors	 and	 circuits	 familiar	 to	electrical	 engineers	 (ibid.).	 A	 distinct	 (and	widely	 publicized)	 feature	 of	 synthetic	biology,	 standard	 biological	 parts	 (commonly	 known	 as	 ‘BioBricks’)3	 embody	 the	engineering	 aspirations	 of	 synthetic	 biologists	 and	 the	 promise	 of	 a	 science	 that	could	enable	the	construction	of	bespoke	biological	systems	in	much	the	same	way	Lego	 blocks	 are	 assembled	 to	 produce	 various	 three-dimensional	 structures.	Referred	 to	 by	 some	 commentators	 as	 the	 “legoization”	 of	 biology	 (Nature	Biotechnology	 2009,	 p.	 1073),	 “[t]he	 end	 goal	 is	 to	 create	 a	 catalogue	 of	interchangeable	parts	that	can	be	easily	mixed	and	matched	for	circuit	construction”	(Purnick	and	Weiss	2009,	p.	411),	enabling	the	predicable	modification	of	naturally	occurring	organisms	or	the	construction	of	novel	biological	systems.	In	sum,	‘synthetic	biology’	tends	to	be	differentiated	from	earlier	attempts	at	genetic	engineering	on	 the	basis	of	advances	 in	 ‘foundational	 technologies’	and	on	the	basis	of	a	‘parts-based’	approach	to	the	design	and	assembly	of	‘genetic	circuits’.																																																									3	See ‘BioBricks Foundation’, which describes ‘BioBricks’ as “the fundamental building 
blocks of synthetic biology” (http://biobricks.org/about-foundation/).	
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If	not	singularly	‘new’,	it	is	nonetheless	widely	agreed	that	synthetic	biology	“marks	the	maturity	of	a	series	of	powerful	technologies”	and	a	“growing	confidence	in	the	scientific	 community	 to	 undertake	 the	 project	 of	 engineering	 life”	 (Balmer	 and	Martin	 2008,	 p.	 29).	 Significantly,	 these	 (rhetorical)	 features	 of	 the	 science	 bring	with	 them	not	only	a	new	vision	 for	how	modern	biology	can	be	conducted	–	one	that	suggests	the	possibility	of	a	biology	that	is	 ‘simple	to	engineer’	(Endy	2005)	–	but	 also	 an	 open-ended	 set	 of	 expectations	 (Kwok	 2010).	 That	 is,	 if	 biology	 is	 no	longer	 constrained	 by	 ‘natural’	 genetic	 sequences;	 if	 ‘novel’	 genetic	 constructs,	genomes	 and	 microorganisms	 need	 only	 be	 imagined	 and	 then	 produced	 using	readily	 accessible	 technologies,	 then	 “the	 possibilities	 of	 synthetic	 …	 biological	structures	and	systems	seem	endless”	(de	Vriend	2006,	p.	29).	Following	this	logic,	synthetic	biology	suggests	numerous	applications,	including:	“[T]he	 creation	 of	 bioengineered	 microorganisms	 (and	 possibly	 other	 life	forms)	that	can	produce	pharmaceuticals,	detect	toxic	chemicals,	break	down	pollutants,	repair	defective	genes,	destroy	cancer	cells,	and	generate	hydrogen	for	the	postpetroleum	economy.”		(Tucker	and	Zilinskas	2006,	p.	25)	In	brief,	as	one	news	feature	in	the	scientific	journal	Nature	observed	in	2010:	“To	read	 some	 accounts	 of	 synthetic	 biology,	 the	 ability	 to	 manipulate	 life	 seems	restricted	only	by	the	imagination”	(Kwok	2010,	p.	288).		
1.2	Synthetic	biologists	At	 the	same	time	that	synthetic	biology,	as	a	 ‘field’,	 is	being	defined,	so,	 too,	 is	 the	very	 notion	 of	 a	 ‘synthetic	 biologist’.	 Prior	 to	 the	 widespread	 use	 of	 the	 term	‘synthetic	biology’	in	the	mid-2000s	(Balmer	and	Martin	2008),	synthetic	biologists	went	 by	 other	 professional	 titles.	 Notably,	 synthetic	 biology’s	 early	 practitioners	were	predominately	“natural	scientists	and	technologists	from	different	disciplines,	most	 of	 them	 based	 in	 the	 USA”	 (de	 Vriend	 2006,	 p.	 65)	 who	 shared	 a	 common	interest	in	testing	the	hypothesis,	‘could	biology	be	made	simple	to	engineer’	(Endy	2005)?	 Representing	 prestigious	 “universities	 and	 institutes	 such	 as	 the	Massachusetts	Institute	of	Technology	(MIT),	the	California	Institute	of	Technology	
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(CalTech),	the	Lawrence	Berkeley	National	Laboratory,	the	J.	Craig	Venter	Institute,	and	the	Harvard	Medical	School”	(de	Vriend	2006,	p.	65),	 these	 individuals	played	an	 instrumental	 role	 in	 establishing	 the	 aims	 and	 methods	 of	 synthetic	 biology,	generating	support	for	a	wider	‘synthetic	biology	movement’.	As	Bauer	and	Gaskell	(2002)	 observe	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 ‘biotechnology	 movement’	 more	 generally,	 the	claims	 and	 evocations	 of	 pioneering	 synthetic	 biologists	 (as	 advocates	 for	 a	 new	approach	to	biological	engineering)	played	a	vital	role	in	the	symbolic	elaboration	of	the	science,	as	well	as	influencing	expectations	for	the	future	of	the	field.	Today,	 “traditional	 life	 scientists	 as	 well	 as	 engineers,	 chemists,	 materials	scientists,	 computer	modelers	 and	others”	 (NSABB	2010,	 p.	 iii),	 in	 the	US,	 Europe	and	beyond	(de	Vriend	2006;	Balmer	and	Martin	2008),	have	similarly	adopted	the	synthetic	 biology	 title,	 framing	 their	 research	 activities	within	 the	methodological	and	 rhetorical	 scope	 of	 a	 science	 that	 strives	 to	 make	 biology	 ‘engineerable’	(Deplazes	 2009).	 Dedicated	 synthetic	 biology	 programs	 have	 been	 established	 at	universities;	 new	 sources	 of	 funding	have	been	 created;	 new	 firms	 and	 industries	have	adopted	synthetic	biology	techniques;	and	the	annual	International	Genetically	Engineered	 Machine	 (iGEM)	 Competition4	 draws	 together	 student	 teams	 from	around	the	world	(de	Vriend	2006;	Balmer	and	Martin	2008).	Add	to	this,	a	growing	number	 of	 ‘non-institutional’	 biologists	 (also	 known	 as	 ‘DIY-biologists’,	 ‘amateur	biologists’,	 ‘garage	 biologists’	 or	 ‘biohackers’)	 working	 outside	 of	 ‘traditional’	research	settings	(Schmidt	2008;	NSABB	2010,	2011),	and	one	finds	that	synthetic	biology’s	 disciplinary	 and	 institutional	 boundaries	 are	 decidedly	 blurred,	 while	‘synthetic	 biology’	 (as	 an	 idealized	 vision	 for	 an	 emerging	 science)	 has	 gained	momentum	as	a	new	way	of	thinking	about	modern	biology.	For	example,	although	conducting	 very	 different	 types	 of	 projects	 than	 their	 institutional	 counterparts	(having	 fewer	 technical	 and	 financial	 resources	 and	working	 in	 informal	 research	settings,	 including	 ‘community	 labs’),	 amateur	 biologists	 have,	 in	 many	 ways,																																																									
4 The iGEM competition is an annual event where “[s]tudent teams are given a kit of 
biological parts at the beginning of the summer from the Registry of Standard Biological 
Parts … and use these parts and new parts of their own design to build biological systems 
and operate them in living cells” (http://igem.org/About). 
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become	 emblematic	 of	 synthetic	 biology,	 if	 only	 because	 the	 trend	 towards	 non-institutional	 science	 suggests	 what	 might	 be	 possible	 “as	 more	 and	 more	 people	have	the	necessary	skills	to	engineer	biology”	(Schmidt	2008,	p.	1).	Thus,	within	ten	years,	a	small	but	growing	‘synthetic	biology	community’	is	said	 to	 have	 emerged	 (de	 Vriend	 2006;	 Tucker	 and	 Zilinskas	 2006;	 Balmer	 and	Martin	 2008),	 composed	 of	 individuals	 with	 diverse	 technical	 backgrounds;	occupying	diverse	 (non-)institutional	 spaces.	 Yet,	 unambiguously	 defining	 a	 set	 of	characteristics	and	practices	 that	 constitute	 ‘synthetic	biology	proper’,	beyond	 the	overarching	 aim	 of	 making	 biology	 ‘engineerable’	 (Deplazes	 2009),	 remains	problematic.5	 What	 can	 be	 said	 is	 that	 synthetic	 biology	 is	 a	 distinctly	interdisciplinary	 field,	 blurring	 the	 boundaries	 between	 biology	 and	 engineering,	and	 between	 ‘institutional’	 and	 ‘non-institutional’	 science.	Moreover,	 according	 to	some	 (for	example,	de	Vriend	2006;	Schmidt	2008),	 it	 is	precisely	 this	blurring	of	boundaries	 that	 “distinguishes	 synthetic	 biology	 from	 genetic	 engineering	 and	‘classical	biology’”	 (de	Vriend	2006,	p.	63).	At	once	characteristic	of	a	 science	 that	promises	 to	 ‘deskill’	 the	 ‘craft’	 of	 genetic	 engineering	 (Mukunda	 et	 al.	 2009)	 and	suggestive	 of	 its	 potential,	 as	 “more	 and	 more	 individuals	 without	 a	 traditional	education	 in	 biology	 or	 genetics	 (and	 probably	 even	 without	 higher	 education)”	learn	 “to	 manufacture	 biological	 systems”	 (Schmidt	 2008,	 p.	 4),	 some	 believe	“synthetic	biology	might	finally	unleash	the	full	potential	of	biotechnology	and	spark	a	 wave	 of	 innovation”	 (ibid,	 p.	 1).	 From	 this	 perspective,	 synthetic	 biology	 is	perceived	 to	 foreshadow	 the	 “domestication	 of	 biology”,	 suggesting	 tantalizing	opportunities,	but	also	“unprecedented”	risks	(ibid.).		
																																																								
5 A number of authors have attempted to further differentiate distinct projects or sub-
disciplines within synthetic biology (see, for example, Benner and Sismour 2005; Balmer 
and Martin 2008; Deplazes 2009). Although offering further categories within which to 
group various research activities, all of which “can lay claim to the title ‘synthetic 
biology’” (Benner and Sismour 2005, p. 542), the overarching theme is “the idea of 
turning biotechnology into a true engineering discipline” (Deplazes 2009, p. 428). 
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1.3	Risks	and	regulatory	challenges	Although	 synthetic	 biology	 has,	 in	 recent	 years,	 attracted	 significant	 attention	 in	light	of	its	promising	applications,	it	has	simultaneously	raised	significant	concerns	about	its	potential	risks	and	wider	social	and	ethical	implications.	On	the	one	hand,	these	 concerns	 closely	 resemble	 those	 associated	 with	 earlier	 debates	 on	‘recombinant	 DNA	 technology’,	 including	 uncertainties	 about	 the	 unanticipated	health	effects	and	environmental	consequences	of	‘genetically	modified	organisms’;	ethical	 dilemmas	 associated	 with	 ‘tinkering	 with	 nature’	 or	 ‘playing	 god’,	 and	concerns	about	the	commodification	of	life	–	patenting	genes,	genomes	or	organisms	(ETC	 Group	 2006;	 Balmer	 and	 Martin	 2008;	 POST	 2008).	 With	 a	 view	 to	 these	concerns,	 synthetic	 biology	 is	 sometimes	 described	 as	 ‘evolutionary’	 rather	 than	‘revolutionary’,	essentially	offering	a	different	mode	of	arriving	at	the	same	 ‘kinds’	of	 social	 and	 ethical	 implications.	 Indeed,	 it	 is	 sometimes	 suggested	 that	much	 of	what	is	presently	called	‘synthetic	biology’	is	really	just	an	extension	of	recombinant	DNA	 technology,	 and	 therefore	 the	 science’s	 ‘implications’,	 including	 its	 potential	risks,	 are	much	 the	 same.	As	 the	 genetic	 engineers	Benner	 and	 Sismour	 (2005,	 p.	541)	 argue,	 adopting	 a	 position	 often	 taken	 by	 advocates	 of	 synthetic	 biology	against	potentially	more	intrusive	forms	of	oversight	and	regulation:	“Placing	a	new	name	on	an	old	technology	does	not	create	a	new	hazard.”		On	 the	 other	 hand,	 just	 as	 many	 accounts	 suggest	 that	 synthetic	 biology	offers	 “greater	 promise”	 and	 poses	 “greater	 perils”	 than	 any	 of	 the	 sciences	 or	technologies	from	which	it	is	derived	(Samuel	et	al.	2009,	p.	7).	In	particular,	in	light	of	advances	in	synthetic	genomics	and	heightened	concerns	about	‘(bio)terrorism’,6	especially	 in	 the	 United	 States	 (Garfinkel et al. 2008; POST 2008;	 Lentzos	 2009;	Torgersen	2009),	concerns	have	been	raised	about	the	potential	de	novo	synthesis	of																																																									
6 ‘Terrorism’ and ‘bioterrorism’ (‘terrorism’ that deploys pathogens as weapons), as well 
as a variety of other terms that characterize the risk and security discourses discussed in 
my thesis, are contested (frequently highly politicized) concepts, which vary according to 
the social and political context within which they are deployed. In policy settings, 
‘terrorism’ is broadly defined as a ‘mode of political violence perpetrated by non-state 
actors against civilian populations’, whereas ‘terrorism’, as a political label, is 
increasingly applied to just about “anything which involves destabilization of the 
normalized order of society” (Lipschutz and Turcotte 2005, p. 30). 
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dangerous	pathogens	 that	 could	be	used	 to	 cause	 ‘deliberate	harm’	 (NSABB	2006;	Garfinkel	 et	 al.	 2007).	 With	 a	 view	 to	 these	 concerns,	 several	 high-profile	experiments	 (for	 example,	 Cello	 et	 al.	 2002;	 Tumpey	 et	 al.	 2005)	 have	 received	particular	attention.	In	the	case	of	‘synthetic	poliovirus’	(Cello	et	al.	2002),	one	of	the	earliest	and	most	frequently	cited	examples	of	this	type	of	experiment,	Garfinkel	et	al.	 (2007,	p.	6)	suggest	 it,	 “demonstrated	 for	 the	 first	 time	 in	a	post-September	11	world	 the	 feasibility	 of	 synthesizing	 a	 complete	 microorganism	 –	 in	 this	 case,	 a	human	 pathogen	 –	 using	 only	 published	 DNA	 sequence	 information	 and	 mail-ordered	 raw	 materials.”	 For	 Garfinkel	 et	 al,	 and	 for	 others	 concerned	 about	synthetic	 biology’s	 potential	 ‘biosecurity’7	 implications,	 experiments	 of	 this	 kind	point	 to	 new	 ‘risks’	 and	 ‘regulatory	 challenges’,	 as	 they	 suggest	 it	 is	 increasingly	possible	for	individuals	to	synthesize	microorganisms	‘from	scratch’,	including	a	list	of	 high-risk	 pathogens	 presently	 under	 regulatory	 control	 (known,	 in	 the	 US	context,	 as	 ‘Select	 Agents’)8	 (NSABB	 2006;	 Garfinkel	 et	 al.	 2007).	 More	 worrying	still,	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 these	 commentators,	 synthetic	 genomics	 could	 yield	novel,	 taxonomically	unclassified	pathogens	(thus	absent	 from	pre-existing	control	lists)	more	dangerous	than	those	presently	found	in	nature	(ibid.).	Magnifying	these	concerns,	 the	recent	synthesis	of	a	more	virulent	strain	of	avian	influenza,	intended	to	test	the	‘pandemic	potential’	of	the	H5N1	virus,	sparked	global	 controversy	 over	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 or	 not	 to	 publish	 the	 research	protocols	 developed	 by	 two	 research	 teams	 (see,	 for	 an	 overview,	 Enserink	 and	Malakoff	2012;	Garrett	2012).	Specifically,	 concerns	were	raised	about	 individuals	or	terrorist	groups	repeating	the	published	procedures,	thereby	gaining	access	to	a																																																									
7 Broadly, ‘biosecurity’, a concept that is relatively new to the life sciences, has been 
described by the World Health Organization (WHO) as consisting of measures aimed at 
“reducing the risk of unauthorized access, loss, theft, misuse, diversion or intentional 
release of [dangerous biological materials]” (WHO 2006, p. 11). In contrast, ‘biosafety’, 
which has a relatively long tradition in the life sciences, broadly refers to measures aimed 
at “reducing the risk of unintentional exposure to pathogens and toxins or their accidental 
release” (ibid). Although I will discuss both concepts in further detail in my thesis, for 
more detailed definitions at this time, see 
http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/biosafety/WHO_CDS_EPR_2006_6.pdf. 
8 See http://www.selectagents.gov. 
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pathogen	 that	 could,	 “in	 the	 hands	 of	 malevolent	 individuals,	 organizations	 or	governments”,	pose	“an	unimaginable	catastrophe	for	which	the	world	is	currently	inadequately	prepared”	(Berns	et	al.	2012,	p.	153).	Not	only	signaling	the	feasibility	of	 creating	 pathogens	 more	 dangerous	 than	 those	 presently	 found	 in	 nature,	reconfirming	 concerns	about	 synthetic	 genomics	and	 the	 limitations	of	 ‘list-based’	approaches	to	regulation,	these	experiments	brought	to	the	fore	an	emerging	set	of	policy	 concerns	 and	 regulatory	 dilemmas	 associated	 with	 access	 to	 ‘dangerous	knowledge’,	 the	 communication	 of	 ‘dual-use	 research’,	 and	 what	 role	 (if	 any)	censorship	should	play	in	the	contemporary	life	sciences	(Rappert	2003).		In	the	longer	term,	it	is	often	said	to	be	synthetic	biology’s	capacity	to	‘deskill’	bioengineering	 (a	 possibility	 often	 associated	 with	 the	 ‘parts-based’	 approach	 to	synthetic	biology	and	concerns	about	an	emerging	‘hacker	culture’)9	that	the	scope	of	synthetic	biology’s	risks	(as	well	as	its	possibilities	for	innovation)	are	viewed	as	infinitely	 expandable.	 As	 Mukunda	 et	 al.	 (2009)	 suggest,	 based	 on	 a	 series	 of	interviews	 with	 “leading	 synthetic	 biologists”	 and	 “practicing	 biosecurity	authorities”	in	the	United	States	(ibid,	p.	2),	it	is	precisely	“synthetic	biology’s	focus	on	decreasing	the	skill	necessary	to	modify	biological	systems	and	its	emphasis	on	modular	design”	 that	new	biosecurity	risks	and	regulatory	challenges	are	 likely	 to	emerge	 (ibid,	 p.	 4).	 The	 expectation	 being,	 developments	 of	 this	 kind	 could	eventually	 enable	 ‘anyone’	 (including	 those	 who	 may	 wish	 to	 cause	 deliberate	harm)	 to	engage	 in	potentially	dangerous	research.	Although	widely	accepted	 that	synthetic	 biology’s	 ‘deskilling	 agenda’	 (ibid.)	 has	 yet	 to	 be	 fully	 achieved	 (that	 is,	genetic	engineering	remains	more	complex	 than	 the	concept	of	a	 ‘BioBrick’	would	suggest),	 ‘if	successful’,	 the	argument	goes,	 there	will	be	many	more	opportunities	for	 the	 accidental	 or	 ‘deliberate	 misuse’	 of	 modern	 biology	 (NSABB	 2006,	 2010;	Mukunda	et	al.	2009;	Purnick	and	Weiss	2009;	Kwok	2010;	NRC	2011).		In	this	context,	it	is	apparent	that	the	promise	of	synthetic	biology	to	enable	the	 construction	of	 (novel)	biological	 entities	and	 to	 ‘democratize’	bioengineering,																																																									
9 See Schmidt (2008, p. 2), who describes “a new kind of hacker culture, the 
‘biohacker’”, which “means designing and manufacturing biological systems in an open 
way but hardly any kind [sic] of regulatory oversight or enforcement in place.” 
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possibilities	that	have	garnered	great	interest	from	governments,	technologists	and	industries	in	recent	years	(Carlson	2008),	have	simultaneously	made	the	science	the	focus	of	an	opposing	set	of	expectations.	A	so-called	‘dual-use	biotechnology’	(NRC	2004),	synthetic	biology	 is	believed	to	be	capable	of	enabling	tremendous	benefits	and	 tremendous	 risks	 –	 new	 avenues	 for	 ‘bioeconomy’	 and	 ‘bioterrorism’	 (NRC	2011).	 In	 this	 light,	 the	 ‘success’	 of	 synthetic	 biology,	 and,	with	 it,	 the	 promise	 of	new	forms	of	‘health’	and	‘wealth’,	is	believed	to	depend	upon	fostering	the	former	while	 preventing	 the	 latter.	 Yet,	 “[h]ow	 can	 possible	 risks	 associated	 with	 the	generation	 of	 novel	 organisms	 be	 addressed”	 (NSABB	 2006,	 p.	 15)?	 How	 can	regulations	 be	 devised	 to	 avoid	 “unnecessarily	 hampering	 the	 pace	 of	 research	while	managing	 risk”	 (ibid,	 p.	 9)?	 How	 can	 “regulators	…	 devise	 a	 legislative	 and	regulatory	 system	 that	 balances	 security	 and	 safety	 risks	 to	 facilitate	 research	without	 imposing	 unreasonable	 bureaucratic	 burdens	 on	 scientists	 and	 academic	freedom”	 (Samuel	 et	 al.	 2009,	 p.	 8)?	 What	 sorts	 of	 ‘options	 for	 governance’	 are	needed	to	ensure	that	synthetic	genomics	achieves	its	full	potential	(Garfinkel	et	al.	2007)?	These	are	among	the	many	practical	considerations	and	instrumental	goals	that	characterize	an	ongoing	regulatory	process	that	seeks	to	‘secure’	and	‘sustain’	a	science	characterized	by	sharply	contrasting	expectations.		
1.4	Regulatory	governance	In	 light	 of	 synthetic	 biology’s	 ‘dual-use	 potential’,	 it	 is	 widely	 believed	 (including	among	some	synthetic	biologists)	that	some	form	of	‘regulation’	is	needed	to	ensure	the	 science	 can	 proceed	 ‘responsibly’.	 In	 the	 United	 States,	 in	 particular,	 these	concerns	 have,	 in	 recent	 years,	motivated	 regulatory	 authorities	 to	 seek	 scientific	and	 technical	 guidance	 on	 how	 to	 ‘assess’	 and	 ‘manage’	 synthetic	 biology’s	‘biosecurity	risks’	(see,	for	example,	NSABB	2006,	2010;	DHHS	2010b;	PCSBI	2010).	Justified	not	only	on	the	basis	of	mitigating	potential	harm,	but	also	on	the	basis	of	fostering	 innovation	 and	 industry,	 the	 overall	 aim	 of	 these	 initiatives	 has	 been	 to	identify	 “relevant	 policy	 actions	 targeted	 to	 promote	 risk	 management,	 while	seeking	 to	 minimize	 negative	 impacts	 upon	 scientific	 progress	 or	 industrial	
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development”	 (DHHS	2010b,	p.	2).	With	a	view	to	 this	objective,	 synthetic	biology	and	synthetic	biologists	(as	the	innovators	and	practitioners	most	directly	engaged	in	the	development	and	application	of	the	science)	have	emerged	as	the	focus	of	an	assortment	of	 risk	assessment	activities	and	risk	management	strategies	explicitly	(if	 not	 self-consciously)	 aimed	 at	 balancing	 potentially	 competing	 demands	 for	‘scientific	freedom’	and	‘national	security’.10	What	is	more,	it	has	been	with	a	view	to	‘risk’	and	its	‘management’	that	this	outcome	is	perceived	to	be	possible.		This	framing	of	synthetic	biology	–	as	a	‘risk’	to	be	‘managed’	–	is	indicative	of	a	 growing	 trend	 towards	 the	 (re)characterization	 of	 regulatory	 subject	 matter	 in	terms	 of	 ‘risk’,	 and	 underpins	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘risk	 regulation’	 (Fisher	 2010).	 As	Bridget	 Hutter	 (2005)	 suggests,	 ‘risk-based’	 regulation	 is	 intended	 “to	 help	governments,	regulatory	agencies	and	companies	manage	risks	more	effectively	and	prioritize	actions	and	resources	accordingly”	(ibid,	p.	13).	Traditionally,	risk-based	approaches	to	regulation	have	aspired	to	‘objectively’	measure	risk,	promoting	“the	use	 of	 technical	 risk-based	 tools,	 emerging	 out	 of	 economics	 (cost	 benefit	approaches)	and	science	(risk	assessment	techniques)”,	suggesting	a	level	of	formal	calculation	(ibid,	p.	3,	emphasis	in	original).	The	benefit	of	such	approaches	is	often	said	to	rest	in	their	capacity	to	“constrain	discretion”	and	to	enhance	the	objectivity	of	 policy	 decisions	 (Fisher	 2010,	 p.	 51).	 Moreover,	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	regulators,	 they	 are	 said	 to	 offer	 a	 more	 or	 less	 explicit	 accounting	 of	 their	 risk	assessment	 and	 risk	 management	 activities,	 enabling	 greater	 transparency,	 and	ultimately	 a	 justification	 for	 their	 regulatory	 decisions	 in	 the	 face	 of	 potential	criticism	for	doing	too	little	or	too	much	to	regulate	(Majone	2010).		Historically,	this	approach	to	regulation	has	been	applied	to	a	limited	sphere	of	regulatory	activity	(notably,	health	and	environmental	risks),	but	in	more	recent	years	 risk-based	approaches	have	come	 to	be	applied	 to	a	much	broader	 range	of	issues,	 ranging	 from	 financial	 crisis	 to	 terrorism.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 risk-based																																																									
10 McLeish and Nightingale (2007, pp. 1636-1637) underline that this “dilemma” is 
characteristic of wider regulatory discussions directed at modern biology, namely: “how 
to design policies that can simultaneously successfully suppress biological weapons 
development whilst accommodating and even encouraging the spread of dual use 
technologies for legitimate technical and scientific reasons?” 
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techniques	have	expanded	from	the	use	of	highly	technical,	probabilistic	methods	of	assessment	 (‘quantitative	 risk	 assessment’)	 to	 a	 broader	 array	 of	 techniques,	ranging	 from	 scenario	 analysis	 to	 expert	 judgment.	 Even	 though	 these	 techniques	may	have	little	to	do	with	‘quantifying’	risk,	they	are	nonetheless	intended	to	enable	‘reasoned	estimation’	(O’Malley	2004)	and	to	lend	a	sense	of	‘process’	to	regulatory	decision-making	 (Power	 2004).	 Today,	 adherence	 to	 ‘risk	 regulation’	 may	 range	from	the	simple	use	of	 ‘risk	regulatory	concepts’	(Fisher	2010),	such	as	 ‘risk’,	 ‘risk	assessment’	 and	 ‘risk	 management’,	 to	 the	 use	 of	 ‘traditional’	 “risk-based	 tools	derived	 from	economics	and	 science”	 (Hutter	2005,	p.	6).	Moreover,	 adherence	 to	such	 approaches	 may	 be	 ad	 hoc	 or	 an	 integral	 component	 of	 an	 overarching	regulatory	strategy	(ibid.).	Irrespective	of	their	adherence	to	quantitative	methods,	risk-based	 approaches	 have	 become	 synonymous	 with	 discourses	 on	 ‘good	governance’	 (Power	 2004)	 and	 are	 increasingly	 central	 to	 notions	 of	 ‘better	regulation’,	serving,	in	many	ways,	as	“a	badge	of	legitimacy”	(Black	2010,	p.	89).		In	this	light,	it	is	perhaps	not	surprising	that	the	notion	of	‘risk’	is	an	integral	feature	of	how	the	‘deliberate	misuse’	of	synthetic	biology	is	currently	represented	in	 regulatory	 contexts,	 and	 that	 ‘risk	 assessment’	 and	 ‘risk	 management’	 are	promoted	as	favored	regulatory	instruments.	To	what	extent	this	characterization	of	synthetic	 biology	 represents	 a	 highly	 technical	 mode	 of	 assessment,	 or	 whether	concepts	 such	 as	 ‘risk’,	 ‘risk	 assessment’	 and	 ‘risk	 management’	 play	 a	 more	rhetorical	function,	is	uncertain.	At	the	very	least,	the	deployment	of	this	language	is	intended	 to	 suggest	 a	 more	 or	 less	 structured	 regulatory	 process,	 one	 that	 may	“offer	 a	 principled	 way	 of	 organizing	 what	 we	 know	 about	 the	 world”	 (Jasanoff	1993,	 p.	 129).	 Moreover,	 whether	 by	 rigorous	 quantification	 or	 qualitative	interpretation,	this	characterization	of	‘deliberate	misuse’	reinforces	the	expectation	that	 synthetic	 biology’s	 ‘risks’	 can	 be	 made	 the	 subject	 of	 ‘regulation’	 or	 ‘risk	management’,	 a	 distinction	 that	 is	 increasingly	 blurred	 (Power	 2007).	 In	 this	context,	 what	 is	 of	 particular	 analytical	 interest	 is	 “the	 overall	 approach	 to	regulating”,	 a	 concept	 known	 as	 “‘regulatory	 governance’”	 (Wiener	 2010,	 p.	 140),	adopted	to	enable	synthetic	biology	to	be	‘governed	through	risk’.			
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1.5	Outline	of	my	argument	It	has	been	suggested	that,	following	the	events	of	9/11,	and	the	subsequent	anthrax	letter	mailings,	“[t]he	dread	of	nuclear,	biological	and/or	chemical	terrorist	attacks	moved	to	the	forefront	of	arguments	about	the	inability	to	estimate	the	severity	of	loss”	 (Erickson	 and	 Doyle	 2004,	 p.	 214).	 For	 some	 risk	 scholars,	 these	 events	reconfirmed	 their	 belief	 that	we	 are	 living	 in	 a	 ‘post-risk-calculation’	world	 (Beck	2002),	one	populated	by	self-generated	risks	for	which	we	do	not	have,	and	cannot	have,	‘the	knowledge	or	the	measure’.11	Yet,	others	disagree,	and	not	simply	on	the	basis	 of	 their	 own	 risk	 theories,	 but	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 diverse	 ‘risk-based’	techniques	 that	 are	 continually	 being	 developed,	 adapted	 and	 deployed	 to	 assess,	manage,	and	insure	against	all	sorts	of	modern	hazards,	including	‘catastrophic’	acts	of	 ‘terrorism’	 (Erickson	 and	 Doyle	 2004;	 Lakoff	 2006;	 Lakoff	 and	 Collier	 2008).	Although	 these	 techniques	 do	 not	 necessarily	 depend	 upon	 the	 use	 of	 statistical	methods,	 traditionally	 favored	 as	 an	 ‘objective’	 mode	 of	 risk	 assessment,	 they	nonetheless	 represent	 legitimate	 attempts	 at	 ‘ordering	 uncertainty’	 in	 such	 a	way	that	 it	might	be	 ‘governed’.	Thus,	 from	 the	perspective	of	 these	 risk	 scholars,	 it	 is	worthwhile	to	attend	to	these	new	sites	of	risk	assessment	and	risk	management,	as	they	 suggest	new	ways	of	understanding	and	 intervening	upon	a	diverse	 range	of	social	 problems.	 In	 brief,	 it	 is	 fruitful	 to	 consider	 how,	 in	 practice,	 issues	 such	 as	terrorism,	 climate	change	and	 financial	 crisis	are	viewed	as	destabilizing	previous	ways	of	understanding	the	world,	yet	are	governed	in	a	variety	of	ways,	beyond	the	limits	of	“meaningful	statistics”	(Erickson	and	Doyle	2004,	p.	18).			 The	 ongoing	 regulatory	 effort	 in	 the	 United	 States	 directed	 at	 synthetic	biology	–	an	emerging	science	that	promises	to	‘democratize’	bioengineering	–	and	its	potential	misuse	in	an	act	of	‘bioterrorism’	represents	one	site	of	risk	assessment	and	risk	management	that	does	indeed	contradict	Ulrich	Beck’s	(1992)	grand	claim	that	we	are	living	in	a	‘post-risk-calculation’	or	‘post-insurance'	age.	This	is	because	a	 variety	 of	 risk-based	 techniques	 and	 regulatory	 strategies	 are	 presently	 being	
																																																								
11 Adapted from François Ewald’s (2002, p. 294) description of “a risk beyond risk, of 
which we do not have, nor [sic] cannot have, the knowledge or the measure.” 
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developed,	adapted	and	deployed	to	govern	this	highly	specific	–	by	some	accounts,	‘potentially	catastrophic’	–	problem.	Not	only	do	these	efforts	demonstrate	that	such	risks	can	be	made	the	subject	of	highly	specific	forms	of	regulatory	intervention	and	control,	but,	moreover,	that	there	is	(within	government	agencies,	federal	bureaus,	
ad	hoc	committees,	working	groups,	scientific	academies,	biotech	companies,	think	tanks	 and	 laboratories,	 based	 in	 the	US	 and	 elsewhere)	 a	 distinct	will	 to	 do	 so.	 If	‘governing	 through	 risk’	 in	 the	 context	 of	 synthetic	 biology	 –	 in	 the	 context	 of	‘catastrophic	terrorism’	–	can	tell	us	anything	about	the	‘limits’	of	‘risk	calculation’,	it	is	that	these	limits	are	restricted	only	by	the	imagination.	My	 thesis,	 in	 turn,	 engages	 with	 a	 ‘risk	 management	 process’	 that	 is,	 in	 a	highly	instrumental	sense,	enabling	synthetic	biology	(as	a	science,	an	industry,	and	a	 source	 of	 seemingly	 boundless	 expectations)	 to	 move	 forward.	 It	 attends	 to	 a	specific	kind	of	 social	problem	–	one	 that	exists	at	 the	 interface	of	 ‘biotechnology’	and	‘national	security’	–	and	the	“constellation	of	experts”	(Rabinow	2008,	p.	279),	ranging	 from	 public	 health	 officials	 to	 law	 enforcement	 agents	 and	 biodefense	scientists,	who	have	assembled	around	this	problem	to	develop	practical	solutions.	I	emphasize	this	term	because	‘pragmatism’	filters	through	all	aspects	of	the	ongoing	regulatory	 response	 that	 has	 been	 mounted	 against	 the	 deliberate	 misuse	 of	synthetic	 biology.	 Most	 of	 all,	 it	 is	 visible	 in	 the	 discursive	 and	 non-discursive	practices	of	scientific	and	technical	experts	who	have	been	called	upon	to	anticipate	and	 (to	 the	 extent	 possible)	 prevent	 risks	 of	 this	 kind,	 and	who	 believe	 that	 this	objective	is	not	only	possible,	but	also	that	it	is	possible	(with	the	right	‘mix’	of	risk	assessment	techniques	and	regulatory	strategies)	to	simultaneously	ensure	that	the	science	 fulfills	 its	 anticipated	 potential.	 In	 other	 words,	 for	 these	 scientific	 and	technical	 experts,	 it	 is	possible,	 even	 in	 the	 face	 of	 ‘potential	 catastrophe’,	 to	 both	‘secure’	and	‘sustain’	synthetic	biology	through	risk	management.		 Of	course,	this	theme	is	not	all	together	new.	Previous	biotechnologies	–	most	notably,	 recombinant	 DNA	 technology	 in	 the	 1970s	 –	 have	 been	 framed	 as	 both	(potentially)	‘catastrophic’	and	(ultimately)	‘manageable’.	Regulatory	controls	were	developed	 in	 the	 belief	 that	 intractable	 uncertainties	 need	 not	 prohibit	 scientific	progress.	 Yet,	 the	 case	 of	 synthetic	 biology	 is	 not	 simply	 a	 repetition	 of	what	 has	
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come	 before,	 and	 not	 only	 because	 the	 science	 is	 perceived	 to	 be	 endowed	 with	unique	attributes	–	offering	the	possibility	of	unparalleled	risks	(Samuel	et	al.	2009,	‘Managing	 the	 unimaginable:	 Regulatory	 responses	 to	 the	 challenges	 posed	 by	synthetic	biology	and	 synthetic	 genomics’)	 –	but	 also	because	 it	 is	 embedded	 in	 a	specific	 historical	 moment,	 one	 that	 favors	 a	 different	 view	 of	 ‘risk’	 in	 the	 life	sciences.	 Namely,	 synthetic	 biology	 is	 the	 first	 iteration	 of	 biotechnology	 to	 be	framed	 first	 and	 foremost	 as	 a	 ‘(bio)terrorist	 threat’,	 a	 type	 of	 ‘deliberate	catastrophe’	 that	 suggests	 a	 “pervasive	 sense	 of	 disestablishment”	 that	 “strikes	 at	the	cultural	foundation	of	risk	society”	(Erickson	and	Doyle	2004,	p.	14).	Today,	in	contrast	 to	 earlier	debates	on	 recombinant	DNA	 technology,	 it	 is	 primarily	with	 a	view	 to	 ‘deliberate	misuse’	 (Rappert	 2003;	 Reppy	 2003;	McLeish	 and	Nightingale	2007;	 Collier	 and	 Lakoff	 2008),	 rather	 than	 ‘unintended	 consequences’,	 that	synthetic	 biology’s	 ‘risks’	 are	 understood,	 represented	 and	 made	 the	 subject	 of	regulatory	 intervention	 and	 control.	 Indeed,	 synthetic	 biology	 represents	 an	exemplar	of	‘dual-use	biotechnology’	in	an	‘age	of	terrorism’	(NRC	2004),	serving	as	both	an	example	of	how	modern	technological	risks	are	assessed	and	managed,	and	as	a	vector	through	which	to	explore	how	the	contemporary	life	sciences	are	being	reconfigured	through	their	pairing	with	concerns	about	bioterrorism.	In	 the	 vein	 of	 research	 projects	 interested	 in	 regulatory	 design	 and	administration,	ranging	from	studies	on	financial	crisis	to	terrorism,	my	thesis	seeks	to	engage	with	how	notions	of	 ‘risk’	are	brought	 to	bear	on	a	complex	hazard	and	ultimately	“how	regulatory	authorities	put	into	operation	risk-based	approaches	to	achieve	 their	 regulatory	goals”	 (Bounds	2010,	p.	 27).	My	 thesis,	 in	 turn,	 examines	the	 discursive	 and	 non-discursive	 practices	 presently	 enacted	 by	 scientific	 and	technical	experts	engaged	 in	 ‘selecting’,	 ‘assessing’	and	 ‘managing’	 the	diverse	risk	aspects	of	synthetic	biology	in	pursuit	of	a	‘secure’	and	‘sustainable’	science.	With	a	view	to	this	overarching	research	aim,	my	primary	research	questions	ask:	How	is	synthetic	 biology	 understood	 and	 represented	 as	 a	 ‘biosecurity	 problem’?	 How	 is	this	 problem	 rendered	 ‘knowable’	 and	 ‘calculable’	 through	 risk	 assessment	techniques?	What	risk	management	strategies	are	proposed	to	mitigate	these	risks,	and	how	are	these	justified?	And,	finally,	what	forms	of	‘risk	responsibility’	do	these	
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strategies	 seek	 to	 engender	 in	 synthetic	 biologists,	 and	 to	 what	 effect?	 These	questions	 are	 intended	 to	 shed	 light,	 not	 only	 on	 the	 techniques	 whereby	problematic	 people	 and	 things	 are	 made	 the	 subjects	 of	 risk	 management	 or	regulation,	 but	 also	 on	 the	 normative	 and	 performative	 dimensions	 of	 ‘governing	through	 risk’.	 In	 this	 manner,	 this	 research	 seeks	 to	 open	 up	 space	 for	 critical	reflection	on	the	kinds	of	risks	synthetic	biology	and	synthetic	biologists	are	taken	to	 be,	 how	 these	 risks	 are	 assessed	 and	managed	 through	 risk-based	 techniques,	and	 the	kinds	of	 responsibility	 for	managing	 risk	 these	 seek	 to	 engender	 in	 those	engaged	in	various	aspects	of	the	science	and	its	management.		
1.6	Structure	of	my	thesis	and	summary	of	chapters	My	 thesis	 attends	 to	 a	 ‘risk	 management	 process’,	 which,	 for	 the	 scientific	 and	technical	 experts	 consulted	 for	my	 research,	 represents	 a	 ‘scientific’	 or	 ‘technical’	approach	to	 ‘risk	management’	or	 ‘regulation’,	consisting	of	several	distinct	 ‘steps’,	typically	 defined	 as:	 ‘risk	 identification’,	 ‘risk	 assessment’	 and	 ‘risk	management’.	For	 these	 experts,	 this	 process	 represents	 a	 linear,	 scientific	 procedure	 (Fisher	2010)	and	marks	the	boundaries	of	‘objective	risk	assessment’	and	‘rational	policy-making’.	However,	while	 this	 thesis	 attends	 to	 this	process,	 it	does	 so	with	a	very	different	perspective	on	its	presupposed	linearity,	procedural	clarity,	and	scientific	rationality.	 In	 practice,	 and	 in	 stark	 contrast	 to	 this	 idealized	 vision	 of	 science	policymaking,	my	thesis	underlines	that	there	is	no	singular	or	best	way	to	‘govern	through	risk’,	and	the	risk	management	process	 in	synthetic	biology	 is	guided	and	constrained	less	by	the	availability	of	scientific	knowledge	and	systematic	standards	of	 measurement,	 and	 more	 by	 the	 very	 capacity	 of	 governmental	 actors	 and	organizations	 to	 design	 and	 produce	 risk	management	 procedures,	 protocols	 and	guidelines	that	are	used	to	inform	and	to	justify	risk	management	actions	that	seek	to	enable	a	‘secure’	and	‘sustainable’	science.	In	the	following	chapter	summaries,	I	will	provide	a	brief	overview	of	the	argument	developed	in	my	thesis,	highlighting	how,	and	to	what	effect,	synthetic	biology	is	‘governed	through	risk’.		
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In	Chapter	2,	I	situate	my	research	in	the	risk	literature	in	sociology,	identifying	two	broad	 schools	 of	 thought	 on	 risk,	 as	 a	 ‘calculative	 rationality’,	 and	 the	 perceived	limits	 of	 ‘risk	 calculation’.	On	 the	 one	hand,	 I	 introduce	Ulrich	Beck’s	 (1992)	 ‘risk	society’	thesis,	which	argues	that	there	exist	today	technological	hazards	that	exceed	the	 very	 limits	 of	 risk	 and	 insurance,	 suggesting	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 ‘risk	 beyond	risk’,	one	that	cannot	be	rationally	assessed.	Risk	society	theorists	call	into	question	not	only	the	epistemological	limits	of	risk	to	calculate	potential	loss	–	where	‘risk’	is	defined	as	a	probabilistic	measure	based	on	‘quantitative	risk	assessment’	–	but	also	cast	 doubt	 on	 the	 authority	 of	 risk	 experts	who	 claim	 that	 immeasurable	dangers	can	be	assessed	and	managed.	On	 the	other	hand,	 and	 in	 contrast	 to	 this	more	or	less	‘realist’	perspective	on	risk,	I	introduce	the	work	of	theorists	who	have	drawn	on	Foucault’s	concept	of	 ‘governmentality’	 to	develop	an	alternative	interpretation	of	 risk,	as	a	 ‘governmental	 rationality’.	For	 these	 theorists,	 risk	 is	not	an	objective	fact	that	can	only	be	calculated	on	the	basis	of	statistical	measurement,	but	rather	it	is	a	category	of	understanding,	a	way	of	ordering	reality	in	such	a	way	that	it	might	be	governed.	It	is	with	a	view	to	the	latter	body	of	theory,	I	argue,	that	one	is	able	to	account	for	diverse	sites	of	risk	assessment	and	risk	management	that	characterize	various	 ‘risk	 regulation	 regimes’	 or	 ‘regimes	of	 government’,	 including	 the	 case	of	synthetic	 biology	 examined	 in	 my	 thesis,	 which	 may	 not	 rely	 on	 numbers	 and	statistics	 to	 validate	 knowledge	 claims	 about	 an	 uncertain	 future,	 but	 are	 no	 less	concerned	with	organizing	uncertainty,	enabling	action	in	the	present.	In	this	light,	risk	is	not	limited	by	the	availability	of	scientific	knowledge,	but	rather	it	is	infinitely	adaptable	and	takes	on	multiple	and	heterogeneous	configurations.		Chapter	3	outlines	my	research	methods,	offering	a	rationale	for	my	research	design	and	outlining	the	research	process	undertaken	to	answer	my	research	questions.	In	the	 first	 instance,	 I	 argue	 that	 an	 ‘analytics	 of	 government’	 provides	 a	 suitable	analytical	framework	for	my	thesis,	as	well	as	a	basis	for	my	research	design,	in	as	much	 as	 this	 approach	 to	 risk	 pursues	 a	 consistent	 line	 of	 questioning	 geared	towards	 understanding	 how	 ‘regimes	 of	 government’	 or	 ‘regimes	 of	 practices’	operate	 (Dean	 1999).	 In	 the	 second	 instance,	 I	 describe	 the	 research	 process,	
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including	my	identification	of	the	social	group	(a	 ‘constellation	of	experts’	engaged	in	‘biosecurity	policy’)	of	primary	interest	to	my	thesis	and	the	‘qualitative	research	methods’	 (including	document	 analysis,	 expert	 interviews	and	observations	 in	 the	field)	 selected	 to	 shed	 light	 on	 the	 discursive	 and	 non-discursive	 practices	 that	comprise	 the	 ‘risk	management	process’	examined	 in	my	thesis.	Finally,	 I	consider	my	own	role	in	the	research	process,	reflecting	on	how	my	choices	have	played	an	integral	role	in	determining	the	‘scope’	and	‘quality’	of	my	research.	Taken	together,	this	 chapter	 describes	 a	 qualitative	 research	 project	 designed	 to	 understand	 how	scientific	and	technical	experts	render	a	seemingly	‘incalculable	risk’	‘knowable’	and	‘actionable’	in	pursuit	of	a	‘secure’	and	‘sustainable’	science.			With	 a	 view	 to	 risk	management	 or	 regulation	 as	 a	 ‘process’,	 Chapter	 4	 examines	what	is	very	often	overlooked	by	various	scientific	and	technical	experts	engaged	in	assessing	 and	managing	 ‘new’	 and	 ‘emerging’	 risks	 in	 the	 life	 sciences	 –	 namely,	these	‘risks’	are	neither	innate	nor	inevitable.	Rather,	they	are	contextually	situated	and	defined	through	a	demanding	process	of	selection	and	classification.	In	the	case	of	synthetic	biology,	what	 is	perceived	 to	be	problematic	about	 the	science	can	be	traced	 to	 growing	 concerns	 about	 ‘bioterrorism’	 and	 heightened	 demands	 for	‘biosecurity’	–	a	defensive	practice	premised	upon	keeping	‘dangerous	tools’	out	of	‘dangerous	 hands’	 (the	 ‘classical’	 biosecurity	 model).	 Drawing	 on	 the	 biosecurity	policy	literature	and	interviews	with	synthetic	biologists	and	experts	specializing	in	aspects	of	biosecurity,	this	chapter	introduces	how	synthetic	biology	–	a	science	that	promises	 to	 ‘democratize’	 modern	 biology	 –	 is	 perceived	 to	 be	 fundamentally	 at	odds	with	 biosecurity	 practices	 premised	 upon	 a	 logic	 of	 ‘command	 and	 control’.	Synthetic	biology,	I	suggest,	 is	undergoing	a	process	of	 ‘problematization’,	as	it	has	destabilized	 previous	 ways	 of	 understanding	 the	 world,	 motivating	 a	 regulatory	response	that	seeks	to	reestablish	order	in	the	face	of	uncertainty	and	change.	It	is	with	 a	 view	 to	 ‘risk	 selection’,	 the	 subject	 of	 this	 chapter,	whereby	 new	 risks	 are	identified,	classified	and	given	a	name,	that	problematic	people	and	things	are	made	subjects	and	objects	of	regulatory	attention	and	political	deliberation.		
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Chapter	 5	 moves	 beyond	 risk	 as	 a	 category	 or	 label	 signifying	 potential	 harm	towards	 risk	 as	 a	 mode	 of	 measurement	 or	 calculation.	 Risk	 assessment	 in	 the	context	 of	 science	 policymaking,	 introduced	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 this	 chapter,	although	aspiring	to	the	regulatory	ideal	of	‘quantitative	risk	assessment’,	does	not	follow	a	preexisting	standard,	much	less	a	 ‘scientific’	one.	In	fact,	risk	assessments,	especially	in	the	case	of	emerging	technologies,	which	are	characterized	by	scientific	unknowns	and	numerous	‘potential	benefits’	as	well	as	‘potential	risks’,	are	not	only	intended	 to	be	reasonably	 ‘precise’	–	 representative	of	 the	 ‘actual’	 risks	–	but	also	‘practical’	 –	 enabling	 regulatory	 interventions	 that	 satisfy	 a	 variety	 of	 policy	objectives,	 including	 aspirations	 for	 regulatory	 consistency	 and	 scientific	 and	economic	 development.	 In	 the	 second	 part	 of	 this	 chapter,	 I	 argue	 that	 this	‘pragmatic’	approach	to	policymaking	is	indicative	of	regulating	biotechnology,	both	the	present	case	of	synthetic	biology	and	the	earlier	case	of	genetic	engineering	(a	precursor	 to	 synthetic	biology).	 In	both	 instances,	 regulatory	 strategies	have	been	designed	 to	 make	 ‘novel’	 risks	 ‘fit’	 (through	 a	 combination	 of	 risk	 assessment	techniques,	 both	quantitative	 and	qualitative)	 existing	 regulatory	 frameworks	 and	specific	risk	management	objectives.	Finally,	this	chapter	concludes	with	a	detailed	case	 study	 on	 ‘biosecurity	 risk	 assessment’	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 DNA	 synthesis	industry,	a	site	of	intense	regulatory	interest	and	concern.	An	instance	of	‘pragmatic	policymaking’,	 recent	 federal	 guidelines	 developed	 for	 DNA	 synthesis	 providers	describe	a	more	or	less	structured	risk	assessment	procedure	or	process	(drawing	on	 an	 assortment	 of	 ‘risk-based’	 techniques	 and	 regulatory	 strategies)	 used	 to	inform	and	to	justify	risk	management	decisions,	enabling	DNA	synthesis	companies	to	process	orders	in	the	face	of	seemingly	intractable	uncertainty.			This	 ‘pragmatic’	 approach	 to	 science	 policymaking	 extends	 to	 all	 aspects	 of	 the	ongoing	 regulatory	 process	 in	 synthetic	 biology,	which	 not	 only	 seeks	 to	 ‘secure’,	but	also	‘sustain’	an	emerging	science.	Chapter	6	considers	how	this	desired	balance	is	brought	into	conflict	with	a	host	of	policy	proposals	and	regulatory	strategies	that	ascribe	to	the	‘classical’	biosecurity	model,	which	depends	upon	restricting	access	to	science.	The	 first	part	of	 this	chapter	considers	 two	broad	 families	of	proposals	of	
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this	 kind,	 one	 directed	 at	 controlling	 access	 to	 tangible	 biotechnologies	 and	 the	other	 intangible	 life	 science	 knowledge.	 Significantly,	 although	 both	 sets	 of	proposals	 share	 a	 common	 preoccupation	 with	 questions	 of	 access	 to	 science,	growing	 concerns	 about	 ‘dangerous	 knowledge’	 (as	 opposed	 to	 dangerous	pathogens,	laboratory	equipment	or	other	tangible	artifacts)	suggest	an	increasingly	precautionary	 approach	 to	 biosecurity,	 raising	 concerns	 about	 constraints	 on	scientific	 freedom,	which	 some	 fear	may	 diminish	 scientific	 progress.	 The	 second	part	 of	 this	 chapter	 then	 considers	 how	 recent	 concerns	 about	 the	 publication	 of	H5N1	(‘bird	flu’)	research	has	motivated	new	federal	policy	on	‘dual-use	research	of	concern’,	 which	 combines	 aspects	 of	 earlier	 proposals	 under	 a	 singular	 risk	management	 standard,	 one	 that	 attempts	 to	 negotiate	 the	 scientific	 uncertainties	and	 administrative	 challenges	 associated	 with	 anticipating	 and	 preventing	 the	production	and	distribution	of	‘forbidden	knowledge’.	The	final	part	of	this	chapter	then	 sheds	 light	 on	 an	 alternative	 biosecurity	 model,	 one	 that	 has	 largely	 been	advanced	 by	 social	 scientists	 and	 is	 gaining	 growing	 support	 among	 biological	weapons	 experts,	 which	 calls	 into	 question	 the	 effectiveness	 and	 desirability	 of	preventing	access	to	science,	suggesting	the	need	for	a	new	approach	to	biosecurity,	one	that	attempts	to	shape	the	conduct	of	scientists	themselves.			Chapter	 7	 examines	 what	 is	 increasingly	 perceived	 to	 be	 among	 the	 most	sustainable	 ‘solutions’	 to	 the	 seemingly	 intractable	 policy	 ‘problem’	 of	 synthetic	biology,	 namely,	 ‘self-governance’.	 The	 first	 part	 of	 this	 chapter	 underlines	 how	recent	calls	 for	a	new	‘culture	of	responsibility’	have	begun	to	place	new	demands	on	scientists,	who	are	increasingly	encouraged	to	play	an	active	role	in	biosecurity.	With	 a	 view	 to	 ‘biosecurity’,	 in	 contrast	 to	 ‘biosafety’,	 scientists	 are	 desired	 to	 be	both	prudent	(‘self-disciplined’)	and	vigilant	(‘watchful’),	enabling	them	to	 take	on	much	 of	 the	 day-to-day	 responsibility	 of	 ‘policing	 science’,	 while	 simultaneously	bringing	 the	 worlds	 of	 ‘science’	 and	 ‘national	 security’	 into	 closer	 contact.	 The	second	part	of	this	chapter	then	looks	in-depth	at	a	variety	of	biosecurity	awareness	raising	 activities,	 in	 particular	 the	 FBI’s	 ongoing	 engagement	 with	 (amateur)	synthetic	biologists,	which	aim	to	provide	scientists	with	the	situational	awareness	
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to	 anticipate	 potential	 biosecurity	 risks	 within	 their	 ‘communities’.	 Although,	 for	many,	 including	 many	 synthetic	 biologists,	 ‘self-governance’	 is	 perceived	 to	 be	desirable,	 as	 it	might	 limit	 regulatory	 constraints	on	 science,	 there	 remain	doubts	about	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 ‘self-governance’	 biosecurity	model	 and	 ambivalent	attitudes	on	the	part	of	scientists	about	the	desirability	of	‘policing	themselves’.		Finally,	 in	 Chapter	 8,	 I	 reflect	 on	 several	 key	 themes	 that	 have	 emerged	 from	my	research,	and	which	have	been	examined	in	my	thesis,	drawing	attention	to,	on	the	one	hand,	risk’s	capacity	as	an	adaptive	‘technique	of	government’	and,	on	the	other,	its	capacity	to	not	only	describe,	but	also	produce	the	very	‘risks’	it	seeks	to	visualize	and	control.	In	relation	to	the	first	theme,	my	thesis	underlines	that	there	are,	quite	literally,	 ‘no	 risks	 beyond	 risk’,	 as	 ‘risk’	 and	 ‘risk	 thinking’	 are	 defined	 and	constrained,	not	by	the	availability	of	scientific	knowledge	(exemplified	by	numbers	and	statistics),	but	by	the	very	capacity	of	governmental	actors	and	organizations	to	(re)imagine	and	(re)configure	 ‘uncertain	 futures’	as	 ‘calculable	risks’.	Contributing	to	recent	risk	scholarship	in	sociology,	which	has	endeavored	to	examine	how	‘risk-based’	 techniques	 are	 brought	 to	 bear	 on	 all	 sorts	 of	 modern	 hazards,	 my	 thesis	demonstrates	 that,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 numbers,	 much	 of	 the	 ‘work’	 of	 risk	management	 in	 the	 context	 of	 regulating	 synthetic	 biology	 leverages	 on	 experts’	determination	 to	 design	 and	 construct	 rationalized	 processes,	 protocols	 and	procedures	 that	 are	 intended	 to	 achieve	 ‘practical’	 policy	 ‘solutions’	 to	 complex	policy	 ‘problems’.	 In	 relation	 to	 the	 second	 theme,	 my	 thesis	 sheds	 light	 on	 the	normative	 and	performative	dimensions	of	 ‘governing	 through	 risk’,	which,	 in	 the	case	of	 synthetic	biology,	 is	 shifting	attention	 to	 concerns	about	bioterrorism,	and	influencing	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 scientists,	 security	 professionals,	 regulators	(indeed,	all	of	us)	understand	and	represent	modern	biology.		
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2.	Theory	and	the	‘how’s’	of	risk-based	government	
	
2.1	Introduction	Whether	 the	potential	misuse	of	synthetic	biology	constitutes	a	 ‘calculable	risk’	or	‘incalculable	danger’	 is	uncertain.	At	best,	such	a	distinction	would	be	an	arbitrary	one,	 as	 the	 future	 cannot	 be	 known	with	 certainty.	 Although	 acknowledging	 that	self-generated	 risks	 produced	 by	 advanced,	 industrialized	 societies	 (Beck	 1992)	challenge	a	risk	calculus	that	calls	for	stable	facts	–	expressed	since	at	least	the	early	nineteenth	century	in	terms	of	probabilities	(Hacking	1990)	–	about	the	activities	of	people	and	the	capacities	of	things,	this	research	seeks	to	avoid	grand	claims	about	what	kind	of	risk	(or	danger)	synthetic	biology	might	‘actually’	pose.	It	also	seeks	to	avoid	 making	 prescriptions	 for	 the	 ‘proper’	 way	 of	 governing	 in	 the	 face	 of	uncertainty.	 Instead,	 it	 focuses	 on	 the	 discursive	 and	 non-discursive	 practices	presently	 enacted	 by	 diverse	 experts	 in	 the	 name	 of	 selecting,	 assessing	 and	managing	 the	 unruly	 aspects	 of	 synthetic	 biology	 in	 pursuit	 of	 a	 ‘secure’	 and	‘sustainable’	science.	Whether	potential	events	are	imagined	as	risks	or	as	dangers,	such	practices	share	the	common	goal	of	negotiating	and	(more	or	less	successfully)	ordering	uncertainty,	enabling	action	and	intervention	in	the	present.	At	 its	 foundation,	 then,	 this	 research	 is	 concerned	 with	 a	 type	 of	governmentality,12	where	risk	can	be	understood	as	“a	way	of	representing	events	in	 a	 certain	 form	 so	 they	 might	 be	 made	 governable	 in	 particular	 ways,	 with	particular	techniques	and	for	particular	goals”	(Dean	1999,	p.	177).	In	this	context,	risk	is	neither	viewed	as	a	monolithic	technology	nor	as	one	driven	by	inescapable																																																									
12 See Burchell, Gordon and Miller (1991) for their edited volume on Michel Foucault’s 
concept of governmentality. See, also, Mitchell Dean’s (1999) book on Governmentality: 
Power and rule in modern society. Based on my reading of Foucault, and guided by my 
reading of the theorists discussed in this chapter, I take ‘governmentality’ to mean 
‘mentalities of government’ or the ‘art of government’, which, I argue, is an 
interpretation that fits well with the notion of ‘governing through risk’ in the context of 
synthetic biology, as it suggests that risk is an adaptive ‘technique of government’ 
applied to the selection, assessment and management of diverse social problems. 
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forces	of	modernization,	but	rather	as	 “a	complex	category	made	of	many	ways	of	governing	problems”	(O’Malley	2004,	p.	7).	With	a	view	to	this	conceptualization	of	risk,	 my	 thesis	 contributes	 to	 a	 growing	 body	 of	 risk	 scholarship	 (for	 example,	Erickson	and	Doyle	2004;	O’Malley	2004;	Bigo	2006;	Aradau	and	van	Munster	2007;	Lakoff	and	Collier	2008)	concerned	with	how	risk	and	security	professionals	(Bigo	2000,	2006)	select,	assess	and	(at	least	ostensibly)	manage	potential	‘catastrophes’,	ranging	 from	 climate	 change	 to	 terrorism,	 that	 would	 seem	 to	 challenge,	 if	 not	undermine,	 a	 scientific	 rationality	 that	 claims	 to	be	based	on	objective	knowledge	about	the	world.	As	opposed	to	collapsing	the	prudential	enterprise	of	risk,	inviting	an	 era	 of	 ‘post-risk-calculation’	 and	 limitless	 ‘precaution’,	 this	 literature	 suggests	that	 efforts	 to	 lay	 claim	 to	an	uncertain	 future	are	proving	 to	be	more	 responsive	and	adaptive	than	‘risk	society’	theorists	would	contend.	In	particular,	in	the	face	of	extreme	 uncertainty,	 non-quantitative	 modes	 of	 risk-based	 government,	 which	increasingly	 draw	 on	 the	 subjective	 expectations	 and	 professional	 judgments	 of	diverse	experts	as	the	source	of	their	authority,	are	increasingly	being	taken	up	and	deployed	side-by-side	more	‘classical’,	quantitative	risk-based	techniques.	In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 will,	 first,	 introduce	 some	 of	 the	 key	 theory	 that	 will	 be	drawn	 on	 throughout	 my	 thesis,	 illustrating	 how	 risk,	 taking	 on	 multiple	 and	heterogeneous	configurations,	can	be	conceived	as	a	‘mode	of	government’.	I	divide	this	 theory	 into	 three	 sections	 –	 (1)	 making	 up	 problems,	 (2)	 problems	 of	measurement	 and	 (3)	 anticipatory	 government	 –	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 organize	 the	conceptual	 framework	 for	 my	 thesis.	 Although	 broadly	 mirroring	 the	 successive	‘steps’	 –	 risk	 identification,	 risk	 assessment	 and	 risk	management	 –	 scientific	 and	technical	 experts	 use	 to	 characterize	 the	 risk	management	 or	 regulatory	 process,	this	 chapter	 presents	 a	 very	 different	 view	 of	 the	 presupposed	 ‘linearity’	 and	‘scientific	 rationality’	 of	 this	 ‘process’.	 Specifically,	 the	 ‘risk	management	 process’	explored	here,	and	throughout	my	thesis,	 is	one	characterized	as	much	by	experts’	attempts	at	 ‘organizing	uncertainty’	 through	 forms	of	classification	and	structured	reasoning	(and	other	‘qualitative’	forms	of	measurement)	as	it	does	highly	technical	modes	of	 ‘risk	calculation’.	Second,	I	will	situate	this	theory	more	concretely	in	the	context	of	 ‘regulatory	governance’,	where	 ‘governance’	refers	 to	“the	overall	mode	
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or	approach	of	governing”	(Wiener	2010,	p.	140).	Third,	I	will	conclude	this	chapter	by	way	of	introducing	how	an	‘analytics	of	government’	–	concerned	with	the	‘how’s’	of	 governing,	 attending	 to	 the	 specific	 and	not	 the	general;	 informing	a	 consistent	line	of	questioning	that	is	geared	towards	understanding	how	‘regimes	of	practices’	of	government	operate	(Dean	1999)	–	not	only	informs	risk	theory,	but	also	serves	as	an	analytical	framework	for	the	study	of	risk,	helping	guide	where	one	looks	for	data,	as	well	as	the	kinds	of	questions	one	seeks	to	ask	of	that	data.		
2.2	Making	up	problems	In	 the	 tradition	 of	 social	 and	 cultural	 studies	 on	 risk	 (Bradbury	 1989),	my	 thesis	starts	 from	 the	 premise	 that	 ‘risk’	 –	 and	 the	 various	 ‘social	 problems’	 (Schneider	1985)	defined	in	its	name	–	is	not	an	intrinsic	attribute	of	objects	that	exists	beyond	the	 social	world.	 Rather,	 risk	 can	more	 appropriately	 be	 thought	 of	 as,	 “a	 kind	 of	conceptual	 umbrella	 used	 to	 cover	 all	 sorts	 of	 events,	 be	 they	 individual	 or	collective,	minor	or	catastrophic”	(Ewald	2000,	p.	366).	To	speak	of	risk	in	this	way,	is	 to	 underline	 that	 risk	 is	 (at	 least	 in	 part)	 ‘socially	 constructed’	 (Berger	 and	Luckmann	1966)	–	“the	outcome	of	a	process	of	collective	definition”	(Blumer	1971,	p.	298)	–	and	not	an	objective	‘fact’	about	the	world	as	it	‘actually’	is.	In	the	context	of	my	thesis,	the	strength	of	this	conceptualization	of	risk	rests	in	its	capacity	to	shift	the	locus	of	analytical	attention	from	the	various	technological	artifacts	and	possible	future	 harms	 associated	 with	 synthetic	 biology	 towards	 the	 discursive	 and	 non-discursive	practices	enacted	by	scientific	and	technical	experts	engaged	in	selecting	and	naming	new	‘risk	objects’	–	things,	activities	or	situations	“deemed	to	be	sources	of	 danger”	 (Hilgartner	 1992,	 p.	 40)	 –	 for	 regulatory	 attention.	 In	 this	 light,	 the	primary	 ‘object’	of	 interest	 in	my	 thesis	 is	not	 so	much	 the	 ‘first-order’	 (Luhmann	1993)	 problem	of	 synthetic	 biology-enabled	 ‘bioterrorism’,	 but	 rather	 the	 various	ways	in	which	this	problem	is	constituted	by	scientific	and	technical	experts	seeking	policy	solutions	to	an	emerging	set	of	concerns	and	dilemmas.		 	At	 the	 same	 time,	 this	 conceptualization	of	 risk	does	not	 demand	 ignoring	that	 events	 such	 as	 terrorism	 (when	 they	 occur)	 can	 and	 do	 have	 an	 objective	
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reality.	Rather,	it	is	to	respect	that	this	‘reality’	is	contingent	and	context	bound.	As	Shelia	Jasanoff	(1993,	p.	127)	suggests:	“What	we	claim	to	know	about	risk,	how	we	acquire	more	information,	and	how	we	interpret	the	facts	in	our	possession	are	all	contingent	 on	 contextual	 factors,	 ranging	 from	 individual	 or	 organizational	experience	 to	 national	 political	 culture.”	 This	 perspective,	 in	 turn,	 places	 the	investigation	 of	 risk	 squarely	within	 the	 social	world,	 permitting	 an	 analysis	 that	favors	a	close	reading	of	the	social	and	political	milieu	within	which	risk	discourses	are	 embedded.	 For	 example,	 as	 Jasanoff	 (1990)	has	demonstrated	 in	her	work	on	science	 advisory	 committees	 in	 the	 United	 States,	 how	 risks	 are	 represented	 in	regulatory	 processes	 varies	 according	 to	 institutional	 and	 national	 context	 (see,	also,	 Hood	 et	 al.	 2001),	 as	well	 as	 the	 individual	 preferences	 of	 those	 considered	competent	 to	 speak	 the	 ‘truth’	 on	 ostensibly	 ‘technical’	 questions	 about	 risk.	 By	treating	risk	as	a	“socially	constructed	attribute”,	and	not	“as	a	physical	entity	that	exists	 independently	 of	 the	 humans	 who	 assess	 and	 experience	 its	 effect”,	 it	 is	possible	 to	make	 clear	 that	 “processes	 of	 risk	 identification	…	 can	never	 be	 value	free”	(Bradbury	1989,	p.	381).	Thus,	while	scientific	and	technical	experts	engaged	in	 science	 policymaking	 tend	 to	 expend	 considerable	 effort	 attempting	 to	differentiate	 between	 ‘politics’	 and	 ‘science’,	 and	 between	 ‘speculative’	 (non-scientific)	 and	 ‘objective’	 (scientific)	 risk	 (an	 activity	 known	 as	 ‘boundary	work’),	boundaries	of	this	kind	are	inevitably	blurred	(Jasanoff	1990).	While	 a	 broader	 literature	 exists	 on	 the	 ‘social	 construction’	 of	 ‘social	problems’	(see,	for	example,	Berger	and	Luckmann	1966;	Blumer	1971;	Kitsuse	and	Spector	 1973;	 Rains	 1975;	 Aronson	 1982;	 Schneider	 1985),	which	 represents	 the	origins	(an	observation	made	by	Hacking	1999)	of	much	of	the	theory	introduced	in	this	 section,	 the	 following	discussion	 is	narrower	 in	 scope.	Rather	 than	seeking	 to	establish	 a	 set	 of	 social	 processes	 that	 describe	 the	 “career	 and	 fate	 of	 social	problems”	 (Blumer	 1971,	 p.	 301),	 the	 following	 theory	 is	 intended	 to	 help	conceptualize	 the	notion	of	 risk	as	a	 ‘social	 construct’	 and	 ‘risk	 identification’	as	a	social	 process.	 In	 particular,	 several	 themes	 are	 introduced	 that	 are	 of	 particular	relevance	 to	 my	 thesis:	 First,	 the	 identification	 of	 new	 risks	 can	 primarily	 be	understood	as	a	‘social’	rather	than	‘technical’	activity.	Second,	claims	about	risk	are	
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(in	many	ways)	‘constitutive’	of	reality	(Rains	1975),	where	the	very	act	of	naming	new	risks	opens	up	new	space	for	thought	and	action.	Third,	notions	of	risk	abound	in	everyday	life,	and	not	simply	because	“threats	are	hovering	over	us”,	but	because	“[t]he	perception	of	risk	constitutes	a	defining	experience	for	contemporary	society”	(Ewald	 2000,	 p.	 379).	 From	 the	 perspective	 of	 governmentality	 theorists,	 a	perspective	 that	 informs	 my	 own	 theoretical	 stance,	 risks	 are	 “neither	 real	 nor	unreal.	Rather	they	are	ways	in	which	the	real	is	imagined	to	be	by	specific	regimes	of	government,	in	order	that	it	may	be	governed”	(O’Malley	2004,	p.	15).	
	
2.2.1	Securitization	Securitization	 theory	 (Wæver	 1995),	 although	 an	 international	 relations	 concept	and	 not	 a	 sociological	 one,	 provides	 a	 number	 of	 useful	 insights	 into	 the	 social	processes	involved	in	marking	out	new	‘risks’	(or,	in	this	case,	‘security	threats’)	for	critical	attention.	Unlike	traditional	approaches	to	security	studies	that	assume	that	the	perception	of	new	threats	are	the	natural	consequence	of	rational	assessments	made	 by	 knowledgeable	 analysts	 (Lipschutz	 1995),	 this	 theory	 proposes	 that	security	 problems	 are	 the	 consequence	 of	 their	 naming	 as	 matters	 of	 security	(Wæver	1995).	In	this	context,	the	authoritative	‘speech	acts’	(Austin	1955)	of	high-ranking	government	officials	are	said	 to	mobilize	security	expectations,	where	 the	enunciation	 of	 the	 word	 ‘security’	 signals	 a	 danger	 and	 sets	 a	 priority	 (Wæver	1995).	Moreover,	 the	word	 ‘security’,	which	 is	 bound	up	with	notions	of	 ‘national	security’,	 is	 said	 to	organize	expectations	 in	a	 specific	manner,	namely	around	 the	themes	 of	 ‘threat-vulnerability-response’.	 And,	 while	 this	 might	 be	 a	 fine	 way	 to	frame	certain	threats,	such	as	war	and	terrorism,	Wæver	and	colleagues	(Lipschutz	1995)	 argue	 that	 it	 may	 be	 an	 inappropriate	 framework	 for	 dealing	 with	 certain	‘state-endorsed’	 security	 matters,	 such	 as	 ‘environmental	 security’	 or	 ‘health	security’.	 This	 suggests	 that	 the	 ‘security’	 label	 (like	 the	 ‘risk’	 label)	 is	 both	performative	 and	 problematic.	 Performative,	 in	 that,	 “[t]he	 naming	 is	 at	 once	 the	setting	of	a	boundary,	and	also	the	repeated	inculcation	of	a	norm”	(Butler	1993,	p.	
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8).	And	problematic,	in	that	some	problems	(if	one	can	speak	of	them	as	‘problems’	in	the	first	place)	are	not	necessarily	matters	of	national	security.		 Although	 a	 distinct	 departure	 from	 the	 dominant,	 realist	 view	 on	 security	that	 conceives	 of	 threats	 as	 the	 material	 consequences	 of	 dangerous	 people	 and	their	 technological	 capabilities	 (Lipschutz	 1995),	 securitization	 theory	 remains	 of	only	 limited	 value	 in	 the	 context	 of	 sociology.	 There	 are	 several	 reasons	 for	 this.	First,	despite	efforts	to	distance	itself	from	‘classical’	security	studies,	securitization	theory	 remains	 grounded	 in	 a	 state-level,	 hegemonic	 view	 of	 politics,	 which	privileges	the	agency	of	political	elites,	while	overlooking	the	words	and	actions	of	other,	 less	 prominent,	 but	 equally	 instrumental,	 actors	 (Bigo	 2000,	 2006;	 CASE	Collective	2006;	McDonald	2008).	Notably,	securitization	theory	has	been	criticized	for	 failing	 to	 acknowledge	 the	 roles	 and	 daily	 routines	 of	 the	 many	 diverse	bureaucrats	 and	 ‘security	 professionals’	 (Bigo	 2000,	 2006),	 ranging	 from	 police	forces	 to	 customs	 officials,	 who	 equally	 have	 a	 stated	 interest,	 and	 a	 perceived	expertise,	in	a	range	of	problematic	issues	that	might	be	taken	up	and	advanced	as	‘matters	 of	 security’.	 More	 generally,	 it	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 securitization	 is	“something	 that	 increasingly	 permeates	 everyday	 life	 in	 the	 form	 of	 risk	management”	 (van	 Munster	 2005,	 p.	 10),	 and	 thus	 it	 is	 far	 more	 routine	 –	 less	‘exceptional’	–	than	securitization	theorists	contend	(ibid.).	Significantly,	Didier	Bigo	(2000,	p.	347)	suggests,	this	more	generalized	perspective	on	securitization	makes	apparent	that	there	is	no	“conspiracy”	behind	the	security	label	–	no	single	group	or	authority	that	“possesses	a	monopoly	on	this	symbolic	power.”	Rather,	Bigo	argues,	“it	is	a	field	effect”,	not	the	outcome	of	a	“one	actor-narrative”	(ibid.).	Second,	 securitization	 theory	 maintains	 an	 ambivalent	 relationship	 with	state-level	 authority.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 it	 acknowledges	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 such	authority,	 in	 as	much	 as	 security	 continues	 to	 be	 framed,	 first	 and	 foremost,	 as	 a	matter	 of	 ‘national	 security’,	 calling	 for	 state-level	 deliberation	 and,	 if	 necessary,	state-level	intervention.	On	the	other	hand,	it	suggests	that	powerful	interests	at	the	highest	 levels	 of	 government	 play	 a	 more	 or	 less	 active	 role	 in	 producing	 new	security	 problems	 to	 protect	 the	 sovereignty	 of	 security	 institutions	 and	 the	
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monetary	 rewards	 stemming	 from	 security	 practice.13	Although	 such	 intent	might	exist,	it	is	speculative,	and	risks	eliding	the	fact	that	mobilizing	security	expectations	need	not	be	driven	by	the	self-motivation	of	government	authorities	(or	any	single	actor	or	group	for	that	matter),	but	could	equally	be	(to	name	just	one	alternative)	a	matter	of	more	or	less	informed	intelligence	about	a	particular	threat,	which	could	legitimately	be	in	the	interests	of	society	to	address	and	prepare	for.	Finally,	 taken	 to	 the	 extreme,	 securitization	 theory	 risks	 becoming	 a	totalizing,	 constructivist	 approach	 to	 security,	 concealing	 the	 materiality	 of	 the	threats	in	question.	Unavoidably,	events,	such	as	war	or	terrorist	attacks	(when	they	occur),	have	an	undeniable	impact	on	human	life,	which	underlines	that	such	events	are	 more	 than	 just	 ‘speech	 acts’	 and	 have	 significance	 beyond	 political	 rhetoric.	Nonetheless,	 and	 largely	 due	 to	 its	 strict	 constructivist	 program,	 securitization	theory	serves	as	a	reminder	that	threats	do	not	exist	‘out	there’,	somewhere	beyond	the	social	world,	but	are	entangled	within	it.	Even	if	such	an	observation	is	familiar	to	sociologists,	securitization	theory,	I	would	suggest,	nonetheless	has	utility	if	only	as	a	means	of	illuminating	that	security	problems	are	‘problems’	of	a	particular	kind,	which	are	quite	 familiar	 to	 international	relations	scholars,	and	perhaps	 less	so	 to	sociologists.	Namely,	security	problems	are	often	associated	with	 ‘states’	and	 ‘sub-state	actors’;	‘war’	and	‘terrorism’,	and	are	bound	up	with	specific	ways	of	thinking	and	 talking	 about	 problematic	 people	 and	 things,	 which	 necessarily	 plays	 a	significant	 role	 in	 shaping	 security	 discourses,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 security	 practices	enacted	in	the	name	of	security.	Therefore,	a	limited	engagement	with	securitization	theory,	and	the	language	of	security	(often	framed	in	terms	of	‘threat-vulnerability-response’,	 as	 noted	 above)	 it	 is	 bound	 up	with,	 can	 help	 add	 nuance	 to	 a	 critical,	sociological	analysis	of	how	security	problems	come	into	being.		
																																																								
13 Wæver (1995, p. 62) argues, for example, that, in the wake of the Cold War, the 
“security establishment” embraced the expansion of security to domains such as the 
environment in an effort to maintain “their own societal relevance, as well as providing 
jobs to ‘security studies’ and ‘strategic studies’ analysts.” 
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2.2.2	Dynamic	nominalism	Another,	more	modest,	but	altogether	more	grounded,	approach	 to	 the	analysis	of	how	new	problems	and	risks	come	into	being	is	one	that	Ian	Hacking	(1990,	2002)	develops	through	his	historical	research	on	risk,	and	the	concurrent	rise	of	statistics	and	probability.	In	particular,	Hacking’s	concept	of	‘making	up	people’	–	a	variety	of	‘dynamic	nominalism’	that	conceives	of	risk	as	a	mode	of	classification	–	describes	a	mechanism	whereby	 risks	 are	 regularly	 produced	 and	made	 the	 subject	 of	 social	and	political	 attention.	Neither	depending	on	authoritative	 speech	acts	nor	on	 the	involvement	 self-interested	 elites,	 Hacking’s	 work	 represents	 a	 departure	 from	securitization	 theory.	 Specifically,	 it	 underlines	 that	 risks	 can	 (and,	 indeed,	 are)	produced	 through	 social	 processes	 that	 are	 by	 no	means	 ‘exceptional’,	 but	 rather	integral	to	contemporary	life.	Since	the	rise	of	statistics,	Hacking	argues,	new	kinds	of	people	and	things	–	new	kinds	of	‘problems’	and	‘risks’	–	have	been	brought	into	being	hand-in-hand	with	their	naming	and	classification.		For	Hacking,	such	labeling	and	classification	can	be	traced	to	at	least	1820,	at	a	 time	when	statistics,	and	the	 ‘avalanche	of	numbers’	 that	accompanied	statistics,	came	 to	be	 systematically	 applied	 to	 all	manner	of	 ‘deviant’	 community,	 including	the	 mentally	 ill,	 criminals,	 prostitutes,	 and	 many	 others.	 At	 this	 time,	 Hacking	argues,	populations	came	to	be	understood	 in	 terms	of	 the	distributions	of	people	that	 constituted	 them,	which,	 in	 turn,	 showed	 predictable	 regularity,	 demarcating	particular	 types	 of	 people	 that	 could	 subsequently	 be	 observed,	 assessed,	 and	managed.	 Concurrently,	 Wilkinson	 (2010,	 p.	 19)	 adds,	 “the	 framing	 of	 social	problems	 as	 ‘risks	 for	 society’”	 and	 “the	 identification	 of	 particular	 groups	 and	individuals	as	‘risks	to	society’”	contributed	to	“the	emergence	of	social	institutions,	legal	frameworks	and	expertise	designed	to	protect	and	promote	the	nation’s	health,	wealth	and	social	well-being.”	In	time,	these	categories	of	people	were	(and,	in	some	instances,	 continue	 to	 be)	 taken-for-granted,	 as	 one	 could	 hardly	 dispute	 their	existence	 once	 they	were	 accounted	 for	 year	 after	 year	 in	 census	 data,	much	 less	after	 they	 had	 been	 made	 the	 subjects	 of	 specialist	 institutions,	 laws	 and	
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professions.	In	brief,	once	new	categories	of	people	came	into	being,	they	could	no	longer	be	ignored,	neither	as	physical	nor	political	subjects.		Conceptually,	Hacking	develops	his	 thinking	 further	 through	his	 concept	 of	‘making	up	people’,	which	quite	 literally	describes	how	new	types	of	people	come	into	being	through	their	naming	as	particular	‘types’.	As	opposed	to	suggesting	that	specific	 categories	of	people	are	discovered,	due	 to	better	 information	about	 their	existence,	Hacking	(2002,	p.	106)	is	careful	to	explain	that	it	is	“not	that	there	was	a	kind	 of	 person	 who	 came	 increasingly	 to	 be	 recognized	 by	 bureaucrats	 or	 by	students	of	human	nature,	but	rather	 that	a	kind	of	person	came	 into	being	at	 the	same	time	as	the	kind	itself	was	being	invented.”	Things,	such	as	ideas,	objects	and	scientific	protocols,	can	also	be	brought	into	existence	in	this	manner,	but	Hacking	is	careful	to	distinguish	things	from	people,	emphasizing	that	people,	as	autonomous	agents,	 respond	to	and	are	changed	by	 their	naming.	 “Making	up	people”,	Hacking	suggests,	“changes	the	space	of	possibilities	for	personhood”	(ibid,	p.	107),	whereas	things	do	not,	and	cannot,	interact	with	the	names	that	are	applied	to	them.	Taken	 together,	 Hacking’s	 notion	 of	 risk	 and	 his	 concept	 of	 ‘making	 up	people’	might	equally	be	thought	of	in	terms	of	‘making	up	problems’	or	‘making	up	risks’.	 This	 is	 because	 the	naming	of	 a	 person	or	 a	 thing	 as	 a	 ‘problem’	 or	 a	 ‘risk’	(indeed,	the	naming	of	any	‘new’	entity,	irrespective	of	how	it	is	qualified)	opens	up	new	 space	 for	 thought	 and	 action	 that	 did	 not,	 and	 could	 not,	 exist	 prior	 to	 their	naming.	 In	 this	 way,	 as	 new	 concerns	 and	 anxieties	 about	 crime,	 disease	 and	terrorism,	 indeed	an	 infinite	number	of	 “non-existent	 yet	possible	 events”	 (Power	2013,	p.	6),	are	voiced,	one	might	observe	a	simultaneous	emergence	of	problems	and	 risks	 that	 demand	 action	 on	 the	 part	 of	 diverse	 institutions,	 including	 law	enforcement,	 public	health,	military,	 and	many	others.	As	Wilkinson	 (2010,	p.	 25)	observes:	“Once	labeled	as	‘risk’,	problems	are	framed	with	a	sense	of	urgency	that	issues	 a	 demand	 for	 political	 attention	 and	 moral	 response.”	 And,	 while	 this	outcome	 (a	 new	 ‘risk’	 comes	 into	 being)	 is	 not	 dissimilar	 from	 the	 outcome	advanced	 in	 securitization	 theory	 (a	 new	 ‘security	 threat’	 comes	 into	 being),	 it	 is	with	 view	 to	 routine	 ‘risk-oriented	 practices’	 (Power	 2013),	 and	 not	 exceptional	circumstances	or	singular	‘speech	acts’,	that	this	outcome	is	possible.		
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As	 a	 way	 of	 conceptualizing	 the	 performative	 impact	 of	 risk	 	 –	 when	conceived	as	a	label	or	category	that	is	used	to	classify	people	or	things	as	particular	kinds	of	 social	problems	–	Hacking’s	 ‘making	up	people’	 goes	 a	 long	way	 towards	shedding	light	on	how	new	entities	might	enter	into	the	realm	of	regulation	and	be	made	the	subject	of	risk	assessment	and	management.	In	contrast	to	securitization	theory,	 this	approach	neither	marginalizes	 the	physical	nor	 ignores	 the	 social,	but	rather	provides	space	for	both	the	 ‘real’	and	the	 ‘constructed’	(Hacking	1999).	Nor	does	 this	 approach	 privilege	 the	 words	 or	 actions	 of	 political	 elites;	 nor	 does	 it	speculate	as	to	their	motives.	If	anything,	Hacking’s	research	is	most	compelling	in	that	 it	 sheds	 light	on	how	a	seemingly	mundane,	bureaucratic	activity	–	municipal	statistics	–	came	to	play	an	instrumental	role	 in	bringing	new	categories	of	people	and	things	into	the	domain	of	political	deliberation.		Before	 proceeding,	 one	 further	 resonance	 between	 Hacking’s	 theoretical	position	 and	 the	 wider	 risk	 literature	 in	 sociology	 merits	 emphasis.	 Namely,	Hacking’s	(1990,	p.	4)	description	of	risk	as	the	“philosophical	success	story	of	the	twentieth	 century”	 is	 indicative	 of	 a	 view	 shared	 by	 risk	 scholars	 coming	 from	diverse	 theoretical	 positions.	 Namely,	 it	 is	 widely	 held	 that	 risk	 perception	 is	integral	 to	modern	 life	 (see,	 among	 others,	 Ewald	 1990;	 Castel	 1991;	 Beck	 1992;	Luhmann	 1993).	 Indeed,	 by	 some	 accounts,	 it	 is	 all	 but	 impossible	 for	 modern	society	 to	 consider	 the	 future	 through	 anything	 other	 than	 the	 conceptual	 and	normative	 lens	 of	 risk	 (Castel	 1991;	 Luhmann	 1993).	 In	 this	 light,	 while	governmentality	theorists	(for	example,	Dean	1999)	may	be	critical	of	Beck’s	(1992)	ontological	 treatment	 of	 risk	 (a	 subject	 I	 will	 return	 to	 in	 the	 following	 section),	there	 is	 little	disagreement	 that	notions	of	 risk	are	a	pervasive	 feature	of	modern	life.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 today	 it	 is	 widely	 agreed	 that,	 “there	 is	 scarcely	 a	 social	problem	that	is	not	dealt	with	in	terms	of	risk”	(Ewald	1991,	pp.	152-153)	and	that	notions	of	risk	pervade	all	aspects	of	 individual	and	collective	experience,	shaping	the	conduct	of	individuals,	families,	communities	and	states.	In	regulatory	contexts,	this	observation	is	evidenced	by	a	growing	number	of	problematic	issues	that	have	come	 to	be	 framed	as	 ‘risks’,	 including	 “financial	well	being,	human	health,	 safety,	environmental	quality	[and]	national	security”	(Graham	2010,	p.	238).	
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2.3	Problems	of	measurement	Although	 an	 important	 starting	 point	 for	 critical	 reflection,	 understanding	 how	labels	 and	 categories	 contribute	 to	 bringing	 new	 problems	 and	 risks	 into	 being	tends	 to	 be	 of	 limited	 interest	 to	 sociologists.	 As	 O’Malley	 (2004)	 suggests,	 the	naming	 of	 new	 risks	 has	 become	 such	 a	 common	 occurrence	 that	 drawing	 an	audience’s	 attention	 to	 the	 fact	 is	 almost	 (although	 by	 no	 means	 entirely)	unnecessary,	and,	thus,	it	is	rarely	the	subject	of	protracted	debate.	Instead,	it	is	at	the	level	of	measurement	(or	‘assessment’,	as	it	is	more	commonly	referred	to	in	the	context	 of	 ‘risk	 analysis’),14	 and	 especially	 at	 the	 perceived	 limits	 of	 rational	
measurement,	where	much	of	the	debate	(both	academic	and	technical)	concerning	contemporary	 risks	 resides.	 It	 is	 here	 that	 questions	of	 ‘limit’,	 namely	 the	 limit	 of	scientific	knowledge	to	render	an	‘objective’	assessment	of	potential	harm,	come	to	the	 fore.	 Some	 of	 the	 common	 questions	 generated	 in	 this	 debate	 resemble	 the	following:	Can	the	likelihood	and	consequences	of	risk	‘x’	be	objectively	assessed?	If	risk	 ‘y’	 cannot	 be	 objectively	 assessed,	 what	 alternative	 techniques	 should	 be	deployed?	What	 are	 the	 implications	of	using	more	 speculative	 (non-quantitative)	varieties	 of	 risk	 assessment?	 In	 brief,	 much	 of	 the	 debate	 concerns	 what	 should	count	as	‘objective	risk’	and	as	‘objective	assessment’,	where	‘objective’	underlines	a	scientific	 rationality	 based	 on	 quantitative	 calculation,	 as	 opposed	 to	 subjective	expectations,	 professional	 judgments,	 speculation,	 rules	 of	 thumb,	 and	 other	 non-quantitative	modes	of	calculation	(O’Malley	2000,	2003,	2004).		 The	 significance	 of	 ‘objective	 risk’,	 as	 opposed	 to	 what	 one	 might	 call	‘subjective	risk’	or	 ‘speculative	risk’,	might	best	be	explained	with	reference	to	the	‘traditional’	 risk	 assessment	 model,	 a	 model	 that	 serves	 as	 a	 common	 reference	point	for	risk	experts	and	risk	scholars	alike.15	According	to	this	model,	risk	is	equal																																																									
14 ‘Risk analysis’, traditionally defined as a technical procedure combining ‘risk 
assessment’ and ‘risk management’ (and sometimes ‘risk communication’), can broadly 
“be understood as an overlapping family of methods for the calculation and measurement 
of risk based in the statistical sciences” (Power 2007, p. 13). 
15 There are many instances of the risk theorists discussed in this chapter drawing on 
‘quantitative risk assessment’ to provide a baseline for their argumentation. Here are just 
a few examples: “By prevention in this context we mean quite generally preparing for 
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to	the	likelihood	of	an	event	occurring	multiplied	by	the	likely	consequences	(level	of	financial	loss,	extent	of	environmental	damage,	number	of	casualties,	and	so	on)	of	 the	event	were	 it	 to	occur.	 In	 this	context,	 risk	 is	a	value	(as	well	as	a	means	of	
valuation)	 expressed	 as	 a	probability,	 and	of	 course	 (according	 to	 the	model)	 it	 is	
calculable.	 Commonly	 known	 as	 ‘quantitative	 risk	 assessment’,	 this	 model	represents,	above	all,	“a	technical	ideal	of	risk”	and	its	measurement	(Power	2007,	p.	70),	underlining	the	belief	that	risks	exist	as	“objective	facts	that	can	be	explained,	predicted,	 and	 controlled	by	 science”	 (Bradbury	1989,	p.	 381).	As	 Jasanoff	 (1993)	argues	 in	 relation	 to	 science	 policymaking,	 this	 view	 of	 risk	 (if	 contradicted	 in	practice)	 is	 distinctive	 of	 the	 dominant	 ‘culture’	 of	 risk	 analysis.	 More	 generally,	Michael	Power	(2007,	p.	70)	suggests,	it	exists	“at	the	centre	of	the	risk	management	collective	imagination,	defining	a	broad	community	of	specialists	united	in	the	belief	that	managing	risk	demands	[quantitative]	measurement.”	While	numerous	scientific	and	technical	domains	are	characterized	by	their	(ostensible)	 use	 of	 ‘quantitative	 risk	 assessment’,	 the	 case	 of	 insurance	 has	traditionally	been	credited	with	significant	advancements	in	probability	theory	and	frequently	serves	as	an	anchor	point	for	theoretical	discussion	in	the	risk	literature	(O’Malley	2003).	According	to	François	Ewald	(1990,	1991,	2000,	2002),	insurance	has,	 since	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 represented	 the	 foremost	 ‘risk	 technology’,	 one	indicative	of	a	worldview	patterned	on	scientific	 facts	and	systematic	standards	of	measurement.	The	subject	matter	of	insurance	is	that	of	common,	recurring	events	(for	example,	car	accidents)	–	phenomena	that	can	be	normalized	through	statistical	calculation.	In	the	world	of	 insurance,	Ewald	suggests	(1990,	p.	143),	“numbers	by	themselves	create	meaning”	and	the	logic	of	probability	and	statistics	(“techniques	of	objectification”)	(ibid,	p.	144)	enable	sense	to	emerge	from	an	“undifferentiated																																																																																																																																																																						
uncertain future losses by seeking to reduce either the probability of occurrence of losses 
or their extent” (Luhmann 1993, p. 29); “Risk is the measure of an expectation – a 
mathematical expectation that, according to Pascal is the product of the probability of the 
event multiplied by its value” (Ewald 2000, p. 369); “This then also means that the 
boundaries of private insurability dissolve, since such insurance is based on the 
fundamental potential for compensation of damages and on the possibility of estimating 
their probability by means of quantitative risk calculation” (Beck 2002, p. 41). 
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mass	of	data	without	any	need	for	reference	to	a	world	outside	that	of	pure	surfaces	and	pure	factuality”	(ibid,	p.	143).	 In	this	 light,	the	notion	of	 ‘risk’	departs	from	its	everyday	 usage	 as	 a	 signifier	 of	 a	 threatening	 future	 event,	 becoming,	 instead,	 an	analytical	tool	or	means	of	measurement.	As	Ewald	(1991,	p.	207)	eloquently	writes:	“To	 calculate	 risk	 is	 to	 master	 time,	 to	 discipline	 the	 future.”	 The	 future	 (to	 the	extent	 that	Ewald’s	statement	 is	perceived	 to	be	 true)	can	be	colonized,	 its	unruly	aspects	tamed,	and	decisions	made	in	accordance	with	a	scientific	rationality.	However,	 some	 events	 (for	 example,	 nuclear	 reactor	 accidents)	 –	 risk	phenomena	 that	 are	 neither	 common	nor	 readily	 ‘calculable’	within	 the	 empirical	constraints	 of	 the	 traditional	 risk	 assessment	 model	 –	 are	 perceived	 to	 be	incompatible	with	 the	 logic	 of	 insurability.	 Specifically,	 problems	 of	measurement	are	 perceived	 to	 arise	 when	 a	 risk	 calculus	 premised	 upon	 the	 availability	 of	scientific	knowledge	threatens	to	break	down	in	the	face	of	extreme	uncertainty.	In	such	cases,	the	future	is	perceived	to	become	untethered	from	a	scientific	rationality	that	claims	to	be	based	on	objective	knowledge	about	the	world,	and	which	seeks	to	inscribe	this	knowledge	in	the	medium	of	probability.	What	if,	for	example,	one	does	not	know	the	starting	parameters	called	for	in	the	model?	What	if	such	an	event	has	never	occurred	before,	so	there	is	no	known	likelihood	of	the	event	occurring	in	the	future,	and	no	knowledge	of	the	likely	damage	that	would	arise	if	the	event	were	to	occur?	In	particular,	when	it	comes	to	the	very	worst-case	scenarios	–	the	potential	catastrophe,	the	disaster	–	little	is	known,	and	perhaps	nothing	can	be	known,	about	the	event.	It	is	at	this	point	that	Ulrich	Beck’s	(1992)	notion	of	incalculable	risk	rears	its	head	and	creates	much	disagreement	and	debate,	as	the	objective	rationality	of	the	 traditional	 risk	 assessment	model	 is	 cast	 in	 doubt,	 as	 is	 the	 credibility	 of	 the	scientific	and	technical	experts	who	continue	to	claim	it	works.		
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2.3.1	‘Risk	society’	and	the	‘special	case	of	high	technology’	For	Ulrich	Beck	(1992),	 the	existence	of	 ‘incalculable	risks’	 is	a	defining	 feature	of	contemporary	 life.	 In	 his	 influential	 thesis,	 Risk	 Society,	 Beck	 describes	 a	“modernization	process”	that	has	led	to	the	unintended	production	of	self-produced	risks	 “before	 which	 the	 human	 imagination	 stands	 in	 awe”	 (ibid,	 p.	 20).16	 The	“wholesale	product	of	industrialization”	(ibid,	p.	21,	emphasis	in	original),	these	risks	are	described	as	having	“a	new	quality”,	namely,	they	are	global	in	nature	and	have	consequences	that	may	extend	over	indefinite	periods	of	time	(ibid,	p.	22).	Above	all,	it	 is	 with	 a	 view	 to	 “techno-scientifically	 produced	 risks”	 (ibid,	 p.	 19),	 such	 as	radioactivity,	 toxins	 and	 pollutants,	 that	 Beck	 argues	 that	 the	 world	 today	 is	 no	longer	 only	 threatened	 by	 finite	 risks	 to	 individuals	 and	 communities,	 but	 also	 to	catastrophic	dangers	 to	 “all	 life	on	Earth”	 (ibid,	p.	21).	For	Beck,	 this	 represents	a	qualitative	change,	one	that	is	indicative	of	“a	real	transformation	in	society”	(ibid,	p.	20),	 which	must	 now	 confront	 risks	 that	 are,	 by	 their	 very	 nature,	 beyond	 “[t]he	normative	basis	of	their	calculation”	(ibid,	p.	22).	That	is,	they	are	incommensurate	with	 the	 traditional	 risk	 assessment	 model,	 and,	 in	 turn,	 “unpredictable,	uncontrollable	and	ultimately	incommunicable”	(Beck	2002,	p.	40).	In	 essence,	 Beck’s	 ‘risk	 society’	 is	 confronted	 by	 risks	 that	 are,	 in	 fact,	 no	longer	‘risks’	at	all,	but	rather	incalculable	dangers,	for	which,	Beck	contends,	there	is	 no	 ‘objective’	 measure.	 To	 put	 it	 another	 way,	 such	 risks	 are	 said	 to	 be	uninsurable.	That	is,	they	are	beyond	the	capacity	of	insurance	to	calculate	potential	loss,	and	thus	beyond	setting	premiums	and	beyond	indemnification	(an	argument	made	by	Dean	1999	and	O’Malley	2000,	2003	in	their	critiques	of	Beck).	While	Beck	does	not	suggest	that	these	conditions	have	led	to	a	world	where	risk	assessments	are	no	 longer	 conducted,	much	 less	 that	 scientific	 and	 technical	 experts	no	 longer	claim	 to	 possess	 the	 necessary	 knowledge	 to	 do	 so,	 he	 does	 claim	 that	 efforts	 to	‘rationally’	 assess	 so-called	 ‘modernization	 risks’	 represent	 an	 attempt	 to	 “feign	
control	 over	 the	 uncontrollable”	 (Beck	 2002,	 p.	 41,	 emphasis	 in	 original).	 Quite	literally,	Beck	suggests,	how,	and	why,	would	an	insurer	(or,	for	that	matter,	a	risk																																																									
16 See, also, Giddens (1990). Like Beck, Giddens argues that society is confronted by 
risks that are the direct and material consequence of scientific progress. 
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analyst,	 a	 scientist,	 a	 politician	 or	 anyone	 else)	 attempt	 to	 empirically	 evaluate	 a	catastrophe	 when	 the	 basic	 means	 of	 valuation	 required	 to	 evaluate	 that	catastrophe	 does	 not	 work?	 This	 question	 points	 to	 an	 unnerving	 realization	 for	Beck	(1992,	2002,	2009),	namely:	 those	who	do	claim	to	know,	at	 least	within	the	prescribed	scientific	rationality	of	the	traditional	risk	assessment	model,	are,	at	best,	mistaken,	and,	at	worst,	deliberately	misleading	others.	In	such	cases,	Beck	suggests,	risk	assessment,	and	trust	in	scientific	expertise,	is	undermined.			 Like	 Beck,	 Niklas	 Luhmann	 (1993),	 although	 coming	 from	 a	 different	theoretical	 background,	 also	 places	 considerable	 emphasis	 on	 the	 destabilizing	effects	 of	 advances	 in	 science	 and	 technology	 and	 attempts	 to	make	 a	 distinction	between	 ‘predicable	 risks’	 and	 ‘unpredictable	 dangers’.	 In	 particular,	 Luhmann	(ibid,	 p.	 83)	 emphasizes	 “the	 special	 case	 of	 high	 technology”,	 including	 risks	associated	 with	 “rapid	 technological	 developments	 in	 fields	 under	 the	 scientific	aegis	of	physics,	chemistry,	and	biology.”	According	to	Luhmann	(ibid.):	“More	than	any	 other	 single	 factor,	 the	 immense	 expansion	 of	 technological	 possibilities	 has	contributed	 to	 drawing	 public	 attention	 to	 the	 risks	 involved.”	 Also	 like	 Beck,	Luhmann	 (ibid,	 pp.	 113-114)	points	 to	 a	 loss	 in	 confidence	 in	 those	who	 claim	 to	possess	the	necessary	knowledge	to	anticipate	and	prevent	unpredictable	dangers,	emphasizing	 that,	 “[u]nder	 certain	 conditions,	 above	 all	 the	 conditions	 of	 risky	technologies,	confidence	in	the	self-confidence	of	others	evaporates.”	In	the	case	of	the	most	 improbable	 events,	 Luhmann	 suggests,	 “tenable	 consensus”	 is	 no	 longer	possible	 and	 “efforts	 to	 base	 decisions	 on	 rational	 calculation	 not	 only	 remain	unsuccessful,	 but	 in	 the	 last	 instance	 also	 undermine	 the	 claim	 of	 method	 and	procedure	to	rationality”	(ibid,	p.	xxx).	“This	means	that	politics	cannot	rely	on	the	quantitative	calculation	of	risk	…	Instead	it	has	to	make	do	with	informal	guesses”	(ibid,	 p.	 15).	 However,	 unlike	 Beck,	 as	 O’Malley	 (2004)	 points	 out,	 Luhmann’s	position	does	not	centre	on	statistical	prediction,	but	rather	on	causal	predication,	proposing	 that	 risks	 can	 be	 attributed	 to	 ‘decisions	 made’	 and	 dangers	 can	 be	attributed	‘externally’	–	that	is,	to	sources	beyond	our	control.	
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2.3.2	Uncertainty	and	the	will-to-order	While	Beck	is	not	alone	in	his	suspicion	that	certain	contemporary	risks,	 including	those	 associated	with	 technological	 advancements	 and	 (a	more	 recent	 addition	 to	the	 ‘risk	 society’	 thesis)	 ‘global	 terrorism’	 (Beck	 2002),	 challenge	 a	 risk	 model	founded	on	the	presumption	of	empirical	evidence,	Beck’s	grand	claim	–	that	we	are	living	 in	 a	 ‘post-risk-calculation’	 or	 ‘post-insurance’	 age	 –	 is	 contested.	 As	Nikolas	Rose	 (2002,	 p.	 213)	 argues:	 the	 “notion	 of	 risk	 society,	 though	 suggestive,	 is	misleading.	It	implies	something	homogenous	and	all	embracing,	an	array	of	effects	that	are	amenable	to	an	epochal	sociological	explanation.”	In	practice,	Rose	suggests,	risk	(and	its	measurement)	cannot	be	defined	en	masse,	as	it	does	not	conform	to	a	singular	type,	rationality	or	technique.	Rather,	risk	is	as	varied	as	the	venues	within	which	it	is	observed	and	measured,	conditioned	by	localized	approaches	to	dealing	with	 uncertainty.	 In	 brief,	 risk,	 and	 ‘risk	 thinking’,	 is	 heterogeneous:	 “It	 may	 be	clinical,	 epidemiological,	 actuarial,	 forensic,	 probabilistic,	 and	 much	 else	 besides”	(ibid.).	Moreover,	and	in	stark	contrast	to	Beck,	Rose	underlines	that,	irrespective	of	the	 ontological	 status	 attributed	 to	 cotemporary	 risks,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 perceived	‘limits’	 of	 ‘traditional’	 risk	 assessment	 techniques,	 concerted	 efforts	 are	 regularly	being	made	to	‘calculate’	the	seemingly	‘incalculable’.	According	to	Rose:	“The	 incompleteness,	 fragmentation,	 and	 failure	 of	 risk	 assessment	 and	 risk	management	 is	not	a	 threat	 to	such	 logics,	merely	a	perpetual	 incitement	 for	the	 incessant	 improvement	 of	 systems,	 generation	 of	 more	 knowledge,	invention	of	more	 techniques	 –	 all	 driven	by	 the	 technological	 imperative	 to	tame	uncertainty	and	master	hazard.”	(2002,	p.	228)17			 For	 Rose,	 and	 governmentality	 theorists	 more	 generally	 (Dean	 1999;	O’Malley	2003;	Erickson	and	Doyle	2004,	among	others),	 the	point	of	conflict	with	Beck’s	‘risk	society’	thesis	is	not	the	question	of	whether	the	future	is	uncertain	(and	possibly	getting	more	so	by	the	day).	What	is,	however,	 is	the	question	of	whether																																																									
17 An observation that is closely echoed by Dean (1999, p. 191), who suggests that the 
failure of risk assessment “(itself judged through a particular epistemological framework) 
does not mean the abandonment of the attempt to construct coherent programmes of 
government. Rather, its discovery is an incitement to the problematization, reformation 
and replacement of such programmes.” 
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individuals	 and	 populations	 are	 presently	 confronted	 by	 dangers	 that	 are	 beyond	legitimate	reflection	and	action.	As	Pat	O’Malley	(2003,	p.	277)	concedes:	“It	may	be	that	‘[r]isk	society	is	a	catastrophic	society’	(Beck	1992:	24),	but	this	does	not	mean	that	alternative	 forms	of	 calculation	cannot	govern	such	developments.”	As	Rose’s	critique	 suggests,	 sites	of	 risk	 selection,	 and	modes	of	 risk	 assessment,	 are	 in	 fact	plural,	diverse	and	diversifying.	 In	 turn,	 this	diversification	suggests	 the	possibility	of	 ‘new’	 approaches	 to	 dealing	 with	 uncertainty,	 beyond	 the	 traditional	 risk	assessment	 model	 –	 a	 model	 that	 has	 tended	 to	 dominate	 both	 technical	 and	theoretical	discussions	on	the	subject	of	risk.	Indeed,	even	in	the	case	of	insurance,	traditionally	 “regarded	 as	 the	 archetype	 of	 modernist	 governance	 of	 the	 future”	(O’Malley	 2003,	 p.	 275),	 Erickson	 and	 Doyle	 (2004)	 have	 shown	 that	 heightened	perceptions	 of	 uncertainty	 have,	 for	 the	 most	 part,	 not	 dissuaded	 insurers	 and	reinsurers	 from	 tackling	 such	 diverse	 ‘problems’	 as	 earthquakes,	 hurricanes,	terrorism	 and	 corporate	 fraud	 liabilities	 (ibid,	 p.	 20).	 Rather,	 these	 so-called	‘catastrophe	risks’	have	motivated	insurers	to	generate	creative	‘solutions’	to	these	problems	 in	 pursuit	 of	 profitable	 insurance	 products	 (choices	 that	 depend	 upon	each	 insurer’s	 own	 ‘appetite	 for	 risk’)	 (ibid.).	 Some	 insurers,	 they	 suggest,	 are	willing	to	provide	insurance	coverage	even	in	the	absence	of	“meaningful	statistics”,	adopting	an	approach	to	risk	assessment	akin	to	‘gambling’	–	relying	as	much	on	gut	feelings	and	intuition	as	hard	‘facts’	about	the	world	(ibid,	p.	18).		In	 regulatory	 contexts,	 it	 has	 similarly	 been	 shown	 that,	while	 quantitative	methods	 remain	 an	 idealized	 mode	 of	 decision-making,	 as	 they	 suggest	 the	possibility	 of	 ‘objective’	 or	 ‘value-neutral’	 policy	 decisions,	 other	 conceptual	frameworks	 are	 commonly	 deployed	 to	 arrive	 at	 informed	 policy	 choices.	 For	example,	 as	 the	 authors	 of	 one	 report	 for	 the	 Organisation	 for	 Economic	 Co-operation	 and	 Development	 (OECD)	 suggest,	 when	 regulators	 are	 confronted	 by	“complex	 policy	 issues”,	 cases	 where	 uncertainty	 cannot	 be	 “assumed	 away”,	decision-making	may	be	 structured	 according	 to	 a	 ‘procedural	 rationality’	 “within	which	the	different	components	of	the	decision	problem	can	be	separately	analysed,	and	 then	 put	 together	 in	 a	 consistent	 way”	 (OECD	 2010,	 p.	 129).	 From	 the	perspective	 of	 regulators,	 “in	 a	 world	 where	 transparency	 and	 accountability	 are	
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viewed	 as	 necessary	 conditions	 of	 legitimacy”,	what	 is	 important	 is	 that	 decision-makers	 are	 as	 “explicit	 as	 possible	 about	 the	 steps	 which	 led	 them	 to	 their	 final	determination”	(ibid.).	Or,	as	Power	(2007,	p.	155)	suggests,	the	very	notion	of	“risk	management	 as	 a	 category	 has	 changed	 its	meaning	 and	 expanded	 its	 scope	well	beyond	 its	 technical	 foundations”,	 with	 risk	 managers	 shifting	 towards	 the	development	of	regulatory	frameworks	that	empathize	‘process’	and	‘transparency’	over	formal	calculations	based	on	quantitative	risk	assessment.		Moreover,	Majone	(2010),	and	others	(for	example,	O’Malley	2004;	Graham	2010),	 call	 into	question	 the	very	notion	 that	 there	exist	distinct	 situations	where	the	level	of	scientific	knowledge	is	sufficient	to	permit	‘quantitative	risk	assessment’	and	 situations	where	 scientific	 knowledge	 is	 insufficient,	 thus	 requiring	 informal,	‘qualitative’	methods.	 “In	 reality,”	Majone	 (2010,	 p.	 108)	 suggests,	 “these	 are	 two	points	on	a	knowledge	 ignorance	continuum	rather	 than	 two	qualitatively	distinct	situations.”	This	leads	Majone	(ibid,	p.	109)	to	conclude	that,	“a	sensible	principle	of	decision	 making	 is	 one	 that	 uses	 all	 the	 available	 information,	 weighted	 by	 its	reliability	in	terms	of	subjective	probabilities,	instead	of	privileging	some	particular	risk.”	 With	 a	 view	 to	 “progress	 in	 the	 decision	 sciences,”	 including	 Bayesian	statistics,	which	 treats	 “strength	of	belief	 as	an	 indication	of	probability”	 (Graham	2010,	 p.	 242),	 Graham	 (ibid,	 pp.	 241-242)	 similarly	 argues	 that	 Knightian18	distinctions	 between	 “‘risk’,	 where	 probabilities	 of	 adverse	 events	 are	 known	 or	ascertainable	 based on	 actuarial	 data,	 and	 conditions	 of	 ‘uncertainty’,	 where	probabilities	of	adverse	events	are	unknown”	are	“no	longer	meaningful.”	In	 the	 case	 of	 ‘regulatory	 science’	 or	 ‘science	 policy’,	 a	 context	where	 “the	normal	 state	 of	 affairs	 is	 neither	 scientific	 certainty	 nor	 complete	 ignorance”	(Majone,	pp.	108-109),	this	observation	is	especially	apparent.	As	Jasanoff	suggests	(1990,	 p.	 14),	 regulatory	 science	 invariably	 “straddles	 the	 dividing	 line	 between	science	 and	 policy”,	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 attempting	 to	 furnish	 rigorous	 scientific	evidence	and	risk	estimates	to	support	policy	decisions	and	on	the	other	having	to	make	 these	 decisions	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 less	 than	 perfect	 knowledge.	 Based	 on	 her																																																									
18 The American economist Frank Knight is typically credited with distinguishing 
between ‘measurable risk’ and ‘unmeasurable uncertainty’ (Knight 1921). 
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research	on	scientific	advisory	committees	 in	 the	United	States,	 Jasanoff	describes	regulatory	 science	 as	 a	 “hybrid”	 activity	 that	 “combines	 elements	 of	 scientific	evidence	and	reasoning	with	 large	doses	of	 social	 and	political	 judgment”	 (ibid,	p.	229).	Rather	 than	strict	 adherence	 to	quantitative	methods,	what	 Jasanoff’s	 (ibid.)	research	demonstrates	 is	 that	regulatory	science	 invariably	mixes	 facts	and	values	in	 pursuit	 of	 particular	 regulatory	 goals.	 In	 this	 context,	 risk	 estimates	 can	 be	understood	 as	 the	 outcome	 of	 a	 negotiated	 process	 that	 attempts	 to	 carefully	balance	 competing	 demands	 and	 interests,	 while	 drawing	 on	 standards	 of	measurement	that	are	at	once	scientific	and	political	(ibid.).		Occupying	a	‘grey	area’	between	science	and	politics,	regulatory	science	(and	risk	 assessment	 itself)	 has	 been	 described	 as	 “a	 classic	 ‘trans-scientific’	 activity	carried	 out	 by	 regulatory	 agencies”	 (Jasanoff	 1990,	 p.	 216)	 seeking	 to	 develop	“‘techniques,	 processes	 and	 artifacts’	 that	 further	 the	 task	 of	 policy	 development”	(ibid,	p.	77).	According	to	Alvin	Weinberg	(1972,	p.	209,	emphasis	in	original),	who	coined	the	term	‘trans-science’	in	the	early	1970s:	“Many	of	the	issues	which	arise	in	the	course	of	the	interaction	between	science	or	technology	and	society	…	hang	on	the	 answers	 to	 questions	which	 can	 be	 asked	 of	 science	 and	 yet	which	 cannot	 be	
answered	 by	 science.”	 Under	 these	 conditions,	 Weinberg	 suggests	 (1985,	 p.	 68),	regulatory	science	has	emerged	as	a	new	branch	of	science,	one	“in	which	the	norms	of	scientific	proof	are	less	demanding	than	the	norms	in	ordinary	science.”	In	other	words,	 regulatory	 science	 “falls	 on	 the	 practical	 side”	 of	 the	 division	 between	 so-called	‘pure’	and	‘applied’	research	(Jasanoff	1990,	p.	77).	In	light	of	disagreements	between	experts	on	the	‘correct’	interpretation	of	policy	issues,	calling	into	question	the	 “scientistic	 and	 separatist	 view	 of	 science	 in	 the	 policy	 process”	 (Irwin	 et	 al.	1997,	 p.	 19),	 regulatory	 science	 effectively	 bridges	 the	 gap	 between	 ‘uncertainty’	and	 ‘risk’,	 enabling	 regulatory	 decisions	 to	 be	 made	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 secure	knowledge	 about	 the	 world.	 In	 brief,	 “regulatory	 science	 is	 concerned	 with	 how	science	can	make	predictions	on	the	basis	of	uncertainties”	(ibid.).		While	 ‘regulatory	 science’	 (‘trans-science’	 or	 ‘science	 policy’)	 can	 be	meaningfully	 contrasted	 –	 as	 an	 ‘ideal	 type’	 (Jasanoff	 1995)	 –	 with	 so-called	‘ordinary	 science’,	 it	 is	 nonetheless	 more	 heterogeneous	 than	Weinberg’s	 (1972)	
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formulation	 of	 the	 concept	 would	 suggest	 (Irwin	 et	 al.	 1997).	 Specifically,	 it	 is	questionable	 whether	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 determine	 “where	 science	 ends	 and	 trans-science	 begins”	 (Weinberg	 1972,	 p.	 216).	 In	 practice,	 as	 Jasanoff	 (1987,	 p.	 211)	observes,	 “the	 scientific	 and	 technical	 aspects	 of	 decision-making”	 cannot	 “be	isolated	 from	 the	 socio-political	 ones.”	 Indeed,	 it	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 it	 is	precisely	with	a	view	to	regulatory	science’s	‘heterogeneous	and	hybrid	character’	–	involving	 a	 range	 of	 academic	 disciplines,	 drawing	 on	 diverse	 risk	 assessment	techniques	 embedded	 in	 varied	 institutional	 and	 national	 contexts	 (Irwin	 et	 al.	1997)	–	that	one	is	able	to	discern	the	sheer	diversity	of	ways	in	which	regulatory	subject	matter	are	made	amenable	to	risk	assessment	and	risk	management.	In	this	light,	 the	search	for	singular	 ‘types’	of	risk,	which	can	be	evaluated	on	the	basis	of	science	alone,	is	not	only	an	oversimplification,	but	also	fails	to	capture	the	inherent	variation	 that	 characterizes	 risk	 and	 regulatory	 processes.	 “The	 lines	 between	science,	 policy,	 and	 the	 areas	 where	 the	 two	 are	 mixed”,	 Jasanoff	 (1987,	 p.	 224)	argues,	 “are	 difficult	 to	 draw	 not	 merely	 because	 science	 is	 indeterminate,	 but	because	the	effort	to	make	such	distinctions	is	politically	charged.”		Far	from	being	exceptional,	regulatory	science	routinely	confronts	questions	about	risks	(ranging	from	GM	crops	to	nuclear	reactor	accidents)	characterized	by	“intrinsic,	irreducible	uncertainty”	(Majone	2010,	p.	99).	Indeed,	it	is	precisely	these	sorts	 of	 contingencies	 –	 “emerging	 risks	 that	 are	 scientifically	 uncertain,	economically	significant,	and	politically	sensitive”	(Graham	2010,	p.	245)	–	that	are	of	particular	concern	to	national	governments,	motivating	regulatory	processes	that,	on	the	one	hand,	acknowledge	the	‘limits’	of	scientific	knowledge,	and,	on	the	other,	strive	to	produce	risk	estimates	based	on	styles	of	reasoning	that	continue	to	appeal	to	 the	 idealized	 standards	 of	 science	 and	 the	 possibility	 of	 ‘objective’	 risk	assessment	 (Jasanoff	 1987,	 1990).	 In	 other	 words,	 even	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 ‘hard’	evidence	 about	highly	uncertain	 risks,	 there	 remains	 an	 enduring	belief	 that	 risks	can	 be	 ‘calculated’,	 and,	 moreover,	 that	 science	 can	 provide	 the	 necessary	ingredients	for	doing	so.	Moreover,	for	the	scientific	and	technical	experts	consulted	for	 their	 specialist	 knowledge,	 it	 is	 in	 their	 interests	 to	 shift	 the	 boundaries	 of	analytical	attention	 towards	 ‘objective’	 science	and	away	 from	 ‘subjective’	politics,	
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valorizing	the	importance	of	scientific	expertise	in	policy	processes	(ibid.).	In	turn,	it	is	 with	 a	 view	 to	 this	 accomplished	 ‘boundary	 work’	 that	 one	 can	 gain	 a	 more	nuanced	understanding	of	the	‘micro-world’	of	risk	analysis,	a	world	built	upon	not	only	scientific	standards	of	measurement,	but	also	on	an	active	politics	undertaken	to	legitimize	and	sustain	the	authority	of	science	itself	(Jasanoff	1993).		As	 the	 above	 discussion	 suggests,	 there	 exist	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 techniques	that	 can	 be	 (and,	 indeed,	 are)	 deployed	 to	 estimate	 risk,	 beyond	 the	 perceived	‘limits’	 of	 ‘quantitative	 risk	 assessment’.	 Accordingly,	 a	 growing	 number	 of	 risk	scholars	 argue	 that	 new	 space	 should	 be	 made	 for	 the	 governmental	 analysis	 of	alternative	approaches	to	risk	measurement,	including	more	speculative	varieties	of	assessment	based	on	estimation,	 imagination,	and	forecasting	(Erickson	and	Doyle	2004;	 O’Malley	 2000,	 2003,	 2004),	 as	 well	 as	 ‘procedural’	 or	 ‘process-based’	approaches	 that	 are	 indicative	 of	 “a	 distinctive	 kind	 of	 organizational	proceduralization	which	prioritizes	the	auditability	process”	(Power	2007,	p.	180).	As	O’Malley	(2000,	p.	466)	suggests,	while	such	approaches	may	be	“less	formal	and	calculable,	perhaps	more	lay	or	commonsensical”,	they	need	not	be	less	“‘rational’”.	Thus,	 while	 ‘risk	 society’	 theorists	 may	 view	 such	 ‘uncertain	 techniques’	 (as	opposed	to	 ‘risk	technologies’)	critically,	as	they	fall	outside	the	remit	of	statistical	calculation,	they	nonetheless	constitute	legitimate	efforts	aimed	at	applying	order	to	disparate	elements	of	an	unknown	future.	From	the	perspective	of	governmentality	theorists,	the	very	adaptability	of	risk	rests	in	the	fact	that	it	is,	above	all,	a	category	of	 understanding,	 “a	 schema	 of	 rationality,	 a	 way	 of	 breaking	 down,	 rearranging,	ordering	certain	elements	of	reality”	(Ewald	1991,	p.	199).	In	other	words,	as	Ewald	(1990,	p.	142)	 succinctly	argues,	 “anything	 can	be	a	 risk	–	everything	depends	on	the	way	the	danger	is	analyzed	and	the	potential	event	is	evaluated.”		In	 sum,	 risk	 measurement	 would	 appear	 to	 be	 more	 adaptive	 than	 ‘risk	society’	 theorists	 would	 contend,	 and	 there	 remains	 considerable	 scope	 for	empirical	 research	 that	 focuses	 on	 sites	 of	 risk	 assessment	 and	 risk	management	that	move	 beyond	 ‘meaningful	 statistics’.	 Yet,	what	 does	 it	mean	 to	move	 beyond	‘objective	 risk’	 and	 ‘objective	 risk	 assessment’?	 What	 techniques	 fall	 within	 the	scope	of	‘speculative	risk’?	How	are	these	techniques	used,	and	to	what	end?	These	
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questions	 offer	 a	 new	 problematic	 for	 critical	 reflection	 and	 debate.	 For	 François	Ewald	(2002,	p.	288),	who	has	(as	discussed	above)	played	a	significant	role	in	the	conceptual	framing	of	insurance	risk	–	a	technology	of	risk	that	prizes	the	virtues	of	the	scientific	method	and	scientific	reason	–	‘new’	approaches	to	risk	presuppose	“a	new	relationship	with	science	and	with	knowledge.”	And,	while	such	approaches	do	not	appear	to	abandon	much	of	the	language	of	risk,	they	nonetheless	seem	to	invite	“one	 to	 anticipate	what	 one	 does	 not	 yet	 know	 and	 to	 take	 into	 account	 doubtful	hypotheses	 and	 simple	 suspicions”	 (ibid.).	 For	 some,	 these	 are	 unfamiliar	 (even	unsettling)	conceptions	of	risk,	as	risk	has,	for	some	time,	been	interconnected	with	the	promise	of	science	to	order	the	heterogeneous	elements	of	an	uncertain	future,	where	now	such	potential	is	increasingly	in	doubt.		
2.4	Anticipatory	government	Risk	also	takes	on	another	configuration,	where	it	is	neither	conceived	as	a	signifier	of	 potential	 danger	 nor	 as	 a	 means	 of	 measurement,	 but	 as	 a	 means	 of	 decision-
making	in	the	face	of	an	uncertain	future.	In	this	context,	risk	is	said	to	enable	action	in	 the	 present	 in	 an	 attempt	 at	 minimizing	 anticipated	 harm	 (and	 providing	 an	ostensibly	 ‘rational’	 basis	 for	 a	 variety	 of	 regulatory	 choices).	 Whether	 this	anticipated	harm	is	perceived	to	be	minimal	or	catastrophic,	imminent	or	on	the	far	horizon,	and,	indeed,	calculable	or	incalculable,	to	act	on	risk,	and	through	the	logic	of	 risk,	 is	 a	 defining	 characteristic	 of	modern	 life	 (Dean	 1999;	 Rose	 2002;	 Power	2004).	This	is	because,	to	acknowledge	risk,	to	measure	it	–	either	through	the	rigor	of	the	scientific	method	or	through	the	vicissitudes	of	pure	imagination	–	is	to	make	risk	real,	to	give	it	form,	which,	in	turn,	necessitates	a	decision	by	a	decision-maker;	even	if	that	decision	is	to	do	nothing.	To	do	otherwise	would	be	unacceptable;	as	to	know	something	about	the	future	and	yet	remain	idle	 is	 incompatible	with	today’s	risk-aware	and	risk-averse	society.	In	the	realm	of	politics,	the	historian	of	science,	Susan	 Wright	 (2007,	 p.	 103),	 describes	 this	 modern	 contract	 with	 risk	 as	 “an	insurance	 policy	 for	 political	 reputations”.	 It	 is,	 then,	 through	 its	 capacity	 to	mobilize,	 to	 enable	 action	 in	 the	 name	of	 prudence,	 that	 risk	most	 clearly	 reveals	
	 53	
itself	 as	 a	 practical	 instrument	 of	 government.	 In	 the	 following,	 I	will	 discuss	 the	work	of	theorists	who	have	traced	out	the	origins	of	this	modern	contract,	as	well	as	the	ways	in	which	they	suggest	it	is	adapting	to	permit	those	potentialities	–	those	dangers	 associated	 with	 modernization	 itself	 –	 that	 would	 seem	 to	 be	 beyond	rational	measurement	and	control,	and	thus	beyond	government.19				
2.4.1	Three	faces	of	prudence	Drawing	 on	 the	 work	 of	 François	 Ewald	 provides	 a	 glimpse	 of	 how	 risk,	 as	 an	instrument	of	government,	has	come	to	occupy	the	space	it	does	in	the	early	twenty-first	 century.	 Specifically,	 Ewald	 (2002,	 p.	 296)	 describes	 “three	 attitudes	 with	regard	to	uncertainty”	 that	have	emerged	since	the	nineteenth	century,	and	which	have	accompanied	society’s	 changing	conception	of	 the	 future	and	how	one	might	intervene	in	the	present	to	prepare	for	that	 future.	Ewald	conceives	of	these	three	attitudes,	 or	 “three	 faces	 of	 prudence”	 (where	 Ewald	 takes	 prudence	 to	 mean	“behavior	 in	 the	 face	 of	 uncertainty”),	 in	 terms	 of	 providence,	 prevention,	 and	precaution	(ibid.).	Importantly,	Ewald	does	not	suggest	that	these	three	behaviors	in	the	 face	of	 uncertainty	 are	 incompatible	 or	 that	 the	 emergence	of	 one	 spelled	 the	end	 of	 the	 other	 two	 (as	 ‘risk	 society’	 theorists	 would	 contend),	 but	 rather	 that	“[e]ach	has	its	field	of	competence	and	area	of	validity”	(ibid.).	Exploring	these	three	faces	of	prudence	in	greater	depth	is	revealing	of	the	ways	in	which	risk	is	mobilized	in	 response	 to	 varying	 perceptions	 of	 uncertainty,	 and	 how	 such	 uncertainty	 is	negotiated	and	managed	in	an	effort	to	mitigate	potential	harm.			 The	nineteenth	century,	Ewald	 (2002,	p.	293)	 suggests,	was	one	concerned	with	providence,	“linked	to	notions	of	fate,	chance	and	misfortune,	and	hazard”,	as	well	as	that	of	prudence,	which	required	that	individuals	take	responsibly	for	their	
																																																								
19 Conceptually, it is important to emphasize that my use of the word ‘government’ in my 
thesis (unless qualified more precisely, for example, ‘national government’, ‘government 
agencies’, and so on) is not intended to refer to a centralized state government or 
sovereign authority. Conceptually, and in keeping with the governmentality literature, the 
term ‘government’ (and its derivatives) is intended to capture multiple governmental 
actors and organizations engaged in the ‘government of conduct’ (Rose 2000). 
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own	destiny.	 “The	world	 of	 providence”,	 Ewald	writes,	 “is	 one	 in	which	 one	must	recognize	his	or	her	own	weaknesses	and	fragility,	subject	to	incessant	reversals	of	fortune;	it	is	a	world	of	chance	events	…	where	one	knows	oneself	to	be	vulnerable	and	scarcely	hopes	to	use	science	and	engineering	(which	are	not	readily	available)	in	order	to	rebalance	one’s	relationship	with	nature”	(ibid,	p.	276).	 In	this	context,	each	 individual	 is	 said	 to	 be	 responsible	 for	 his	 or	 her	 own	 conduct,	where	 their	security	depends	wholly	on	 their	capacities	 to	avert	 injury	and	 their	provisions	 to	compensate	for	potential	loss.	The	fault	of	misfortune	(unless	intentionally	imposed	by	another)	rests	solely	with	them,	as	do	the	costs.	Although	providence	 is	said	to	mark	the	beginning	of	an	active	relationship	not	only	with	the	present	but	also	with	the	 future,	 it	 is	 a	 future	 that	 is	 scarcely	 foreseeable	 and	beyond	 control,	 and	 thus	beyond	the	remit	of	calculable	risk	and	prevention.	At	the	same	time,	the	potential	damages	 arising	 from	 human	 error	 are	 envisioned	 as	 finite,	 and	 are	 thus	 the	responsibility	of	individuals	and	not	society	as	a	whole.	By	 the	 late	 nineteenth	 century,	 Ewald	 suggests,	 notions	 of	 risk,	 and	 its	management,	began	to	enter	into	the	daily	lives	of	individuals,	spurned	by	a	form	of	solidarity	 in	 response	 to	 common	 workplace	 accidents,	 where	 faults	 were	considered	“less	as	individual	than	organizational”	(Ewald	2002,	p.	281).	Individuals	came	 to	 be	 viewed	 as	 links	 in	 a	 technical	 system,	 more	 than	 free	 agents.	Compensation	through	insurance	provided	a	safety	net	for	workers,	and	minimizing	the	 likelihood	 of	 harm	 became	 a	 preoccupation	 for	 employers.	 Advances	 in	insurance	risk,	in	turn,	elevated	the	science	of	statistics,	permitting	the	future	to	be	known	more	 and	more	 through	 the	medium	of	 probability.	 In	 this	 context,	 Ewald	suggests,	the	notion	of	prevention	replaced	that	of	providence,	becoming	a	staple	of	modern	society,	where	prevention,	“presupposed	science,	technical	control,	the	idea	of	 possible	 understanding,	 and	 objective	 measurement	 of	 risks”	 (ibid,	 p.	 282).	Throughout	the	twentieth	century,	faith	in	the	mastery	of	science	over	uncertainty	grew	exponentially,	tied	to	perceptions	of	a	“scientific	utopia	ever	more	capable	of	controlling	risks”	(ibid.).	In	this	fashion,	Ewald	describes	an	expanding	realm	within	which	technologies	of	risk	became	the	preferred	tool	for	dealing	with	all	manner	of	
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potential	hazard,	 from	‘occupational	hazard’	to	 ‘social	risk’	 to	 ‘environmental	risk’;	up	to	the	perceived	limits	of	Beck’s	‘society	of	risk’	(Ewald	2000).		 However,	 by	 the	 end	 of	 the	 1970s,	 Ewald	 (2000)	 suggests,	 environmental	concerns	 began	 to	 suggest	 a	 future	 not	 only	 populated	 by	 localized	 accidents	 but	also	by	the	possibility	of	global	catastrophes.	At	this	point,	a	risk	calculus	intended	for	the	valuation	of	finite	harms	that	can	be	reasonably	predicted	and	their	impact	mitigated	appeared	to	reach	its	limits.	In	this	context,	Ewald	(2002,	p.	292)	suggests,	the	utopian	ideal	of	‘preventable	risk’,	where	decisions	can	be	made	based	on	what	is	more	or	 less	probable	or	 improbable,	gave	way	 to	precaution,	where	 “decisions	must	be	made	by	reason	of	and	in	the	context	of	scientific	uncertainty.”	Precaution,	then,	is	said	to	mark	the	limits	of	risk	(or,	more	precisely,	technologies	of	risk)	and	its	 perceived	 capacity	 to	 render	 the	 future	 knowable,	 “[returning]	 us	 to	 an	epistemology	of	the	relativity	of	scientific	knowledge”	(ibid,	p.	288).	For	Ewald,	this	suggests	 the	 possibility	 of	 “a	 risk	 beyond	 risk”,	 for	which	 one	 does	 not	 have,	 and	cannot	have,	the	“knowledge	or	the	measure”	(ibid,	p.	294).	Yet,	far	from	collapsing	the	 enterprise	 of	 prudence,	 due	 to	 insufficient	 knowledge	 about	 the	 future,	 such	extreme	uncertainty	is	said	to	call	 for	even	greater	caution,	which,	 if	 fully	realized,	imagines	 the	 worst-case	 scenario	 or	 “worst	 imaginable	 accident”	 (Dean	 1999,	 p.	183)	and	prepares	for	that	contingency	(Cooper	2006;	Furedi	2009).	 In	this	sense,	precaution	invites	a	new	form	of	responsibility	in	the	face	of	unforeseeable	hazards.	Unlike	 the	 responsibility	 imposed	by	providence	 in	 the	nineteenth	 century,	which	responded	 to	 finite	 damages	 facing	 individuals,	 the	 responsibility	 imposed	 by	precaution	 is	 total,	 as	 the	 potential	 damages	 are	 assumed	 to	 be	 irreversible	 and	global.	 In	 those	 cases	where	 the	 logic	of	precaution	 is	believed	 to	be	 justified,	 the	only	acceptable	outcome	or	event	is	no	event	at	all,	as	its	potential	costs	cannot	be	borne	by	society,	and	thus	the	event	must	be	pre-empted.		
2.4.2	Configurations	of	risk	and	uncertainty	Although	 Ewald’s	 three	 ‘faces	 of	 prudence’	 offer	 a	 useful	 schematic	 for	 thinking	about	different	approaches	to	decision-making	in	the	face	of	uncertainty,	there	is	a	
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risk	 in	drawing	 too	 sharp	 a	distinction	between	 them,	 as	well	 as	 in	 limiting	 one’s	analysis	of	risk	to	these	modes	of	decision-making,	as	there	are	no	such	constraints	on	risk	management	in	practice.	In	practice,	O’Malley	(2004,	p.	7)	argues,	managing	risk	takes	on	diverse	and	heterogeneous	forms	that	are	“constantly	being	tinkered	with,	 re-imagined,	 reinvented,	 [and]	 ‘improved’”.	 For	 example,	 in	 the	 case	 of	‘catastrophe	 insurance’,	 speculative	 and	 probabilistic	 techniques	 are	 increasingly	developed	 and	 deployed	 side-by-side	 (Ericson	 and	 Doyle	 2004;	 O’Malley	 2004).	Therefore,	while	 Ewald	 (2000,	 p.	 296)	 acknowledges	 (as	 noted	 above)	 that	 there	exists	space	for	providence,	prevention	and	precaution,	his	suggestion	that	they	be	kept	 separate,	 respecting	 “their	 spheres	 of	 influence	 and	 jurisdiction”,	 is	 not	something	that	can	necessarily	be	achieved	in	practice,	as	governing	through	risk	(in	any	given	context)	is	likely	to	be	irreducible	to	a	discrete	technique	(say	prevention	or	 precaution).	 Instead,	 it	 is	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 made	 up	 of	 multiple	 ways	 of	responding	to	the	problem	at	hand.	Therefore,	O’Malley	(2004,	p.	24)	suggests,	it	is	both	more	practical,	and	more	reasonable,	 to	“envision	governmental	 technologies	in	 terms	of	 variable	 configurations,	 assemblages	or	 ensembles	of	 elements,	 rather	than	 as	 fixed	 types”.20	 Accordingly,	 O’Malley	 (ibid.)	 proposes	 thinking	 in	 terms	 of	specific	 ‘configurations’	 of	 risk	 and	 uncertainty,	 which	 leaves	 room	 for	 ‘hybrid’	forms	of	risk	and	risk	management.	This	 thinking,	 in	 turn,	permits	an	 ‘analytics	of	government’	 that	 allows	meaningful	 distinctions	 to	 be	made	 between	 (calculable)	risk	and	(incalculable)	uncertainty	without	requiring	that	complex	assemblages	be	reduced	to	either	‘objective’	or	‘speculative’	modes	of	government.	More	than	the	differences	between	providence,	prevention	and	precaution,	it	is	their	similarities	that	are	most	suggestive	of	their	shared	capacity	to	enable	action	in	anticipation	of	potential	harm.	That	is,	irrespective	of	whether	future	events	are	imagined	 as	 calculable	 or	 incalculable,	 amenable	 to	 prevention	 or	 merely	precaution,	each	attitude	towards	uncertainty,	as	well	as	the	various	‘technologies	of	risk’	 and	 ‘uncertain	 techniques’	 it	 is	 bound	 up	with,	 is	 concerned	with	 governing																																																									
20 An observation that is closely echoed by Dean (1999, p. 178), when he suggests that 
risk should be “analyzed as a component of assemblages of practices, techniques and 
rationalities concerned with how we govern”. 
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through	“reasoned	estimation	of	an	indeterminate	future”	(O’Malley	2004,	p.	6).	The	significance	 of	 this	 observation	 should	 not	 be	 underestimated.	 The	 reason	 being,	much	 of	 the	 recent	 critique	 of	 contemporary	 risk	 management	 implies	 that	precautionary	risk	signals	a	departure	from	statistical	forms	of	risk	assessment,	and,	in	 turn,	 a	 departure	 from	 meaningful	 forms	 of	 risk	 management.	 This	 is	 most	evidently	 reflected	 in	 the	 work	 of	 ‘risk	 society’	 theorists,	 who	 claim	 that	 we	 are	presently	 living	 in	 an	 era	 of	 ‘post-risk-calculation’,21	 but	 also,	 as	 O’Malley	 (2004)	points	out,	 it	 appears,	 albeit	 less	 frequently	and	 to	a	 lesser	degree,	 in	 the	work	of	some	 governmentality	 theorists,	 including	Ewald,	 in	 as	much	 as	 they	 suggest	 that	there	exist	discrete	cases	of	catastrophic	risk	that	are	similarly	beyond	calculation	and	control.	Yet,	as	noted	previously,	while	it	is	certainly	true	that	there	exist	cases	that	 do	 not	 lend	 themselves	 to	 the	 probabilistic	 model	 of	 ‘informed’	 decision-making,	this	is	not	to	say	that	decisions	about	such	cases	are	not	‘informed’,	merely	that	 they	 are	 informed	 by	 other	metrics,	 such	 as	 “experienced	 judgment,	 shrewd	guess	work,	rules	of	thumb,	analogies,	and	so	forth”	(O’Malley	2004,	p.	13).		Of	course,	whether	such	alternative	(that	is,	non-probabilistic)	approaches	to	risk	management	will	 ‘work’	–	capturing	a	 ‘true’	picture	of	future	realities	that	can	be	responded	to	in	‘successful’	ways	–	is	another	question,	but	a	question	for	which,	O’Malley	(2004)	argues,	sociologists	are	not	best	suited	to	answer.	For	the	purposes	of	 a	 governmental	 analysis	 of	 risk,	 he	 suggests,	 it	 is	 enough	 to	 acknowledge	 that	there	exist	diverse	ways	of	imagining	the	future,	all	of	which	inform	decisions	in	the	present,	 and	 all	 of	 which	 can	 claim	 (in	 their	 own	 right)	 to	 be	 legitimate	 ways	 of	doing	so.	The	challenge,	then,	is	not	to	correctly	discern	the	‘best’	way	to	govern,	but	to	acknowledge	those	ways	in	which	such	diverse	problems	as	climate	change	and	terrorism	 are	 already	 being	 governed	 (ibid.).	 Indeed,	 even	 in	 the	 case	 of	‘precautionary	risk’,	often	portrayed	as	beyond	‘rational’	response,	there	exists	the	possibility	 of	 highly	 specific	 forms	 of	measurement	 and	 intervention.	 After	 all,	 as	O’Malley	 (ibid.)	 points	 out,	 precautionary	 responses	 are	 responses	 to	 those																																																									
21 See Dean (1999, p. 182) for a more extensive critique of Beck’s methodological 
approach to risk, which he suggests reflects the ontological belief that “real riskiness has 
increased so much that it has outrun the mechanisms for its calculation and control”. 
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imaginable	catastrophes	that	would	seem	to	be	beyond	compensation.	In	each	case,	it	should	be	recalled,	anticipations	of	the	future	can	only	exist	as	representations,	as	imperfect	 as	 these	may	 be.	 It	 should	 also	 be	 noted	 that	 precaution	 does	 not	 only	motivate	inactivity,	as	often	suggested,	but	it	can	equally	motivate,	as	the	sociologist	Melinda	 Cooper	 (2006)	 argues	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 threat	 of	 terrorism,	 rigorous	action	 in	 the	 form	of	 counter-proliferation,	 surveillance,	 emergency	preparedness,	and	alike.22	In	brief,	risk,	either	‘objective’	or	‘speculative’,	statistically	calculated	or	discerned	 through	crude	estimation,	 informs	prudential	practices.	 It	 is,	 in	 turn,	by	way	of	attending	to	these	practices	that	one	is	provided	with	evidence	of	how	risk,	in	specific	contexts,	is	applied	to	the	management	of	specific	problems.	
	
2.4.3	The	management	of	regulation	In	 an	 effort	 to	 situate	 ‘risk	 management’	 more	 concretely	 in	 the	 context	 of	‘regulatory	governance’,	additional	historical	context	 is	valuable.	Specifically,	 since	the	1980s,	 largely	 “in	 response	 to	 criticisms	about	 the	 emergence	of	 the	 so-called	‘regulatory	state’	and	corresponding	concerns	about	over-regulation	and	‘burdening	industry’”	(Hutter	2005,	p.	1),23	‘risk-based’	frameworks	have	come	to	be	favored	by	regulators	and	applied	 to	an	ever-larger	array	of	 regulatory	activity	 (Hutter	2005;	Black	2010;	Fisher	2010;	Graham	2010).	Characteristic	of	the	so-called	‘new	public	management’,	the	use	of	‘risk-based	tools’	–	especially	‘quantitative	risk	assessment’	(Bounds	2010)	–	are	intended	to	reflect	‘styles	of	management’	visible	in	the	private	sector,	 including	 greater	 attention	 to	 reducing	 “the	 costs	 of	 regulation”	 (Hutter	2005,	 p.	 1).	 Holding	 the	 promise	 of	 enhanced	 ‘objectivity’	 and	 improved	‘transparency’,	 risk-based	 frameworks	 suggest	 both	 the	 possibility	 of	 greater	regulatory	 efficiency,	 and	 offer	 regulators	 a	 means	 of	 providing	 a	 more	 explicit	accounting	of	 their	decision-making	activities	 in	 the	hope	of	 averting	 criticism	 for	doing	too	little	(type	1	errors)	or	too	much	(type	2	errors)	to	regulate	(Hutter	2005;																																																									
22 See, also, Aradau and van Munster (2007, 2008) and Furedi (2009). 
23 Hutter’s (2005, p. 1) analysis primarily focuses on the so-called ‘regulatory crisis’ in 
the UK context, but also underlines comparable developments in the US under Regan, as 
well as other “advanced industrialized societies” during the 1980s/1990s.  
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Black	2010;	Bounds	2010;	Majone	2010).	At	the	same	time,	the	vocabulary	of	‘risk’,	‘risk	 assessment’	 and	 ‘risk	 management’,	 as	 well	 as	 other	 ‘risk	 regulatory	concepts’,24	has	become	(especially	within	the	last	ten	years)	a	“central	[feature]	of	administrative	decision	making”	 (Fisher	2010,	 p.	 46),	 lending	 “a	 sense	 of	 strategy	and	control”	(Black	2010,	p.	188)	to	regulatory	activity.	In	this	manner,	the	adoption	of	risk-based	frameworks	(including	the	language	they	are	bound	up	with)	has	come	to	be	“seen	as	a	functionally	efficient	tool”	(ibid,	p.	190)	and,	in	many	ways,	“a	badge	of	legitimacy”	(ibid,	p.	189)	(see,	also,	Hutter	2005;	Fisher	2010).	Coupled	 with	 the	 adoption	 of	 risk-based	 frameworks	 to	 enhance	 the	efficiency	 of	 regulatory	 activity	 (and	 to	 limit	 the	 ‘reputational’	 risks	 to	 regulators	stemming	from	regulatory	failures),	the	reforms	of	the	1980s	also	contributed	to	the	“decentring	of	the	state”	to	include	a	much	wider	variety	of	actors	and	organizations	in	regulatory	processes	(Hutter	2005,	p.	3).	Indeed,	as	Rhodes	suggests:	“[T]here	 is	 no	 longer	 a	 single	 sovereign	 authority.	 In	 its	 place,	 there	 is	 the	multiplicity	 of	 actors	 specific	 to	 each	 policy	 area;	 interdependence	 among	these	 social-political-administrative	 actors;	 shared	 goals;	 blurred	 boundaries	between	public,	private	and	voluntary	sectors;	and	multiplying	and	new	forms	of	action,	intervention	and	control.”	(1996,	p.	658)	In	 other	 words,	 regulation	 has	 become	 ‘fragmented’	 (Hutter	 2005).	 Significantly,	this	transition	–	from	state	sovereignty	to	a	multiplicity	of	“systems	of	rule”	(Bunton	and	Peterson	2005,	p.	4)	–	is	said	to	coincide	with	the	emergence	of	‘governance’,	a	concept	 that	 is	 often	 defined	 as	 a	mode	 of	 governing	 that	 is	 primarily	 shaped	 by	decentralized	networks	of	sub-national,	national	and	international	organizations,	as	opposed	to	centralized	government	authorities	(Rhodes	1996).			 More	broadly,	 ‘governance’	has	been	defined	as	“‘the	prevailing	patterns	by	which	public	power	is	exercised	in	a	given	social	context’”	(Jenkins	2002,	p.	485,	as	citied	 in	 Corbridge	 et	 al.	 2005,	 p.	 153).	 With	 a	 view	 to	 this	 more	 general																																																									
24 Included under the rubric of ‘risk regulatory concepts’, Fisher (2010, p. 48) suggests, 
“are not only concepts of risk, risk management, and risk assessment but associated 
concepts such as comparative risk analysis, the precautionary principle, risk 
communication, security, uncertainty and hazard.” 
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understanding	of	 ‘governance’,	 it	 is	possible	 to	shed	 light	not	only	on	 the	range	of	actors	 and	 organizations	 engaged	 in	 regulatory	 activity,	 but	 also	 on	 the	 changing	role	of	regulatory	authorities	in	orienting	risk	management	processes.	In	particular,	it	 is	 often	 suggested	 that	 the	 role	 of	 the	 state	 has	 shifted	 towards	 facilitating	 risk	management	 through	 ‘indirect	 action’	 –	 governing	 ‘at	 a	 distance’	 or	 “steering	 and	regulating	 rather	 than	 rowing	 and	 providing”	 (Rose	 2000,	 p.	 324).	 Manifest	 in	 a	growing	 number	 of	 formal	 guidelines	 and	 visionary	 documents	 outlining	 ‘risk	assessment’	 and	 ‘risk	 management’	 procedures,	 the	 production	 of	 prescriptive	guidance	 offers	 a	 new	 mechanism	 for	 shaping	 regulation	 (Power	 2007;	 Graham	2010).	Promising	greater	efficiency,	it	is	through	such	indirect	action	that	regulatory	authorities	 seek	 to	 empower	 an	 expanding	 array	 of	 governmental	 actors	 and	organizations,	 including	 private	 enterprise	 and	 individuals,	 to	 play	 a	more	 active	role	 in	managing	 risk	 (Rose	 2000;	 Fisher	 2010).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 it	 promises	 to	shift	 much	 of	 the	 responsibility	 for	 risk	 management	 (and	 potential	 blame	 for	perceived	failures)	to	a	new	constellation	of	actors	and	organizations.			 For	 some	 risk	 scholars,	 the	 emergence	 of	 ‘governance’	 (as	 opposed	 to	‘government’,	as	the	word	is	typically	conceived	in	policy	arenas)	 is	 indicative	of	a	new	type	of	governmentally,	one	that	“reflects	a	regulatory	preference	for	 indirect	action	and	influence	by	prescribing	frameworks	and	principles	and	by	enrolling	self-regulating	 resources”	 (Power	 2007,	 p.	 37).	 Indeed,	 by	 some	 accounts	 (ibid.),	attention	 to	 the	 ‘management	of	 regulation’	–	 the	 ‘control	of	 control’	 –	has	 largely	displaced	 the	need	 for	direct	 action	on	behalf	 of	 regulatory	 authorities.	 For	 some,	this	 transformation	 is	 said	 to	 be	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 ‘risk-based	 regulation’	 (ibid.).	Described	 by	 Michael	 Power	 as	 “governance	 of	 the	 risk	 assessment	 and	 risk	management	process”	(ibid,	p.	19),	this	so-called	“‘managerial	turn’”	(ibid,	p.	36)	is	said	to	mark	“the	extension	of	risk	as	an	organizing	category	…	to	the	management	process	 itself”	 (ibid,	 p.	 156).	 Consequently,	 in	 light	 of	 a	 greater	 accent	 on	management	and	“the	rational	design	of	the	risk	management	process”	(ibid,	p.	28),	Power	 suggests,	 “the	 distinction	 between	 regulating	 and	 managing	 has	 become	blurred”	(ibid,	p.	192).	To	the	extent	 that	a	managerial	approach	to	regulation	has	come	 to	 replace	 (some)	 of	 the	 ‘risk-based	 tools’	 (Hutter	 2005)	 familiar	 to	 ‘risk	
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analysis’,	“[a]	cultural	‘trust	in	numbers’”	is	said	to	“have	given	way	to	an	emphasis	on	systems	and	processes	to	define	governance”	(Power	2007,	p.	178).	
	 While	 there	 are	 other	 aspects	 of	 ‘risk-based	 governance’	 that	 could	 be	explored	 here,	 including	 trends	 in	 ‘upstreaming’	 citizen	 engagement	 (see,	 for	example,	Wilsdon	2004;	Tait	2009),	my	 intention	 is	simply	 to	underline	 that	 ‘risk-based’	approaches,	while	diverse,	also	reflect	rationalities25	that	are	characteristic	of	contemporary	 forms	of	 government.	Moreover,	 it	 tends	 to	be	with	a	view	 to	 ‘risk’	and	 ‘risk	 management’	 that	 much	 regulatory	 activity	 is	 currently	 framed.	 At	 the	same	 time,	 to	 what	 extent	 individual	 ‘risk	 regulation	 regimes’	 or	 ‘regimes	 of	government’	 prescribe	 to	 the	 technical	 ideal	 of	 ‘risk	 analysis’,	 or	 whether	 the	language	 of	 ‘risk’	 and	 ‘risk	 management’	 is	 intended	 to	 play	 a	 more	 rhetorical	function,	is	highly	variable.	As	Hutter	(2005,	p.	4)	suggests,	a	key	factor	influencing	the	 degree	 of	 adherence	 to	 a	 ‘risk-based’	 approach	 to	 regulation	 is	 the	 degree	 of	“buy-in	to	the	risk	philosophy”.	In	any	case,	just	as	risk	assessment,	in	practice,	does	not	ascribe	 to	an	absolute	standard,	 it	 is	perhaps	more	appropriate	 to	 forgo	strict	classifications	of	regulatory	activity,	given	that	pure	‘types’	rarely	represent	reality.	Indeed,	 in	any	given	context,	and	especially	 in	the	context	of	science	policymaking	(as	discussed	earlier),	risk	regulation	exists	as	a	hybrid	activity,	one	that	combines	formal	modes	of	calculation	with	various	degrees	of	rhetorical	structuring	intended	to	lend	a	sense	of	objectivity	and	control	to	an	uncertain	future.	
	
2.4.4	Risk	regulation	regimes	Ultimately,	 key	 to	 understanding	 the	 diversity	 of	 ways	 in	 which	 various	governmental	actors	and	organizations	‘handle’	or	 ‘manage’	risk	is	to	acknowledge	that	 risk	 is,	 above	 all,	 ‘contingent’	 or	 ‘context-dependent’	 (Jasanoff	 1993).	 That	 is,	“what	 people	 claim	 to	 know	 about	 risk	 is	 …	 constructed	 in	 different	 ways	 in	different	 political	 and	 cultural	 settings”	 (ibid,	 p.	 127).	 In	 light	 of	 this	 variability,	Hood	 et	 al.	 (2001,	 p.	 8)	 suggest,	 it	 is	 necessary	 for	 risk	 scholars	 “to	 go	 beyond																																																									
25 Where I take ‘rationality’ to mean “any form of systematic or explicit thinking aimed 
at structuring how things are and how things aught to be” (Dean 1999, p. 11). 
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generalizing	perspectives	like	‘risk	society’	to	a	more	disaggregated	analysis”	of	risk	domains	that	can	vary	widely	 from	one	domain	to	another.	 In	regulatory	contexts,	they	suggest,	it	is	precisely	this	sort	of	variation	that	contributes	to	an	“‘archipelago’	of	 risk	 domains	 …	 with	 very	 different	 policy	 stances”,	 both	 between	 and	 within	countries,	 as	 well	 as	 over	 time	 (ibid,	 p.	 6).	 In	 the	 first	 instance,	 for	 example,	 as	Jasanoff	(1993,	p.	127)	has	shown,	“[c]ountries	as	similar	as	the	United	States	and	Britain	 …	 differ	 markedly	 in	 the	 kinds	 of	 information	 they	 deem	 necessary	 and	sufficient	 to	 establish	 the	 existence	 of	 an	 actionable	 risk.”	 In	 the	 second	 instance,	Hood	et	al.	 (2001,	p.	7)	observe,	considerable	variation	exists	across	risk	domains	within	 countries,	 including	 various	 approaches	 to	 ‘standard-setting’,	 which	 are	characterized	by	different	 ‘cultures’	 of	 risk	 assessment,	 ranging	 from	 ‘cost	 benefit	analysis’	(road	safety)	to	‘quantitative	risk	assessment’	(nuclear	power	plant	safety)	to	“qualitative	‘seat	of	the	pants’	approaches”	(gun	control).	In	 an	effort	 to	 conceptualize	 this	 apparent	diversity,	 and	 to	offer	 “a	way	of	describing,	comparing,	and	explaining”	variations	between	risk	domains,	Hood	et	al.	(2001,	 p.	 8)	 propose	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘risk	 regulation	 regimes’.	 Here,	 “‘[r]egime’	connotes	the	overall	way	risk	 is	regulated	in	a	particular	policy	domain”	(ibid.).	 In	turn,	the	analysis	of	various	risk	regulation	regimes,	they	suggest,	should	center	on	the	forces	that	underpin	how	regimes	function	(how	they	‘work’	or	how	they	‘fail’),	taking	into	consideration	not	only	questions	of	“institutional	geography	and	formal	rules”,	 but	 also	 “the	 range	 of	 risk-assessment	 techniques	 and	 policy-making	approaches”	that	characterize	and	shape	“different	ﬁelds	of	risk	regulation”	(ibid.).	Moving	 beyond	 “macroscopic”	 world-historical	 perspectives	 on	 risk,	 like	 ‘risk	society’,	 “which	 inevitably	 can	 deal	 only	 in	 broad-gauge	 interpretation”	 (ibid,	 14),	this	approach	is	intended	to	“bring	out	variety	that	is	otherwise	hard	to	see”.	In	this	manner,	Hood	et	al.	(ibid,	p.	16)	suggest,	“a	risk	regulation	regime	approach	is	not	just	a	tool	for	analysis	–	a	lens	that	comes	between	the	microscope	and	the	telescope	–	but	also	a	challenge	for	explanation	of	observed	variety.”	Variation	 between	 risk	 domains,	 Hood	 et	 al.	 (2001)	 argue,	 contributes	 to	different	regime	‘anatomies’,	which	can	broadly	be	conceived	along	two	dimensions.	The	first	dimension,	they	suggest,	is	comprised	of	“three	components	that	form	the	
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basis	of	any	control	system	–	that	is,	ways	of	gathering	information,	ways	of	setting	standards,	goals,	or	targets,	and	ways	of	changing	behaviour	to	meet	the	standards	or	targets”	(ibid,	p.	21).	The	second	dimension,	 they	suggest,	 is	defined	by	 ‘regime	context’	 and	 ‘regime	 content’.	 In	 the	 first	 instance,	 ‘regime	 context’	 refers	 to	 “the	backdrop	of	regulation,	comprising,	for	example,	the	intrinsic	characteristics	of	the	problem	 it	 addresses,	 public	 and	media	 attitudes	 about	 it,	 and	 the	way	 power	 or	inﬂuence	is	concentrated	in	organized	groups”	(ibid,	p.	28).	In	the	second	instance,	‘regime	 content’	 refers	 to	 specific	 “regulatory	 objectives,	 the	 way	 regulatory	responsibilities	 are	 organized,	 and	 operating	 styles	 of	 regulators”	 (ibid.).	Significantly,	Hood	et	al.	(ibid.)	argue,	these	components	(among	others)	shape	the	‘space’	 within	 which	 risk	 regulation	 operates,	 influencing	 policy	 design.	 In	particular,	 the	 authors	 make	 a	 strong	 case	 for	 the	 effect	 of	 ‘regime	 context’	 on	‘regime	 content’,	 drawing	 attention	 to	 the	 “‘inner	 lives’	 of	 regulatory	 regimes,”	including	 “the	 attitudes,	 beliefs,	 and	 conventions	 of	 the	 various	 technocratic	 and	bureaucratic	‘tribes’	in	the	regulatory	machine”		(ibid,	p.	18).	Having	at	its	foundation	an	interest	in	examining	the	multiplicity	of	ways	in	which	regulation	is	conducted	in	different	political	and	cultural	settings,	the	concept	of	 ‘risk	regulation	regimes’	aligns	well	with	a	governmental	approach	 to	risk.	Like	the	 regime	 approach,	 an	 ‘analytics	 of	 government’	 rejects	 totalizing	 assumptions	about	risk	in	contemporary	life,	endeavoring	instead	to	shed	light	on	the	particular	mentalities	of	government	and	administration	 that	are	brought	 to	bear	on	various	social	 problems	 so	 that	 they	 might	 be	 governed	 (Dean	 1999).	 In	 this	 context,	Mitchell	Dean	(ibid,	p.	178)	suggests,	 risk	 is	 conceived	as	a	 “calculative	rationality	that	is	tethered	to	assorted	techniques	for	the	regulation,	management	and	shaping	of	 human	 conduct	 in	 the	 service	 of	 specific	 ends”.	More	 precisely,	 an	 ‘analytics	 of	government’	 “is	 concerned	 with	 the	 means	 of	 calculation,	 both	 qualitative	 and	quantitative,	 the	 type	 of	 governing	 authority	 or	 agency,	 the	 forms	 of	 knowledge,	techniques	 and	 other	 means	 employed,	 the	 entity	 to	 be	 governed	 and	 how	 it	 is	conceived,	the	ends	sought	and	the	outcomes	and	consequences”	(ibid,	p.	11).		Taken	together,	these	perspectives	on	risk	and	its	management	offer	a	more	differentiated	 view	 of	 ‘risk	 regulation’,	 which	 serves	 to	 “underscore	 the	 fact	 that	
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knowledge	about	risk	 is	produced	 to	serve	different	 functions	and	under	different	constraints	 across	 political	 and	 cultural	 boundaries”	 (Jasanoff	 1993,	 p.	 127).	Moreover,	as	a	method	of	inquiry,	focusing	on	‘risk	regulation	regimes’	or	‘regimes	of	government’	helps	mark	out	space	“to	ask	questions	about	government,	authority	and	 power,	 without	 attempting	 to	 formulate	 a	 set	 of	 general	 principles	 by	which	various	forms	of	the	‘conduct	of	conduct’	could	be	reformed”	(Dean	1999,	p.	36).	In	turn,	 this	perspective	offers	risk	scholars	a	means	of	accounting	 for	variety	across	risk	domains	and	offers	insight	into	how	various	sites	or	regulatory	activity	function	in	 practice.	 In	 particular,	 it	 sheds	 light	 on	 the	 “means,	 mechanisms,	 procedures,	instruments,	tactics,	techniques,	technologies	and	vocabularies”	whereby	“authority	is	constituted	and	rule	accomplished”	(ibid,	p.	31),	as	well	as	the	overall	way	risk	is	handled	in	various	political	and	cultural	settings	(Hood	et	al.	2001).			
2.5	Conclusion	As	 the	 preceding	 discussion	 underlines,	 there	 is	 no	 singular	 type	 of	 risk,	 no	prescribed	mode	of	risk	measurement,	and,	 indeed,	no	necessary	or	best	response	to	an	uncertain	 future	event.	Rather,	 risk-based	government	 is	plural,	defined	and	constrained	not	only	by	the	technical	limitations	of	risk	technologies,	but	also	by	the	normative	 context	within	which	 these	 technologies	are	deployed	 (Fearnley	2008).	The	 challenge,	 then,	 as	 a	 researcher,	 is	 to	 attend	 to	 the	 context-specific	 practices	deployed	 in	 the	 name	 of	 managing	 uncertainty,	 without	 presupposing	 a	 general	category	 of	 risk	 that	 pervades	 modern	 life	 and	 that	 limits	 the	 scope	 of	 possible	responses	available	to	society.	Conceiving	of	risk	as	a	‘governmental	rationality’	can	help	 fulfill	 the	 former	objective	while	helping	avoid	 the	 latter.	This	 is	because	 this	approach	to	risk	takes	as	its	primary	site	of	analysis	the	pragmatic	interventions	of	diverse	 governmental	 actors	 and	 organizations,	 and	 thus	 conceives	 of	 risk	 in	 the	plural,	 and	 rejects	 totalizing	 prescriptions	 for	 change	 or	 reform	 (Dean	 1999).	 An	‘analytics	of	government’,	and	a	complimentary	‘risk	regulation	regime’	approach,	in	turn,	not	only	informs	risk	theory,	but	also	serves	as	an	analytical	framework	for	the	study	 of	 risk,	 helping	 guide	 where	 one	 looks	 for	 data,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 kinds	 of	
	 65	
questions	one	seeks	to	ask	of	that	data.	In	particular,	an	analytics	of	government	is	concerned	 with	 the	 ‘how’s’	 of	 governing,	 attending	 to	 the	 specific	 and	 not	 the	general;	 informing	 a	 consistent	 line	 of	 questioning	 that	 is	 geared	 toward	 how	‘regimes	of	practices’	or	‘regimes	of	government’	operate	(ibid.).		Drawing	 on	 this	 conceptual	 and	 analytical	 foundation,	my	 thesis	 pursues	 a	similar	 line	 of	 questioning	 and	 argumentation.	That	 is,	 it	 endeavors	 to	 investigate	the	discursive	and	non-discursive	practices	presently	enacted	by	diverse	scientific	and	technical	experts	engaged	in	selecting,	assessing	and	managing	the	risk	aspects	of	 synthetic	 biology	 in	 pursuit	 of	 a	 ‘secure’	 and	 ‘sustainable’	 science.	 Thus,	 my	primary	 research	 questions	 ask:	 How	 is	 synthetic	 biology	 understood	 and	represented	 as	 a	 ‘biosecurity	 problem’?	How	 is	 this	 problem	 rendered	 ‘knowable’	and	 ‘calculable’	 through	 risk	 assessment	 techniques?	 What	 risk	 management	strategies	 are	 proposed	 to	mitigate	 these	 risks,	 and	 how	 are	 these	 justified?	 And,	finally,	what	 forms	 of	 ‘risk	 responsibility’	 do	 these	 strategies	 seek	 to	 engender	 in	synthetic	biologists,	and	to	what	effect?	These	questions	are	intended	to	shed	light,	not	only	on	the	calculative	techniques	whereby	problematic	people	and	things	are	made	the	subjects	of	risk	management,	but	also	on	the	normative	and	performative	dimensions	 of	 ‘governing	 through	 risk’	 in	 the	 context	 of	 synthetic	 biology.	 In	 this	manner,	this	research	seeks	to	open	up	space	for	critical	reflection	on	the	kinds	of	risks	synthetic	biology	and	synthetic	biologists	are	taken	to	be,	how	these	risks	are	assessed	 and	 managed	 through	 risk-based	 techniques,	 and	 the	 kinds	 of	 risk	responsibility	 these	 seek	 to	 engender	 in	 those	 engaged	 in	 various	 aspects	 of	 the	science	and	its	management.	Before	pursuing	these	lines	of	enquiry,	in	the	following	chapter	I	will	provide	a	brief	overview	of	the	research	process	and	methods	used	to	investigate	the	‘risk	regulation	regime’	examined	in	my	thesis.		
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3.	Methodology	
	
3.1	Introduction	The	case	of	 ‘risk	management’	examined	 in	my	thesis	centers	on	a	 ‘risk	regulation	regime’	 (Hood	 et	 al.	 2001)	 presently	 orienting	 regulatory	 efforts	 directed	 at	synthetic	 biology.	 More	 precisely,	 it	 examines	 how	 a	 “constellation	 of	 experts”	(Rabinow	2008,	p.	279)	committed	to	advancing	 ‘biosecurity	policy’26	–	existing	at	the	 interface	 of	 ‘science’	 and	 ‘security’	 policy	 (McLeish	 and	 Nightingale	 2007)	 –	attempt	to	reconfigure	seemingly	 ‘incalculable	uncertainties’	as	 ‘calculable	risks’	 in	pursuit	 of	 a	 ‘secure’	 and	 ‘sustainable’	 science.	 Informed	 by	 the	 work	 of	 theorists	introduced	in	the	previous	chapter,	the	motivation	for	my	thesis	derives	less	from	a	pre-existing	commitment	to	a	particular	theoretical	approach	or	paradigm	and	more	from	a	practical,	 albeit	 significant,	 observation	made	at	 the	outset	 of	 the	 research	process.	Namely,	synthetic	biology	has,	within	the	last	ten	years,	not	only	emerged	as	an	exemplar	of	so-called	‘dual-use	biotechnology’,	but	also	as	a	site	of	regulatory	activity	characterized	by	the	belief	that	even	the	most	uncertain	‘risks’	(in	this	case,	an	 act	 of	 ‘bioterrorism’)	 can	 be	 made	 the	 subject	 of	 practical	 intervention	 and	control.	 In	 this	 context,	 an	 ‘analytics	of	 government’	provides	a	 suitable	 analytical	framework	for	my	thesis,	as	well	as	a	basis	for	my	research	design.27	As	 introduced	 in	the	previous	chapter,	an	 ‘analytics	of	government’	enables	researchers	 to	 approach	 questions	 about	 risk	 with	 a	 view	 to	 how	 ‘regimes	 of																																																									
26 While I will further explore (both within this chapter and elsewhere in my thesis) the 
nature of ‘biosecurity policy’, the US NIH’s ‘Office of Science Policy Biosecurity 
Program’ characterizes this activity as: “the development of policies addressing life 
sciences research that yields information or technologies with the potential to be misused 
to threaten public health or national security”, as well as “policies for the responsible 
conduct and oversight of life sciences research” (http://osp.od.nih.gov/office-
biotechnology-activities/biosecurity). In this light, ‘biosecurity policy’ might be thought 
of as a form of ‘science policy’ or ‘regulatory science’ (discussed in the previous chapter) 
with an accent on the ‘national security’ aspects of modern biology. 
27 ‘Research design’ can broadly be defined as: ‘a plan for collecting and analyzing 
evidence that is used to investigate and answer a specified set of research questions’ 
(adapted from Ragin 1994, p. 191, cited in Flick 2004, p. 146). 
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practices’	 of	 ‘regimes	 of	 government’	 operate,	 prioritizing	 ‘how’	 questions	 (Dean	1999).	Rejecting	totalizing	assumptions	about	risk,	this	approach	does	not	attempt	to	seek	answers	about	the	‘best’	way	to	govern,	but	instead	to	shed	light	on	how,	in	practice,	 various	 governmental	 actors	 and	 organizations	 (transcending	 traditional	notions	 of	 state	 rule)	 render	 disparate	 ‘social	 problems’	 calculable	 and	 actionable	through	 routine	 practices.	 In	 this	 context,	 ‘risk’	 is	 conceived	 as	 a	 ‘calculative	rationality’,	and	as	a	 ‘mode	of	governing’,	that	is	continually	adapted	and	deployed	to	 achieve	 specific	 goals.	 In	 turn,	 an	 ‘analytics	 of	 government’	 seeks	 to	mark	 out	space	 for	critical	 reflection	about	how	regimes	operate	–	characterized	by	specific	‘techniques’	and	‘mentalities’	of	government	–	and,	ultimately,	to	shed	light	on	what	is	 at	 stake	 in	 thinking	 and	 acting	 in	 a	 certain	 way	 (ibid.).	 “An	 analytics	 of	government”,	Dean	(ibid,	p.	38)	suggests,	“removes	the	‘naturalness’	and	‘taken-for-granted’	 character	 of	 how	 things	 are	 done”,	 thus	 permitting	 new	 perspectives	 on	how	things	‘aught’	to	be	and	new	possibilities	for	governing	in	the	present.				With	a	view	to	synthetic	biology,	an	‘analytics	of	government’	offers	a	means	of	 investigating	 the	manner	 in	which	an	emerging	 science	 is	 governed	 through	an	assortment	 of	 ‘risk	 assessment	 techniques’	 and	 ‘risk	management	 strategies’	 that	comprise	an	ongoing	‘risk	management	process’.	It	also	underlines	the	need	to	think	critically	 about	what	 sorts	 of	 ‘risks’	 synthetic	 biology	 and	 synthetic	 biologists	 are	taken	 to	 be,	 as	 these	 conceptions	 not	 only	 shape	 regulatory	 design,	 but	 also	 our	collective	understanding	of	modern	biology,	which	is	increasingly	viewed	through	a	lens	of	 ‘biosecurity’.	 In	 turn,	 drawing	 inspiration	 from	studies	 in	 governmentality,	my	 research	methods	 (the	 subject	 of	 this	 chapter)	 describe	 a	 qualitative	 research	project	geared	 towards	understanding	 the	discursive	and	non-discursive	practices	enacted	by	scientific	and	 technical	experts	 (especially	 those	 in	 the	US)	engaged	 in	various	 aspects	 of	 an	 ongoing	 regulatory	 process.	 Combining	 document	 analysis,	semi-structured	 expert	 interviews,	 and	 observations	 in	 the	 field,	 these	 methods	(through	a	process	of	‘triangulation’,	Flick	2004,	pp.	178-183)	were	selected	to	offer	critical	insight	into	how	governmental	actors	and	organizations	represent	–	and,	in	so	doing,	construct	–	a	world	that	can	be	known	and	acted	on.		
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3.2	My	research	design	and	the	research	process	The	 task	 of	 investigating	 an	 emerging	 policy	 debate	 and	 an	 ongoing	 regulatory	process	 is	 challenging.	 It	 is	 challenging	 because	 the	 subject	 matter	 is	 continually	evolving,	 with	 new	 policy	 proposals	 and	 revisions	 to	 existing	 guidelines	 and	regulatory	standards	emerging	(seemingly)	by	the	day.	It	is	also	challenging	because	the	 vocabulary	 and	definitions	used	 to	 characterize	 ‘synthetic	 biology’	 –	 a	 science	that	is	in	the	process	of	being	imagined	–	are	in	a	state	of	flux,	with	each	variation,	evolution	or	revision	variously	characterizing	synthetic	biology	to	something	‘old’	–	‘a	 continuation	 of	 genetic	 engineering	 that	 doesn’t	 really	 require	 exceptional	oversight	 and	 regulation’	 –	 or	 something	 ‘new’	 –	 ‘a	 technology	without	 precedent	that	 requires	 new	 forms	 of	 regulation	 and	more	 intensive	 oversight’.	 Finally,	 it	 is	challenging	because	‘the	experts’	–	the	‘policymakers’	and	‘regulators’	privileged	for	their	 authoritative	 knowledge	 about	 the	 ‘actual’	 risks,	 their	 ‘implications’,	 and	‘technical’	 remedies	 –	 do	 not	 conform	 to	 a	 singular	 ‘type’.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 they	represent	 diverse	 institutions	 in	 different	 organizational	 settings,	 ranging	 from	government	 agencies	 to	 universities,	 biotechnology	 firms	 to	 scientific	 advisory	committees.	 In	brief,	 it	 is	challenging	to	analyze	an	emerging	policy	debate	and	an	ongoing	regulatory	process	because	it	is	fluid	and	delocalized.	In	 light	 of	 this	 dynamic	 and	 distinctly	 heterogeneous	 regulatory	 ‘space’,	 it	was	 evident	 from	 the	outset	 of	my	 research	 that	my	 thesis	would	need	 to	 engage	with	a	range	of	regulatory	activities	 that	are	neither	 limited	 to	a	single	site	nor	 to	the	 actions	 of	 a	 single	 overarching	 regulatory	 authority.	 Rather,	 it	would	 need	 to	respect	 that	 these	 activities	 are	 embedded	 in	 “an	 existing	 regime	 comprised	 of	 a	collection	of	cooperative	and	coercive	national	and	international	control	measures	–	including	 international	 agreements,	 multinational	 organisations,	 national	 and	international	laws,	regulations,	policies,	norms	and	rules”	(McLeish	and	Nightingale	2007,	 p.	 1638).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 it	 was	 equally	 evident	 from	 the	 outset	 of	 my	research	that	concerns	about	the	‘biosecurity	implications’	of	synthetic	biology	(and	biotechnology	 more	 generally)	 are	 especially	 prominent	 in	 the	 United	 States.	Indeed,	since	the	1990s,	and	especially	since	9/11	and	the	subsequent	anthrax	letter	
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attacks,	 US	 regulators	 have	 prioritized	 biosecurity	 as	 a	 core	 component	 of	 life	science	 regulation	 (Rappert	 2003;	 Reppy	 2003;	 McLeish	 and	 Nightingale	 2007;	Collier	 and	 Lakoff	 2008).	 It	 is	 also	 within	 the	 US	 that	 corresponding	 regulatory	reforms	 have	 been	 the	 most	 visible,	 including	 new	 “biosecurity	 controls”	 on	“scientific	 funding,	peer-review,	publication,	 employment,	materials	 transfer,	post-graduate	 teaching,	 international	 travel,	 and	 researchers’	 ability	 to	 construct,	perform	and	disseminate	research”	(McLeish	and	Nightingale	2007,	p.	1635).	With	a	view	to	 these	considerations,	and	having	recently	participated	as	an	observer	 at	 the	 Biological	Weapons	 Convention	 (BWC),28	 I	 was	 fortunate	 to	 have	been	granted	access	to	the	BWC	as	the	primary	site	for	my	fieldwork.	A	multilateral	disarmament	treaty,	the	BWC	has	been	described	as	“[t]he	normative	backbone”	of	“an	 existing	 regime”	 against	 the	 hostile	 use	 of	 modern	 biology	 (McLeish	 and	Nightingale	 2007,	 p.	 1638)	 and	 as	 the	 “premier	 forum	 for	 dealing	with	 biological	threats”.29	Moreover,	 the	BWC	quite	 literally	assembles	a	 ‘constellation	of	experts’	(representing	more	than	170	countries)	at	Geneva’s	Palais	des	Nations	twice	a	year	to	 consider	 various	 policies,	 techniques	 and	 strategies	 for	 controlling	 the	proliferation	 of	 ‘dual-use’	 materials,	 technologies	 and	 knowledge	 relevant	 to	 the	development	 of	 biological	weapons.	Working	 at	 the	 interface	 of	 the	 ‘life	 sciences’	and	‘national	security’,	these	individuals	–	scientific	and	technical	experts	described	by	 some	 (for	 example,	Mukunda	 et	 al.	 2009)	 as	 ‘biosecurity	 authorities’	 –	 share	 a	commitment	 to	 addressing	 the	 ‘biosecurity	 risks’	 associated	with	 advances	 in	 the	life	sciences	and	biotechnology.	In	turn,	it	was	through	my	engagement	with	experts																																																									
28 At an early stage of my PhD, I attended the public sessions of the August 2009 BWC 
Meeting of Experts and the December 2009 BWC Meeting of States Parties. In addition 
to observing the public sessions of these meetings, I attended related side events on 
synthetic biology. The first meeting included a side event on, ‘The Political Implications 
of the Possible De Novo Synthesis of Smallpox’ (presented by the International Security 
and Biopolicy Institute). The second meeting included a side event on, ‘Biosecurity Risks 
and Assessment: Illicit Trafficking, Intangible Transfers of Knowledge, Biotechnological 
Advances’ (presented by UNICRI). 
29 This statement was made by Ellen Tauscher, former Under Secretary for Arms Control 
and International Security, during an address to the Annual Meeting of the States Parties 
to the Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, Switzerland, 9 December 2009, full 
statement available at: http://www.state.gov/t/us/133335.htm. 
	 70	
at	 the	 BWC,	 and	 especially	 with	 members	 of	 the	 US	 delegation	 (representing	multiple	federal	departments,	government	agencies	and	affiliated	institutions),	that	I	 was	 granted	 an	 opportunity	 to	 gain	 insight	 and	 proximity	 to	 a	 variegated	regulatory	space	that	is	not	easily	accessible	from	the	outside.		In	 addition	 to	 this	 fieldwork,	 which	 included	 a	 series	 of	 semi-structured	expert	 interviews	 and	 observations	 at	 the	 BWC	 and	 several	 smaller	 biosecurity	policy	 forums,	 my	 research	 equally	 drew	 on	 an	 extensive	 phase	 of	 document	analysis.	 In	 particular,	 it	 drew	 on	 policy-oriented	 documents	 (see,	 for	 example,	NSABB	 2006;	 Garfinkel	 et	 al.	 2007;	 Mukunda	 et	 al.	 2009)	 characterizing	 the	‘synthetic	 biology	 threat’	 and	 presenting	 various	 ‘governance	 options’	 for	 its	‘management’.	 In	 the	 US	 context,	 in	 particular,	 documents	 of	 this	 kind	 have	proliferated	 in	 recent	 years,	 as	 regulatory	 authorities	 have	 sought	 guidance	 from	scientific	and	technical	experts	perceived	to	possess	relevant	knowledge	in	various	aspects	 of	 ‘synthetic	 biology’	 and	 ‘biosecurity’.	 Analyzing	 documents	 of	 this	 kind,	and	 their	 ‘institutionalized	 traces’	 (Wolff	2004),	provided	a	 further,	 rich	 source	of	data	on	the	“institutional,	governmental	and	discursive	mechanisms”	(Zinn	2004,	p.	13)	 intended	 to	 ‘steer’	 the	 synthetic	 biology	 regulatory	 process	 examined	 in	 my	thesis.	Taken	 together,	 this	 ‘fieldwork’	 and	 ‘deskwork’	 (discussed	 in	 further	detail	below)	 sought	 to	 investigate	 how	 synthetic	 biology	 is	 perceived	 to	 destabilize	existing	control	measures,	and	how	regulatory	authorities	and	policymakers	seek	to	overcome	these	obstacles	in	pursuit	of	a	‘secure’	and	‘sustainable’	science.		
	
3.2.1	Deskwork	A	technical	and	scientific	literature	review	constituted	the	first	step	of	the	research	process	 undertaken	 for	my	 thesis.	 This	 involved,	 first,	 reading	 extensively	 on	 the	subject	 of	 synthetic	 biology,	 and,	 second,	 examining	 policy-oriented	 documents	addressing	 the	 ‘dual-use’	 aspects	of	 the	 science.	 In	 the	 first	 instance,	 the	objective	was	to	learn	about	‘synthetic	biology’	and	‘synthetic	biologists’,	gaining	insight	into	how	 the	 science	 is	 described	by	practitioners	 in	 the	 field.	 This	 involved	 analyzing	(and,	 in	 many	 ways,	 studying)	 articles	 in	 prominent	 scientific	 journals	 such	 as	
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Nature	 and	 Nature	 Biotechnology.	 Having	 an	 undergraduate	 degree	 in	 biology	(specializing	in	animal	physiology)	was	of	some	help	in	this	regard,	as	I	am	familiar	with	 a	 number	 of	 subject	 areas	 within	 the	 life	 sciences	 (for	 example,	 molecular	biology,	evolution	and	genetics),	as	well	as	a	variety	of	associated	concepts,	such	as	metabolic	 pathways,	 genes,	 DNA,	 and	 so	 forth,	 discussed	 in	 the	 synthetic	 biology	literature.	However,	as	much	of	the	language	describing	synthetic	biology	relates	to	new	 and	 evolving	 concepts	 such	 as	 ‘biological	 parts’,	 ‘genetic	 circuits’,	 ‘synthetic	genomes’,	and	alike,	much	conceptual	work	was	nonetheless	required	in	an	effort	to	conceive	of	this	new	way	of	looking	at	and	talking	about	biology.		In	 the	 second	 instance,	 the	 objective	 was	 to	 survey	 the	 policy-oriented	literature	aimed	at	‘assessing’	and	‘managing’	synthetic	biology’s	‘biosecurity	risks’.	This	 required	 assembling	 and	 analyzing	 diverse	 documents,	 including	 official	reports	 by	 scientific	 advisory	 committees	 (for	 example,	 NSABB	 2006),	interdisciplinary	 papers	 geared	 towards	 developing	 ‘optimal’	 science	 policies	(Garfinkel	et	al.	2007),	and	recent	policy	guidelines	(for	example,	DHHS	2010b).	The	aim,	 here,	 was	 not	 an	 exhaustive	 mining	 of	 all	 available	 data	 from	 all	 available	sources,	 but	 a	 ‘theoretical	 sample’	 (Flick	 2009,	 pp.	 117-119)	 of	 the	 visibilities,	knowledge	 claims,	 techniques	 and	 practices	 mobilized	 by	 experts	 in	 pursuit	 of	representing	 synthetic	 biology	 as	 a	 specific	 kind	 of	 social	 problem	 that	 can	 be	governed	 (Dean	 1999).	 This	 process	 of	 sampling	 continued	 up	 to	 the	 point	 of	encountering	 numerous	 resonances	 and	 repetitions	 –	 shared	 sites	 of	 interest	 and	conflict	–	among	comparable	sources.	At	this	time,	I	determined	that	I	had	reached	a	point	 of	 ‘theoretical	 saturation’	 (Flick	 2009,	 p.	 119),	which	 suggested	 that	 further	reading	would	 not	 add	 significant	 depth	 to	 the	 themes	 and	 conceptual	 categories	that	had	already	emerged	from	the	literature.	Nonetheless,	from	this	point	forward,	reading	was	 undertaken	 periodically,	 as	 and	when	 scientific	 and	 technical	 papers	were	 published	 describing	 new	 advances	 in	 synthetic	 biology,	 and	 the	 potential	‘biosecurity	risks’	perceived	to	be	engendered	by	these	advances.	As	 a	 qualitative	 research	 method,	 document	 analysis	 (especially	 when	combined	with	 complimentary	methods,	 such	 as	 qualitative	 interviews)	 offers	 an	important	 tool	 for	 generating	 empirical	 data,	 as	 documents	 are	 “a	 means	 of	
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communication”	 that	 convey	 the	beliefs	of	various	social	groups	engaged	 in	active	processes	of	meaning	creation	(Flick	2009,	p.	257).	 In	 this	context,	documents	are	not	treated	as	static	entities	that	convey	uncontested	‘facts’	about	the	world	(ibid.).	Rather,	they	are	taken	to	“represent	a	specific	version	of	realities”	that	are	produced	with	specific	goals	and	audiences	in	mind	(ibid,	p.	257).	In	turn,	“[d]ocuments	can	be	instructive	for	understanding	social	realities	in	institutional	contexts”	(ibid,	p.	262).	In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 policy-oriented	 literature	 noted	 above,	 documents	 are,	 for	example,	the	product	of	working	group	meetings,	roundtable	discussions	and	expert	dialogues.	 They	 are	 the	 end	 result	 of	 a	 process	 of	 (qualitative/quantitative)	assessment,	 interpretation,	negotiation	and	meaning	creation	aimed	at	 influencing	policy	design	and	 ‘steering’	 regulatory	activities.	 In	 this	 light,	Wolff	 (2004,	p.	288)	suggests,	 it	 is	 appropriate	 to	 conceive	 of	 “the	 nature	 of	 the	 document	 as	 a	phenomenon”.	 “Official	 documents	 function	 as	 institutionalized	 traces,”	 enabling	researchers	to	“draw	conclusions	about	the	activities,	 intentions	and	 ideas	of	 their	creators	or	the	organizations	they	represented”	(ibid,	p.	284).	Beyond	 their	 empirical	 value,	 the	documents	 analyzed	during	 this	phase	of	the	research	process	also	helped	shed	light	on	key	actors	and	organizations	engaged	in	the	synthetic	biology	biosecurity	debate.	This	provided	not	only	a	broad	sense	of	the	policy	 ‘network’	engaged	in	this	debate,	but	also	helped	inform	my	subsequent	selection	of	“key	informants”	(Merkens	2004,	p.	169)	interviewed	for	my	thesis.	For	example,	 it	was	evident	at	an	early	stage	of	my	 ‘deskwork’	 that	a	small	number	of	synthetic	biologists	(predominately	based	in	the	US)	tend	to	be	credited	with	being	leaders	 in	 the	 field.	 Occupying	 key	 positions	 in	 a	 wider	 network	 (ibid.),	 these	individuals	 are	 both	 consistent	 reference	 points	 for	 other	 synthetic	 biologists	engaged	 in	 defining	 the	 ‘field’	 of	 synthetic	 biology	 and	 for	 regulatory	 authorities	concerned	 about	 synthetic	 biology’s	 ‘biosecurity	 implications’.	 Consequently,	 I	recognized	 that	 interviewing	 one	 or	 more	 of	 synthetic	 biology’s	 so-called	 ‘key	players’	 (de	 Vriend	 2006)	 would	 be	 beneficial.	 Similarly,	 it	 was	 apparent	 that	 a	number	 of	 regulatory	 bodies	 have	 tended	 to	 dominate	 the	 synthetic	 biology	biosecurity	debate.	 In	 the	US	 context,	 for	 example,	 official	 reports	by	 the	National	Science	 Advisory	 Board	 for	 Biosecurity	 (NSABB)	 on	 ‘synthetic	 genomics’	 (2006),	
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‘synthetic	biology’	 (2010)	and	 ‘amateur	biology’	 (2011)	have	been	 instrumental	 in	orienting	 biosecurity	 policy	 discussions	 in	 the	 country.	 The	 product	 of	 ad	 hoc	advisory	committees,	assembled	by	the	NSABB	and	endorsed	by	the	US	government,	these	reports	have	indeed	set	in	motion	deliberative	processes	(often	involving	the	formation	of	 further	 technical	committees	recommended	by	 the	NSABB)	 that	have	provided	the	basis	for	new	policy	guidelines	(for	example,	DHHS	2010b).		Based	 on	 my	 reading	 of	 the	 literature,	 there	 equally	 emerged	 consistent	references	 to	 various	 expert	 ‘communities’	 participating	 in	 the	 synthetic	 biology	policy	process.	In	particular,	the	notion	of	a	‘synthetic	biology	community’	(part	of	a	wider	 ‘scientific	 community’)	 and	 a	 ‘security	 community’	 (broadly	 encompassing	government	 authorities	 specializing	 in	 aspects	 of	 ‘national	 security’)	 featured	prominently	 in	 the	 literature.	 These	 ‘communities’	 tended	 to	 be	 represented	 as	more	 or	 less	 distinct	 social	 groups	 sharing	 a	 set	 of	 technical	 competencies	 and	beliefs	about	the	world	and	what	might	be	‘best’	for	‘synthetic	biology’	(as	a	science)	and	‘biosecurity’	(as	a	form	of	regulatory	control).	In	particular,	‘synthetic	biologists’	tended	 to	 be	 portrayed	 as	 ‘knowing’	 about	 ‘the	 science’	 (taking	 an	 interest	 in	preserving	 scientific	 autonomy)	 and	 ‘security	 experts’	 tended	 to	 be	 portrayed	 as	‘knowing’	 about	 ‘the	 security	 implications	 of	 the	 science’	 (favoring	 stronger	biosecurity	controls).	Distinctions	of	 this	kind	were	especially	apparent	 in	relation	to	 the	 controversial	 subject	 of	 censoring	 ‘fundamental	 research’	 (discussed	 in	Chapter	 6),	 a	 subject	 that	 has	 raised	questions	 about	 the	 role	 of	 national	 security	considerations	 in	 the	 life	 sciences	 and	 the	 need	 for	 improved	 communication	between	 science	 and	 security	 ‘communities’.	 As	 Kwik	 et	 al.	 (2003,	 p.	 32)	 suggest:	“The	 idea	 of	 subjecting	 biological	 knowledge	 to	 constraints	 because	 of	 security	concerns	is	a	new	and	unwelcome	notion	within	much	of	the	research	community.”	Reppy	(2003,	p.	45)	has	also	pointed	to	tensions	of	this	kind,	suggesting	that,	“there	is	 little	 rapport	 and	 trust	 between	 the	 security	 and	 biology	 communities”,	 raising	“important	 issues	 for	 the	 governance	 of	 science	 and	 more	 generally	 for	 the	relationship	between	science	and	the	state.”	In	brief,	while	not	always	represented	as	 two	 opposing	 forces,	 the	 distinction	 between	 ‘science’	 and	 ‘national	 security’	 –	
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between	 science	 and	 security	 ‘communities’	 –	was	 a	 common	discursive	 theme	 in	the	literature	and	throughout	the	research	process.	Notions	of	a	 ‘scientific	community’	and	a	 ‘security	community’,	while	useful	conceptual	 categories	 –	 conveying	 two	 broad	 professional	 orientations	 deriving	from	“shared	expertise,	norms,	and	worldviews”	(see	Davis	Cross	2013,	p.	157,	on	‘epistemic	 communities’	 and	 ‘professionalism’)	 –	 can	 nonetheless	 be	 somewhat	misleading.	Not	only	 is	 this	because	 some	 ‘synthetic	biologists’	promote	enhanced	biosecurity30	 and	 some	 ‘security	 experts’	 favor	 limited	 restrictions	 on	 scientific	freedom,31	but	also	because	the	very	nature	of	‘biosecurity	policy’	is	said	to	be	both	‘hybrid’	 and	 ‘heterogeneous’.	 In	 the	 first	 instance,	 as	 Lakoff	 and	 Collier	 (2008)	suggest,	 one	 of	 the	 distinguishing	 features	 of	 biosecurity	 policy	 is	 that	 it	 brings	together	(or	blurs	 the	boundaries	between)	previously	distinct	 technical	problems	and	political	domains,	notably	 ‘public	health’	and	 ‘national	security’.	 In	 the	second	instance,	 biosecurity	 policy	 is	 said	 to	 be	 characterized	 by	 diverse	 “ecologies	 of	experts	 and	 organizations”,	 including	 “public	 health	 officials,	 policy	 experts,	humanitarian	 activists,	 life	 scientists,	multilateral	 agencies	 such	 as	WHO,	 national	health	 agencies	 such	 as	 the	 Centers	 of	 Disease	 Control	 (CDC),	 national	 security	experts,	physicians,	veterinarians,	and	government	officials”	(ibid,	p.	9).		This	view	of	‘biosecurity	policy’	–	as	both	‘hybrid’	and	‘heterogeneous’	–	was	reinforced	 during	 interviews	 with	 scientific	 and	 technical	 experts	 at	 the	 BWC	(discussed	in	the	following	section).	Specifically,	these	experts	frequently	described	themselves	 as	 having	 life	 science	 research	backgrounds	 that	 subsequently	 formed	the	basis	for	their	careers	as	‘biodefense	scientists’	or	‘biological	weapons	experts’.																																																									
30 For example, as Rappert (2003, p. 302) observes in relation to ‘bioscience and medical 
communities’ more broadly, bioscientists and professional organizations in the US have 
expressed an interest in taking greater biosecurity precautions since the 2001 anthrax 
attacks. Albeit, Rappert notes, the biosecurity measures put forward by these groups have 
primarily focused on developing “their own structures of governance before others (read: 
‘politicians’) do for them (and do it inappropriately”). 
31 For example, a consistent message (examined in further detail in Chapter 7) conveyed 
by the FBI to synthetic biologists and DIY-biologists is one of limiting regulatory 
controls on productive scientific research while maintaining a heightened sense of 
‘vigilance’ about potential transgressions within their ‘community’. 
	 75	
These	experts	equally	represented	a	variety	of	professions	(spread	across	multiple	institutions),	 ranging	 from	 veterinary	 medicine	 to	 law	 enforcement.	 Thus,	 while	science	and	security	 ‘communities’	are	often	represented	as	discrete	social	groups,	underscoring	different	types	of	professional	activity	and	varying	attitudes	towards	‘science’	 and	 ‘national	 security’,	 the	 ‘hybrid’	 and	 ‘heterogeneous’	 nature	 of	‘biosecurity	policy’	renders	distinctions	of	this	kind	far	more	fluid	than	they	might	initially	appear.	Consequently,	when	referring	to	science	and	security	‘communities’	in	my	thesis,	my	intention	is	not	to	suggest	that	these	categories	are	fixed	and	neatly	bounded.	 Rather,	 it	 is	 to	 respect	 that	 these	 categories	 represent	 important	discursive	features	of	the	synthetic	biology	biosecurity	debate.		More	 generally,	 the	 very	 notion	 of	 ‘experts’	 and	 ‘expertise’,	 in	 contrast	 to	‘non-experts’	 (or	 ‘lay-people’)	 and	 ‘lay-knowledge’,	 is	 widely	 known	 to	 be	problematic	(see,	for	example,	Blok	et	al.	2008),	meriting	a	degree	of	ambivalence	in	forming	distinctions	of	this	kind.	As	Jasanoff	(2003b,	p.	162)	suggests,	“[t]oo	often	…	experts	 are	 seen	 as	 individuals	 possessing	 special	 skills	 or	 superior	 knowledge	applicable	to	predetermined	domains	of	decisionmaking”.	In	this	context,	the	nature	of	expertise	is	‘essentialized’	(Jasanoff	2003a),	contributing	to	the	belief	that	experts	possess	 ‘objective’	 knowledge	 that	 is	 somehow	 beyond	 the	 ‘subjective’	 or	‘normative’	 viewpoints	 of	 non-experts,	 and	 thereby	 necessary	 for	 formulating	‘unbiased’	decisions	and	 ‘appropriate’	policy	responses	(Jasanoff	2003a;	Blok	et	al.	2008).	 However,	 in	 practice,	 Jasanoff	 (2003b,	 p.	 160)	 observes,	 “the	 view	 of	 the	disinterested	expert,	standing	apart	from	values	and	preferences,	has	all	but	eroded	over	the	past	few	decades”.	In	part,	this	more	ambivalent	attitude	towards	‘experts’	and	 ‘expertise’	 can	 be	 traced	 to	 the	 apparent	 ‘failures’	 of	 ‘expert	 assessments’	regarding	aspects	of	“health,	safety	and	the	environment”	(ibid.),	and,	in	part,	to	the	substantial	knowledge	‘lay-people’	routinely	bring	to	bear	on	complex	(often	highly	‘technical’)	 problems	 encountered	 in	 their	 daily	 lives.	 For	 example,	 as	 Jasanoff	(1993,	p.	127)	observes:	“Many	studies	of	community	responses	to	risk	have	shown	that	citizens	are	capable	of	learning	extraordinary	amounts	of	technical	information,	and	indeed	of	participating	actively	in	creating	relevant	knowledge”.	
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In	this	light,	there	is	good	reason	to	ask:	who	should	count	as	an	‘expert’	and	what	 should	count	as	 ‘expertise’	 in	 the	 first	place?	While	no	one	answer	exists,	 as	these	 distinctions	 ultimately	 rest	 upon	 subjective	 judgments,	 it	 is	 important	 to	underline	that	‘expertise’	is	not	simply	an	‘objective’	or	‘fixed’	trait	that	exists	“in	the	heads	and	hands	of	skilled	persons,	constituted	through	their	deep	familiarity	with	the	 problem	 in	 question”	 (Jasanoff	 2003a,	 p.	 393).	 In	 contrast,	 “it	 is	 something	acquired,	and	deployed,	within	particular	historical,	political,	and	cultural	contexts”	(ibid.).	Consequently,	 Jasanoff	 (2003b,	p.	158)	 suggests,	 “it	makes	 sense	 to	 look	at	expertise	 as	 a	 form	 of	 delegated	 authority”,	 which,	 in	 policy	 contexts,	 lends	specialists	 “circumscribed	 power”	 to	 speak	 for	 the	 public	 “on	 matters	 requiring	specialized	 judgment.”	 Moreover,	 reliance	 on	 ‘experts’	 in	 policy	 contexts	 is	 not	simply	based	on	their	capacity	to	generate	 ‘objective’	knowledge,	but	also	on	their	capacity	 to	 ‘legitimize’	 and	 ‘substantiate’	 policy	 actions	 (Boswell	 2014).	 In	 other	words,	“drawing	on	expert	knowledge	can	be	said	to	have	a	symbolic	rather	than	a	substantive	value:	it	enhances	the	credibility	of	agencies	or	policy	positions”	(ibid,	p.	7).	 Thus,	 it	 can	 be	 said	 that,	 “who	 counts	 as	 an	 expert	 (and	 what	 counts	 as	expertise)”	is	contingent,	responding	“to	specific	institutional	imperatives	that	vary	within	and	between	nation	states”	and	over	time	(Jasanoff	2003a,	p.	393).	Finally,	 as	 a	 researcher,	 who	 must	 also	 use	 and	 construct	 conceptual	categories	 through	 which	 to	 communicate	 and	 present	 my	 argument,	 my	 own	descriptions	 of	 research	 informants	 as,	 for	 example,	 ‘synthetic	 biologists’	 or	‘security	 professionals’	 (see	 Bigo	 2000)	 should	 also	 be	 viewed	 as	 imperfect	representations	–	as	‘ideal	types’	–	rather	than	‘objective’	classifications.	Indeed,	as	I	have	 suggested,	 there	 is	 good	 reason	 to	 argue	 that	 there	 is	 no	 single,	 uniform	‘science’	 or	 ‘security’	 community	 to	 speak	 of.	 Rather,	 there	 are	 a	 ‘constellation	 of	experts’	 engaged	 in	 ‘biosecurity	 policy’.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 those	 interviewed	 for	 my	thesis,	 these	 designations	 were	 largely	 based	 on	 interviewees’	 self-defined	professional	 titles,	 educational	 backgrounds,	 job	 descriptions	 and	 the	 national	 or	
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sub-national	 institutions	 they	 represented.32	 This	 information	 was	 used	 to	 help	locate	 interviewees	 in	 institutional	 space,	providing	an	 indication	of	 their	primary	professional	 interests	 and	 responsibilities.	More	 broadly,	my	 thesis	 draws	 on	 and	tends	 to	 favor	 (due,	 in	 part,	 to	 the	 often	 blurred	 professional	 and	 epistemic	boundaries	 of	 those	 engaged	 in	 aspects	 of	 ‘biosecurity	 policy’)	 the	 term	 ‘scientific	and	technical	experts’	 to	characterize	my	research	informants.	This	 is	to	underline	that	 these	 individuals,	 although	 having	 varying	 professional	 backgrounds,	 share	something	in	common	as	‘first-order	observers’	(Luhmann	1993).	That	is,	they	view	‘synthetic	 biology’	 and	 ‘biosecurity	 risks’	 not	 as	 abstract	 concepts	 or	 as	 ‘social	constructs’,	but	as	 first-order	 ‘things’	 that	can	be	 ‘known’	and	made	 the	subject	of	practical	intervention	and	control.	In	brief,	 ‘scientific	and	technical	experts’	believe	in	objective	 ‘facts’	about	 the	world	and	prize	 the	accumulation	of	more	and	better	information	as	the	basis	for	‘rational’	decision-making	(ibid.).			
3.2.2	Fieldwork	Drawing	 on	 the	 discursive	 themes	 that	 emerged	 during	 the	 course	 of	 this	‘deskwork’,	my	 attention	 turned	 to	 conducting	 a	 series	 of	 ‘semi-structured	 expert	interviews’	with	 scientific	 and	 technical	 experts	 engaged	 in	 various	 aspects	 of	 the	synthetic	 biology	 biosecurity	 debate.33	 These	 interviews	 permitted	 me	 to	 further	explore	 the	 discursive	 resonances	 and	 discontinuities	 identified	 in	 the	 literature,	gaining	first-hand	accounts	of	‘synthetic	biology’,	its	potential	‘biosecurity	risks’	and	various	 ‘policy	 options’	 for	 ‘managing’	 these	 risks.	 As	 numerous	 ‘qualitative	interview’	methods	exist	(Hopf	2004),	it	is	important	to	underline	that	the	choice	to																																																									
32 Each time I introduce an interviewee in my thesis, I also provide a more detailed 
description of their (self-defined) area(s) of expertise and institutional affiliations, for 
example, ‘biological weapons expert working for the US Department of State’. 
Subsequent references to interviewees are by first and last name, often including a more 
concise description of their primary area of specialization, for example, ‘biological 
weapons expert’, ‘public health official’, or ‘synthetic biologist’. 
33 In total, I interviewed 20 different scientific and technical experts. Each interview 
lasted approximately 1-hour. In three cases, I conducted follow-up interviews, each 
lasting an additional hour. See Appendix A for a list of interviewees, including brief 
professional profiles. See below for further details on the context of the interviews.  
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conduct	 interviews	 of	 this	 kind	 was	 informed	 by	 several	 methodological	considerations	 and	 ultimately	 by	 their	 applicability	 to	 answering	 my	 research	questions.	 In	 particular,	 ‘expert	 interviews’,	 “as	 a	 specific	 form	 of	 applying	 semi-structured	interviews”	(Flick	2009,	p.	165),	are	appropriate	in	the	case	of	research	projects	concerned	with	reconstructing	expert	knowledge,	technical	processes,	and	various	 institutionalized	ways	 of	 thinking	 common	 to	 a	 target	 group	 (Flick	 2009;	Pfadenhauer	2009).	In	this	context,	what	is	of	particular	interest	are	the	capacities	of	 interviewees	 “as	experts	 for	a	certain	 field	of	activity”	 (Flick	2009,	p.	165)	who	often	 possess	 privileged	 access	 to	 information	 and	 (delegated)	 responsibility	 “for	problem-solving	related	decisions”	(Pfadenhauer	2009,	p.	83).34		Recognizing	 that	 being	 granted	 access	 to	 interview	 subjects	 is	 difficult,	especially	when	 ‘interviewing	up’,	 this	 fieldwork	was	greatly	aided	by	the	contacts	that	I	had	recently	established	as	an	observer	at	the	biannual	meetings	of	the	BWC,	as	well	as	at	several	other	workshops	and	conferences	related	to	synthetic	biology	and	its	perceived	‘biosecurity	implications’.35	Having	a	background	in	biology	and	a	familiarity	with	the	subjects	of	 ‘synthetic	biology’	and	‘biosecurity’	(due,	 in	part,	to	the	earlier	scientific	and	technical	literature	review,	and,	in	part,	to	my	experiences	at	the	biosecurity	forums	noted	above)	was	equally	advantageous.	In	particular,	this	enabled	me	to	(at	 least	in	part)	“‘speak	the	same	language’”	(Heyl	2001,	p.	371)	as	the	interview	subjects	consulted	for	my	research.	In	the	case	of	expert	interviews,	in	particular,	 demonstrating	 a	 level	 of	 “thematic	 competence”	 (Pfadenhauer	 2009,	 p.	90)	 in	 the	 subject	matter	under	 investigation	 is	 said	 to	be	essential	 for	asking	 the	right	 questions”	 and	 “probing	 in	 an	 appropriate	 way”	 (Flick	 2009,	 p.	 168).	 In	essence,	expert	interviews	are	said	to	require	that	the	interviewer	take	on	the	role	of	 ‘quasi-expert’	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 break	 down	 communication	 barriers,	 build	 trust,	more	 easily	 establish	 a	 good	 rapport,	 and	 (to	 the	 extent	 possible)	 “conduct	 a	conversation	‘on	equal	footing’”	(Pfadenhauer	2009,	p.	91).		
																																																								
34 This can be contrasted with, for example, ‘biographical interviews’, which are 
primarily concerned with interviewees’ individual life histories (Flick 2009). 
35 These workshops and conferences will be discussed in further detail below.	
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Balancing	the	time	required	to	conduct	and	transcribe	my	interviews	(23	in	total,	each	lasting	approximately	1-hour)	against	the	need	to	ensure	the	‘quality’	of	the	 collected	data	 (Merkens	2004),	my	 selection	of	 interviewees	 focused	on	 ‘good	informants’	 (Flick	 2009).	 Although	 multiple	 criteria	 exist	 for	 identifying	 ‘good	informants’,	 at	 minimum	 these	 individuals	 should	 possess	 practical	 (or	‘operational’)	knowledge	and	proximity	to	the	research	subject	under	investigation	and	be	willing	to	participate	in	the	study	(Flick	2009;	Pfadenhauer	2009).	Moreover,	the	selection	of	interviewees,	like	other	sources	of	empirical	data,	should	represent	“the	case	[under	 investigation]	with	as	many	facets	as	possible”	(Merkens	2004,	p.	167).	With	a	view	to	these	considerations,	and	in	light	of	the	many	types	of	scientific	and	 technical	 experts	 represented	 in	 the	 literature;	 the	 diverse	 composition	 of	experts	 represented	 at	 the	 BWC,	 and	 based	 on	 several	 exploratory	 talks	 with	experts	 prior	 to	my	 fieldwork,	 it	was	 apparent	 that	my	 interviews	would	 need	 to	include	a	relatively	wide	range	of	professionals	engaged	in	‘biosecurity	policy’.		Focusing	primarily	on	experts	working	in	the	US	context,	my	interviews	were	conducted	 in	 person	 at	 two,	 weeklong	 meetings	 of	 the	 BWC	 in	 Geneva	 (23-27	August	2010;	6-10	December	2010),	 in	addition	 to	 several	 interviews	at	 the	LSE’s	BIOS	 Centre	 and	 over	 Skype.	 These	 interviews	 were	 conducted	 with:	 leading	synthetic	biologists	who	have	been	 instrumental	 in	defining	 the	 ‘field’	of	 synthetic	biology;	 law	 enforcement	 agents	 responsible	 for	 ‘biosecurity	 awareness	 raising’	activities	with	synthetic	biologists	and	‘do-it-yourself	(DIY)	biologists’;	public	health	officials	 overseeing	 ‘community	 labs’	 engaged	 in	 ‘DIY-biology’,	 and	 disarmament	experts	 conducting	 ‘biosecurity	 outreach’	 activities	 at	 the	 annual	 International	Genetically	 Engineered	 Machine’s	 (iGEM)	 competition.	 Interviews	 were	 recorded	and	 later	 transcribed	 and	 coded	 (see	 Flick	 2009,	 pp.	 305-332,	 on	 “Coding	 and	Categorizing”)	 with	 a	 view	 to	 the	 conceptual	 categories	 and	 themes	 identified	during	 the	 earlier	 literature	 review,	 as	well	 as	 further	 ‘discursive	patterns’	 (Coyle	2007)	 visible	 in	 the	 interview	 texts.	 With	 the	 exception	 of	 several	 interviews	conducted	 with	 military	 biodefense	 scientists,	 interviewees	 permitted	 me	 to	 use	their	real	names.	In	accordance	with	the	sensitivity	of	some	of	the	information	that	
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was	shared	with	me,	as	well	as	the	LSE’s	Research	Ethics	Policy,36	interviewees	were	informed	 of	 how	 I	would	 use	 their	 interview	 data	 and	 offered	 the	 opportunity	 to	review	the	interview	transcripts	in	advance	of	this	data	being	used.37	Finally,	 my	 research	 also	 drew	 on	 informal	 discussions	 and	 observations	made	at	 the	BWC	and	during	several	other	workshops	and	conferences,	 including:	the	Geneva	Forum’s	workshop	series	on,	 ‘Enhancing	 the	BWC	Confidence	Building	Measure	Regime’	 (Jongny,	22-23	August	2009;	Geneva,	12	December	2009;	Berlin,	26-27	 April	 2010);	 the	 United	 Nations	 Interregional	 Crime	 and	 Justice	 Research	Institute’s	(UNICRI)	 ‘Synthetic	Biology	and	Nano-biotechnology	Risk	and	Response	Assessment	Project’	(Turin,	24-25	March	2010	and	Geneva,	16-17	June	2010),	and	Cesagen’s	workshop	entitled,	‘Microbiology,	genomics,	and	beyond:	Regulating	dual	use	 technologies	 in	 the	21st	Century’	 (London,	17	September	2010).	While	each	of	these	meetings	focused	on	synthetic	biology	(as	the	primary	topic	of	discussion)	to	varying	 degrees,	 several	 overarching	 themes	 emerged	 that	 were	 particularly	relevant	 to	 understanding	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 synthetic	 biology	 biosecurity	 debate	examined	 in	my	 thesis.	 First,	 experts	 at	 each	 of	 these	meetings	 tended	 to	 present	synthetic	biology	as	posing	‘unique	biosecurity	challenges’,	which	were	believed	to	require	‘existing	regulatory	structures’	to	be	‘reconsidered	or	revised’.	At	the	same	time,	 it	 was	 equally	 apparent	 that	 many	 of	 the	 same	 experts	 believed	 that	 it	 is	‘possible’,	if	not	‘necessary’,	to	‘encourage	scientific	progress’	and	‘minimize	the	risk	of	 deliberate	 misuse’.	 In	 this	 light,	 ‘the	 challenge	 facing	 regulators’	 tended	 to	 be	framed	as	one	of	finding	‘appropriate	regulatory	strategies’	to	achieve	this	objective.	Lastly,	 it	 was	 often	 suggested	 that	 any	 effort	 to	 ‘regulate’	 or	 ‘manage’	 synthetic	biology’s	 ‘biosecurity	 risks’	 would	 depend	 upon	 the	 capacities	 of	 scientific	 and	security	‘communities’	to	‘work	together’	towards	this	‘shared	goal’.	Although	 my	 role	 as	 a	 ‘participant	 observer’	 (Atkinson	 and	 Hammersley	1994)	at	 these	events	was	 limited	 in	 scope,38	 this	 fieldwork	nonetheless	offered	a																																																									
36 This included completing the ‘LSE Research Ethics Review Checklist’, available at: 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/intranet/LSEServices/policies/pdfs/school/resEthResChe.pdf. 
37 Ultimately, few interviewees opted to redact or modify the interview transcripts. Those 
modifications that were made largely involved clarifications (for example, adding detail 
to a specific response) rather than substantive changes. 
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valuable	 ‘snapshot’	 of	 the	 social	 phenomenon	under	 investigation	 (Flick	 2009).	 In	particular,	 unlike	 the	 more	 structured	 interview	 environment,	 observations	collected	 (transcribed	 as	 field	 notes	 and	 later	 categorized	 and	 coded)	 at	 these	meetings	 enabled	me	 to	 observe	 how,	 in	 a	more	 ‘natural’	 setting	 (ibid.),	 scientific	and	 technical	 experts	 talk	 about	 synthetic	 biology	 as	 a	 specific	 kind	 of	 ‘social	problem’;	the	forms	of	reasoning	and	types	of	certified	knowledge	brought	to	bear	on	 this	 problem,	 and	 the	 methods	 of	 negotiation	 and	 compromise	 deployed	 in	determining	 ‘appropriate	 policy	 solutions’.	 In	 addition,	 this	 level	 of	 proximity	 to	biosecurity	 policy	 discussions	 offered	 the	 possibility	 of	 relatively	 subtle	observations,	which	often	drew	as	much	on	visual	cues,	 the	 tone	of	a	participant’s	voice,	 or	 the	 personal	 opinions	 participants	 shared	with	me	 during	 breaks	 in	 the	meetings,	 as	 they	 did	 formal	 statements.	 This	 revealed,	 for	 example,	 that	 despite	frequent	 claims	 of	 ‘working	 together’,	 ‘life	 scientists’	 and	 ‘security	 experts’	 (when	these	 two	 ‘communities’	 can	 be	 differentiated)	 often	 display	 different	 attitudes	towards	 the	 role	 and	 importance	 of	 ‘national	 security’	 considerations	 in	 the	 life	sciences,	suggesting	(at	times)	a	 far	more	 ‘uneasy’	partnership	between	 ‘scientists’	and	‘security	experts’	than	might	otherwise	be	communicated.		Through	 this	 research	 process,	 which	 combined	 document	 analysis,	 qualitative	interviews	and	observations	in	the	field,	I	gained	a	broad	sense	of	the	structure	and	composition	 of	 the	 ‘policy	 constellation’	 that	 comprises	 the	 synthetic	 biology	biosecurity	 debate	 examined	 in	 my	 thesis,	 as	 well	 as	 gaining	 insight	 into	 the	discursive	 themes	 and	 conceptual	 categories	 that	 characterize	 this	 debate.	Moreover,	 by	 opting	 to	 use	 several	methods,	 each	 geared	 towards	 understanding	the	discursive	and	non-discursive	practices	deployed	by	experts	engaged	in	aspects																																																																																																																																																																						
38 In contrast to ethnographic studies, which tend to involve the researcher becoming 
immersed in a social group over an extended period of time, my ‘participation’ at these 
meetings was limited. In fact, to the extent possible, I sought to maintain a degree of 
‘distance’ (Flick 2009) from the subject matter being discussed in an effort to not overly 
influence the events observed at these meetings. Yet, as all forms of social research are 
arguably a form of ‘participant observation’, in as much as a researcher “cannot study the 
social world without being part of it” (Atkinson and Hammersley 1994, p. 249), it 
remains appropriate to describe my role as that of a ‘participant observer’. 
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of	‘biosecurity	policy’,	I	endeavored	to	limit	the	interpretive	bias	of	my	results	and	to	maximize	 their	 generalizability.	 As	 Flick	 (2009,	 pp.	 26-27)	 suggests,	 combining	complimentary	 methods	 (‘triangulation’),	 integrated	 into	 a	 coherent	 research	design,	 can	 help	 compensate	 for	 “the	 weakness	 and	 blind	 spots	 of	 any	 single	method”,	offering	a	more	accurate	 representation	of	 the	 social	world.	At	 the	 same	time,	 no	 matter	 how	 well	 conceived	 the	 research	 design,	 it	 is	 important	 to	acknowledge	that	the	research	process	is	never	‘neutral’	or	‘apolitical’,	but	rather	it	is	 the	outcome	of	numerous	choices,	which	place	constraints	upon	 the	 ‘scope’	and	‘quality’	of	the	research	(ibid.).	In	turn,	it	is	necessary	to	consider	my	own	role	in	the	research	process,	and	the	potential	limitations	of	my	research	design.	
	
3.3	My	role	in	the	research	process	and	the	potential	limitations	of	my	research	
design	That	knowledge	about	 the	world	 is	not	simply	a	 “portrayal	of	given	 facts,	but	 [the	outcome	 of]	 a	 process	 of	 active	 production”	 is	 a	 central	 tenant	 of	 social	constructivism	and	a	cornerstone	of	much	qualitative	research	(Flick	2009,	p.	70).	Indeed,	the	belief	that	‘facts’	do	not	simply	exist	‘out	there’,	beyond	the	social	world,	but	 are	 produced	 through	 social	 interactions,	 can	 be	 said	 to	 provide	much	 of	 the	motive	 force	 behind	 critical	 research	 in	 the	 social	 sciences.	 In	 turn,	 to	 adopt	 this	perspective,	 as	 a	 researcher,	 one	must	 equally	 acknowledge	one’s	own	 role	 in	 the	research	process,	which	is	no	less	an	‘active	process	of	(re)construction’	(Flick	2009;	Denzin	2004).	As	Denzin	(2004,	p.	86)	observes:	“There	is	no	mirror	of	nature”	and,	thus,	no	 ‘singular’	or	 ‘objective’	mode	of	enquiry.	Rather,	“the	world	as	it	 is	known	[by	 social	 scientists	 or	 anyone	 else]	 is	 constructed	 through	 acts	 of	 representation	and	 interpretation”	(ibid.).	 In	this	 light,	 far	 from	being	a	passive	observer	of	 ‘facts’	about	 the	 social	 world,	 the	 researcher	 can	 be	 seen	 to	 play	 an	 integral	 role	 in	 all	aspects	 of	 the	 research	 process	 (Lincoln	 2004),	 including	 the	 selective	 work	 of	choosing	‘social	groups’	or	‘cases’	of	interest	to	the	research	(Merkens	2004,	p.	167);	the	documentary	materials	and	interview	subjects;	the	collection	and	interpretation	of	data,	and,	ultimately,	the	manner	in	which	this	data	is	organized	and	presented.	In	
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brief,	at	all	phases	of	the	research	process,	numerous	choices	must	be	made,	which	both	define	and	constrain	the	‘scope’	and	‘quality’	of	a	research	project.		 In	 the	 case	of	my	 thesis,	 several	 considerations	 can	be	 said	 to	have	shaped	the	 ‘scope’	 and	 ‘quality’	 of	 my	 research.	 In	 the	 first	 instance,	 it	 is	 important	 to	acknowledge	that	the	overall	focus	(and,	in	turn,	the	scope)	of	my	thesis	sheds	light	on	 certain	 aspects	 of	 the	 ‘social	 and	 ethical	 debate’	 on	 synthetic	 biology,	 while	obfuscating	 others.	 In	 particular,	 my	 thesis	 engages	 with	 only	 one	 aspect	 of	 this	debate,	 namely	 the	 ‘biosecurity	 implications’	 of	 synthetic	 biology	 and	 the	 various	‘risk	assessment	 techniques’	 and	 ‘risk	management	 strategies’	 that	have,	 in	 recent	years,	been	brought	 to	bear	on	 this	highly	specific	policy	 ‘problem’	with	a	view	to	finding	practical	policy	‘solutions’.	Moreover,	in	choosing	to	focus	on	‘scientific	and	technical	experts’	(particularly	those	working	in	the	US	context)	engaged	in	aspects	of	‘biosecurity	policy’,	I	have,	to	some	extent,	excluded	other	social	groups	(who	no	less	have	a	stake	 in	determining	the	acceptability	and	future	direction	of	synthetic	biology)	from	this	discussion.	For	example,	my	thesis	does	not	take	as	its	focus	‘risk	perception’	among	members	of	the	so-called	‘lay-public’.39	Thus,	in	choosing	to	focus	on	 a	 specific	 segment	 of	 a	 much	 wider	 social	 phenomenon,	 it	 is	 important	 to	acknowledge	that	my	thesis	cannot	(nor	does	it	claim	to)	provide	a	comprehensive	picture	of	‘the’	social	and	ethical	debate	on	synthetic	biology.		 In	the	second	instance,	it	is	equally	important	to	consider	how	choices	made	at	subsequent	stages	of	the	research	process	could	have	influenced	the	quality	of	my	research.	 For	 example,	 in	 addition	 to	 choosing	 to	 focus	 on	 a	 specific	 aspect	 of	 a	wider	 social	 and	 ethical	 debate	 on	 synthetic	 biology,	 my	 research	 also	 depended	upon	choices	regarding	the	selection	of	interview	subjects	who	‘represent’	the	case	of	 interest.	 These	 choices,	 although	 informed	 by	 my	 literature	 review	 and	 my																																																									
39 Yet, nor should this decision be seen as arbitrary. As I have suggested, the ‘policy 
constellation’ engaged in ‘biosecurity’ consists primarily of experts with	‘operational’ 
knowledge in various aspects of ‘public health’, the ‘life sciences’ and ‘national security’. 
Therefore, it is arguably appropriate that my thesis focuses on these groups of actors. 
Moreover, at present, at least in relation to the ‘lay-public’, it should be noted that there 
exists limited ‘public awareness’ of ‘synthetic biology’, thus limiting the possibilities for 
empirical research on ‘public risk perception’ of the field.	
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experiences	 at	 various	 biosecurity	 policy	 forums	 (as	 I	 have	 noted),	 inevitably	excluded	 some	 actors	 who	 certainty	 possess	 ‘practical	 knowledge’	 on	 aspects	 of	‘synthetic	 biology’	 and	 ‘biosecurity’.	 Moreover,	 the	 interview	 experience	 itself	 is	shaped	by	numerous	 choices,	 as	well	 as	 a	 range	 of	 contingencies	 that	 result	 from	reciprocal	 interactions	 between	 interviewer	 and	 interviewee.	 According	 to	Hermanns	(2004),	these	factors	contribute	to	shaping	the	‘interview	drama’,	and	the	resulting	 ‘co-produced’	knowledge.	 In	 this	 light,	 although	 I	prepared	an	 ‘interview	guide’	to	help	orient	my	interviews	towards	a	series	of	‘open’	questions	designed	to	help	 answer	my	 research	 questions	 (Hopf	 2004),	 additional	 factors,	 including	 the	choice	 of	 interview	 environment	 and	 the	 quality	 of	 my	 own	 ‘performance’	 as	 an	interviewer	 (Hermanns	 2004;	 Hopf	 2004),	 inevitably	 influenced	 the	 direction	interviews	 took,	 and	 the	 content	 of	 the	 interview	 data.	 Lastly,	 it	 is	 important	 to	underline	 that	 my	 interpretation	 and	 presentation	 of	 the	 data	 –	 an	 exercise	 that	depends	 upon	 forming	 conceptual	 categories,	 defining	 discursive	 themes	 and	grouping	 multiple	 strands	 of	 information	 together	 to	 produce	 a	 generalizable	‘picture’	 of	 the	 social	 world	 –	 was	 itself	 a	 ‘process	 of	 (re)construction’,	 requiring	numerous	choices	to	be	made.	Thus,	even	though	my	analysis	was	 informed	by	an	‘analytics	 of	 government’,	which	 “singles	 out	 for	 special	 attention	…	 the	 practices	and	forms	of	reasoning	that	shape	technical	response”	(Collier	et	al.	2004,	pp.	6-7),	multiple	interpretations	of	the	same	data	are	always	possible.	Finally,	 in	 addition	 to	 these	 considerations,	 and	 the	 possible	 empirical	constraints	 and	 limitations	 they	 may	 place	 on	 my	 research,	 there	 is	 an	 ‘ethical’	dimension	or	 ‘dilemma’	to	my	research	that	I	 feel	warrants	acknowledgment.	That	is,	 like	 the	 diverse	 scientific	 and	 technical	 experts	with	whom	my	 thesis	 engages,	who	 discuss	 the	 ‘synthetic	 biology	 threat’	 and	 possible	 ways	 of	 ‘assessing’	 and	‘managing’	this	‘threat’,	my	own	contribution	to	this	debate,	albeit	from	the	critical	standpoint	 of	 a	 ‘second-order	 observer’,	 to	 some	 extent	 contributes	 to	 reifying	anxieties	 about	 future	 events	 that	 may	 never	 happen.	 Thus,	 I	 would	 like	 to	acknowledge	that	I	take	responsibility	for	my	own	performance	in	this	debate,	and	recognize	that	talking	about	issues	such	as	‘bioterrorism’	and	‘biological	weapons’	is	never	 unproblematic,	 no	 matter	 how	 ‘critical’	 my	 perspective	 may	 be.	 Yet,	 like	
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Rappert	 (2003,	 p.	 303),	 I	 also	 recognize	 that	 “the	 topic	 of	 biological	weapons	 has	received	scant	[albeit	growing]	attention	 in	the	past	 in	many	social	science	 fields”,	making	 the	 need	 for	 critical	 research	 in	 this	 area	 all	 the	 more	 important.	 Thus,	despite	the	dilemma	faced	by	those	engaged	in	this	line	of	research,	it	should	not,	in	my	 opinion,	 discourage	 scholarly	 discussion	 and	 debate.	 Rather,	 I	 believe	 it	 is	important	to	discuss	these	issues	openly,	and	through	this	discussion	contribute	to	changing	the	tenor	of	 the	debate	 for	 the	better;	and	this	by	way	of	bringing	to	the	surface	 some	 of	 the	 taken-for-granted	 assumptions	 and	 unquestioned	 categories	that	might	otherwise	be	less	likely	to	emerge	and	be	critically	discussed.		
3.4	Conclusion	In	this	chapter,	I	have	endeavored	to	provide	a	rationale	for	my	research	design	and	outline	 the	 research	 process	 undertaken	 to	 answer	my	 research	 questions.	 In	 the	first	 instance,	 I	 have	 argued	 that	 an	 ‘analytics	 of	 government’	 provides	 a	 suitable	analytical	framework	for	my	thesis,	as	well	as	a	basis	for	my	research	design,	in	as	much	 as	 this	 approach	 to	 risk	 pursues	 a	 consistent	 line	 of	 questioning	 geared	towards	 understanding	 how	 ‘regimes	 of	 government’	 or	 ‘regimes	 of	 practices’	operate	(Dean	1999).	In	the	second	instance,	I	have	described	the	research	process	I	have	undertaken,	including	my	identification	of	the	social	group	(a	‘constellation	of	experts’	 engaged	 in	 ‘biosecurity	 policy’)	 of	 primary	 interest	 to	my	 thesis	 and	 the	‘qualitative	research	methods’	(including	document	analysis,	expert	interviews	and	observations	in	the	field)	selected	to	shed	light	on	the	discursive	and	non-discursive	practices	 that	 comprise	 the	 synthetic	 biology	 biosecurity	 debate.	 Finally,	 I	 have	endeavored	to	consider	my	own	role	 in	 the	research	process,	underlining	how	my	choices	have	played	an	 integral	 role	 in	determining	 the	 ‘scope’	and	 ‘quality’	of	my	research.	Taken	together,	this	chapter	describes	a	qualitative	research	project	that	has	 been	 designed	 to	 understand	 how	 scientific	 and	 technical	 experts	 engaged	 in	biosecurity	policy	render	a	seemingly	‘incalculable	risk’	‘knowable’	and	‘actionable’	in	pursuit	of	a	‘secure’	and	‘sustainable’	science.	My	thesis,	in	turn,	attempts	render	
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this	activity	–	one	aspect	of	the	social	world	–	visible	with	a	view	to	understanding	how,	and	to	what	effect,	synthetic	biology	is	‘governed	through	risk’.	
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4.	Risk	selection:	Constructing	a	‘taxonomy	of	difference’	
	
4.1	Introduction	Amidst	growing	concerns	about	synthetic	biology’s	potential	‘biosecurity	risks’,	it	is	rarely	acknowledged	that	to	speak	of	synthetic	biology	in	relation	to	‘biosecurity’	is	already	a	highly	specific	framing	of	a	‘problem’	to	be	‘solved’.	There	are,	after	all,	any	number	of	ways	 in	which	 synthetic	 biology	might	be	 framed	as	problematic,	 each	presupposing	particular	kinds	of	worries,	dilemmas,	and	possible	future	harms.	So	why	 do	 many	 scientific	 and	 technical	 experts	 engaged	 in	 aspects	 of	 the	 ongoing	synthetic	 biology	 policy	 debate	 privilege	 this	 particular	 problem	 (or	 set	 of	problems)?	What	 is	 it	 about	 synthetic	 biology	 and	 its	 diverse	practitioners	 that	 is	perceived	to	be	‘dangerous’	or	‘of	concern’?	And	how	do	these	‘concerns’	orient	risk	management	 efforts	 and	 delimit	 the	 possibilities	 for	 regulatory	 intervention	 and	control?	These	are	just	some	of	the	reflexive	considerations,	I	suggest,	that	need	to	be	 brought	 to	 the	 surface	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 understand	 what	 is	 at	 stake	 in	 framing	synthetic	biology	as	a	specific	kind	of	problem	for	risk	management.		 With	 a	 view	 to	 these	 research	questions,	 in	 this	 chapter	 I	will	 examine	 the	selective	 processes	 experts	 employ	 in	 their	 efforts	 to	 define	 and	 demarcate	 the	boundaries	of	what	is	‘dangerous’	or	‘of	concern’	in	synthetic	biology.	My	argument	is	developed	in	several	sections.	First,	I	underline	that,	in	the	United	States	(US),	in	particular,	 the	material	 and	 informational	 elements	 that	 makeup	modern	 biology	are	increasingly	framed	in	relation	to	the	threat	of	‘bioterrorism’	and	in	accordance	with	 the	 norms	 and	 logics	 of	 ‘biosecurity’	 –	 a	 defensive	 practice	 premised	 upon	keeping	 ‘dangerous	 tools’	 out	 of	 ‘dangerous	 hands’.	 Second,	 I	 situate	 synthetic	biology	 in	 this	 context,	 examining	 how	 it	 is	 perceived	 to	 complicate	 the	 goals	 of	biosecurity	by	way	of	enabling	more	people	to	gain	access	to	‘potentially	dangerous’	biological	 materials	 and	 information	 (an	 expectation	 that	 builds	 on	 synthetic	biologists’	own	claims	about	the	potential	of	their	science	to	 ‘democratize’	modern	biology).	Finally,	 I	conclude	by	way	of	reflecting	on	the	manner	 in	which	scientific	
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and	technical	experts	draw	on	notions	of	‘difference’	or	‘otherness’	–	a	‘different	way	of	doing	biology’	and	a	‘different	way	of	being	a	biologist’	–	to	not	only	describe	but	also	produce	a	new	set	of	‘problems’	and	‘risks’	to	be	assessed	and	managed.		 This	 research	 suggests	 that,	 for	 many	 scientific	 and	 technical	 experts,	synthetic	 biology	 is	 perceived	 to	 be	 problematic	 because	 it	 disrupts	 existing	approaches	 to	 biosecurity.	 In	 effect,	 synthetic	 biology	 is	 undergoing	 a	 process	 of	‘problematization’:	 that	 is,	 it	 has	 been	 interpreted	 as	 destabilizing	 conventional	ways	 of	 knowing	 and	 understanding	 the	world,	motivating	 a	 regulatory	 response	that	seeks	to	reestablish	continuity	and	order	in	the	face	of	uncertainty	and	change.	In	 this	 light,	 ‘risk	 selection’	 –	 whereby	 risks	 are	 identified,	 classified	 and	 given	 a	name	 –	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 the	 process	 of	 surfacing	 those	 aspects	 of	 synthetic	biology	 that	 do	 not	 conform	 to	 the	 prevailing	 logics	 of	 biosecurity,	 setting	 them	apart	as	‘risk	objects’	of	regulatory	interest	and	concern.	Resembling	taxonomy	–	a	practice	that	depends	upon	classifying	and	naming	a	set	of	elemental	parts	that	can	be	(re)configured	according	to	specific	rules	–	risk	selection	is	both	descriptive	and	inventive,	 drawing	 on	 experts’	 capacities	 to	 identify	 and	 produce	 new	 ‘kinds’	 of	people	and	things	to	be	governed	through	risk	management.		
4.2	Framing	the	threat	In	this	section,	I	will	introduce	several	interrelated	subjects	and	concepts	that	help	shed	 light	 on	why	 synthetic	 biology	 is	 perceived	 to	 pose	 ‘biosecurity	 risks’	 in	 the	first	place.	In	particular,	I	underline	that,	in	recent	years,	‘bioterrorism’	has	emerged	as	a	key	subject	of	regulatory	interest	and	concern	within	life	science	policy	circles,	especially	in	the	US.	Moreover,	although	there	have	been	few	historical	instances	of	bioterrorism,	and	expert	opinion	varies	as	to	the	‘likelihood’	and	‘consequences’	of	this	type	of	event,	‘concerns	about	bioterrorism’	have	had	a	significant	impact	on	the	life	 science	 regulatory	 environment.	 Next,	 I	 take	 a	 closer	 look	 at	 the	 concept	 of	‘biosecurity’,	 which,	 for	 the	 scientific	 and	 technical	 experts	 consulted	 for	 my	research,	represents	a	technical	‘solution’	to	the	‘problem’	of	bioterrorism.	Finally,	I	consider	 how,	 in	 this	 context,	 synthetic	 biology	 is	 perceived	 to	 be	 especially	
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problematic.	 Specifically,	 synthetic	 biology	 is	 perceived	 to	 complicate,	 if	 not	undermine,	the	norms	and	logics	of	biosecurity	–	a	defensive	practice	borne	out	of	growing	concerns	about	bioterrorism	and	premised	upon	keeping	‘dangerous	tools’	out	of	‘dangerous	hands’.	In	this	light,	much	of	what	is	perceived	to	be	problematic	about	synthetic	biology	 in	relation	to	 its	 ‘regulation’,	which	 I	will	explore	 in	depth	during	the	remainder	of	the	chapter,	can	be	traced	to	this	highly	specific	framing	of	‘risk’	and	‘risk	management’	in	the	contemporary	life	sciences.		
4.2.1	Focusing	on	bioterrorism	Although	there	have	been	few	historical	instances	of	‘bioterrorism’,40	and	none	that	have	 approached	 the	 ‘worst-case	 scenarios’	 predicted	 by	 some,	 ‘concerns	 about	bioterrorism’	are	real	enough.	Indeed,	since	the	mid-1990s,	largely	in	response	to	a	perceived	 link	 between	 international	 terrorism	 and	 the	 possible	 use	 of	 biological	weapons	 in	 a	 terrorist	 attack,	 many	 policymakers,	 especially	 in	 the	 US	 context,41	have	 come	 to	 view	 bioterrorism	 as	 a	 ‘catastrophic’	 threat	 (Wright	 2004).	Compounding	 these	 concerns,	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 events	 of	 9/11	 and	 the	subsequent	anthrax	letter	mailings,	it	is	all	but	taken-for-granted	in	US	policy	circles	that	 there	 exists	 an	 urgent	 and	 legitimate	 need	 to	 prepare	 (and	 to	 be	 seen	 to	prepare)	for	this	contingency	(Rappert	2003;	Reppy	2003;	Wright	2004).	In	a	recent	report	presented	to	the	US	Congress,	for	example,	the	science	and	technology	policy																																																									
40 According to arms control scientist Milton Leitenberg’s (2005, p. 22) analysis of five 
extensive databases covering all known bioterrorism-related “events” in the twentieth 
century, there have, in fact, been only four instances involving “the preparation or 
attempted preparation of pathogens in a private laboratory by a nonstate actor.” These 
include the Rajneesh's deliberate contamination of salad bars using salmonella in 1984 in 
Oregon, which resulted in 750 cases of food poisoning; the Aum Shinrikyo cult’s 
“unsuccessful attempts to procure, produce and disperse anthrax and botulinum toxin” 
between 1990 and 1994 in Japan; Al-Quaeda’s unsuccessful attempts to procure anthrax 
and establish a functional biological weapons laboratory in the late 1990s in Afghanistan; 
and “the successful ‘Amerithrax’ distribution of a high-quality dry-powder preparation of 
anthrax spores” in the US in 2001, which resulted in five deaths.  
41 While heightened concerns about bioterrorism and the subsequent addition of new 
‘biosecurity controls’ have been the most evident in the US, the UK (among other 
countries) has also seen an increased focus (albeit to a lesser degree) on bioterrorism and 
biosecurity in recent years (see, for example, McLeish and Nightingale 2005).	
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specialists	 Gottron	 and	 Shea	 (2011,	 p.	 4,	 emphasis	 added)	 observe	 that,	 although	bioterrorism	has	been	a	 topic	of	concern	 for	US	policymakers	 for	sometime,	 these	more	 recent	 events	 have	 “led	 to	 an	 increased	 focus	 on	 terrorism	 in	 general	 and	especially	on	biological	weapons	of	mass	destruction	(WMDs).”	As	Rappert	(2003,	p.	99)	has	similarly	argued,	 these	events	 “served as	a	punctuating	point”,	motivating	not	only	regulatory	authorities	but	also	life	scientists	and	professional	organizations	to	 consider	 various	 measures	 aimed	 at	 countering	 the	 threat	 of	 bioterrorism	 (in	part,	as	a	preemptive	measure	against	‘reactionary’	government	legislation).			Hand-in-hand	with	an	 increased	 focus	on	bioterrorism,	 there	has	also	been	an	increased	focus	on	‘non-state	actors’.	The	origin	of	these	concerns	is	often	traced	to	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 former	 Soviet	 Union,	 which	 is	 said	 to	 have	 elevated	(particularly	in	the	US	context)	the	perceived	threat	that	individuals,	as	opposed	to	states,	 could	 exploit	 modern	 biology	 for	 destructive	 purposes.	 Central	 to	 these	accounts,	 as	 Collier	 et	 al.	 (2004,	 p.	 6)	 note,	 are	 concerns	 about	 former	 Soviet	scientists	 “with	 weapons-relevant	 expertise”	 who	 “have	 ‘melted	 away’	 and	 are	unaccounted	for”	following	the	dissolution	of	the	Soviet	Union	and	its	accompanying	weapons	 programs.	 Adding	 to	 these	 concerns,	 McLeish	 and	 Nightingale	 (2007,	 p.	1640)	 suggest,	 the	 growing	 accessibility	 of	 biological	 materials,	 laboratory	equipment	 and	 advanced	 life	 science	 knowledge	 (all	 of	 which	 have	 ‘legitimate’	research	 applications)	 is	 often	 cited	 as	 enabling	 individuals	 to	 circumvent	 the	financial	 costs	 and	 technical	 barriers	 associated	 with	 biological	 weapons	development.	 In	 turn,	 in	 contrast	 to	 a	 former	 era	 characterized	 by	 the	 perceived	threat	 of	 state-level	 ‘biowarfare’,	 individuals	 (including	 life	 scientists,	 who	 are	perceived	to	have	privileged	access	to	potentially	dangerous	life	science	resources)	are	 increasingly	viewed	“as	both	sources	of	 threat	and	as	 sources	of	 technological	capabilities”	 (ibid.).	As	McLeish	and	Nightingale	 suggest	 (ibid.),	 this	 “marks	a	new	development	in	biosecurity	policy,	which	historically	has	been	state-centric	because	only	states	were	able	to	afford	to	development	biological	weapons.”		At	 the	 level	 of	 life	 science	 regulation,	 the	 growing	 emphasis	 on	 non-state	actors	has	also	contributed	to	a	decline	in	the	perceived	relevance	of	control	efforts	“based	on	bilateral	or	multilateral	agreements	among	states”	and	 the	ascension	of	
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“new	strategies	for	regulating	biological	warfare	knowledge”	(Collier	et	al.	2004,	p.	6).	Specifically,	as	McLeish	and	Nightingale	(2007,	p.	1640)	suggest,	a	new	“regime	has	evolved”	that	places	a	greater	emphasis	on	the	part	of	national	governments	on	regulating	 the	 conduct	 of	 life	 scientists,	 encompassing	 “new	 controls	 on	 people,	experiments	 and	 the	 flow	 of	 information,	 technology	 and	 materials.”42	Circumscribed	under	 the	heading	of	 ‘biosecurity	policy’,	 “[t]hese	national	 controls	are	now	the	main	vehicles	 that	govern	scientific	activity”	 (ibid).	At	 the	same	 time,	individuals	who	are	“not	normally	associated	with	security”	have	been	enrolled	 in	combating	 the	perceived	 threat	of	bioterrorism	 (ibid.).	 In	particular,	 life	 scientists	are	 increasingly	 conceived	 as	 ‘guardians	 of	 science’	 –	 actors	who	 are	 essential	 to	monitoring	 and	 preventing	 the	 ‘deliberate	 misuse’	 of	 modern	 biology,	 including	potential	 transgressions	 within	 their	 ‘community’.	 Taken	 together,	 these	 new	regulatory	measures,	whether	 voluntary	 or	 enforced,	 implemented	 at	 the	 level	 of	national	 governments	 or	 sub-national	 institutions,	 comprise	 an	 evolving	‘governance	 system’	 comprised	 “of	 international	 agreements,	 legal	 regulations,	professional	standards,	ethical	mores,	and	catalogues	of	‘best	practices’”	intended	to	ensure	sustainable	progress	in	the	life	sciences	(Kwik	et	al.	2003,	p.	27).		While	 concerns	 about	 bioterrorism	 have	 grown	 in	 prominence	 in	 recent	years,	 having	 important	 consequences	 for	 life	 science	 regulation,	 expert	 opinion	nonetheless	varies	as	to	the	‘likelihood’	and	‘consequences’	(the	standard	metrics	of	‘quantitative	risk	assessment’)	of	these	sorts	of	events.	In	part,	as	I	have	suggested,	this	is	because	there	have	been	few	historical	instances	of	bioterrorism,	and,	in	part,	because	 there	 exist	 very	 different	 opinions	 about	 the	 technical	 feasibility	 of	producing	 viable	 biological	 weapons.	 With	 a	 view	 to	 the	 second	 source	 of	uncertainty,	 some	 describe	 bioterrorism	 as	 the	 ‘poor	 man’s	 atomic	 bomb’,43																																																									
42 It is important to note, as McLeish and Nightingale (2007, p. 1648) underline, that: 
“While the most extensive controls have been introduced in the USA, the extent of 
international collaboration with the US science system, the adoption of similar measures 
by the EU, and the importance of global implementation for their effectiveness, suggests 
that these controls will diffuse for the foreseeable future”. 
43 Characteristic of this view, Jeremy Rifkin (2001) underlines that biological weapons 
(including “genetic weaponry”) can justifiably be described as the ‘poor man’s atomic 
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underlining	the	belief	that	 it	 is	relatively	affordable	and	easy	to	produce	biological	weapons,	 and,	moreover,	 that	 their	 use	 could	 have	 ‘catastrophic’	 consequences.44	From	 the	 perspective	 of	 these	 commentators,	 it	 is	 not	 so	 much	 a	 question	 of	‘whether’	 a	 large-scale	 act	 of	 bioterrorism	 will	 happen,	 but	 rather	 ‘when’	 it	 will	happen.45	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 just	 as	 many	 experts	 suggest	 that	 it	 is	 relatively	difficult	 to	 produce	 biological	weapons,	 not	 only	 due	 to	 the	 challenges	 associated	with	 acquiring	 dangerous	 pathogens	 (for	 example,	 smallpox),	 but	 also	 due	 to	 the	‘downstream’	 technical	 difficulties	 associated	 with	 transforming	 pathogens	 into	viable	 weapons.	 A	 multi-step	 process,	 ‘weaponizing’	 pathogens	 is	 said	 to	 require	producing	 a	 sufficient	 quantity	 of	 pathogenic	 material,	 which	 can	 be	 stored,	transformed	into	an	environmentally	stable	product,	and	successfully	disseminated	over	a	large	area	to	cause	‘mass	casualties’	(Leitenberg	2005).	From	the	perspective	of	this	second	group	of	commentators,	the	paucity	of	historical	data	on	bioterrorism	is	therefore	not	so	much	a	reflection	of	a	lack	of	intent	on	the	part	of	individuals,	but	a	 consequence	 of	 the	 technical	 challenges	 confronting	 individuals	 or	 terrorist	groups	who	might	wish	to	produce	a	true	‘weapon	of	mass	destruction’.	The	 question	 of	whether	 bioterrorism	 represents	 a	 ‘viable’	 and	 potentially	‘catastrophic’	 threat	 or	 whether	 the	 threat	 is	 overstated	 due	 technical	 challenges	associated	 with	 ‘weaponizing’	 pathogens	 remains	 an	 ongoing	 source	 of	 debate	among	experts.	Moreover,	 contrasting	opinions	 exist	 between	 countries	 as	 closely	allied	as	the	United	States	and	the	United	Kingdom	(see	Rappert	2003),	with	the	US,	as	 I	 have	 said,	 placing	 considerably	 more	 emphasis	 on	 bioterrorism	 within	 their	national	 ‘portfolio’	of	biological	 ‘risks’	and	 ‘threats’.	Yet,	 irrespective	of	 the	 ‘actual’	risks	 –	 their	 ‘likelihood’	 and	 ‘consequences’	 –	 ‘concerns	 about	 bioterrorism’	 have																																																																																																																																																																						
bomb’ as they could pose “a similar threat to our very existence”, and, “unlike nuclear 
bombs, the materials and tools required to create biological warfare agents are accessible 
and inexpensive” (http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2001-10-
07/topic/0110050346_1_biological-warfare-biological-agents-biological-weapons). 
44 See, for example, The Defense Science Board 1997 Summer Study Task Force on DoD 
Responses to Transnational Threats, Vol. I, Final Report, October 1997. 
45 Leitenberg (2005, p. 105) notes that: “The two main popularizers of this phrase, in 
innumerable press, radio and TV interviews, were Drs. D.A. Henderson and Michael 
Osterholm” (vocal contributors to the ‘bioterrorism-catastrophic-potential’ discourse). 
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had	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 modern	 biology	 is	 understood,	represented,	and	made	the	subject	of	regulatory	intervention	and	control.	Indeed,	as	multiple	 scholars	 (Rappert	 2003;	 Reppy	 2003;	 McLeish	 and	 Nightingale	 2007,	among	others)	have	pointed	out,	concerns	about	bioterrorism	have	contributed	to	increased	 spending	 on	 national	 ‘biodefense’	 programs;	 an	 increased	 accent	 on	preventing	 the	 ‘deliberate	 misuse’	 of	 modern	 biology;	 the	 design	 and	implementation	 of	 new	 national	 legislation;	 the	 promotion	 of	 ‘self-governance’	mechanisms,	and	the	development	of	new	oversight	and	regulatory	strategies	aimed	at	 monitoring	 and	 controlling	 flows	 of	 materials	 and	 information	 relevant	 to	 the	production	 of	 biological	 weapons.	 In	 brief,	 as	 the	 science	 and	 technology	 scholar	Judith	Reppy	(2003)	rightly	argues,	concerns	about	bioterrorism	have	“changed	the	political	and	social	context	for	biological	research”	(ibid,	p.	40)	and	contributed	to	a	“permanent	 shift”	 in	 the	 research	 and	 regulatory	 environment,	 “the	 full	consequences	of	which	are	still	to	be	revealed”	(ibid,	p.	49).		
4.2.2	The	‘dual-use	dilemma’	In	 light	 of	 growing	 concerns	 about	 bioterrorism,	 advances	 in	 the	 life	 sciences	 are	increasingly	characterized	as	possessing	an	 innate	 ‘dual-use	potential’.	That	 is,	 the	necessary	 ‘ingredients’	 for	doing	biology	are	perceived	to	enable,	on	the	one	hand,	‘revolutionary’	 advances	 in	 health,	medicine	 and	 industry,	 and,	 on	 the	 other,	 new	threats	 to	 ‘public	health’	and	 ‘national	security’	 (Kwik	et	al.	2003).	Popularized	by	the	 so-called	 ‘Fink	Committee’,	 in	 a	 report	published	by	 the	US	National	Research	Council	(NRC)	in	2004,46	this	characterization	of	modern	biology	is	inscribed	under	the	concept	of	the	‘dual-use	dilemma’.	In	the	words	of	the	Fink	Committee,	an	ad	hoc	
																																																								
46 The Fink Committee, otherwise known as the ‘Committee on Research Standards and 
Practices to Prevent the Destructive Application of Biotechnology’, was composed 
predominantly of life scientists, guided by the contributions of a select number of security 
advisors and biological weapons experts. One member of the Fink Committee, David 
Franz (introduced in further detail below), was interviewed for my research in the context 
of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). 
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advisory	 committee	 named	 in	 honor	 of	 the	 Committee’s	 chair,	 Gerald	 Fink,	 a	genetics	professor	at	the	Massachusetts	Institute	of	Technology	(MIT):		“The	 great	 achievements	 of	molecular	 biology	 and	 genetics	 over	 the	 last	 50	years	 have	 produced	 advances	 in	 agriculture	 and	 industrial	 processes	 and	have	revolutionized	the	practice	of	medicine.	The	very	technologies	that	fueled	these	benefits	to	society,	however,	pose	a	potential	risk	as	well	–	the	possibility	that	 these	 technologies	 could	 also	 be	 used	 to	 create	 the	 next	 generation	 of	biological	weapons.	 Biotechnology	 represents	 a	 ‘dual	 use’	 dilemma	 in	which	the	 same	 technologies	 can	 be	 used	 legitimately	 for	 human	 betterment	 and	misused	for	bioterrorism.”	(NRC	2004,	p.	1)	The	 ‘dual-use	 dilemma’,	 as	 a	 concept	 that	 has	 been	 widely	 adopted	 by	scientists,	security	experts,	public	officials,	and	many	others,	has	in	effect	‘unlocked’	a	new	set	of	possibilities	for	biotechnology,	directing	attention	towards	a	new	set	of	‘problems’	 and	 ‘potential	 risks’.	More	 than	ever	before,	 advances	 in	biotechnology	are	 accompanied	 by	 an	 expectation	 of	 ‘deliberate	 misuse’	 and	 the	 possibility	 of	‘catastrophic	harm’.	Moreover,	concerns	of	this	kind	are	increasingly	located	in	the	material	 and	 informational	 elements	 that	 makeup	 modern	 biology,	 which	 are	represented	 as	 possessing	 ‘fixed’	 functions	 that	 are	 ‘intrinsically	 dangerous’	(McLeish	and	Nightingale	2007).	Indeed,	the	Fink	Committee’s	primary	aim,	and	one	that	has	been	taken	up	and	advanced	by	diverse	bureaus,	departments,	agencies,	ad	
hoc	committees	and	working	groups,	both	in	the	US	and	elsewhere,	was	to	explore	and	to	categorize,	“the	capacity	for	advanced	biological	research	activities	to	cause	disruption	or	harm,	potentially	on	a	catastrophic	scale”	(NRC	2004,	p.	1).		Conceptually,	 the	 ‘dual-use	 dilemma’	 can	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 enabling	 the	production	of	new	‘risk	objects’		–	“ideas	about	harm	with	implicit	causality”	–	that	can	 be	 made	 the	 subject	 of	 risk	 management	 or	 regulation	 (Power	 2007,	 p.	 25).	Indeed,	 a	 further	 legacy	 of	 the	 Fink	 Committee	 was	 their	 introduction	 of	 seven	categories	 of	 problematic	 experiments	 –	 labeled	 ‘experiments	 of	 concern’	 (NRC	2004)	 –	 that	 the	 Committee	 argued	 could	 enable	 the	 production	 of	 (enhanced)	biological	weapons.	This	new	emphasis	on	 ‘dual-use	research’	has,	 in	turn,	had	the	effect	of	expanding	the	scope	of	life	science	oversight	and	regulation,	which	is	now	
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focused	not	only	on	pathogens	and	advanced	 technologies,	but	also	on	 life	science	knowledge,	 including	 its	 production	 and	 dissemination.	 In	 this	 manner,	 to	 an	existing	 list	of	high-risk	pathogens	 (known,	 in	 the	US	context,	 as	 ‘Select	Agents’)47	and	an	array	of	modern	laboratory	equipment,	there	exist	growing	concerns	about	genetic	 information,	 research	 activities,	 scientific	 protocols,	 and	 alike.	 Moreover,	according	to	the	Fink	Committee,	this	catalogue	of	risks	is	far	from	complete:	“The	 great	 diversity	 as	 well	 as	 the	 pace	 of	 change	 makes	 it	 imprudent	 to	project	the	potentialities	both	for	good	and	ill	too	broadly	and	too	far	into	the	future.	 Therefore,	 the	 Committee	 has	 initially	 limited	 its	 concerns	 to	 cover	those	 possibilities	 that	 represent	 a	 plausible	 danger	 and	 has	 tried	 to	 avoid	improbable	 scenarios.	Over	 time,	 however,	 the	Committee	believes	 it	will	 be	necessary	to	expand	the	experiments	of	concern	to	cover	a	significantly	wider	range	of	potential	threats.”	(NRC	2004,	p.	6)	In	 brief,	 under	 the	 “the	 ever-elusive	 category	 of	 ‘dual-use	 research’”,	 as	 the	anthropologist	Carlo	Caduff	(2008,	p.	272)	has	rightly	argued,	“the	potential	scope	of	regulatory	intervention	is	in	fact	infinitely	expandable.”			
4.2.3	‘Guns,	gates	and	guards’:	Introducing	the	‘classical’	biosecurity	model	In	tandem	with	the	production	of	new	‘risk	objects’,	which	have	been	defined	on	the	basis	 of	 the	 ‘dual-use	 dilemma’,	 there	 has	 been	 an	 appreciable	 shift	 in	 the	 US	regulatory	 environment	 from	 a	 regulatory	 focus	 on	 ‘biosafety’	 to	 ‘biosecurity’	(Reppy	2003;	Atlas	 2005b).	As	McLeish	 and	Nightingale	 (2007)	 suggest,	 this	 shift	has	been	accompanied	by	“new	governance	measures”	(ibid,	p.	1643)	“that	focus	on	restricting	 the	 diffusion	 of	 dangerous	 scientific	 information,	 pathogens	 and	materials”	 (ibid,	 p.	 1644).	 Characteristic	 of	 these	 reforms,	 the	 US	 Patriot	 Act	(2001)48	 and	 US	 Public	 Health	 Security	 and	 Bioterrorism	 Preparedness	 and	Response	 Act	 (2002),49	 legislation	 introduced	 following	 the	 terrorist	 attacks	 of																																																									
47 See http://www.selectagents.gov/. 
48 See http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ56/pdf/PLAW-107publ56.pdf. 
49 See http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ188/pdf/PLAW-107publ188.pdf. 
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2001,	 imposed	 new	 control	 measures	 on	 “select	 agents	 (i.e.,	 those	 pathogens	considered	 likely	 to	 be	 used	 in	 biological	 weapons)”,	 including	 mandatory	registration	requirements	 for	 laboratories	handling	Select	Agents,	FBI	background	checks	on	researchers	working	with	Select	Agents,	and	rules	 forbidding	 ‘restricted	persons’50	from	gaining	access	to	Select	Agents	(Reppy	2003,	p.	38).	Although	only	one	 component	of	 a	wider	 regime	aimed	at	 countering	 the	 threat	of	bioterrorism,	these	 reforms	 are	 illustrative	 of	 a	 distinctive	 functionality	 and	 set	 of	 underlying	logics	characteristic	of	biosecurity.	In	particular,	they	underline	how	biosecurity	(as	the	 concept	 is	 understood	 in	 the	US	 regulatory	 context)	 is	 conceived	 as	 a	 specific	kind	of	technical	‘fix’	to	the	‘problem’	of	bioterrorism.	The	nature	of	biosecurity	can	be	 further	 clarified	 when	 it	 is	 compared	 with	 the	 well-established	 practice	 of	biosafety.	Although	both	biosafety	and	biosecurity	broadly	describe	a	mechanism	of	control,	they	are	each	directed	at	managing	two	very	different	kinds	of	‘risk’.51	In	the	case	of	biosafety,	which	prior	to	2001	had	been	the	primary	focus	of	life	 science	 regulatory	 strategies	 in	 the	 US	 (Reppy	 2003;	 Atlas	 2005a),	 risk	management	efforts	are	directed	at	controlling	the	‘unintended	consequences’	of	life	science	 research.	 This	 framing,	 which	 was	 influenced	 by	 scientific	 and	 technical	deliberations	on	recombinant	DNA	technology	in	the	1970s	(Wright	1986),	 locates	‘risk’	 in	 the	 laboratory,	 embodied	 in	 the	 hazardous	 materials	 handled	 by	 life	scientists	 (Caduff	2008).	The	accompanying	risk	management	strategies	are	based	on	 a	 principal	 of	 containment	 (ibid.),	 whereby	 experiments	 and	 experimental	products	are	kept	within	the	confines	of	controlled	research	settings,	exemplified	by	“rules	 governing	 laboratory	 design	 and	 research	 practices	 intended	 to	 protect	workers	 and	 the	 general	 public	 from	 inadvertent	 release	 of	 biopathogens	 or	potentially	dangerous	genetically	engineered	agents”	(Reppy	2003,	p.	40).	‘Biosafety																																																									50	According to the US Patriot Act (2001, section 175b), ‘restricted persons’ include, 
among others, convicted criminals (incarcerated for more than one year), fugitives, 
unlawful users of controlled substances, the mentally ill, and illegal aliens 
(http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ56/pdf/PLAW-107publ56.pdf). 51	See ‘Biosafety and Biosecurity’, an explanatory document prepared by the BWC 
Implementation Support Unit, available at: 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/46BE0B4ACED5F0E0C125747
B004F447E/$file/biosafety%2Bbackground%2Bpaper%2B-%2Badvanced%2Bcopy.pdf.	
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risks’,	 in	 turn,	 are	 typically	 understood	 and	 represented	 as	 the	 unintended	byproduct	 of	 experimental	 error	 or	 scientific	 negligence,	 and	 the	 primary	responsibility	 for	 risk	 management	 falls	 upon	 scientists	 who	 are	 intended	 to	monitor	their	own	conduct	in	an	effort	to	minimize	unintended	harm.		 Biosecurity,	 in	 contrast,	 broadly	 describes	 a	 set	 of	 practices	 directed	 at	preventing	 the	 ‘deliberate	 misuse’	 of	 modern	 biology	 by	 sub-state	 groups	 or	individuals,	 calling	 for	 sustained	 ‘vigilance’	 on	 the	 part	 of	 scientists	 (as	 well	 as	biotech	 companies,	 scientific	 publishers,	 and	 others)	 to	 guard	 against	 potential	transgressions	within	 their	 ‘community’.	 In	other	words,	 it	 is	 intended	to	confront	and	 control	 the	 perceived	 threat	 of	 bioterrorism.	 In	 practice,	 even	 though	definitions	 of	 ‘biosecurity’	 vary	 between	 countries	 and	 ‘biosecurity	 controls’	 are	continually	evolving	in	tandem	with	the	emergence	of	new	‘dual-use	concerns’,	 for	US	 authorities	 engaged	 in	 aspects	 of	 ‘biosecurity	 policy’,	 biosecurity	 is	 typically	defined	by	a	finite	set	of	characteristics,	which	set	it	apart	from	biosafety	and	other	modes	of	managing	biological	risks	(for	example,	public	health).	According	to	the	US	National	Science	Advisory	Committee	for	Biosecurity	(NSABB	2010,	p.	10),	to	offer	a	general	 overview,	 biosecurity	 “refers	 to	 the	 protection,	 control	 of,	 and	accountability	 for	 high	 consequence	 biological	 agents	 and	 toxins,	 and	 critical	relevant	 biological	 materials	 and	 information,”	 and	 preventing	 “unauthorized	possession,	loss,	theft,	misuse,	diversion,	or	intentional	release.”	Interviews	conducted	with	several	biological	weapons	experts	in	the	context	of	 the	 Biological	 Weapons	 Convention	 (BWC)	 further	 capture	 much	 of	 what	 is	distinctive	about	biosecurity,	as	a	particular	kind	of	technical	‘fix’	to	the	problem	of	bioterrorism.	 For	 Dana	 Perkins,	 a	 public	 health	 official	 and	 biological	 weapons	expert	working	for	the	US	Department	of	Health	and	Human	Services	(DHHS):52	“[B]iosecurity,	 nowadays,	 means	 physical	 security	 of	 biological	 agents.	Basically	we	have	a	 list	of	agents	and	we	know	we	have	 to	keep	 them	under	lock	and	key;	 scrutinize	 the	people	 that	work	with	 those	agents;	 and	control																																																									
52 Please note: Dana Perkins now works for the United Nations Security Council 1540 
Committee. However, throughout my thesis, I refer only to Perkins’ professional 
responsibilities at the time of our interview. 
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information	 related	 to	 the	 facilities	 they’re	 in;	 their	 transportation;	 their	genetic	information,	and	so	on.”	(Dana	Perkins)	In	 other	 words,	 biosecurity	 is	 said	 to	 involve	 controlling	 access	 to	 potentially	dangerous	biological	materials	and	information	–	most	notably,	biological	materials	and	information	related	to	‘Select	Agents’	(a	list	of	microorganisms	and	toxins	that	are	believed	to	be	especially	suitable	for	use	as	biological	weapons).53		Other	 biological	 weapons	 experts	 interviewed	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 BWC	described	 biosecurity	 as,	 “locking	 up	 bugs”	 (Piers	 Millett)	 or	 “prevent[ing]	 bugs	from	 theft	 or	 diversion”	 (Richard	 Weller).	 From	 this	 perspective,	 the	 source	 of	concern	is	more	narrowly	conceived	as	pathogens	(‘bugs’),	and	people	(the	‘wrong	ones’)	gaining	access	to	pathogens.	More	succinctly,	and	with	a	view	to	broader	so-called	 “national	 security	measures”,	biosecurity	has	been	described	as,	 “protecting	biological	resources	against	acquisition	by	terrorists”	(Atlas	2005b,	p.	122).		In	 each	 of	 these	 accounts,	 the	 general	 principle	 is	 the	 same	 –	 to	 keep	‘dangerous	 tools’	 out	 of	 ‘dangerous	 hands’.	 As	 David	 Franz,	 a	 senior	 biodefense	scientist	 and	 former	 member	 of	 the	 Fink	 Committee,	 put	 it:	 the	 “classical”	biosecurity	 model	 depends	 upon	 “guns,	 gates	 and	 guards”	 to	 restrict	 access	 to	biological	resources	that	might	be	“deliberately	misused”.	In	 this	 light,	 the	 ‘classical’	biosecurity	model	 can	be	 thought	of	as	a	 type	of	‘command	 and	 control’	 strategy	 that	 depends	 upon	 maintaining	 a	 clear	 division	between	 those	 who	 can	 and	 those	 who	 cannot	 ‘legitimately’	 (and,	 in	 the	 case	 of	‘Select	 Agents’,	 legally)	 participate	 in	 aspects	 of	modern	 biology.	 Typically	 a	 core	component	 of	 arms	 control	 (including	 chemical	 and	 nuclear	 weapons)	 and	environmental	policy	 regimes,	 ‘command	and	 control’,	 sometimes	 referred	 to	 as	 a	‘direct	 regulatory	 instrument’	 (Goulder	 and	 Parry	 2008),	 represents	 a	 ‘top-down’	approach	 to	 regulation,	 relying	 on	 the	 prohibition	 of	 undesirable	 behavior,	which	can	 be	 monitored	 and	 then	 enforced	 through	 national	 laws	 (Holling	 and	 Meffe	1996).	More	generally,	 ‘command	and	control’	has	been	described	as	an	“approach	to	solving	problems	…	in	which	a	problem	is	perceived	and	a	solution	for	its	control																																																									
53 See http://www.selectagents.gov/. 
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is	developed	and	implemented”	(ibid,	p.	329).	“Most	of	all,”	a	command	and	control	approach	“is	expected	to	solve	the	problem	either	through	control	of	the	processes	that	lead	to	the	problem”	(ex	ante	control	measures)	“or	through	amelioration	of	the	problem	after	it	occurs”	(ex	post	control	measures)	(ibid.).	On	the	one	hand,	this	would	appear	to	be	an	exceptionally	narrow	framing	of	a	 ‘problem’	 to	be	 ‘solved’,	 reducing	 ‘biosecurity’	 (as	conceived	under	 the	 ‘classical’	biosecurity	model)	to	the	level	of	isolating	and	restricting	access	to	a	select	group	of	harmful	biological	entities.	On	the	other	hand,	as	the	following	accounts	suggest,	this	framing	 is	 deceptively	 complex,	 and	 possibly	 open-ended.	 Commenting	 on	 the	underlying	 principles	 of	 a	 ‘command	 and	 control’	 approach	 to	 ‘risk	 governance’,	Kwik	et	 al.	 (2003),	 a	group	of	biological	weapons	experts	 from	 the	 Johns	Hopkins	Centre	for	Civilian	Biodefense	Strategies,	suggest:		“This	type	of	governance	depends	on	being	able	to	assign	crisp	edges	to	what	is	and	 is	not	 subject	 to	 regulation,	and	 the	ability	 to	define	explicitly	what	 is	allowed	and	what,	precisely,	is	prohibited.”	(Kwik	et	al.	2003,	p.	30)		Or,	as	Holling	and	Meffe	(1996,	p.	329)	suggest,	a	“command-and-control	approach	implicitly	 assumes	 that	 the	 problem	 is	 well-bounded,	 clearly	 defined,	 relatively	simple,	and	generally	linear	with	respect	to	cause	and	effect.”		But,	 what	 if	 “these	 same	 methods	 of	 control	 are	 applied	 to	 a	 complex,	nonlinear,	 and	 poorly	 understood	 natural	 world,	 and	 when	 the	 same	 predictable	outcomes	are	expected	but	rarely	obtained”	(Holling	and	Meffe	1996,	p.	329)?	In	the	case	of	the	 life	sciences	and	biotechnology,	 there	are	 indeed	no	 ‘sharp	boundaries’	demarcating	 ‘productive’	 from	 ‘destructive’	 life	 science	 artifacts	 (McLeish	 and	Nightingale	 2007).	 Which	 begs	 the	 question:	 ‘who’	 or	 ‘what’,	 precisely,	 is	 to	 be	regarded	as	‘dangerous’	or	‘of	concern’	in	the	contemporary	life	sciences,	and	where	should	 one	 draw	 the	 line?	 As	 I	 have	 suggested,	 the	 very	 concept	 of	 the	 ‘dual-use	dilemma’	 invites	 the	 possibility	 that	 all	 life	 science	 artifacts	 (biological	 or	informational,	 tangible	 or	 intangible)	 can	 be	 dangerous	 and	might	 be	 deliberately	misused.	In	this	context,	there	are	no	‘crisp	edges’	that	can	be	used	to	define	‘what	is	and	 is	 not	 subject	 to	 regulation’	 and	 ‘what	 is	 allowed	 and	 what,	 precisely,	 is	prohibited’.	 Therefore,	 although	 binaries,	 categories,	 lists,	 and	 labels	 may	 be	
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desirable	from	the	standpoint	of	the	‘classical’	biosecurity	model	–	a	‘command	and	control’	approach	to	regulation	–	as	they	serve	to	demarcate	the	boundaries	of	‘safe’	and	‘dangerous’,	‘legitimate’	and	‘illegitimate’,	‘right	hands’	and	‘wrong	hands’,	such	divisions,	in	practice,	do	not	exist.	On	the	contrary,	they	are	created.		
4.2.4	Problematizing	synthetic	biology	It	 is,	 then,	 within	 this	 context	 that	 synthetic	 biology	 and	 synthetic	 biologists	 are	embedded:	a	context	that	views	‘bioterrorism’	as	a	problem	worth	worrying	about;	one	 that	 endeavors	 to	 control	 ‘dangerous	 tools’	 from	 reaching	 ‘dangerous	 hands’;	and	 one	 that	 is	 actively	 seeking	 to	 determine	 who	 or	 what,	 precisely,	 is	 to	 be	regarded	 as	 ‘dangerous’	 or	 ‘of	 concern’	 in	 light	 of	 a	 ‘dual-use	 dilemma’	 in	 the	 life	sciences.	As	Drew	Endy,	a	prominent	American	scientist	who	has	been	instrumental	in	 shaping	 the	 underlying	 goals	 of,	 and	 possibilities	 for,	 synthetic	 biology,	commented	during	an	interview	for	my	research:		“This	 is	 the	world	we’ve	 inherited	…	 there	 is	 an	 additional	 lens	 that	 shapes	security	conversations	where	there’s	quite	a	strong	 focus	on	sub-state	actors	and	individuals.	In	this	context,	synthetic	biology	has	garnered	a	fair	amount	of	attention,	in	that	if	anybody	could	order	up	the	genome,	and	perhaps	bring	to	life	 a	 viable	 hemorrhagic	 fever	 …	 And	 so	 our	 political	 systems,	 or	 security	systems,	are	prepared	to	respond	to	that.	So,	you	can	talk	about	the	impact	of	synthetic	 biology	 on	 biosecurity	 grounded	 in	 the	 context	 of	 existing	biosecurity	practice	and	strategy.”	(Drew	Endy)	Much	 of	 what	 I	 have	 said	 up	 to	 this	 point	 has	 been	 in	 an	 effort	 to	acknowledge	 precisely	 this	 –	 ‘existing	 [US]	 biosecurity	 practice	 and	 strategy'	 –	 so	that	 I	may	 discuss	 synthetic	 biology	 in	 context.	 This	 is	 because,	 synthetic	 biology	does	 ‘inherit	 a	world’,	 and	 it	 is	 one	 that	 frames	 biology	 and	 biologists	 in	 a	 highly	specific	way:	it	is	a	world	of	‘bioterrorism’	and	‘biosecurity’,	of	‘dangerous	tools’	and	‘dangerous	hands’.	 It	 is	a	world	of	defense,	of	material	controls,	and	of	a	ceaseless	search	 for	new	 ‘vulnerabilities’	 engendered	by	advances	 in	 the	 life	 sciences.	Thus,	when	conceiving	of	 the	 ‘how’s’	of	 risk-based	government	 in	synthetic	biology,	 this	
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context	must	always	be	kept	it	mind,	as	it	has,	fundamentally,	made	the	‘biosecurity	problems’	 associated	with	 synthetic	biology	 ‘knowable’	 and	 ‘speakable’,	 as	well	 as	orienting	 a	 “constellation	 of	 experts”	 (Rabinow	2008,	 p.	 279)	 in	 their	 attempts	 at	finding	practical	‘solutions’	to	seemingly	intractable	policy	‘problems’.	In	the	following,	I	will	explore	how	synthetic	biology	fits	in	this	context	–	that	is,	 how	 it	 is	 perceived	 to	 contribute	 to	 a	 growing	 list	 of	 contentious	 life	 science	research;	and	how	it	is	perceived	to	complicate	the	underlying	aims	of	biosecurity,	a	defensive	 practice	 premised	 upon	 keeping	 ‘dangerous	 tools’	 out	 of	 ‘dangerous	hands’.	 This	 research	 represents	 a	 contribution	 to	 the	 recent	 work	 of	 social	scientists	 interested	 in	 asking	 how	 cutting-edge	 biotechnologies	 like	 synthetic	biology	 are	 understood	 and	 represented	 as	 ‘biosecurity	 problems’,	 which	 are	believed	to	merit	some	sort	of	regulatory	response	(for	example,	Collier	et	al.	2004;	Lakoff	and	Collier	2008).	Conceptually,	this	body	of	scholarship	treats	“bioterrorism	and	 biosecurity	 as	 a	 site	 of	 problematization”	 (Collier	 et	 al.	 2004,	 p.	 3),	 exploring	“how	 policymakers,	 scientists,	 and	 security	 planners	 have	 constituted	 potential	future	events	as	biosecurity	threats,	and	have	responded	by	criticizing,	redeploying,	or	reworking	existing	apparatuses”	(Collier	and	Lakoff	2008,	p.	12).	This	approach,	“places	 in	 question	 existing	 attention	 to	 risk	 and	 its	 modes	 of	 identification,	recognition	 and	 definition”	 (Hutter	 and	 Power	 2005,	 p.	 11).	 Synthetic	 biology,	 I	suggest,	 is	 undergoing	 a	 process	 of	 ‘problematization’,	 as	 both	 the	 science	 and	 its	diverse	practitioners	 are	perceived	 to	destabilize	previous	ways	 of	 understanding	the	 world.	 The	 naming	 and	 classification	 of	 new	 ‘risk	 objects’	 for	 regulatory	attention	 (the	 subject	 of	 this	 chapter),	 I	 suggest,	 represents	 the	 first	 step	 in	 an	ongoing	 risk	 management	 process	 that	 seeks	 to	 identify,	 and	 ultimately	 ‘fix’,	regulatory	gaps	in	biosecurity,	enabling	synthetic	biology	–	as	a	science,	an	industry,	and	a	source	of	seemingly	boundless	expectations	–	to	move	forward.			
4.3	Taxonomy	and	the	objects	of	classification		If	labeling	what	is	to	be	regarded	as	‘dangerous’	or	‘of	concern’	in	the	context	of	the	contemporary	 life	 sciences	 is	 difficult,	 it	 is,	 perhaps,	 especially	 so	 with	 regard	 to	
	 102	
synthetic	biology.	This	 is	because	synthetic	biologists	claim	to	be	able	to	achieve	a	qualitative	 change	 in	modern	biology:	promising	 that	more	people	 in	more	places	will	be	able	to	design	and	build	‘novel	biological	systems’;	promising	to	make	‘new	life’	 from	 component	 parts	 or	 ‘off-the-shelf’	 chemicals;	 promising	 a	 rational,	‘engineerable’	 biology	 that	 does	 away	 with	 complexity	 and	 the	 need	 for	 tacit	knowledge,	 ushering	 in	 the	 much	 anticipated	 (yet	 unfulfilled)	 promise	 of	 a	deterministic	biology.	Synthetic	biologists,	in	brief,	have	promised	much,	and	there	are	 many	 ways	 of	 interpreting	 the	 scope	 and	 potential	 of	 their	 field.	 For	 those	scientific	 and	 technical	 experts,	 sometimes	 referred	 to	 as	 ‘biosecurity	 authorities’	Mukunda	et	al.	(2009),	whose	job	it	is	to	monitor	and	to	remain	a	step	ahead	of	so-called	 ‘biosecurity	 risks’,	 so	 that	 these	 risks	 may	 be	 assessed	 and	 managed,	 the	interpretive	flexibility	of	what	synthetic	biology	is	–	or	what	it	could	be	if	synthetic	biologists’	expectations	are	fulfilled	–	provides	a	seemingly	limitless	pool	of	people	and	 things	 to	 watch	 out	 for,	 to	 learn	 about,	 and	 to	 comprehend.	 Like	 other	regulatory	 subject	 matter	 perceived	 to	 deviate	 from	 familiar	 methods	 of	 control,	“[a]s	 new	 risk	 management	 needs	 arise,	 institutions	 develop	 new	 ways	 of	categorizing,	classifying,	thinking,	and	acting”	in	an	effort	to	reestablish	order	in	the	face	of	uncertainty	and	change	(Ericson	and	Haggerty	1997,	p.	25).	Thus,	 the	 task	 facing	 these	 experts	 is	 arguably	 a	 difficult	 one,	 requiring	considerable	 knowledge	 about	 the	 diverse	 equipment,	 techniques,	 practices,	 and	practitioners	bound	up	with	synthetic	biology,	all	of	which	require	sorting,	naming,	and	prioritizing,	 so	 that	a	 coherent	picture	of	 the	 ‘synthetic	biology	 threat’	 can	be	constructed.	In	many	ways,	this	work	resembles	‘taxonomy’	–	a	science	that	involves	the	 meticulous	 identification	 and	 grouping	 of	 diverse	 elements,	 and	 an	 equally	meticulous	naming	of	structures,	types	and	categories,	so	that	order	can	be	applied	to	disorder.	Also	like	taxonomy,	much	of	the	work	conducted	by	these	experts	draws	on	 techniques	 concerned	with	 seeing	 and	 contrasting	minute	differences	between	similar	entities,	as	such	differences	suggest	new	categories	of	interest	and	concern.	But,	 of	 course,	 biosecurity	 is	 not	 taxonomy.	 It	works	with	 different	materials	 and	with	different	aims.	For	diverse	risk	and	security	experts	engaged	in	aspects	of	the	synthetic	 biology	 regulatory	 response,	 perceived	differences	 (between	people	 and	
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between	 things)	do	not	 suggest,	 for	 example,	new	species	delineations,	but	 rather	new	 vulnerabilities	 in	 a	 system	 of	 controls	 on	 select	 biological	 materials	 and	information.	 Thus,	 for	 these	 experts,	 perceived	 differences	 –	 emergent	 and	 novel	properties	or	characteristics	–	are,	in	many	ways,	synonymous	with	new	‘problems’	and	‘risks’,	as	they	are	perceived	to	expose	‘gaps’	in	biosecurity.		There	 are,	 I	 argue,	 two	 principal	 branches	 that	 constitute,	 what	 might	 be	called,	 the	 ‘taxonomy	 of	 difference’	 that	 describes	 the	 ‘synthetic	 biology	 threat’.	First,	 there	 are	 the	 ‘tools’	 that	 makeup	 the	 science,	 broadly	 defined	 as	 the	assemblage	of	 instruments,	 techniques,	and	knowledge	 that	are	 said	 to	enable	 the	construction	 of	 ‘new	 life’	 and	 ‘novel	 biological	 systems’.	 Second,	 there	 are	 the	‘hands’,	the	actors	who	promise	to	make	use	of	these	tools	in	such	a	way	that	they	may	 be	 used	 to	 circumvent	 the	 controls	 in	 place	 on	 certain	 kinds	 of	 biological	materials	and	information	deemed	to	be	of	greatest	‘dual-use	concern’.	In	each	case,	it	 is	 by	way	 of	 ‘marking	 out	 difference’	 –	 identifying	 and	naming	 those	 aspects	 of	synthetic	biology	and	synthetic	biologists	that	are	perceived	to	be	‘new’	or	‘novel’	–	that	experts	conceive	of	people	and	things	as	‘biosecurity	problems’	or	‘biosecurity	risks’.	Taken	together,	these	labels	suggest	an	expanding	taxonomy	of	‘dangers’	and	‘concerns’,	 but	 one	 that	 lacks	 much	 of	 the	 coherency	 and	 hierarchical	 structure	traditionally	 associated	 with	 taxonomy.	 That	 is,	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 ‘synthetic	biology	threat’	is	non-linear,	heterogeneous,	and	undergoing	a	process	of	definition.	Indeed,	much	of	 the	work	of	 fixing	boundaries	–	marking	out	a	coherent	space	 for	thought	 and	 action	 –	 remains	 unresolved.	 	 Yet,	 it	 is	with	 a	 view	 to	 this	 emerging	taxonomy	that	one	is	provided	with	a	glimpse	of	the	emerging	‘problems’	and	‘risks’	that	are	presently	attributed	to	synthetic	biology,	as	well	as	how	the	science	and	its	practitioners	are	presently	framed	as	‘matters	of	(bio)security’.	
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4.3.1	‘Dangerous	tools’:	The	problem	of	‘doing	biology	differently’	Synthetic	 biologists	 are	 often	 outspoken	 about	 the	 ‘novelty’	 of	 their	 science.54	 In	particular,	 they	 boast	 of	 an	 impressive	 range	 of	 tools	 that	 promise	 to	 make	 the	design	 and	 engineering	 of	 biology	 easier	 and	 more	 widely	 accessible.	 For	 those	experts	whose	 job	 it	 is	 to	 identify	 and	 control	 emerging	 risks	 in	 the	 life	 sciences,	these	 tools	 are	 (by	 virtue	 of	 the	 ‘dual-use	dilemma’)	 often	 viewed	with	 suspicion.	Yet,	it	is	not	always	clear	what	these	‘tools’	look	like,	and	how,	precisely,	they	might	be	 problematic,	 which	 contributes	 to	 a	 variety	 of	 opinions	 on	 which	 are	 to	 be	regarded	 as	 the	most	 worrying	 and	 of	 greatest	 ‘dual-use	 concern’.	 There	 are,	 for	example,	 DNA	 sequencers	 and	 DNA	 synthesizers,	 which	 are	 physical	 laboratory	apparatus	 that	 might	 be	 misused,	 and	 that	 might	 be	 identified	 and	 listed	 with	minimal	 difficulty	 as	 ‘dangerous’	 or	 ‘of	 concern’.	 However,	 then	 there	 are	 DNA	sequence	 libraries,	 registries	 of	 ‘standard	 biological	 parts’,	 and	 other	 online,	information-based	resources,	which	are	more	 ‘virtual’	 than	 ‘physical’,	and	perhaps	less	easily	conceived	and	classified	as	‘dangerous’	or	‘of	concern’.	Finally,	there	are	the	more	 abstract	 aspects	 of	 synthetic	 biology,	which	 do	 not	 (at	 least	 intuitively)	resemble	 ‘tools’	 at	all,	but	are	perhaps	no	 less	 instrumental	 in	making	 the	science	problematic:	 these	are	the	foundational	 tenets	on	which	the	science	 is	based	–	the	methodologies	 and	 stated	aims	 that	 set	 out	 the	nature	 and	 scope	of	 the	 field,	 and	which	 arguably	 provide	 the	 field	 with	 much	 of	 its	 identity.	 Although	 discussed	today,	 amongst	 life	 scientists	 and	 technologists,	 these	 methodologies	 are	 largely	oriented	 to	 the	 future	 –	 that	 is,	 they	 are	 largely	 based	 on	 the	 promise	 of	 a	 truly	rational,	‘engineerable’	biology,	which	might	enable	‘anyone’	to	design	and	build	‘life																																																									
54 They are arguably less so when responding to arguments that suggest their science is 
sufficiently ‘new’ to require an entirely new (possibly more burdensome) approach to 
regulating the materials and information they work with. That is, they are willing to 
express that synthetic biology is ‘novel’, but not so novel that it should demand 
exceptional regulation. Similarly, while synthetic biologists welcome discussion on the 
subject of synthetic biology’s potential ‘biosecurity risks’, they are not prepared to assert 
that these risks are insurmountable. Aspects of these themes are touched on later in this 
chapter and discussed in further detail in subsequent chapters.	
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from	scratch’.	In	the	following,	I	will	discuss	how	each	of	these	‘tools’	is	framed	(in	part)	 as	 ‘dangerous’,	 and	 how	 each	 is	 perceived	 to	 pose	 its	 own	 challenges	 to	naming	 and	 classification.	 In	 doing	 so,	 I	 will	 also	 highlight	 that	 notions	 of	‘difference’,	and	thus	‘vulnerability’,	are	applied	equally	(if	not	more	so)	to	the	‘non-physical’	 tools	 of	 a	 science	 that	 promises	 nothing	 less	 than	 a	 ‘new	 way	 of	 doing	biology’	as	it	does	to	the	‘physical’	tools	that	more	visibly	characterize	the	field.		
4.3.1.1	‘Foundational	technologies’	First,	for	some,	including	the	Fink	Committee	(NRC	2004),	as	well	as	several	experts	interviewed	 for	 my	 research,	 “proliferation	 is	 over”	 (David	 Franz).	 By	 this	statement,	what	these	experts	mean	to	suggest,	in	the	words	of	the	Fink	Committee,	is	 that,	 “it	 is	 futile	 to	 imagine	 that	 access	 to	dangerous	pathogens	and	destructive	biotechnologies	can	be	physically	restricted,	as	is	the	case	for	nuclear	weapons	and	fissionable	materials”	 (NRC	2004,	p.	23).	 In	other	words,	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 scarce	materials	 and	 technical	 infrastructure	 that	 characterize	 the	 nuclear	 field	 and	 the	threat	posed	by	nuclear	weapons,	physical	pathogens	and	tangible	biotechnologies	are	already	“widely	accessible,	both	to	nations	and	to	terrorist	groups”	(ibid.).	Yet,	despite	the	assertion	that	‘proliferation	is	over’	–	a	view	that	is	arguably	based	less	on	the	belief	that	physical	pathogens	and	tangible	biotechnologies	cannot	(much	 less	 should	 not)	 be	 controlled,	 and	 more	 on	 the	 belief	 that	 access	 to	intangible	 life	 science	knowledge	 is	 an	 equally	 (if	 not	more)	urgent	problem	 (as	 I	will	 discuss	 in	 relation	 to	 genetic	 sequence	 information	 following	 the	 present	discussion)	–	this	remains	a	problematic	issue	for	many.	Indeed,	it	is	not	uncommon	for	 scientific	 and	 technical	 experts	 to	 represent	 tangible	 biotechnologies,	exemplified	by	modern	laboratory	equipment,	as	‘intrinsically	dangerous’	(McLeish	and	 Nightingale	 2007).	 In	 this	 manner,	 laboratory	 equipment,	 chemical	 reagents,	and	other	physical	‘ingredients’	for	doing	biology,	are	characterized	as	possessing	a	‘latent	 potential’	 for	 dangerousness,	 seemingly	 existing	 independently	 of	 human	action.	 This	 characterization	 of	 biotechnology	 is	 especially	 apparent	 in	 an	 article	
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written	by	the	biosecurity	experts	Kwik	et	al.	(2003,	p.	28),	who	refer	to,	“inherent	risk	in	bioscience”	and	describe,	“the	kidnapping	of	modern	biology”.		Of	 course,	 irrespective	 of	 the	 intrinsic	 characteristics	 that	 are	 ascribed	 to	modern	laboratory	equipment,	it	is	ultimately	not	the	‘equipment’	that	is	perceived	to	 be	 the	 problem,	 as	 equipment	 does	 not	 operate	 itself.	 Rather,	 the	 ‘problem’	 is	ultimately	 associated	with	what	 the	 equipment	 is	 perceived	 to	 ‘enable’	 or	what	 it	‘makes	 possible’.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 synthetic	 biology,	 much	 of	 what	 the	 science	 is	perceived	to	be,	as	well	as	much	of	what	 is	perceived	to	be	problematic	about	 the	science,	 is	defined	by	 the	present,	 as	well	 as	anticipated,	 capacities	of	 two	 related	technologies:	DNA	sequencing	and	DNA	synthesis.	Although	these	technologies	are	not	 ‘new’	 (in	 fact,	 they	 predate	 synthetic	 biology	 by	 several	 decades),	 they	 have	taken	 on	 new	 life	 in	 the	 synthetic	 biology	 discourse,	 described	 by	 synthetic	biologists	as	being	faster,	cheaper,	and	more	productive	than	ever	before	(Garfinkel	et	al.	2007).	As	the	microbiologists	Wimmer	et	al.55	suggest:		“Unprecedented	progress	in	synthesis	and	sequence	analysis	of	DNA	lies	at	the	heart	of	the	recent	transformation	of	molecular	biology	and	the	emergence	of	the	field	termed	synthetic	biology.”	(2009,	p.	1163)	Together,	these	so-called	‘foundational	technologies’56	are	perceived	to	make	a	specific	thing	possible,	namely,	‘synthetic	genomics’,	a	branch	of	synthetic	biology	that	promises	to	‘read’	(DNA	sequencing)	and	‘write’	(DNA	synthesis)	the	four	letter	‘code’	that	comprises	DNA,	permitting	the	de	novo	synthesis	of	genes	and	genomes.	Although	I	will	not	discuss	the	differing	technical	opinions	about	the	limitations	and	operational	 difficulties	 associated	 with	 de	 novo	 synthesis	 or	 the	 problematic	assumptions	that	underpin	the	belief	that	synthetic	genes	and	genomes	are	akin	to	ready-to-deploy	 biological	 weapons	 (a	 subject	 I	 briefly	 touched	 on	 earlier	 in	 this																																																									
55 The lead author on this paper, Eckard Wimmer, was also among the life scientists 
credited with creating ‘synthetic poliovirus’ (Cello et al. 2002), which is often cited as 
‘proof of principle’ in terms of what is possible using this technology. This experiment, 
as I will discuss in Chapter 6, is one of several ‘experiments of concern’ that have 
recently helped motivate new US policy on ‘dual-use research of concern’. 
56 This term has been used by synthetic biologists to describe those technologies “that 
affect the science and engineering of biology” (Endy 2005, p. 452).	
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chapter	 in	 relation	 to	 ‘weaponizing’	 pathogens)	 at	 this	 time,	 as	 these	 are	 subjects	that	I	will	examine	more	closely	 in	the	 last	section	of	Chapter	6,	what	I	do	wish	to	discuss	 is	 how	de	 novo	 synthesis	 is	 perceived	 to	 pose	 ‘biosecurity	 problems’	with	regard	to	‘access’	and	‘classification’	of	dangerous	pathogens.	The	 problem	 of	 access	 (in	 principle)	 is	 rather	 clear:	 DNA	 synthesis	technology	is	perceived	to	permit	the	de	novo	synthesis	of	biological	agents	that	are	presently	kept	under	lock	and	key	(‘Select	Agents’).	For	those	engaged	in	aspects	of	biosecurity	 policy,	 this	 is	 viewed	 as	 a	 singularly	 worrying	 problem,	 as	 it	 “might	provide	 an	 effective	 alternative	 route	 to	 those	who	would	 seek	 to	 obtain	 specific	pathogens	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 causing	 harm”	 (Bügl	 et	 al.	 2007,	 p.	 628).	What	 this	means,	in	practice,	is	that	in	addition	to	guarding	against	the	possibility	of	procuring	pathogens	 from	 nature,	 from	 biodefense	 facilities,	 or	 from	 commercial	 culture	collections,	regulators	must	now	also	be	concerned	about	pathogens	being	obtained	through	a	combination	of	openly	accessible	DNA	sequence	information,	off-the-shelf	chemicals	and	hardware57	–	all	of	which	are	now	framed	as	objects	of	‘suspicion’	and	‘concern’.	 Alternatively,	 and	 increasingly,	 companies	 that	 specialize	 in	 DNA	synthesis	 are	 said	 to	 be	 able	 to	 provide	 the	 desired	 oligonucleotides	 (or	 ‘oligos’)	(short	stretches	of	non-specific	DNA),	genes	or	genomes	‘on	demand’,	and,	as	several	experts	interviewed	for	my	research	highlighted,	“overnight”.			 The	 problem	 of	 classification,	 although	 less	 self-evident,	 is	 described	 as	equally	problematic	in	relation	to	biosecurity.	This	is	because	advances	in	synthetic	genomics	promise	 to	make	 it	possible	not	only	 to	 ‘replicate’	extant	pathogens,	but	also	to	‘resurrect’	ones	that	are	extinct	or	‘create’	entirely	new	ones.	Thus,	for	some,																																																									
57 Significantly, what is often missing from this equation is the individual with the 
requisite skills and know-how to actually make use of this technology. As the science and 
technology studies scholar Kathleen Vogel (2008a) observes, it is precisely this absence 
that obfuscates the social character of biotechnology while privileging access to materials 
and information. This observation is shared, as well as reinforced, by my own research, 
and will be returned to throughout my thesis. Discussing ‘dangerous tools’ independently 
of ‘dangerous hands’ in this chapter is, in part, intended to showcase the fact that the 
‘sociotechnical assemblage’ (ibid.) that is synthetic biology, is, in fact, often divided into 
two separate hemispheres by experts, where materials and information are appraised quite 
independently of the people that might (mis)use them.   
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DNA	synthesis	undermines	the	very	notion	of	a	‘list’	of	controlled	biological	agents,	as	the	following	interview	excerpts	underline:	“From	 the	 get	 go,	 I	 have	 been	mystified	…	 at	 the	whole	 concept	 of	 a	 ‘Select	Agent	List'	because	…	with	the	ability	to	change	existing	pathogens	or	to	build	different	 kinds	 of	 pathogens,	 why	 focus	 just	 on	 these?”	 (Amy	 Smithson,	chemical	and	biological	weapons	expert)	“The	 thing	 that	 struck	 me	 most	 when	 I	 first	 learned	 about	 [DNA	 synthesis	technology]	was	that	this	was	going	to	change	the	landscape	with	regard	to	the	Select	Agent	Rule.	That	lists	were	going	to	become	obsolete.”	(David	Franz)	As	these	accounts	suggest,	de	novo	synthesis	is	perceived	to	limit	one’s	ability	to	categorically	define	(and	ultimately	control)	a	specific	‘list’	of	pathogens,	because	modified	 pathogens	 or	 entirely	 new	 ones	 cannot	 be	 explicitly	 accounted	 for	 on	 a	pre-existing	 list.	 The	 ‘Select	 Agent	 List’58	 (introduced	 earlier)	 corresponds	with	 a	finite	number	of	high-risk	pathogens	and	biological	toxins.	It	does	not,	and	cannot,	cover	an	infinite	number	of	biological	entities,	especially	ones	that	no	longer	exist,	much	 less	ones	that	have	(perhaps)	never	existed.	Thus,	 to	the	extent	that	experts	believe	 in	 the	 potential	 of	de	 novo	 synthesis	 to	 create	 ‘new	 life’,	 it	 is	 perceived	 to	pose	 an	 open-ended	 ‘biosecurity	 problem’.	 As	 Dana	 Perkins,	 the	 US	 public	 health	official	and	biological	weapons	expert	introduced	in	the	previous	section,	expressed	with	regard	to	the	limitations	of	lists	in	light	of	the	possibilities	enabled	by	synthetic	genomics:	 “the	 range	 [of	possible	pathogens]	 expands	 so	much	 that	 it	may	pose	a	challenge	 in	 terms	of	what	we	 are	preparing	against.”	This	 dilemma	has	 similarly	been	 voiced	 by	 a	 number	 of	 other	 scientific	 and	 technical	 experts	 (for	 example,	Petro	et	al.	2003;	Nixdorff	et	al.	2008;	Mukunda	et	al.	2009).		 In	 contrast,	 there	are	 those	who	do	not	believe	 in	 the	 limitless	potential	 of	DNA	synthesis	technology	and	the	open-ended	capacity	to	synthesize	new	biological	entities,	 and,	 for	 these	 experts,	 as	 one	 Australian	 biodefense	 scientist	 asserted	during	 an	 interview	 at	 the	 BWC:	 “The	 claim,	which	 has	 been	 articulated	 by	 some	(mostly	 in	 the	 US	 context),	 that	 the	 Select	 Agent	 List	 is	 ‘obsolete’,	 because	 of	 the																																																									
58 See http://www.selectagents.gov/SelectAgentsandToxinsList.html. 
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possibility	of	novel	synthetic	organisms,	is	absurd.”	Many,	as	I	will	discuss	in	further	detail	 in	 subsequent	 chapters,	 share	 this	 biodefense	 scientist’s	 objection	 to	 the	notion	 that	 lists	 are	 ‘obsolete’,	 and	 their	 views	 are	 expressed	 in	 relation	 to,	what	they	 perceive	 to	 be,	 the	 most	 likely	 (not	 only	 ‘possible’,	 but	 also	 more	 or	 less	‘probable’)	 and/or	 the	 most	 relevant	 (in	 keeping	 with	 regulatory	 or	 other	institutional	 norms)	 risks	 enabled	 by	 synthetic	 biology.	 For	 these	 experts,	 lists,	although	 imperfect,	 remain	practical	 instruments	 for	delimiting	 the	 scope	of	high-risk	pathogens	with	a	view	to	keeping	them	‘locked	up’.	Whether	DNA	synthesis	technology	will	or	will	not	make	lists	‘obsolete’,	it	is	nonetheless	 perceived	 to	 enable	 a	 larger	 universe	 of	 ‘potentially	 dangerous’	biological	entities,	 if	only	by	way	of	more	readily	enabling	subtly	different	genetic	constructs	 resulting	 in	 unfamiliar	 strains	 of	 existing	 microorganisms.	 And	 while	simple	 modifications	 (for	 example,	 moving	 a	 single	 gene	 from	 one	 organism	 to	another)	have	been	possible	since	the	advent	of	recombinant	DNA	technology	in	the	1970s,	advances	in	DNA	synthesis	technology	are	described	as	making	many	more	varieties	of	‘dangerous	species’	possible	(for	example,	mixing	and	matching	multiple	genes	 from	 multiple	 organisms	 or	 inserting	 a	 novel	 ‘synthetic	 sequence’	 into	 a	naturally	 occurring	 one).	 Moreover,	 and	 of	 greatest	 relevance	 to	 the	 present	discussion,	 as	 such	 microorganisms	 do	 not	 (yet)	 have	 names	 or	 known	characteristics,	 they	 are,	 by	 some	 accounts,	 beyond	 classification,	 and	 thus	 quite	literally	beyond	the	remit	of	a	‘list-based’	approach	to	biosecurity.	
	
4.3.1.2	‘Sequences	of	concern’	and	‘malicious	parts’	Second,	 the	 ‘problem’	 of	 synthetic	 biology	 is	 equally	 perceived	 to	 be,	 as	 the	 Fink	Committee	 observed	 in	 relation	 to	 biotechnology	 more	 generally	 (NRC	 2004),	 a	problem	of	 the	 ‘non-physical’	aspects	of	 the	science.	That	 is,	 the	knowledge	bound	up	 with	 an	 improved	 understanding	 of	 biological	 processes	 and	 molecular	 life,	increasingly	 communicated	 in	 the	 language	 of	 modern	 genetics.	 In	 particular,	synthetic	 biology	 is	 closely	 tied	 to	 the	 production,	 distribution	 and	 use	 of	 genetic	
	 110	
information,	 either	 in	 the	 form	 of	 ‘genomic	 sequence	 information’59	 or	 ‘genetic	parts’.60	 This	 information,	 encoded	 in	 the	 series	 of	 letters	 that	 represent	 the	 four	base	pairs	that	comprise	DNA	–	adenine	(A),	thymine	(T),	guanine,	(G)	and	cytosine	(C)	 –	 is,	 for	 those	 who	 believe	 that	 biology	 can	 largely	 be	 reduced	 to	 genetic	information	(the	dominant	view	conveyed	by	synthetic	biologists,	if	complicated	or	contradicted	 in	 practice),	 itself	 perceived	 to	 be	 a	 powerful,	 and	 potentially	dangerous,	 ‘tool’.	 Unlike	 laboratory	 equipment,	 however,	 information	 does	 not	possess	physical	properties	 that	are	readily	observable	and	measurable,	making	 it	more	 difficult	 to	 define	 and	 control.	 Thus,	 from	 a	 biosecurity	 standpoint,	 genetic	information	is	perceived	to	be	especially	problematic.			 Many	of	the	biosecurity	concerns	and	dilemmas	that	are	presently	associated	with	 the	 production	 and	 distribution	 of	 genetic	 information	 vis-à-vis	 synthetic	biology	are	 captured	 in	 the	 following	quotation	by	Ronald	M.	Atlas,	Co-director	of	the	 Center	 for	 Health	 Hazards	 Preparedness	 at	 the	 University	 of	 Louisville	 and	former	 president	 of	 the	 American	 Society	 for	 Microbiology,	 who	 discusses	 the	broader	‘problem’	of	access	to	information	in	the	context	of	the	life	sciences:			“Beyond	 the	 issue	 of	material	 control,	 i.e.	 how	 to	 prevent	 the	 acquisition	 by	terrorists	 of	 dangerous	 pathogens,	 lies	 the	 more	 difficult	 issue	 of	 how	 to	constrain	 information	 in	 the	 life	 sciences	 which	 is	 potentially	 dual	 use	 and	could	be	misused	to	cause	harm	…	But	how	can	we	define	what	is	dangerous	and	 how	 can	 we	 design	 a	 system	 that	 contains	 that	 danger	 while	 allowing	legitimate	biomedical	research	to	proceed	in	a	manner	acceptable	to	society?”	(Atlas	2005b,	p.	133)	Atlas’	question,	“how	can	we	define	what	is	dangerous	[with	regard	to	information]	and	how	can	we	design	a	system	that	contains	that	danger	while	allowing	legitimate	biomedical	 research	 to	 proceed	 in	 a	 manner	 acceptable	 to	 society?”	 is,	 for	 those																																																									
59 See, for example, GenBank, “an annotated collection of all publicly available DNA 
sequences” that describes the genetic makeup of numerous genes and genomes 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/genbank/). 
60 See, for example, MIT’s ‘Registry of Standard Biological Parts’, a “collection of 
genetic parts that can be mixed and matched to build synthetic biology devices and 
systems” (http://partsregistry.org/Main_Page).	
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concerned	about	the	deliberate	misuse	of	synthetic	biology,	at	the	heart	of	much	of	their	 thinking	 and	 action.	 Like	 physical	 pathogens,	 information	 about	 pathogens	(including	 sequence	 information	 associated	 with	 complex	 traits	 for	 pathogenicity	and	 virulence)	 is	 perceived	 to	 pose	 problems	 of	 ‘access’	 and	 of	 ‘classification’,	threatening	to	undermine	the	‘classical’	biosecurity	model.			 Concerns	 about	 access	 to	 genetic	 information	 are	 related	 to	 the	 belief	 that	this	 information,	 once	 produced,	 is	 ‘openly	 accessible’	 and	 thus	 ‘vulnerable	 to	misuse’.	The	availability	of	genetic	information	is	described	as	being	fuelled	by	rapid	advances	in	DNA	sequencing	technology,	which	has	permitted	a	growing	number	of	genes	 and	 genomes	 to	 be	 ‘decoded’	 and	 made	 available	 to	 a	 public	 audience	 via	online	 genetic	 sequence	databases.	 In	 the	words	 of	Mukunda	 et	 al.	 (2009,	 p.	 7),	 a	group	 of	 academic	 experts	 who	 have	 closely	 followed	 recent	 developments	 in	synthetic	 biology	 with	 a	 view	 to	 its	 ‘security	 implications’,	 this	 information	represents	 a	 “treasure	 trove	 of	 biological	 functions	 evolved	 during	 the	more	 than	3.8	billion	years	since	 life	on	Earth	began	–	a	smorgasbord	as	 it	were,	 that	 invites	experimentation	 and	 exploitation.”	 The	 authors	 further	 emphasize	 that	 GenBank,	the	 largest	 public	 database	 of	 genetic	 sequence	 information,	 “contains	 nearly	 100	trillion	letters	of	the	genetic	alphabet”	(ibid.),	offering	“encyclopedic	coverage	of	all	the	functional	components	and	processes	of	organisms”	(ibid,	p.	8).		As	 this	 account	 suggests,	 concerns	 of	 this	 kind	 are	 interconnected	 with	concerns	 about	 the	 accessibility	 of	 information	 over	 the	 Internet	more	 generally.	Like	Mukunda	 et	 al,	 the	 security	 analysts	Machi	 and	McNeill	 (2010,	 p.	 10)	worry	that,	 “the	 full	 genetic	 sequence	 for	 many	 select	 agents	 and	 other	 pathogenic	genomes	(smallpox,	botulism,	anthrax)	are	already	in	Internet-accessible	databases	that	 currently	 mandate	 free,	 unfettered,	 and	 anonymous	 access.”61	 Furthermore,	
																																																								
61 Contrary to Machi and McNeill’s (2010) account, ‘Select Agents’ do not describe 
‘pathogenic genomes’, but whole microorganisms. Moreover, ‘genomes’ are rarely 
‘pathogenic’ in themselves. Rather, they must be inserted into a suitable cellular 
environment to be ‘activated’, a step that is more complex than synthesizing the genome 
itself (NSABB 2006). Again, these aspects of biological weapons development (in this 
case, the first step in a developmental pathway, as pathogens alone are not ready-to-
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according	to	the	French	biological	weapons	expert	Elisande	Nexon	(2011,	p.	6),	the	“availability	of	genomic	sequence	data”	becomes	“more	of	an	issue	as	capacities	for	[DNA]	synthesis	steadily	 increase”,	offering	the	possibility	of	the	de	novo	synthesis	of	 “virulence	 factors”	 and	 other	 genes	 “linked	 with	 a	 risk	 of	 misuse”.	 Counter-bioterrorism	 specialists,	 Petro	 et	 al.	 (2003,	 p.	 165),	 have	 voiced	 similar	 concerns	about	“digital	proliferation”,	where	sequence	information,	“commonly	accessible	via	a	 currently	 non-attributable	 manner	 over	 the	 Internet”,	 makes	 it	 “increasingly	possible	to	reconstruct	viruses	from	genomic	digital	data	files”.		On	 one	 level,	 then,	 concerns	 about	 access	 to	 genetic	 information	 would	appear	 to	be	defined	as	much	by	advances	 in	 information	 technology	(IT),	as	 they	are	 by	 advances	 in	 synthetic	 biology.	 That	 is,	 irrespective	 of	 its	 origin,	 sequence	information,	 once	 put	 online,	 is	 perceived	 to	 be	 especially	 problematic,	 as	 the	Internet	enables	‘unfettered’	and	‘anonymous’	access.	In	this	light,	synthetic	biology	would	 appear	 to	 be	 problematic	 only	 in	 as	much	 as	 advances	 in	DNA	 sequencing	technology	have	increased	the	quantity	of	genetic	information	available	online,	and	advances	 in	 DNA	 synthesis	 technology	 make	 it	 increasingly	 possible	 to	 translate	genomic	 sequence	 information	 into	physical	 genomes.	As	 the	anthropologist	Carlo	Caduff	(2008,	p.	259)	has	rightly	argued,	many	biosecurity	concerns	are	not	so	much	about	 “biotechnology’s	 miraculous	 transformative	 capacity	 itself	 but	 rather	 the	ability	attributed	 to	 information	 to	circulate	and	reproduce	 faster	and	more	easily	than	matter.”		“Information”,	he	suggests,	“is	bodiless,	or	is	at	least	said	to	be	so,	and	thus	appears	to	escape	the	universal	law	of	gravity”	(ibid.).	On	another	level,	however,	synthetic	biology	does	add	a	further	dimension	to	existing	 concerns	 about	 access	 to	 genetic	 information,	 but	 this	 requires	 taking	 a	closer	look	at	another	vision	of	the	science	and	its	possibilities,	namely	the	so-called	‘parts-based’	 approach	 to	 synthetic	 biology.62	 Under	 this	 approach,	 genetic	
																																																																																																																																																																					
deploy biological weapons) are often glossed over in favor of generalized concerns about 
‘access’ to intrinsically dangerous artifacts (McLeish and Nightingale 2007). 
62 Although the ‘parts-based’ approach to synthetic biology tends to be discussed in 
relation to synthetic biology’s potential to make biology ‘engineerable’, which I consider 
following the present discussion, what I wish to emphasize here is that ‘genetic parts’, as 
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information	is	not	characterized	as	a	 linear	sequence	of	A’s,	T’s,	G’s	and	C’s,	but	as	‘genetic	parts’	or	‘modular	parts’,	such	as	‘BioBricks’,63	which	are	intended	to	‘code’	for	specific	biological	functions.	Synthetic	biologists	promise	this	will	make	genetic	‘circuits’	(coding,	 for	example,	 for	specific	metabolic	pathways)	easier	to	assemble,	analogized	as	snapping	together	Legos.	Online	databases,	such	as	MIT’s	‘Registry	of	Standard	 Biological	 Parts’,64	 store	 this	 information,	 which	 can	 then	 be	 used	 to	synthesize	 desired	 biological	 components.	 Alternatively,	 these	 components	 can	 be	ordered	directly	from	the	Registry,	albeit	many	sequences	and	their	corresponding	DNA	 are	 presently	 described	 as	 poorly	 characterized,	 incomplete	 and/or	unavailable.65	The	Registry	is	used	by,	among	others,	undergraduate	biology	teams	during	 their	 preparations	 for	 the	 annual	 International	 Genetically	 Engineered	Machine	 (iGEM)	Competition,	 a	 competition	 that	 sees	 student	 teams	 from	all	 over	the	world	compete	to	construct	innovative	‘living	machines’.66	For	 some	 scientists	 engaged	 in	 biosecurity	 policy,	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘modular	parts’	 is	 a	 problem	 in	 as	 much	 as	 it	 suggests	 a	 more	 flexible,	 standardizable,	reproducible,	bioengineering	capability,	offering	new	avenues	 for	 the	proliferation	and	 use	 of	 information	 that	 might	 be	 deliberately	 misused.	 As	 Richard	Weller,	 a	biological	weapons	expert	and	biodefense	scientist	working	for	the	US	Department	of	Energy,	commented	during	an	interview	at	the	BWC:	“If	you	have	access	to	the	genomic	data	[in	the	form	of	‘modular	parts’]	and	the	technology’s	advanced	to	the	point	where	you	sort	of	have	this	basic	car	frame	[‘chassis’]	that	you’re	now	going	to	customize,	you	really	don’t	need	access	[to	pathogens].	 I	mean	 all	 of	 the	 things	we	have	 done,	 the	 time	 and	 energy	 and	debate	and	everything	we’ve	done	with	regard	to	biosecurity	(locking	up	bugs	in	 a	 box	 or	 security	 facilities	 to	 prevent	 bugs	 from	 theft	 or	 diversion),	 it																																																																																																																																																																						
specific configurations of genetic sequence information, are themselves perceived to be 
problematic entities in relation to the ‘classical’ biosecurity model. 
63 See the ‘BioBricks Foundation’, which describes ‘BioBricks’ as “the fundamental 
building blocks of synthetic biology” (http://biobricks.org/about-foundation/). 
64 See http://partsregistry.org/Main_Page.	
65 Ibid. 
66 See http://igem.org/Main_Page. 
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becomes	 a	 sort	 of	 moot	 point,	 at	 least	 from	 an	 arms	 control	 or	 threat	perspective.”	(Richard	Weller)	Or,	 as	 Piers	Millett,	 a	 biological	 weapons	 expert	 and	 senior	 administrator	 for	 the	BWC,	 expressed	 this	 dilemma	 during	 an	 interview	 conducted	 for	my	 research,	 in	reference	to	intangible	life	science	knowledge	more	generally:		“From	a	proliferation	perspective,	it’s	no	longer	about	locking	up	bugs;	it’s	no	longer	about	locking	up	materials	or	restricting	the	number	of	thermocyclers	in	 the	world	or	making	sure	 that	people	don’t	have	1,000	 liter	 fermenters	 in	military	 facilities	 or	 whatever	 it	 is.	 Those	 points	 are	 going	 to	 be	 irrelevant,	because	the	really	dangerous	stuff	will	be	knowledge	that	you	can’t	necessarily	lock	up.”	(Piers	Millett)	Thus,	 for	Weller	 and	 for	 Millett,	 and	 for	 many	 others	 who	 have,	 in	 recent	 years,	voiced	 their	 concerns	 about	 the	 problem	 of	 access	 to	 intangible	 life	 science	knowledge,	 the	 knowledge	 bound	 up	 with	 advances	 in	 synthetic	 biology	 is	problematic	 not	 only	 because	 ‘proliferation	 is	 over’	 (physical	 pathogens	 and	laboratory	 equipment	 are	 already	 ‘out	 there’);	 not	 only	 because	 this	 knowledge	(communicated	 in	 the	 language	 of	 modern	 genetics	 and	 stored	 in	 online	 genetic	sequence	 databases)	 is	 ‘the	 really	 dangerous	 stuff’,	 but	 also	 because,	 as	 Millett	simply	reasons,	knowledge	‘can’t	necessarily	be	locked	up’.	 	The	 task	 of	 classifying	 the	 genetic	 information	 associated	 with	 synthetic	biology,	so	that	it	can	be	characterized	and	monitored,	is	described	as	an	equally	(if	not	more)	challenging	problem	for	regulatory	authorities.	It	is	also	more	illustrative	of	 scientific	 and	 technical	 experts’	 attempts	 at	 refining	 and	 inscribing	 notions	 of	‘danger’	 and	 ‘concern’	 at	 the	 level	 of	 knowledge	 about	molecular	 life.	 Specifically,	synthetic	biologists’	determination	to	make	biology	 ‘informational’,	breaking	down	cells	into	genetic	‘circuits’,	‘parts’,	and	‘parts	of	parts’	that	can	be	assembled	in	novel	ways,	pushes	scientific	and	technical	experts	to	locate	their	security	concerns	at	the	level	 of	 increasingly	 small	 units	 of	 molecular	 life,	 raising	 new	 questions	 and	dilemmas.	 As	 Christopher	 Park,	 Senior	 Advisor	 for	 Bioterrorism	 in	 the	 Bureau	 of	
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International	 Security	 and	 Non-proliferation	 at	 the	 US	 Department	 of	 State,67	contemplated	with	regard	to	characterizing	smallpox	in	the	process	of	moving	from	its	‘scientific	name’	to	‘strain’	to	‘genomic	sequence’:	“What	 degree	 of	 genetic	 similarity	 does	 it	 need	 to	 have	 to	 some	 reference	sequence	to	constitute	smallpox?		We	have	a	law	in	the	books	that	says	85	per	cent	 similarity.	Well,	 that’s	 a	problem,	because	 some	 strains	of	monkypox	 in	fact	 exceed	 that	 threshold.	But	 they’re	 not	 smallpox.	 So	…	we’re	 getting	 to	 a	point	 where	 these	 labels	 are	 not	 really	 adequate	 and	 useful	 tools,	 because	where	 is	 the	 line?	You	know,	once	you	move	 from	form	to	sequence,	you	get	the	 same	 problem	 as	 in	 evolutionary	 biology,	 where	 you	 start	 saying,	 you	know,	 ‘Do	 our	 species	 delineations	 make	 sense	 now	 that	 we’re	 looking	 at	sequences	rather	than	bone	structure?’”	(Christopher	Park)	In	 this	account,	 ‘labels’,	while	perceived	 to	be	necessary,	as	 they	help	differentiate	between	 ‘safe’	 and	 ‘dangerous’	 genomic	 data,	 are	 seen	 as	 problematic.	 What	‘constitutes	 smallpox’	 and	 thus	 a	 ‘dangerous	 thing’?	 For	 this	 counter-bioterrorism	specialist,	 the	answer	 is	not	 self-evident,	 and	 it	 is,	perhaps,	becoming	 less	 so	with	increased	 knowledge	 about	molecular	 life.	 Specifically,	 he	 questions	 the	 utility	 of	classifications	 based	 on	 marginal	 units	 of	 genetic	 similarity	 (or	 difference),	compared	 to	 those	 based	 on	 species	 type,	 as	 it	 is	 no	 longer	 clear	 that	 this	information	uniquely	characterizes	the	pathogen	of	 interest	and	concern.	Where	is	the	 ‘threshold’,	 and	 how	 does	 one	 know	 when	 it	 has	 been	 ‘exceeded’?	 As	 Park	expressed	later:	“the	conclusion,	at	least	for	the	moment,	is,	‘Yeah,	there’s	a	blurring,	sorry.	Use	your	best	judgment’.	It’s	not	an	easy	problem	to	quantify.”	In	this	fashion,	increasingly	 small	 margins	 of	 difference	 are	 used	 to	 demarcate	 those	 biological	entities	 that	 are	 perceived	 to	 be	 ‘dangerous’	 from	 those	 that	 are	 not,	 despite	 the	practical	difficulties	encountered	in	making	these	distinctions.		
																																																								
67 Please note: Christopher Park is now Director of the Biological Policy Staff in the 
Department of State’s Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. However, 
throughout my thesis, I refer only to Park’s professional responsibilities at the time of our 
interview. 
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	 Other	 interviewees	 expressed	 similar	 concerns,	 although	 voiced	 in	 slightly	different	 ways.	 As	 one	 senior	 biodefense	 scientist,	 Volker	 Beck,	 remarked	 in	 the	context	 of	 determining	 what	 constitutes	 a	 ‘synthetic	 sequence’,	 let	 alone	 a	‘dangerous’	 one:	 “Where	 does	 synthetic	 biology	 start?	 Does	 it	 start	 with	 15	 base	pairs,	or	does	it	start	with	100	or	1,000?”	Like	Park,	Beck	expresses	an	ambivalent	attitude	towards	meaningfully	assigning	a	label	to	a	marginal	unit	of	difference.	His	question,	roughly	summarized	as,	‘at	what	point	does	a	synthetic	sequence	begin	to	be	 conceived	 in	 terms	 of	 synthetic	 biology?’	 is	 arguably	 a	 good	 one,	 and	 one	 that	would	 seem	 to	 be	 without	 a	 clear-cut	 answer.	 Yet,	 efforts	 are	 nonetheless	 being	made	to	do	precisely	this.	Specifically,	although	not	discussed	in	the	context	of	this	interview,	 for	 the	purposes	of	 the	 first	draft	of	 the	Screening	Framework	Guidance	
for	Providers	of	Synthetic	Double-Stranded	DNA,	a	policy	proposal	put	forward	by	the	US	DHHS	 (2009),	which	 I	will	 discuss	 in	detail	 in	 the	 second	half	 of	 the	 following	chapter,	 the	original	 recommendation	was	 to	only	screen	sequence	orders	of	 “200	base	 pairs”	 or	 more.	 In	 effect,	 this	 cutoff	 would	 then	 dictate	 when	 an	 order	 for	‘synthetic	DNA’	(that	is,	a	request	for	a	physical	strand	of	DNA	produced	using	DNA	synthesis	 technology	 and	 off-the-shelf	 chemicals;	 encoded	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 an	arbitrary	 ‘digital	 sequence’	 of	 A’s,	 T’s,	 G’s	 and	 C’s	 submitted	 by	 a	 prospective	customer)	begins	to	matter	as	a	‘potential	risk’.	Some	commentators	described	this	decision	as	having	“no	firm,	credible,	or	scientific	justification”	(Berger	et	al.	2010,	p.	9).	 Upon	 further	 review,	 and	 based	 on	 feedback	 from	 a	 60	 day	 period	 of	 public	comment,	the	DHHS	(2010a,	p.	3)	agreed,	deciding,	“to	eliminate	the	200	bp	limit”	in	the	final	draft	because	the	“200	bp	limit	is	not	scientifically	justified”.			 Synthetic	biology,	then,	would	seem	to	push	the	limits	of	classifying	‘potential	risks’	at	the	level	of	genetic	information.	Yet,	as	the	preceding	discussion	underlines,	efforts	 are	 nonetheless	 being	 made	 to	 do	 so.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 DHHS’	 (2010b)	
Screening	Framework,	the	DNA	synthesis	industry	is	determined	(albeit	for	different	reasons,	 including	 averting	 commercial	 liability	 and	more	 restrictive	 government	legislation	 in	 the	 event	 of	 a	 biosecurity	 incident)	 to	 develop	 a	 curated,	 federally	backed,	list	of	‘sequences	of	concern’	with	which	to	compare	incoming	orders	in	an	effort	 to	 screen	 out	 problematic	 sequences	 (Fischer	 and	Maurer	 2010).	 However,	
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even	if	it	were	possible	to	definitively	‘know’	which	genes	are	‘dangerous’	and	which	are	 not	 –	 an	 objective	 that	 is	 greatly	 complicated	 by	 uncertainty	 regarding	 gene	sequence	in	relation	to	gene	function,	as	well	as	complex	interactions	between	gene	expression	and	the	cellular	and	extracellular	milieu	(NSABB	2010)	–	openly	 listing	this	information	is	said	to	be,	from	a	biosecurity	standpoint,	potentially	undesirable.	As	Piers	Millett	remarked	with	regard	to	the	possibility	of	such	a	list:	“There’s	a	push	towards	gathering	together	all	the	information	we	know	about	pathogenicity	 and	 infectivity	 (all	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 pathogens	 act	 as	pathogens)	 …	 But	 you’re	 also	 therefore	 compiling	 a	 database	 of	 exactly	 the	knowledge	that	would	be	of	the	greatest	proliferation	concern.”	(Piers	Millett)	Or,	as	Christopher	Park	put	it:	“it	would	be	a	real	cookbook	for	people	doing	things	we	 don’t	 want	 them	 to	 do.”	 Others	 interviewed	 for	 my	 research	 raised	 similar	concerns,	 contemplating	 the	 possibilities	 and	 difficulties	 of	 identifying	 and	classifying	 ‘genetic	 parts’	 that	 might	 confer	 virulence	 to	 otherwise	 harmless	bacteria,	referred	to	by	several	experts	as	“toxic	parts”	or	“malicious	parts”.	Taken	 together,	 these	 accounts	 suggest	 that,	 to	 a	 growing	 list	 of	 ‘dual-use	biotechnologies’,	 one	might	also	add	 ‘sequences	of	 concern’	or	 ‘malicious	parts’	or	any	 other	 configuration	 of	 genetic	 information	 that	 is	 perceived	 to	 be	 potentially	hazardous.	 In	 this	 fashion,	 security	concerns	about	 synthetic	biology	contribute	 to	the	 ‘molecularization’	 (Rose	2001)	of	 ‘(in)security’,	 embedding	notions	of	 ‘danger’	and	 ‘concern’	 in	ever-finer	parcels	of	molecular	 life.	Although,	as	Herbert	Gottweis	(1998)	has	argued,	a	conceptual	link	between	risk	and	(engineered)	molecules	can	be	 traced	 to	 scientific	 and	 technical	 deliberations	 on	 genetic	 engineering	 in	 the	1970s,	 the	 ‘risks’	 in	 question	were	 of	 a	 different	 sort,	 reflecting	 a	 different	 set	 of	political	 preoccupations	 and	 cultural	 concerns.	 Namely,	 genetic	 engineering	 was	predominately	 framed	as	having	potential	 ‘unintended	consequences’,	which	were	linked	 to	 concerns	 about	 the	 harmful	 (yet	 unintended)	 effects	 of	 emerging	technologies	 (for	 example,	 nuclear	 power	 stations)	 on	 public	 health	 and	 the	environment.	 Synthetic	 biology,	 in	 contrast,	 is	 framed	 as	 having	 the	 potential	 for	‘deliberate	 misuse’,	 reflecting	 more	 recent	 concerns,	 as	 I	 have	 suggested,	 about	
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bioterrorism.	 In	 brief,	 knowledge	 about	 molecular	 life	 (or	 at	 least	 access	 to	 this	knowledge)	is	increasingly	framed	as	a	‘biosecurity	problem’.		
4.3.1.3	Biology	made	‘simple	to	engineer’	Finally,	by	some	accounts,	 synthetic	biology’s	 ‘methodology’	 is	perceived	 to	be	 the	most	problematic	 ‘tool’	of	all.	In	this	instance,	biosecurity	concerns	are	linked	with	the	foundational	tenets	of	synthetic	biology	itself,	an	emerging	science	characterized	by	 a	 different	 way	 of	 thinking	 and	 talking	 about	 biology	 and	 biological	 research.	According	to	Drew	Endy	(2005,	p.	452),	a	key	figure	in	the	rhetorical	structuring	of	this	new	approach	to	‘doing	biology’,	synthetic	biology	depends	upon	“foundational	technologies	 based	 on	 ideas	 of	 standardization,	 decoupling	 and	 abstraction”	 that	“help	make	 routine	 the	engineering	of	 synthetic	biological	 systems	 that	behave	as	expected”.	These	concepts	(and	the	related	ideal	of	‘standard	biological	parts’)	graft	the	 mechanical	 logics	 and	 vocabularies	 of	 engineering	 onto	 the	 more	 unruly	substrate	 of	 biology	 –	 both	 the	 science	 and	 the	 material	 entity	 –	 suggesting	 the	possibility	of	enhanced	control	over	 life.	According	to	Endy,	and	others	who	share	his	vision,	the	hope	is	to	set	a	new	standard	in	pursuit	of	an	ambitious	experimental	aim:	to	verify	if	biology	can	be	made	‘simple	to	engineer’	(ibid.).	For	 scientific	 an	 technical	 experts	 engaged	 in	 biosecurity	 policy,	 while	 the	possibility	of	a	biology	that	is	‘simple	to	engineer’	is	perceived	to	be	promising,	it	is	also	perceived	to	be	“a	potential	game	changer”	(Piers	Millett).	Biosecurity,	as	I	have	discussed,	 is	 premised	 upon	 keeping	 ‘dangerous	 tools’	 out	 of	 	 ‘dangerous	 hands’.	Synthetic	 biologists’	 stated	 aims	 threaten	 to	 undermine	 this	 practice,	 calling	 into	question	 the	 very	 logics	 of	 a	 ‘command	 and	 control’	 approach	 to	 securing	biotechnology.	As	Piers	Millett	explained	during	an	interview:	“It’s	 not	 that	 synthetic	 biology	 could	 do	 this	 [enable	 broad-based	bioengineering	 capabilities],	 but	 that	 its	 deliberate	 intent	 is	 to	 do	 this.	 Its	stated	aim	is	to	allow	more	people	to	have	access	to	biology;	to	turn	it	into	an	information	 science;	 to	 spread	 it	 around	 the	 world;	 to	 bypass	 technological	
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requirements,	 and	 to	 reduce	 the	 time	 it	 takes	 from	 having	 an	 idea	 to	 a	commercial	application.”	(Piers	Millett)	For	 Millett,	 and	 for	 others	 who	 embrace	 the	 possibilities	 enabled	 by	 this	 new	methodology,	synthetic	biology	signals	something	different	because:	“It’s	not	a	development.	It’s	not	a	technological	improvement.	It’s	not	the	next	step	 in	 a	 development	 chain.	 For	 me,	 at	 least,	 it	 is	 a	 genuinely	 different	approach	 to	 biology,	 and	 one	 that	 will	 fundamentally	 change	 the	 space	 in	which	the	security	community	works.”	(Piers	Millett)	Here,	 a	 “genuinely	 different	 approach	 to	 biology”	 suggests	 ‘genuinely	 different	demands	 on	 securing	 biology’,	 because,	 Millett	 reasoned,	 “security	 concerns	ultimately	do	not	come	from	small	issues,	they	come	from	changing	the	way	biology	is	done,	and	that	leads	me	to	a	very	different	set	of	problems.”		 Mukunda	et	al.	 (2009,	p.	13)	have	similarly	argued	that	synthetic	biology	 is	unique	to	the	extent	that	it	“includes,	as	a	principal	part	of	 its	agenda,	a	sustained,	well-funded	 assault	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 tacit	 knowledge	 to	 bioengineering	 and	thus	on	one	of	 the	most	 important	current	barriers	 to	 the	production	of	biological	weapons.”	 Based	 on	 interviews	with	 “leading	 synthetic	 biologists”	 and	 “practicing	biosecurity	 authorities”	 (ibid,	 p.	 1),	 the	 authors	 suggest	 that,	 even	 though	 “the	aspirations	 of	 Synthetic	 Biologists	 remain	 largely	 unfulfilled”	 (ibid,	 p.	 3),	 the	 very	possibility	that	synthetic	biology	could	make	biology	easier	to	engineer	is	enough	to	set	 the	 science	 apart	 from	 earlier	 attempts	 at	 bioengineering	 and	 to	 make	 it	 of	greater	concern	to	many	who	are	closely	monitoring	its	development.	With	a	view	to	these	potential	advances,	as	Mukunda	et	al.	(ibid.)	suggest,	one	can	see	that,	if	only	setting	 a	 new	 ‘agenda’	 and	 foreshadowing	 enhanced	 bioengineering	 capabilities,	synthetic	biology	is,	for	some	experts,	both	exceptional	and	worrying.		 	Yet,	others	are	skeptical	that	synthetic	biology	signals	a	radical	change	in	our	ability	 to	 ‘do	biology’;	highlighting	 that,	 even	 for	 those	with	considerable	 skill	 and	know-how	 applied	 to	 constructive	 research	 projects,	 ‘doing	 biology’	 remains	 a	difficult	 job.	 David	 Franz,	 who	 was	 previously	 the	 head	 of	 the	 US	 Army	 Medical	Research	Institute	of	Infectious	Diseases	(USAMRIID),	explained:	
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“I	always	say	that	anything	is	possible.	We	can’t	afford	to	say,	‘that’s	impossible;	you’ll	 never	 do	 that’,	 or	 something	 like	 that.	…	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 I’ve	 tried	myself	or	been	around	people	who	have	worked	on	doing	things	with	biology	for	 so	many	 years	…	 it’s	 really	 complicated.	…	And	 I	 remember	 all	 the	good	things	we’ve	tried	to	do,	and	how	hard	it	 is	to	do	good	things,	as	well.	So,	 it’s	kind	of	humbling	to	see	how	little	we	really	do	know;	and	how	little	control	we	really	do	have	of	biology.”	(David	Franz)	During	 my	 interview	 with	 Dana	 Perkins,	 she	 similarly	 emphasized	 that	synthetic	biology	is	not	“Pasteur’s	microbiology”.	Perkins	then	went	on	to	describe	the	 specialized	 equipment,	 laboratory	 facilities,	 and	 alike,	 that	 she	 believes	 are	necessary	components	 for	doing	advanced	bioengineering	work.	At	 the	same	time,	her	 account	was	 not	 without	 contradiction,	 responding	 to,	 “Will	 doing	 biology	 or	synthetic	biology	ever	be	‘easy’?”	with:	“Well,	 biology’s	 easy	 now.	 It’s	 just	 that	 you’ll	 have,	 in	 the	 future,	 synthetic	biology	made	easy.	And,	in	some	respects,	at	the	low-end,	synthetic	biology	is	
already	easy.	It’s	just	at	the	upper	end,	you	know,	where	the	areas	of	concern	start,	when	you	start	to	create	completely	new	organisms...”	(Dana	Perkins)	Similar	 inconsistencies	 in	 individual	 accounts	 were	 not	 uncommon	 in	 the	interviews	 conducted	 for	 my	 research.	 Frequently,	 experts	 expressed	 ambivalent	attitudes	 about	 what	 synthetic	 biology	 ‘makes	 possible’,	 torn	 between	understandings	of	what	they	believe	the	science	can	achieve	today	versus	what	they	believe	 the	 science	 might	 enable	 in	 the	 future.	 This	 ambivalence	 was	 clearly	discernable	 in	 an	 interview	 with	 Special	 Agent	 You	 of	 the	 Federal	 Bureau	 of	Investigation’s	(FBI)	Weapons	of	Mass	Destruction	Directorate.	According	to	Agent	You,	 a	 virologist	 by	 training	 and	 now	 a	 leading	 figure	 in	 the	 US	 government’s	biosecurity	 awareness	 raising	 activities	 directed	 at	 synthetic	 biologists	 (and	 life	scientists	more	 broadly),	 although	 synthetic	 biology	may	 not	 pose	 an	 “immediate	threat”,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 not	 “fall	 behind	 the	 curve”,	 as	 “this	 is	 going	 to	 be	 the	century	of	 the	 life	sciences,	potentially.”	Drawing	the	common	analogy	between	IT	(or	 ‘computing’)	 and	 synthetic	 biology,	 Agent	 You	 argued	 that,	 if	 the	 “security	community”	had	sufficient	foresight	in	the	1970s,	
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“we	wouldn’t	be	so	behind	the	curve	now	when	it	comes	to	your	information	getting	hacked	or	identify	theft	or	getting	your	system	infected	by	a	virus	or	a	worm,	and	all	those	sorts	of	issues.	I	mean,	if	we	had	acknowledged	that	those	could	be	possibilities,	back	then,	systems	would	be	much	better	protected	now.	So,	 if	 we	 take	 a	 lesson	 from	 history	 …	 then	 it’s	 incumbent	 upon	 us	 to	 have	these	discussions	now	[about	synthetic	biology	and	its	potential	risks],	so	that	we’re	not	behind	the	curve	yet	again.”	(Edward	You)	Significantly,	 Agent	 You’s	 assessment	 is	 not	 just	 based	 on	 his	 own	premonitions	about	an	emerging	science	and	its	potential	risks.	Rather,	it	builds	on	the	 expectations	 of	 synthetic	 biologists,	who	 claim	 that	 advanced	 “capabilities”	 in	synthetic	biology	are	inevitable,	often	comparing	their	science’s	trajectory	with	the	history	 of	 “computing”	 (interviews	 with	 Andrew	 Hessel	 and	 Rob	 Carlson).	 In	reference	to	the	outlooks	of	two	prominent	synthetic	biologists,	You	reasoned:		“If	we	take	the	visions	of	Andrew	[Hessel]	and	Rob	[Carlson]	seriously	–	saying	that’s	 where	 they	 see	 the	 future,	 where	 they	 see	 households	 rather	 than	companies	and	universities	having	these	capabilities	–	then	there	is	a	need	for	the	security	community	to	be	proactive	and	to	act	now.”	(Edward	You)	In	 this	 light,	even	 though	biosecurity	experts	 like	Agent	You	believe	 that	synthetic	biology	 currently	 falls	 short	 of	 its	 stated	 aims,	 and	 that	 there	 are	 not	 yet	 ‘DNA	synthesizers	 in	 every	 home’	 (a	 common	 claim	made	 by	 synthetic	 biologists	 about	the	 future	 of	 their	 science,	 anticipated	 by	 Hessel	 and	 Carlson),	 there	 nonetheless	exists	 the	possibility	 that	 the	 expectations	of	 leading	 synthetic	 biologists	 could	be	fulfilled.	Moreover,	 if	 these	 expectations	 are	 fulfilled,	 and	 if	 the	 IT	 experience	 can	provide	a	meaningful	point	of	comparison	and	a	historical	lesson,	it	is	important	to	‘act	now’	in	anticipation	of	just	such	a	technological	future.	Ambivalence	of	this	kind,	I	suggest,	can	be	traced	to	the	‘anticipatory’	nature	of	threat	 assessments	 and	 risk	 forecasts	 more	 generally,	 which	 endeavor	 to	 look	forward;	 yet	 must	 be	 based	 on	 existing	 data	 and	 present	 beliefs.	 Uncertainty,	 in	other	words,	is	not	only	intrinsic	to	possible	future	events,	but	also	to	the	manner	in	which	 these	 events	 are	 imagined	 (O’Malley	 2004).	 As	 the	 science	 and	 technology	scholar	 Kathleen	 Vogel	 (2008b)	 rightly	 argues,	 bioweapons	 threat	 assessments	
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attempt	to	imagine	future	threats	based	on	current	capabilities,	limited		‘intelligence	information’,	 and	 expected	 technological	 developments.	 Drawing	 on	 Stephen	Hilgartner’s	 (2007)	 analysis	 of	 ‘anticipatory	 knowledge’	 in	 various	 arenas	 of	biotechnology,	Vogel	underlines	that	assessments	of	this	kind	are	“used	to	construct	societal	narratives	about	the	future	of	biotechnology	and	the	life	sciences”,	which,	in	turn,	 drive	 “particular	 policy	 responses”	 that	 “flow	 from	 these	 narratives”	 (Vogel	2008b,	p.	562).	Thus,	when	synthetic	biology’s	‘potential	risks’	are	linked	to	claims	about	 uncertain	 technological	 futures,	 there	 exists	 considerable	 scope	 for	ambivalent	or	contradictory	assessments	about	the	‘risks’	that	are	to	come.	In	turn,	there	exists	considerable	scope	for	multiple	‘policy	responses’.			There	 is,	 of	 course,	 no	 way	 of	 knowing	 whether	 synthetic	 biologists	 will	achieve	their	stated	aims	and	successfully	implement	a	‘new	way	of	doing	biology’.	By	 some	accounts,	 a	 future	of	 this	kind	would	appear	 to	be	doubtful.	 In	an	article	entitled,	 ‘Five	hard	truths	for	synthetic	biology’,	published	in	the	 journal	Nature	 in	2010,	 Roberta	 Kwok	 argues	 that,	 although	 “some	 accounts	 of	 synthetic	 biology”	seem	to	be	“restricted	only	by	the	imagination”	–	inspired	by	visions	“that	biologists	can	extend	genetic	engineering	to	be	more	like	the	engineering	of	any	hardware”	–	analogies	of	this	kind	“don't	capture	the	daunting	knowledge	gap	when	it	comes	to	how	life	works”	(Kwok	2010,	p.	288).	In	other	words,	for	Kwok,	and	for	others	who	remain	 skeptical	of	Endy’s	 (2005)	vision	 for	 synthetic	biology,	which	 is	 in	effect	 a	vision	 for	 the	 future	 of	 biological	 research	 and	 bioengineering	 more	 generally,	biology	is	not,	and	moreover	may	never	be,	‘simple	to	engineer’.	Yet,	despite	this	more	modest	outlook	on	synthetic	biology,	for	the	scientific	and	 technical	experts	 interviewed	 for	my	research,	and	 for	 the	majority	of	 those	 I	have	 encountered	 in	 the	 biosecurity	 policy	 literature,	 the	 possibility	 of	 an	‘engineerable’	biology	is	taken	seriously;	it	is	factored	into	their	‘anticipatory	gaze’,	and	composed	as	 ‘anticipatory	knowledge’	about	 “a	 future	 that	may	never	happen	but	that	must	be	guarded	against”	(O’Malley	2004,	p.	7).	In	the	absence	of	evidence	about	the	capacities	and	potentials	of	an	emerging	technology	(and	amidst	a	host	of	uncertainties	about	the	actors	who	might	choose	to	misuse	this	technology),	‘if,	then’	thinking	becomes	central	to	both	synthetic	biologists’	claims	about	their	science	and	
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to	 ‘biosecurity	 authorities’	 (Mukunda	 et	 al.	 2009)	 concerns	 about	 its	 potential	 for	‘deliberate	 misuse’.	 Thus,	 irrespective	 of	 whether	 the	 future	 will	 coincide	 with	 a	biology	that	is	‘simple	to	engineer’,	few	would	seem	to	discount	that	such	a	future	is	at	 least	 possible.	 And,	 “if	 it	 is	 possible”,	 as	 the	 authors	 of	 a	 report	 on	 synthetic	biology	 and	 its	 implications	 for	 insurers	 suggest,	 “then	 there	 is	 a	 risk”	 (Lloyd’s	Emerging	Risks	Team	2009,	p.	10,	section:	“What	could	go	wrong?”).		
	
4.3.2	‘Dangerous	hands’:	The	problem	of	‘being	a	different	kind	of	biologist’	For	 many	 scientific	 and	 technical	 experts,	 as	 I	 have	 suggested,	 a	 ‘democratized’	biology	 is	 perceived	 to	 be	 a	 dangerous	 biology.	 Moreover,	 it	 is	 perceived	 to	 be	‘dangerous’	 in	 a	 highly	 specific	 sense	 –	 namely,	 it	 is	 said	 to	 have	 the	 potential	 to	enable	more	people	to	gain	access	to	biological	materials	and	information	that	have	traditionally	 been	 kept	 out	 of	 reach	 of	 those	 outside	 familiar	 (secure)	 research	settings.	Whether	 enabled	 by	 DNA	 synthesis	 technology,	 the	 availability	 of	 online	genetic	 sequence	 information,	 or	 a	 methodology	 that	 promises	 a	 more	 inclusive	bioengineering	capability,	 the	perception	that	synthetic	biology	does	(or	will	soon)	lower	 barriers	 to	 access	 invites	 the	 possibility	 of	 new	 actors	 taking	 part	 in	potentially	dangerous	biological	research.	But,	which	actors,	precisely,	should	be	the	subjects	 of	 concern?	 And,	 what	 is	 it	 about	 these	 actors,	 in	 particular,	 that	 is	perceived	to	be	especially	problematic?	As	the	editor-in-chief	of	the	journal	Nature	queried	 (Campbell	 2006,	 p.	 S19)	 in	2006,	while	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 someone	might	choose	 to	 use	 synthetic	 biology	 for	 ‘malign	 purposes’,	 “who	 might	 that	 malign	someone	be?”	For	biosecurity	experts,	who	are	sought	 for	 their	knowledge	on	 the	kinds	of	people	who	are	likely	to	engage	in	acts	of	bioterrorism,	these	questions	are	increasingly	central	to	their	professional	responsibilities.	In	 the	 following,	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 just	 as	 experts	 engage	 in	 a	 process	 of	selection	to	name	those	tools	associated	with	synthetic	biology	that	they	perceive	to	be	of	greatest	relevance	and	concern,	they	similarly	engage	in	a	process	of	selection	to	 determine	 who	 might	 misuse	 these	 tools.	 For	 these	 experts,	 perceptions	 of	‘difference’,	 once	 more,	 suggest	 new	 vulnerabilities,	 but,	 in	 this	 context,	 the	
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perceived	differences	are	not	between	things,	but	between	people.	Specifically,	it	is	with	a	view	to	a	‘different	kind	of	biologist’,	one	who	is	empowered	by	the	tools	of	synthetic	biology	and	who	works	on	the	margins	of	‘institutional	science’,	that	many	security	 concerns	 are	 grounded.	 People,	 unlike	 things,	 however,	 interact	with	 the	names	 that	 are	 applied	 to	 them,	 and,	 thus,	 the	 act	 of	 naming	 and	 classifying	 a	‘dangerous	person’	poses	problems	and	dilemmas	beyond	 the	practical	difficulties	associated	with	the	naming	and	classification	a	‘dangerous	thing'.		
4.3.2.1	The	‘spectrum	of	potential	attackers’	Given	 the	 “spectrum	 of	 potential	 attackers”	 (Moodie	 2009,	 p.	 14)68	 who	 might	deliberately	 misuse	 synthetic	 biology,	 how	 are	 biosecurity	 experts	 to	 determine	who	 is	 of	 greatest	 relevance	 and	 concern?	 The	 answer	 (and	 for	 those	 engaged	 in	assessing	 the	 risks	 posed	 by	modern	 biology	 there	must	 be	 an	 ‘answer’,	 as	 their	work	requires	that	one	is	found)	is	that	not	everyone	counts	equally.	There	are,	 in	brief,	some	hands	that	are	perceived	to	be	more	dangerous	than	others.	And,	while	determining	 who,	 precisely,	 these	 ‘hands’	 belong	 to	 would	 seem	 to	 be	 an	 open-ended	 problem,	 the	 ‘spectrum	 of	 potential	 attackers’	 has,	 in	 fact,	 already	 been	narrowed	down	considerably;	by	the	nature	of	the	‘concerns’	themselves.		As	 I	 have	 said,	 to	 speak	 of	 ‘bioterrorism’,	 and	 not	 of	 ‘biosafety’	 or	 of	‘biowarfare’	or	of	much	else	besides,	is	already	to	suggest	certain	possibilities	while	obfuscating	others.	That	is,	concerns	about	bioterrorism	suggest	a	particular	kind	of	problem:	one	that	pertains	to	the	activities	of	sub-state	groups	or	individuals	intent	on	 using	 biology	 to	 cause	 deliberate	 harm,	 saying	 nothing	 about	 the	 risks	 arising	from	laboratory	accidents	or	the	activities	of	states.	As	one	synthetic	biologist	put	it	during	an	interview:	“The	only	concern	that	is	legitimate,	in	many	people’s	minds,	is																																																									
68 I should note that the phrase, ‘dangerous tools in dangerous hands’, which is a key 
theme introduced in this chapter, was partly inspired by the title of Moodie’s (2009) 
report, ‘Dangerous weapons in dangerous hands: Responding to the Challenges of 
Chemical and Biological Terrorism’. However, other than this similarity, my research 
does not conceptually overlap with Moodie’s (a consultant on international security 
affairs). In fact, the terms, “Dangerous weapons” and “dangerous hands” appear only in 
the title of Moodie’s report and are not developed as concepts (ibid.). 
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from	non-state	actors,	from	terrorists	...	The	‘bad	guy’	isn’t	a	state	anymore;	it’s	non-states.”	 Here,	 concerns	 about	 ‘(bio)terrorism’	 are	 perceived	 to	 limit	 the	 scope	 of	who	can	and	should	be	reasonably	worried	about.	So	much	so,	that	the	activities	of	‘(bio)terrorists’	are,	in	many	ways,	perceived	to	be	the	only	activities	worth	talking	about.	 This	 view	 reflects	 a	 common	 apprehension	 (particularly	 among	 those	working	outside	the	US	regulatory	context)	about	contemporary	biosecurity	policies	that	 increasingly	 prioritize	 the	 non-state	 threat	 over	 other	 (potentially	 more	important)	problems,	including	biowarfare	and	biosafety.69	However,	 unlike	 many	 contemporary	 security	 discourses,	 the	 synthetic	biology	biosecurity	debate	tends	to	focus	not	on	the	clandestine	activities	of	foreign	‘terrorists’,	but	rather	on	the	relatively	visible	activities	of	the	diverse	practitioners	that	 makeup	 the	 ‘synthetic	 biology	 community’.	 And	 perhaps	 one	 should	 not	 be	surprised	that	this	is	the	case.	Synthetic	biologists	are,	after	all,	the	ones	doing	the	research,	driving	the	technology	forward,	generating	innovative	ideas,	and	generally	interacting	 with	 the	 materials	 and	 information	 bound	 up	 with	 the	 science,	 all	 of	which	can	(in	principle)	be	deliberately	misused.	As	the	biological	weapons	experts	Tucker	and	Zilinskas	(2006,	p.	40)	argue:	“In	any	large	population	of	professionals,	a	small	minority	may	be	prepared	to	use	their	skills	for	illicit	purposes.”	In	the	case	of	synthetic	biology,	as	of	2006,	they	suggest	that:	“The	pool	of	people	capable	of	misusing	synthetic	biology	is	currently	limited	to	 the	 small	 number	 of	 undergraduates,	 graduate	 students,	 and	 senior	scientists	who	constitute	the	research	community	–	probably	fewer	than	500	people	…	In	the	future,	however,	the	number	of	capable	individuals	will	grow	
																																																								
69 During the course of the interviews conducted for my research at the BWC, a number 
of biological weapons experts, mostly based in Europe, expressed concerns about the 
emphasis on bioterrorism in the US context, suggesting that bioterrorism tends to 
overshadow, what they perceive to be, the more immediate problem of state-level 
biological warfare programs, which are perceived to currently have the necessary 
resources to make use of synthetic biology for hostile purposes. At the same time, 
concerns about bioterrorism vis-à-vis synthetic biology are not absent outside the US, but 
rather tend to be viewed as one among a number of possible risks (see, for example, 
Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology 2008). 
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rapidly	 as	 researchers	 are	 drawn	 into	 this	 exciting	 and	 dynamic	 field.”	(Tucker	and	Zilinskas	2006,	p.	42)	Thus,	when	selecting	and	naming	 ‘potential	attackers’	who	might	misuse	synthetic	biology,	biosecurity	experts	tend	to	 look	first	 to	members	of	 the	 ‘synthetic	biology	community’	 for	 answers.	 According	 to	 Gerald	 L.	 Epstein	 (2008),	 a	 security	 expert	and	 Director	 of	 the	 Center	 for	 Science,	 Technology,	 and	 Security	 Policy	 at	 the	American	 Association	 for	 the	 Advancement	 of	 Science:	 “Terrorists	 becoming	biologists	is	less	of	a	concern	than	biologists	becoming	terrorists”,70	underlining	the	belief	 that	 ‘being	 a	 biologist’	 is	 not	 only	 a	 profession,	 but	 also	 a	 craft,	 which	 is	perceived	to	enable	certain	possibilities	and	engender	certain	risks.		Synthetic	biologists,	 too,	have	been	outspoken	about	 the	possibility	of	 their	science	 being	 deliberately	misused	 by	members	 of	 their	 own	 community,	 and,	 in	some	 cases,	 they	 have	 gone	 to	 considerable	 lengths	 to	 share	 their	 concerns	with	others.	 Writing	 in	 the	 journal	 Nature	 in	 2005,	 for	 example,	 George	 Church,	 a	geneticist	at	Harvard	Medical	School	and	a	leading	figure	in	synthetic	biology,	called	for	 not	 only	 a	 “code	 of	 professional	 ethics	 for	 synthetic	 biologists”,	 but	 also	 for	 a	variety	of	modes	of	monitoring	and	surveillance	that	might	be	used	to	“watch	out	for	the	 rare	 cases	when	 they	 transgress”	 (Church	2005,	p.	423).	According	 to	Church,	synthetic	biologists	must	learn	from	past	experience	(that	is,	the	history	of	previous	technologies)	and	“should	imagine	worst-case	scenarios	and	protect	against	them”,	including	 through	 the	development	of	 a	 variety	of	 ‘technical	 solutions’	 that	would	prevent	engineered	pathogens	from	causing	harm	if	released	into	the	environment	(a	subject	that	I	will	discuss	further	in	Chapter	6)	(ibid.).		Like	Church,	a	number	of	the	synthetic	biologists	(Drew	Endy;	Rob	Carlson)	interviewed	 for	 my	 research	 expressed	 their	 long-standing	 commitment	 to	biosecurity	 and	 their	 early	 advocacy	 for	 ‘biosecurity	 awareness’	 within	 their	community.	 Moreover,	 and	 lending	 support	 to	 these	 accounts,	 a	 number	 of																																																									
70 This view was similarly expressed at a workshop that I attended during my field 
research, when one commentator argued that: “It is more likely that a biologist will 
become a terrorist, than a terrorist will become a biologist” (‘Microbiology, genomics 
and beyond: Regulating dual use technology into the 21st Century Programme’, held at 
the Wellcome Trust, London, 17 September 2010). 
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biosecurity	 experts	 (Richard	 Weller;	 Edward	 You)	 interviewed	 for	 my	 research	emphasized	 that	 their	 concerns	about	 synthetic	biology	were	 in	 fact	motivated	by	the	voiced	concerns	of	several	prominent	synthetic	biologists	(notably,	Drew	Endy	and	Rob	Carlson).	In	other	words,	in	some	cases,	synthetic	biologists	would	appear	to	 have	 raised	 ‘biosecurity	 concerns’	 about	 their	 science	 (and	 their	 ‘community’)	before	biosecurity	experts	were	aware	of	‘concerns’	to	be	‘concerned	about’.	However,	 synthetic	 biologists’	 advocacy	 for	 safety	 and	 security	 can	 equally	be	 understood	 as	 an	 attempt	 to	 underline	 a	 commitment	 to	 ‘responsible	 science’,	preempting	public	concern	and	potential	controversy.	According	to	Church	(2005,	p.	423):	 “Whether	we	believe	that	 these	are	 immediate,	distant	or	 imaginary	threats,	the	 concerns	 are	 real."	 Here,	 Church	 would	 seem	 to	 suggest	 that	 he	 is	 no	 less	concerned	 about	 the	 ‘concerns	 about	 the	 risks’	 than	 he	 is	 about	 the	 ‘risks’	 (the	material	 ones)	 themselves.	 In	 reference	 to	 the	 legacy	 of	 genetically	 modified	products	and	gene-therapy	drugs,	Church	further	cautions	against	failed	exercises	in	public	engagement	(ibid.).	Accounts	of	this	kind	reveal	that,	more	than	ever	before,	scientists	are	acutely	aware	of	the	‘secondary’	or	‘reputational’	risks	that	go	hand-in-hand	with	managing	the	‘primary’	risks	that	are	the	immediate	subject	of	regulation	(Power	 et	 al.	 2009).	 In	 this	 light,	 although	 advocating	 for	 a	 commitment	 to	biosecurity,	Church	(and	the	synthetic	biologists	noted	above)	would	appear	to	be	no	 less	 concerned	 about,	 and	 preoccupied	 with,	 demonstrating	 a	 sense	 of	responsibility	 and	 maintaining	 an	 air	 of	 optimism	 about	 their	 science.	 Indeed,	Church	 (2005,	 p.	 423)	 concludes	 his	 article	 on	 precisely	 this	 note:	 “Finally,	 the	community	 needs	 to	 discuss	 the	 benefits	 of	 synthetic	 engineering	 to	 balance	 the	necessary,	but	distracting,	focus	on	[‘primary’]	risks.”	Whether	motivated	primarily	by	 concerns	 about	 bioterrorism	 or	 primarily	 by	 concerns	 about	 a	 loss	 of	 public	support	 for	 their	 research,	 the	 fact	 remains:	 synthetic	biologists	have	been	among	the	first	to	declare	that	their	science	could	be	deliberately	misused.		Yet,	even	in	light	of	general	agreement	that	the	‘synthetic	biology	community’	is	 itself	a	source	of	potential	concern,	there	remain	further	difficulties	facing	those	engaged	 in	 determining	 who	 is	 worth	 worrying	 about	 within	 this	 community.	 In	particular,	 there	exists	a	 lack	of	clarity	about	who	makes	up	 the	 ‘synthetic	biology	
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community’	to	begin	with;	and,	moreover,	what	it	means	to	be	a	‘synthetic	biologist’.	Synthetic	biology	is	often	described	as	an	interdisciplinary	‘field’,	bringing	together	life	 scientists,	 chemists,	 engineers,	 physicists,	 computer	 scientists,	 materials	scientists,	 and	 others	 (Schmidt	 2008;	 NSABB	 2010).	 These	 actors,	 in	 turn,	 are	engaged	 in	 a	 diverse	 range	 of	 activities,	 “driven	 mainly	 by	 the	 idea	 of	 turning	biotechnology	 into	a	 true	engineering	discipline”	 (Deplazes	2009,	p.	428).	 In	brief,	synthetic	biology	is	framed	as	many	things;	synthetic	biologists	as	many	people,	and,	together,	 they	 are	 loosely	 clustered	 around	 an	 ‘idea’	 –	 that	 is,	 to	 make	 biology	‘engineerable’.	 For	 even	 the	 most	 ‘category-inclined’	 regulator,	 making	 sense	 of	these	diverse	 elements	might	 justifiably	 be	described	 as	 ‘daunting’.	 For	 several	 of	the	 biosecurity	 experts	 interviewed	 for	 my	 research,	 the	 ambiguity	 surrounding	synthetic	 biology	 was	 simply	 described	 as	 “fuzzy”.	 Therefore,	 although	 concerted	efforts	 are	 being	 made	 by	 biosecurity	 experts	 (among	 others)	 to	 make	 sense	 of	synthetic	 biology	 –	mapping	out	 those	 aspects	 of	 the	 science	 and	 its	 practitioners	that	 make	 it	 distinctive	 –	 ‘knowing’	 with	 any	 degree	 of	 clarity	 what	 ‘synthetic	biology’	 is	 and	 who	 constitutes	 the	 ‘synthetic	 biology	 community’,	 let	 alone	 who	within	this	community	might	be	‘dangerous’,	remains	highly	uncertain.	
	
4.3.2.2	Outliers	and	exceptional	cases:	‘Lone	wolves’	and	‘biohackers’	Despite	 these	 uncertainties,	 however,	 efforts	 are	 nonetheless	 being	 made	 “to	anthropomorphize	danger	and	construct	a	vision	of	the	enemy”,	which	is	a	defining	feature	of	any	security	 regime	(Bigo	2006,	p.	22).	Like	other	security	 regimes,	 the	synthetic	 biology	 biosecurity	 discourse	 also	 draws	 on	 notions	 of	 ‘otherness’	 to	demarcate	 those	 who	 are	 and	 those	 who	 are	 not	 to	 be	 regarded	 as	 ‘real’	 or	‘legitimate’	threats	to	our	collective	security.	In	particular,	it	is	with	a	view	to	those	working	on	the	margins	of	synthetic	biology	–	the	outliers	and	exceptional	cases	–	that	new	categories	of	 ‘dangerous	person’	are	in	the	process	of	being	produced.	At	the	 heart	 of	 this	 process	 of	 selection	 and	 classification	 are	 biosecurity	 experts’	perceptions	of	synthetic	biologists’	idealized	goals,	which	promise,	on	the	one	hand,	“to	 eventually	 expand	 the	universe	 of	 capabilities	 open	 to	 its	 [synthetic	 biology’s]	
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most	skilled	practitioners”,	while,	on	the	other,	“substantially	 leveling	the	gradient	between	 elite	 and	 peripheral	 practitioners”	 (Mukunda	 et	 al.	 2009,	 p.	 15).	 In	 each	case,	synthetic	biology	is	perceived	to	have	something	to	offer	the	small	fraction	of	those	who	would	choose	to	deliberately	misuse	the	science.		For	‘elite	practitioners’,	the	full	potential	of	synthetic	biology	is	perceived	to	be	at	their	disposal,	inviting	an	array	of	possibilities	that	might	undermine	current	biosecurity	efforts.	Variously	referred	to	by	biosecurity	experts	as	 ‘lone	operators’,	‘lone	wolves’	or	simply	 ‘scientists	with	a	grudge’	(Tucker	and	Zilinskas	2006),	 this	type	 of	 person	 is	 perceived	 to	 be	 someone	 with	 ready	 access	 to	 the	 biological	materials	and	knowledge	that	form	the	basis	of	synthetic	biology,	which	they	can,	in	turn,	 use	 to	 design	 and	 build	 (given	 the	 current	 ‘state-of-the-art’)	 just	 about	 any	dangerous	pathogen.71	In	many	ways,	this	person	might	be	any	‘synthetic	biologist’	who,	working	on	the	margins	of	‘legitimate’	life	science	research,	chooses	to	use	this	research	in	‘illegitimate’	ways.	For	example,	according	to	Gerald	L.	Epstein:	“The	 most	 serious	 potential	 scenario	 would	 be	 if	 individuals	 trained	sufficiently	 broadly	 in	 biological	 science	 or	 biotechnology	 –	 and	 who	therefore	already	have	the	expertise	to	develop	biological	weapons	–	become	sympathetic	with	or	recruited	by	terrorist	groups.”	(Epstein	2008)	Once	 again,	 Epstein’s	 views	 reflect	 the	 belief	 that	 experienced	 scientists	 possess	privileged	knowledge	that	can	(in	principle)	be	deliberately	misused.	This	view,	of	course,	is	characteristic	of	‘dual-use	concerns’	more	broadly,	and	has	therefore	done	relatively	little	to	destabilize	perceptions	of	the	‘dual-use	threat’.	In	 the	 case	 of	 synthetic	 biology’s	 ‘peripheral	 practitioners’,	 however,	 the	problem	is	perceived	to	become	markedly	more	complex.	This	is	because	synthetic	biology	promises	to	make	it	easier	for	‘less	skilled’	practitioners,	formally	excluded	from	 ‘institutional	 science’,	 to	 participate	 in	 ‘potentially	 dangerous’	 research,	 a																																																									
71 Once again, this view is based on the assumption that access to materials and 
knowledge is itself a sufficient requirement for producing pathogens and viable 
biological weapons. As I have touched on earlier in this chapter, and as I will discuss in 
further detail in subsequent chapters (especially the final section of Chapter 6), this 
assumption fails to account for the practical difficulties (both technical and social) that 
complicate the research process. 
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scenario	 fundamentally	 at	 odds	 with	 current	 approaches	 to	 biosecurity	 (NSABB	2010).	 The	 ‘classical’	 biosecurity	model,	 as	 I	 have	 discussed,	 relies	 on	 barriers	 to	access	and	distinctions	 to	be	made	between	 those	who	can	and	 those	who	cannot	‘legitimately’	 participate	 in	 aspects	 of	 modern	 biology.	 But,	 what	 happens	 when	these	 barriers	 are	 lowered,	 the	 line	 between	 ‘legitimate’	 and	 ‘illegitimate’	practitioners	blurred,	and	those	formally	excluded	from	‘institutional	science’	enter	the	field	of	play?	As	Piers	Millett	expressed	during	an	interview:	“Whilst	I’m	sure	99.9	per	cent	of	those	people	would	want	to	have	fun;	would	want	to	make	money;	would	want	to	get	the	Nobel	Prize;	would	want	to	do	something	that	was	generally	beneficial,	you	can	guarantee	down	to	human	nature	that	some	tiny	little	fraction	will	want	to	do	something	nasty	with	it.”		(Piers	Millett)	Or,	as	Christopher	Park	succinctly	put	it:	“You	give	the	same	technology	to	enough	people	 and	 somebody’s	 going	 to	 do	 something	 stupid.”	 Like	 many	 biosecurity	experts,	Park	and	Millett	 (despite	 their	optimism	for	 the	science	and	 its	potential)	are	 concerned	 about	 the	 implications	 of	 giving	 more	 people	 the	 capability	 to	engineer	biology.	The	reason	being,	even	though	most	‘peripheral	practitioners’	are	expected	 to	 have	 good	 intentions,	 there	 are	 also	 those	 who	 might	 transgress	community	norms.	And,	for	these	experts	–	who	are	responsible	for,	according	to	the	demands	of	their	individual	professions,	imagining	the	unexpected	and	unwelcome	possibilities	 enabled	 by	 modern	 biology	 –	 these	 are	 precisely	 the	 individuals	(however	few	there	may	be)	who	are	of	greatest	relevance	and	concern.		 Of	 particular	 interest	 and	 concern	 is	 a	 growing	 community	 of	 amateur	biologists	or	so-called	‘biohackers’,	who	seek	to	move	biology	and	biotechnology	out	of	 ‘institutions’	 and	 into	 garages,	 kitchens,	 basements,	 community	 labs,	 and	 other	‘non-institutional’	 research	settings	 (interview	with	amateur	biologist,	 Jason	Bobe,	introduced	in	further	detail	below).	The	French	biological	weapons	expert,	Elisande	Nexon	(2011),	offers	a	glimpse	of	 the	world	of	 ‘DIY-biology’,	as	 imagined	 from	the	perspective	of	security	experts	and	life	science	regulators:	“When	 considering	 biosecurity	 and	 biosafety,	 a	 new	 phenomenon	 is	worth	monitoring:	 namely,	 the	 emergence	 of	 ‘do	 it	 yourself	 (DIY)	 biology’	 (also	
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referred	 to	 as	 ‘garage	 science’).	 The	 reduced	 cost	 and	wider	 availability	 of	specialist	 equipment	 and	 the	 spread	 of	 information	 have	 allowed	 citizen	scientists	 and	 amateur	 biologists	 to	 practise	 biology	 outside	 traditional	professional	 settings,	 including	 extracting	 and	 building	 synthetic	 DNA	sequences	in	makeshift	laboratories.	Online	networks	such	as	DIYbio.org	and	OpenWetWare.org	provide	information	and	facilitate	communication	in	ways	that	can	lead	to	innovation,	but	that	also	represent	a	new	challenge	in	terms	of	awareness,	best	practice	and	regulation.”	(Nexon	2011,	p.	4)		Here,	DIY-biology	 is	 framed	as	a	distributed	(online)	network	of	 ‘citizen	scientists’	engaged	 in	 the	 very	 practices	 that	 are	 of	 greatest	 concern	 to	 those	 monitoring	advances	in	biotechnology	and	developing	biosecurity	policies.	Although	 some	 question	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 amateur	 biologists	 are	 doing	‘synthetic	 biology’,	 as	 opposed	 to	 more	 basic	 forms	 of	 research	 conducted	 in	 its	name	(interviews	with	biological	weapons	experts	and	senior	biodefense	scientists	at	the	BWC),	their	aims	–	to	introduce	modern	biology	into	the	public	sphere	–	are	intimately	 bound	 up	 with	 the	 promise	 of	 a	 science	 that	 seeks	 to	 make	 the	manipulation	 of	 genomes	 ‘user-friendly’	 by	 reducing	 the	 need	 for	 scientific	 and	technical	 knowledge	 (Smith	 and	 Davison	 2010)	 and	 ‘black-boxing’	 “powerful	applications”	and	“key	procedures”	(Chyba	2006).		In	many	ways,	 DIY-biologists,	 including	 artists,	 designers,	 hobbyists,	 and	 a	handful	 of	 professional	 scientists	 (interview	 with	 amateur	 biologist,	 Mackenzie	Cowell,	 introduced	 in	 further	detail	below),	 serve	as	a	 test	case	 for	what	might	be	possible	 if	 synthetic	 biologists	 can	 (in	 time)	 make	 biology	 ‘simple	 to	 engineer’.	Moreover,	from	a	biosecurity	standpoint,	the	extension	of	biology	to	more	people	in	less	formal	research	settings	 is	decidedly	problematic.	As	one	recent	report	by	the	US	National	Science	Advisory	Board	for	Biosecurity	(NSABB)	explains:		“[S]ince	 current	 biosafety	 and	 biosecurity	 paradigms	 address	 life	 sciences	research	 conducted	 at	 research	 institutions,	 there	 may	 well	 be	 gaps	 in	oversight	resulting	 from	the	 large	numbers	of	synthetic	biology	practitioners	who	come	from	backgrounds	that	are	not	traditionally	considered	life	sciences	or	who	lack	formal	institutional	affiliations.”	(NSABB	2010,	p.	iii)	
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As	 the	NSABB	 suggests,	 amateur	biology	 is	 perceived	 to	be	 a	problem	because,	 in	brief,	 it	 is	 ‘different’.	 That	 is,	 ‘non-institutional	 biology’	 is	 perceived	 to	 be	 at	 odds	with	 an	 existing	 regulatory	 ‘paradigm’	 that	 is	 premised	 upon	 limiting	 access	 to	‘potentially	dangerous’	life	science	research.	In	this	light,	to	the	extent	that	synthetic	biology	expands	the	number	of	users	of	modern	biology,	as	a	recent	report	by	 the	Presidential	 Commission	 for	 the	 Study	 of	 Bioethical	 Issues	 (PCSBI	 2010,	 p.	 8)	suggests,	“synthetic	biology	poses	some	unusual	potential	risks”.		 On	one	level,	concerns	about	‘amateur	biologists’	are	essentially	the	same	as	those	leveled	at	‘elite	practitioners’	–	that	is,	synthetic	biology	might	enable	them	to	obtain	 dangerous	 pathogens.	 However,	 on	 another	 level,	 the	 concerns	 are	qualitatively	 different.	 As	 the	 previous	 accounts	 suggest,	 concerns	 about	 amateur	biology,	 in	many	ways,	 are	 not	 so	much	 about	what	 amateur	 biologists	might	 do	with	synthetic	biology	(obtain	dangerous	pathogens),	as	they	are	about	where	they	(or	 where	 they	 do	 not)	 conduct	 their	 work,	 and,	 ultimately,	 about	 who	 amateur	biologists	 are	 (or	 who	 they	 are	 not).	 That	 is,	 amateur	 biologists	 are	 framed	 as	something	 other	 than	 ‘traditional	 life	 scientists’	 working	 in	 venues	 other	 than	‘traditional	 research	 settings’.	 In	 this	way,	 amateur	biologists	 are	defined	by	 their	‘difference’	 or	 ‘otherness’	 in	 relation	 to	 ‘life	 science	 proper’.	 And	 while	 these	distinctions	might,	 on	 the	 surface,	 seem	 to	 suggest	 little	more	 than	 an	 alternative	system	of	classification	(one	based	on	‘where’	and	‘who’,	and	not	on	‘what’),	under	closer	examination	they	reveal	 that,	by	 labeling	amateur	biologists	 in	 this	manner,	experts	are	shaping	and	aggravating	perceptions	of	their	community.	For	 the	 co-founders	 of	 DIYbio,72	 one	 of	 the	 most	 visible	 communities	 of	amateur	 biology	 activity,	 the	 pairing	 of	 amateur	 biology	 with	 concerns	 about	‘bioterrorism’	 and	 ‘weapons	 of	 mass	 destruction’	 (a	 connection	 made	predominately,	if	indirectly,	by	the	FBI’s	Weapons	of	Mass	Destruction	Directorate,	which	engages	in	a	variety	of	biosecurity	outreach	and	awareness	raising	activities	related	to	synthetic	biology)	has	significant	 implications	for	how	members	of	their	community	are	understood	by	others,	as	well	as	how	they	understand	themselves	(a																																																									
72 See http://diybio.org/. 
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subject	 I	 will	 discuss	 further	 in	 Chapter	 7).	 As	 Jason	 Bobe,	 co-founder	 of	 DIYbio,	describes	 amateur	 biologists’	 ambivalent	 relationship	 with	 the	 FBI	 (and	 the	omnipresent	subject	of	‘WMD’),	“as	long	as	I	can	remember	talking	about	DIYbio,	it’s	always	been	 about	 biosecurity	 and	weapons	of	mass	destruction”,	 and	 about	 how	“DIYbio	 offers	 a	 new	 avenue	 for	 terrorists	 to	 get	 access	 to	 weapons	 of	 mass	destruction”.	 Although	 Jason	 Bobe	 acknowledges	 that	 the	 attention	 that	 DIYbio	receives	 in	 policy	 circles	 and	 in	 the	 media	 is	 testimony	 to	 their	 success	 (their	community	has	grown	considerably	and	is	now,	he	suggests,	“on	the	radar”),	it	is	not	exactly	 the	 kind	 of	 ‘attention’	 they	 were	 looking	 for.	 “If	 you’ve	 heard	 of	 DIYbio	recently”,	 Jason	 Bobe	 explained	 (somewhat	 humorously)	 at	 the	 outset	 of	 his	presentation	at	a	workshop73	 interested	 in	 the	 ‘dual-use’	aspects	of	biotechnology,	“it	was	probably	in	the	context	of	weapons	of	mass	destruction”.			 Jason	Bobe	and	Mackenzie	Cowell,	fellow	co-founder	of	DIYbio,	have	a	vision	for	amateur	biology;	one	that	is	geared	towards,	“making	this	simple,	easy	to	use	tool	kit,	based	on	synthetic	biology,	to	tinker	with	 biological	 systems,	 because	 [amateur	 biologists	 are]	 fascinated	 by	 that.	But	 that	 ‘tinkering	 tool	kit’,	 is	not	necessarily	…	going	 to	enable	you	 to	build	weapons	or	anything	…	It	will	let	you	play	around	with	biological	systems	...	It	will	give	you	the	intuition	you	need	to	engineer	something	in	the	future.”	Thus,	for	them,	amateur	biology	is	about	‘tinkering’,	about	‘play’,	and	about	gaining	‘intuition’	about	engineering	biology.	It	is	not	(or	at	least	not	yet)	about	working	‘on	the	cutting	edge’	and	it	is	not	about	‘making	weapons’.		In	 contrast	 to	 the	dominant	 biosecurity	 frame	 that	 concerns	 itself	with	 the	problem	 of	 ‘being	 a	 different	 kind	 of	 biologist’	 –	 one	 who	 operates	 outside	 the	controls	in	place	on	institutional	science	–	Jason	Bobe	and	Mackenzie	Cowell	suggest	that,	“being	a	biohacker	isn’t	so	much	about	where	the	work	is	done	or	whether	or	not	 they’re	professionals	or	amateurs	or	artists	or	whatever,	 it’s	more	about	what	the	activity	is”.	Thus,	for	them,	the	‘dual-use	dilemma’	is	perhaps	not	the	best	way	to	frame	 synthetic	 biology	 (or	 at	 least	 their	 vision	 for	 synthetic	 biology)	 because,	 as																																																									
73 ‘Microbiology, genomics and beyond: Regulating dual use technology into the 21st 
Century Programme’, held at the Wellcome Trust, London, 17 September 2010.	
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they	 suggest,	 “biology	 is	 really	 ‘poly-use’	 and	 framing	 it	 as	 either	 ‘good’	 or	 ‘bad’	overstates	the	clarity	with	which	biology	is	practiced.”		
4.4.	Conclusion	What	 is	 often	 missing	 from	 experts’	 accounts	 about	 the	 ‘biosecurity	 risks’	engendered	 by	 synthetic	 biology	 is	 that	 these	 ‘risks’	 are	 neither	 innate	 nor	inevitable.	They	 are,	 in	 fact,	 contextually	 situated	 and	 largely	 contingent	upon	 the	statements	made	by	diverse	experts	who	compete	to	lay	claim	to	what	should	count	as	 a	 ‘real’	 or	 ‘legitimate’	 threat	 to	our	 collective	 security.	There	are	many	ways	 in	which	 synthetic	 biology	 could	 have	 been	 (and,	 indeed,	 still	 can	 be)	 framed	 as	‘problematic’,	each	presupposing	particular	kinds	of	worries,	dilemmas	and	possible	future	 harms.	 To	 speak	 of	 synthetic	 biology	 in	 relation	 to	 ‘bioterrorism’	 and	 in	accordance	 with	 the	 norms	 and	 logics	 of	 ‘biosecurity’	 is	 to	 privilege	 one	 way	 of	looking	the	world,	while	obfuscating	many	others.	In	this	chapter,	I	have	endeavored	to	think	critically	about	how	this	highly	specific	framing	permits	synthetic	biology	to	be	understood	and	represented	as	a	specific	kind	of	problem	for	risk	management.	Synthetic	 biology,	 I	 have	 suggested,	 is	 undergoing	 a	 process	 of	 problematization,	because,	 in	brief,	 it	does	not	conform	to	 the	 ‘classical’	biosecurity	model.	 It	has,	 in	other	words,	destabilized	previous	ways	of	understanding	 the	world,	motivating	a	regulatory	response	that	is	 intended	to	reestablish	order	in	the	face	of	uncertainty	and	change,	thereby	enabling	synthetic	biology	to	be	governed.	On	one	 level,	 this	research	underlines	that	the	task	of	selecting	and	naming	new	‘risk	objects’	for	regulatory	attention	is	one	that	requires	considerable	work	on	the	part	of	scientific	and	technical	experts	engaged	in	biosecurity	policy.	As	Michael	Power	(2007,	p.	25)	argues:	“Experts	work	hard	to	construct	objects	for	attention,	to	make	 them	 a	 common-sense	 object	 for	 management	 purposes”.	 In	 the	 case	 of	synthetic	biology,	as	I	have	discussed	throughout	this	chapter,	numerous	questions	exist	about	‘who’	or	‘what’	should	be	regarded	as	‘dangerous’	or	‘of	concern’.	In	turn,	biosecurity	experts,	drawing	on	synthetic	biologists’	claims	about	their	science	and	its	 potential,	 engage	 in	 a	 demanding	 process	 of	 selection	 that	 requires	 sorting,	
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naming,	and	prioritizing	the	diverse	risk	aspects	of	synthetic	biology,	so	they	may	be	assessed	and	managed.	Given	the	interpretive	flexibility	of	what	 ‘synthetic	biology’	is,	and	who	‘synthetic	biologists’	are,	these	experts	are	presented	with	considerable	scope	 to	 select	 and	name	an	 expanding	 taxonomy	of	 ‘dangers’	 and	 ‘concerns’.	 For	some,	 the	 possibilities	 enabled	 by	 DNA	 synthesis	 technology	 are	 worrying;	 for	others,	 the	 genetic	 information	 bound	 up	 with	 increased	 knowledge	 about	molecular	life	and	biological	processes;	and	for	many,	it	is	the	promise	of	a	biology	that	 is	 ‘simple	 to	 engineer’,	 inviting	 those	 previously	 excluded	 from	 ‘institutional	science’	 to	 take	 part	 in	 ‘potentially	 dangerous’	 research.	 In	 each	 case,	 it	 is	with	 a	view	to	‘difference’	–	differences	that	suggest	new	ways	of	 ‘doing	biology’	and	new	ways	of	‘being	a	biologist’	–	and	by	way	of	‘marking	out	difference’	–	relying	on	the	construction	of	categories	and	lists	–	that	potential	‘biosecurity	risks’	are	conceived	and	produced.	Notions	of	‘difference’	and	‘otherness’,	in	this	context,	are	conceived	and	 mobilized	 in	 two	 distinct,	 yet	 related	 ways:	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 suggesting	vulnerabilities	or	gaps	in	biosecurity	–	a	defensive	practice	premised	upon	keeping	‘dangerous	 tools’	 out	 of	 ‘dangerous	 hands’	 –	 and,	 on	 the	 other,	 serving	 as	 a	technique	for	drawing	distinctions	and	distinguishing	between	who	should	count	as	a	‘dangerous	person’	and	what	should	count	as	a	‘dangerous	thing’.		On	 another	 level,	 this	 research	 sheds	 light	 on	 the	 performative	 impact	 of	labels.	Risk	selection	is	not	only	‘an	activity’,	but	also	‘an	act’,	with	implications	for	how	people	and	things	are	understood	and	represented	as	particular	kinds	of	social	problems.	Labeling	 theory,	as	Hacking	 (2002,	p.	103)	suggests,	 “asserts	 that	 social	reality	 is	 conditioned,	 stabilized	or	even	created	by	 the	 labels	we	apply	 to	people,	actions,	 and	 communities”.	 Or,	 as	 Butler	 (1993,	 p.	 8)	 observes:	 “The	 naming	 is	 at	once	 the	 setting	 of	 a	 boundary,	 and	 also	 the	 repeated	 inculcation	 of	 a	 norm.”	Therefore,	 the	 assertions	 made	 by	 experts	 not	 only	 describe,	 but	 also	 produce	particular	realities.	 In	 the	case	of	synthetic	biology,	 to	speak	of	 the	science	and	 its	practitioners	as	‘biosecurity	problems’	makes	these	problems	real.	On	the	one	hand,	biosecurity	 experts	 variously	 depict	 the	 diverse	 ‘tools’	 associated	 with	 synthetic	biology	 as	 ‘dangerous’	 or	 ‘of	 concern’,	 ascribing	 their	 worries	 not	 only	 to	 the	‘physical’	equipment	that	characterizes	synthetic	biology,	but	also	to	the	‘intangible’	
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knowledge	 bound	 up	 with	 genetic	 information,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 aims	 and	methodologies	that	set	out	the	scope	and	nature	of	the	field.	Taken	together,	these	labels	 contribute	 to	 locating	 anxieties	 about	 bioterrorism	 not	 only	 in	 the	instruments	and	engineering	concepts	deployed	by	synthetic	biologists,	but	also	in	the	 minutia	 of	 molecular	 life,	 embedding	 notions	 of	 ‘danger’	 and	 ‘concern’	 in	genomes	and	genes,	‘genetic	circuits’	and	‘modular	parts’.	On	the	other	hand,	experts	apply	 labels	 to	 the	people,	or	 the	 ‘hands’,	 that	are	 said	 to	 constitute	 the	 ‘synthetic	biology	community’,	and,	in	particular,	those	working	on	the	margins	of	the	science,	who	 are	 said	 to	 be	 empowered	 by	 the	 tools	 of	 synthetic	 biology.	 However,	 as	Hacking	(2002)	observes,	labelling	a	person	poses	ethical	dilemmas	beyond	that	of	labelling	 a	 thing,	 as	 people	 are	 not	 passive	 agents,	 but	 rather	 interact	 with	 the	names	that	are	assigned	to	 them,	changing,	and	being	changed	by,	 the	name	 itself.	Therefore,	although	‘biohackers’	have	not	been	directly	linked	to	‘bioterrorism’	and	‘weapons	 of	 mass	 destruction’,	 their	 discursive	 pairing	 with	 these	 concerns	nonetheless	changes	and	aggravates	perceptions	of	their	community.	
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5.	Risk	assessment:	‘Pragmatism	at	the	limits	of	predictability’	 
	
5.1	Introduction	In	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 I	 argued	 that,	 for	 many	 scientific	 and	 technical	 experts,	synthetic	 biology	 is	 perceived	 to	 be	 problematic	 because	 it	 promises	 to	‘democratize’	modern	biology,	enabling	more	people	in	less	formal	research	settings	to	 gain	 access	 to	 ‘potentially	 dangerous’	 life	 science	 resources.	 This	 framing	 of	synthetic	biology,	I	argued,	serves	to	define	and	constrain	the	scope	of	what	can	be	expected	of	the	science,	as	well	as	its	diverse	practitioners.	Both,	I	suggest,	are	now	entangled	 in	 a	 biosecurity	 debate	 that	 envisions	 advances	 in	 biotechnology	 as	embodying	an	 ‘intrinsic’	 (McLeish	and	Nightingale	2007)	 ‘dual-use	potential’	 (NRC	2004)	that	is	perceived	to	merit	some	sort	of	regulatory	response.	Yet,	as	a	number	of	commentators	have	pointed	out	(for	example,	Check	2005;	IRGC	2009),	although	many	appear	 to	agree	 there	exists	a	 synthetic	biology	 ‘biosecurity	problem’,	 there	remains	 considerable	 uncertainty	 about	 the	 kinds	 of	 ‘biosecurity	 solutions’	 that	might	enable	this	problem	to	be	made	amenable	to	practical	intervention.	With	 this	 in	 mind,	 in	 the	 following	 chapters	 I	 turn	 my	 attention	 towards	ongoing	 efforts	 aimed	 at	 implementing	 ‘practical	 interventions’	 –	 in	 other	words,	‘biosecurity	 solutions’	 –	 in	 the	 context	 of	 synthetic	 biology.	 Specifically,	 I	 will	examine	 how	 those	 engaged	 in	 shaping	 biosecurity	 policy	 options	 for	 synthetic	biology	go	about	imagining	its	risks	with	a	view	to	preventing	its	deliberate	misuse	and	 ensuring	 continued	 progress	 in	 a	 promising	 scientific	 field.	 In	 pursuit	 of	 this	overarching	research	aim,	this	chapter	will	focus	on	the	concept	of	‘risk	assessment’,	which	 I	 define	 as	 a	 calculative	 technique	 aimed	 at	 understanding	 or	 rendering	visible	 possible	 future	 harms.	 In	 the	 following	 chapter,	 I	 will	 then	 focus	 on	 the	concept	of	 ‘risk	management’,	which	 I	define	as	a	 family	of	ways	of	 intervening	or	acting	upon	those	harms	with	a	view	to	 their	prevention	(among	other	regulatory	objectives).	Taken	together,	I	will	argue,	risk	assessment	and	risk	management	play	a	decisively	pragmatic	role	in	the	synthetic	biology	policy	debate,	underlying	a	risk	
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management	 process	 that	 seeks	 to	 render	 synthetic	 biology’s	 risks	 amenable	 to	thought	and	action,	that	is,	amenable	to	risk-based	government.		Although	 I	 make	 the	 conceptual	 distinction	 between	 ‘risk	 assessment’	(‘understanding’)	and	 ‘risk	management’	 (‘intervening’),	 I	do	not	 intend	to	suggest	that	 these	 functions	are	neatly	separable.	On	the	contrary,	even	though	regulatory	debates	 typically	 characterize	 risk	 assessment	 as	 a	 ‘scientific’	 activity	 and	 risk	management	 as	 a	 ‘political’	 activity	 (Jasanoff	 1987,	 1995),	 which	 can	 be	 neatly	compartmentalized	 as	 sequential	 steps,	 they	 are	 in	 fact	 “closely	 intertwined	 in	practice”	(Majone	2010,	p.	120).	This	is	because	the	setting	of	“regulatory	priorities”	is	 an	 outcome	 informed	 by	 numerous	 “scientific,	 economic,	 and	 political	judgements”	that	are	themselves	“not	easily	separable”	(ibid.).	Therefore,	to	say	that	risk	 assessment	 comes	 ‘before’	 risk	 management	 is,	 for	 me,	 more	 a	 matter	 of	convention	 than	 a	matter	 of	 practice.	 In	 fact,	 as	 I	will	 discuss	 in	 some	 detail,	 one	might	just	as	easily	make	the	counterargument,	that	is,	risk	management	objectives	shape	how	risk	assessments	are	conducted,	effectively	reversing	the	more	familiar	sequence	of	‘cause’	and	‘effect’.	In	the	case	of	synthetic	biology,	as	in	other	spheres	of	 science	 and	 technology	 characterized	 by	 not	 only	 the	 possibility	 of	 significant	‘risks’	but	also	 significant	 ‘benefits’,	 there	exists	 considerable	 incentive	 to	develop	policies	 that	 move	 the	 science	 forward,	 motivating	 risk	 assessments	 that	 are	 (at	least	 in	part)	tailored	to	enable	this	outcome	(Tierney	1999).	Thus,	although	I	will	broadly	address	risk	assessment	in	this	chapter	and	risk	management	in	the	next,	I	by	no	means	attempt	to	enforce	their	strict	separation	analytically.		How,	then,	are	synthetic	biology’s	‘biosecurity	risks’	assessed?	How	are	they	‘calculated’?	How	are	they	brought	under	a	framework	of	technical	intervention	and	control?	Moreover,	who	is	responsible	for	conducting	these	assessments,	and	what	are	 the	 assessments	 intended	 to	 enable?	 These	 are	 among	 the	 key	 questions	 that	will	serve	as	a	guide	for	this	chapter	(as	well	as	featuring	in	subsequent	chapters).	On	one	level,	these	might	be	described	as	‘technical’	questions,	concerned	with	risk	assessment	as	a	mode	of	measurement	or	calculation.	Yet,	on	another	level,	they	are	decidedly	 ‘social’	 questions,	 concerned	 with	 aspects	 of	 risk	 assessment	 that	 are	often	 glossed	 over	 by	 the	 very	 experts	 who	 conduct	 them,	 including	 problematic	
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assumptions	about	‘risks’	for	which	there	exist	little	historical	precedent	and	limited	scientific	evidence.	By	focusing	on	both	the	technical	and	the	social	aspects	of	risk	assessment,	I	underline	that,	in	the	case	of	synthetic	biology,	as	in	other	spheres	of	social	life,	risk	assessments	are	the	product	of	both	technical	and	social	interactions.	That	 is,	 they	 rely	 not	 only	 on	 scientific	 knowledge	 and	 (more	 or	 less)	 systematic	standards	 of	measurement,	 but	 also	 on	 imagination	 and	 intuition,	 rules	 of	 thumb	and	 even	 guesswork.	 What	 matters,	 at	 least	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 those	 who	design	or	conduct	the	assessment,	is	that	the	risk	assessment	‘works’	–	that	is,	that	it	provides	 a	 ‘risk	 estimate’	 that	 is	 not	 only	 reasonably	 precise,	 but	 also	 ‘practical’,	enabling	 biosecurity	 interventions	 that	 are	 both	 achievable	 in	 practice	 and	amenable	to	fulfilling	particular	risk	management	objectives.	
	
5.2	An	introduction	to	risk	assessment	in	the	context	of	science	policy	Before	 addressing	 how	 synthetic	 biology’s	 ‘biosecurity	 risks’	 are	 assessed,	 it	 is	worthwhile	 to	 briefly	 consider	 “the	 role	 of	 science	 in	 regulatory	 proceedings,	 an	area	 of	 decisionmaking	 that	 is	 often	 generically	 described	 as	 ‘science	 policy’”	(Jasanoff	 1990,	 p.	 6).	 More	 precisely,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 consider	 how	 ‘risk	assessment’,	 “a	classic	 ‘trans-scientific’	activity	carried	out	by	regulatory	agencies”	(ibid,	 p.	 216),	 has	 historically	 been	 understood	 and	 represented	 in	 science	policymaking	processes.	By	drawing	on	this	history,	I	suggest,	one	is	able	to	better	appreciate	the	technical	and	political	constraints	that	shape	the	present	debate	on	synthetic	biology.	In	particular,	I	wish	to	make	two	observations.	First,	the	statistical	technique	of	 ‘quantitative	risk	assessment’	has	 traditionally	been	conceived	as	 the	benchmark	 of	 ‘rational’	 policymaking,	 and,	 while	 this	 technique	 continues	 to	 be	favored	 (as	 a	 regulatory	 ideal,	 if	 nothing	 else),	 the	 possibility	 of	 ‘objective’	 risk	assessment	 is	 increasingly	 contested.	 In	 particular,	 there	 exists	 a	 growing	awareness	 of	 the	 ‘limits	 of	 prediction’,	 made	 evident	 by	 uncertainties	 associated	with	 assessing	 emerging	 technologies,	 as	 well	 as	 a	 growing	 awareness	 of	 the	diversity	 of	 risk	 assessment	 techniques	 (both	 ‘quantitative’	 and	 ‘qualitative’)	 that	inform,	and	have	always	informed,	risk	assessment	in	practice.	Indeed,	the	types	of	
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risk	assessment	techniques	that	are	favored;	the	types	of	evidence	that	are	deemed	valid,	and	who	should	be	made	accountable	for	demonstrating	that	this	evidence	is	sufficient,	are	all	normative	questions,	which	are	understood	differently	at	different	historical	 moments	 and	 in	 different	 social	 and	 political	 contexts.	 Second,	 the	‘purpose’	of	risk	assessment	in	the	context	of	science	policymaking	has	historically	been,	 and	 remains,	 a	 fundamentally	 pragmatic	 one.	 That	 is,	 risk	 assessment	 is	premised	upon	the	belief	 that	risks	can	be	known	with	reasonable	confidence	and	be	made	 the	 subject	 of	 interventions	 that	 can	 be	 used	 to	 satisfy	 particular	 policy	objectives,	including,	but	not	limited	to,	mitigating	the	‘likelihood’	and	‘impact’	(the	traditional	metrics	of	‘quantitative	risk	assessment’)	of	possible	future	harm.	In	the	following,	 I	 shed	 light	 on	 both	 of	 these	 dimensions	 with	 reference	 to	 several	documents	that	have	influenced	how	science	policymaking	(in	the	US,	in	particular)	is	understood	and	represented,	and	that	vividly	depict	the	historical	precedents	that	underpin	current	efforts	to	assess	synthetic	biology’s	‘biosecurity	risks’.	By	some	accounts,	science	policymaking	based	on	‘risk	analysis’	–	combining	risk	assessment	and	risk	management	–	can	be	 traced	 to	an	article	written	by	 the	American	electrical	engineer	and	nuclear	energy	expert,	Chauncey	Starr	(Kates	and	Kasperson	1983;	Power	2007).	Entitled,	 ‘Social	Benefit	versus	Technological	Risk’,	and	 published	 in	 the	 journal	 Science	 in	 1969,	 this	 article	 outlined	 an	 approach	 to	science	 policymaking	 that	 aimed	 to	 achieve	 an	 ‘optimal’	 balance	 between	 ‘social	benefits’	and	‘social	costs’	based	on	a	‘quantitative’	risk	calculus.	Having	a	significant	impact	in	its	time,	it	inspired	a	series	of	national	scientific	symposia	and	workshops,	each	 premised	 upon	 Starr’s	 (ostensibly)	 ‘technical’	 approach	 to	 science	policymaking	(Kates	and	Kasperson	1983).	According	to	Starr:		“If	 we	 understood	 quantitatively	 the	 causal	 relationships	 between	 specific	technological	developments	and	societal	values,	both	positive	and	negative,	we	might	 deliberately	 guide	 and	 regulate	 technological	 developments	 so	 as	 to	achieve	maximum	social	benefit	and	minimum	social	cost.”	(1969,	p.	1233)	Whether	Starr’s	vision	for	‘risk	analysis’	as	it	relates	to	guiding	the	regulation	of	emerging	technologies	was	the	first	of	its	kind,	or	whether	it	merely	represented	a	contribution	to	an	ongoing	movement	towards	risk-based	regulation	in	light	of	the	
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uncertain	health	and	environmental	effects	posed	by	emerging	technologies	such	as	nuclear	energy,	is	open	to	interpretation	(Short	1984;	Weingart	1999).	What	can	be	said,	 however,	 is	 that	 Starr’s	 approach	 to	 risk	 analysis	 –	 seeking	 to	 quantitatively	determine	 causal	 relationships	 with	 a	 view	 to	 directing	 the	 optimal	 allocation	 of	scarce	societal	resources	–	continues	to	represent	a	benchmark	and	‘technical	ideal’	(Power	2007)	for	science	policymakers.	Today,	as	in	1969,	there	remains	at	least	the	presumption	that	the	‘actual’	risks	posed	by	advances	in	science	and	technology	can	be	 determined	 and	 that	 an	 ‘optimal’	 balance	 between	 ‘social	 benefits’	 and	 ‘social	costs’	 can	 be	 ‘objectively’	 achieved.	 What	 is	 more,	 it	 tends	 to	 be	 with	 a	 view	 to	science	–	and	above	all	the	science	of	‘quantitative	risk	assessment’,	often	defined	as	a	 statistical	 technique	 premised	 upon	 calculating	 ‘the	 probability	 of	 an	 event	occurring	multiplied	by	the	 likely	 impact	of	 that	event	were	 it	 to	occur’	(Bradbury	1989)	–	that	the	‘right’	balance	is	perceived	to	be	possible.		 Despite	the	prominence	of	‘quantitative	risk	assessment’,	as	a	technical	ideal,	the	 possibility	 of	 ‘objective’	 risk	 analysis	 and	 ‘value-neutral’	 policymaking	 is	 (and	always	was)	 elusive	 in	 practice.	 This	 is	 because	 the	 future	 cannot	 be	 known	with	certainty.	Thus,	decisions	about	how	to	prepare	for	future	events	remain	obscured	from	objective	understanding,	underlying	the	‘limits	of	prediction’.	As	the	economic	theorist	Brian	J.	Loasby	(1976,	p.	2)	expressed	in	Choice,	Complexity,	and	Ignorance:	“Choice	within	a	complex	system	cannot	be	fully	informed;	neither	can	the	study	of	a	complex	 system	 from	 the	outside	…	 [p]artial	 ignorance	 is	 intrinsic	 to	problems	of	choice”.	While	 this	 observation	 applies	 to	 decision-making	 in	 all	 spheres	 of	 social	life,	 it	 is	 especially	 apparent	 in	 relation	 to	 science	 policy,	 a	 domain	 typically	confronted	with	intractable	uncertainties	due	to	scientific	unknowns	that	are	poorly	characterized	 or,	 quite	 possibly,	 not	 even	 recognized.	Moreover,	 “uncertainties	 in	regulation”,	 Irwin	 et	 al.	 (1997,	 p.	 20)	 observe,	 are	 not	 simply	 the	 product	 of	“technical	uncertainties	which	can	be	reduced	by	further	investigation	and	rational	discussion”.	 They	 are	 also	 “the	 result	 of	 …	 indeterminacies	 and	 conflicts	 in	 the	policy-process	 resulting	 from	 the	differing	perspectives,	 interests	and	rationalities	of	different	groups	involved	in	regulation”	(ibid.).	Consequently,	while	informed	by	predictive	 techniques	 (quantitative	 or	 qualitative,	 formal	 or	 informal),	 regulators	
	 142	
must	 ultimately	 make	 decisions	 about	 how	 to	 allocate	 ‘scarce	 societal	 resources’	based	 upon	 human	 judgment,	 incomplete	 information	 and	 contrasting	 (expert)	opinions.	As	the	science	and	technology	scholars	Stirling	and	Mayer	(2001,	p.	530)	rightly	 argue	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 assessment	 of	 technological	 risk:	 “Even	 the	 most	ostensibly	 ‘technical’	 citadels	 of	 the	 analytic	 approach	 –	 the	 quantification	 of	probabilities	 and	 the	 measurement	 of	 harm	 –	 remain	 fundamentally	 context	dependent,	subjective,	and	thence	political	in	character”.			 Contestation	over	Starr’s	strictly	‘quantitative’	interpretation	of	risk	analysis	is	not	only	reflected	in	academic	critique,	but	also	in	changing	attitudes	toward	what	should	 count	 as	 a	 ‘good’	 decision-making	 model.	 Specifically,	 over	 the	 last	 half-century,	 confidence	 in	 the	 quantitative	 model	 has	 been	 gradually	 eroded,	 as	 the	limits	of	prediction	have	come	to	be	increasingly	acknowledged	by	decision-makers	engaged	in	designing	regulatory	policy	(OECD	2010).	One	affect	this	has	had,	at	least	in	terms	of	how	risk	analysis	is	represented	in	the	context	of	science	policymaking	(which	 is	 not	 the	 same	 as	 saying	 that	 risk	 analysis	 has	 necessarily	 changed	 in	practice),	 is	 the	more	 explicit	 inclusion	 of	 ‘qualitative	 risk	 assessment’	 as	 a	 valid	mode	of	understanding,	and,	with	this,	 the	recognition	that	scientific	knowledge	 is	not	the	only	type	of	knowledge	that	informs	risk	management	processes.	In	the	US	context,	 this	 shift	 –	 from	 a	 strictly	 ‘quantitative’	 to	 a	 more	 (but	 by	 no	 means	exclusively)	 ‘qualitative’	 interpretation	 of	 risk	 analysis	 –	 is	 perhaps	 most	 clearly	demonstrated	by	 two	 influential	guides	on	risk	analysis	published	by	 the	National	Research	Council	(NRC	1983,	1996);	each	intended	to	improve	the	US	government’s	science	 policymaking	 efforts.	 Taken	 together,	 these	 guides	 reflect	 two	 rather	different	interpretations	of	risk	analysis	in	the	context	of	science	policymaking	–	an	activity	 that	 is	 increasingly	 represented	 as	 not	 only	 including,	 but	 also	 benefiting	from,	a	more	diverse	range	of	knowledge	and	knowledge-making	practices.		
5.2.1	The	‘Red	Book’	risk	analysis	model	The	first,	the	so-called	‘Red	Book’,	published	in	1983,	describes	a	risk	management	process	 premised	 upon	 strict	 adherence	 to	 the	 quantitative	 model,	 where	 risk	
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estimates	are	represented	as	the	rational	outcome	of	a	step-by-step,	unidirectional	process	that	requires	limited	human	judgment	and	no	additional	knowledge	beyond	that	afforded	by	science.	In	Figure	1,	this	process	is	 illustrated	by	three	successive	stages	 –	 ‘research’,	 ‘risk	 assessment’,	 and	 ‘risk	 management’	 –	 where	 scientific	evidence	about	risks	 is	not	only	represented	as	attainable,	but,	 indeed,	as	 the	only	type	of	evidence	that	merits	consideration	 in	 the	risk	management	process.	At	 the	same	 time,	 scientists	 (and	 scientific	 expertise)	 are	 represented	 as	 the	 singular	source	of	legitimate	knowledge	about	risks,	and	are	accountable	for	producing	risk	estimates	 that	 are,	 in	 turn,	 used	 as	 a	 basis	 for	 implementing	 federal	 policies.	 In	relation	to	the	health	risks	posed	by	exposure	to	chemical	or	biological	agents,	 for	example,	 the	 Red	 Book	 describes	 ‘dose-response	 assessment’	 as	 the	 “process	 of	estimating	 the	 incidence	of	 a	 health	 effect	 under	 the	 various	 conditions	of	 human	exposure”	 (NRC	 1983,	 p.	 20)	 providing	 “a	 concise	 estimate	 of	 adverse	 effect	 in	 a	given	population”	(ibid,	p.	28).	In	turn,	policymakers	use	this	estimate	(according	to	the	model)	to	guide	and	to	justify	specific	policy	actions	(ibid.).		
		
Figure 1: ‘Red Book’ risk analysis model (Source: NRC 1983, p. 31). 
	 144	
	
5.2.2	The	‘Orange	Book’	risk	analysis	model	By	 1996,	 with	 the	 publication	 of	 the	 so-called	 ‘Orange	 Book’	 (the	 NRC’s	 updated	guide	 on	 risk	 analysis	 for	 science	 policymakers),	 this	 singular,	 science-based	interpretation	of	risk	analysis	and	its	role	in	science	policymaking	was	deemed	to	be	out	 of	 date,	 and,	 moreover,	 not	 representative	 of	 how	 risk	 assessments	 are	conducted	 in	 practice.	 Although	 observing	 that	 the	 Red	 Book’s	 risk	 paradigm	“remains	prevalent	in	federal	agencies”74	(NRC	1996,	p.	14),	the	NRC’s	views	on	risk	analysis	 had	 shifted	 to	 the	 point	 of	 concluding	 that	 strict	 adherence	 to	 the	quantitative	 model	 is	 “seriously	 deficient”	 (ibid,	 p.	 16).	 The	 NRC	 cites	 several	reasons	 for	 this,	 including:	 (1)	 the	 limitations	 of	 risk	 techniques	 that	 inform	 risk	analysis;	 (2)	 fundamental	 uncertainty	 in	 information	 about	 risks;	 and	 (3)	 the	 fact	that,	despite	claims	to	the	contrary,	risk	analysis	is	a	complex	process	that	depends	upon	value-laden	judgments	and	social	deliberation	(ibid.).	With	 this,	 the	 Orange	 Book	 proposes	 an	 alterative,	 “more	 robust”	 (ibid,	 p.	16),	 risk	 paradigm,	 described	 as	 an	 “analytic-deliberative	 process”,	 where	“[a]nalysis	and	deliberation	can	be	thought	of	as	two	complementary	approaches	to	gaining	 knowledge	 about	 the	 world,	 forming	 understandings	 on	 the	 basis	 of	knowledge,	 and	 reaching	 agreement	 among	 people”	 (ibid,	 p.	 3).	 In	 Figure	 2,	 this	process	 is	 illustrated	 as	 recursive,	where	 knowledge	 gained	 through	 analysis	 and	deliberation	 folds	 back	 on	 itself,	 contributing	 to	 new	 problem	 formulations,	 new	modes	 of	 understanding,	 and	 ultimately	 new	 risk	 estimates	 that	 result	 from	adapting	 the	 assumptions	 and	 constraints	 of	 the	 model	 itself.	 In	 this	 light,	 risk	estimates	 are	 depicted	 as	 the	 outcome	 of	 both	 technical	 and	 social	 processes,	drawing	on	both	quantitative	and	qualitative	modes	of	assessment.	In	other	words,	risk	 estimates	 are	 represented	 (at	 least	 in	 part)	 as	 political	 in	 nature,	 built	 upon	negotiation	and	compromise	between	social	actors,	which	is	depicted	as	providing	space	 for	more	than	one	 ‘right’	answer,	 in	addition	to	more	than	one	 ‘best’	way	of	‘calculating’	risks.	At	the	same	time,	scientists	are	no	longer	represented	as	the	sole																																																									
74 An observation, I will argue, that is equally valid today. 
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source	 of	 legitimate	 knowledge	 about	 risks,	 but	 as	 one	 among	 several	 primary	stakeholders	 contributing	 to	 the	 risk	 management	 process.	 In	 particular,	 policy	specialists	are	represented	as	playing	an	equally	prominent	role	in	risk	assessment	and	risk	management	decisions	(Wolt	and	Peterson	2000).		
		
Figure 2: ‘Orange Book’ risk analysis model (Source: NRC 1996, p. 28). 	Having	 highlighted	what	 would	 appear	 to	 have	 changed	with	 regard	 to	 how	 risk	analysis	is	represented	in	science	policymaking	processes,	I	wish	to	highlight	what	I	would	 suggest	 remains	 the	 same	 in	 practice.	 That	 is,	 despite	 endorsing	 different	methods	–	the	former	calling	for	strict	adherence	to	quantitative,	science-based	risk	assessment	 techniques,	and	the	 latter	more	qualitative,	social-analytic	ones	–	both	models	 (NRC	1983,	 1996)	 are	 premised	 upon	 the	 assumption	 that	methodologies	exist	that	can	be	applied	to	the	assessment	of	complex	risk	phenomena.	Moreover,	each	methodology	describes	a	more	or	less	structured	process	that	seeks	to	produce	a	 risk	estimate	 that	 can	be	used	 to	 inform	and	 to	 justify	practical	objectives.	 “The	purpose”,	the	Orange	Book	suggests,	“of	risk	characterization	is	to	enhance	practical	understanding	 and	 to	 illuminate	 practical	 choices”	 (NRC	 1996,	 p.	 16).	 The	 term	‘practical’	 merits	 emphasis.	 This	 is	 because	 science	 policymaking	 is	 inevitably	characterized	 by	 “a	 mix	 of	 scientific	 and	 policy	 considerations”	 that	 blur	 the	boundary	 between	 ‘science’	 and	 ‘politics’	 (Jasanoff	 1987,	 p.	 214).	 In	 other	words,	regulatory	decisions	are	not	simply	 the	product	of	 ‘technical’	procedures	aimed	at	
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deriving	 “a	 concise	 estimate	 of	 adverse	 effect”	 (NRC	 1983,	 p.	 20),	 but	 also	 the	normative	viewpoints	and	expectations	of	 the	scientists,	public	officials	and	policy	specialists	 who	 inform	 the	 regulatory	 process	 with	 a	 view	 to	 ‘optimal’	 policy	outcomes.	 Thus,	 no	 matter	 how	 ‘robust’	 the	 model,	 there	 remain	 numerous	subjective	considerations	that	inform	the	risk	management	process.	For	 this	 reason,	 ‘pragmatism’,	 I	 suggest,	 can	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 a	 unifying	feature	 of	 both	 models	 (NRC	 1983,	 1996),	 and	 risk	 analysis	 more	 generally,	especially	when	 the	potential	 rewards	 stemming	 from	science	 and	 technology	 are	deemed	 to	 be	 high.	 In	 such	 cases,	 the	 ‘purpose’	 of	 risk	 analysis,	 at	 least	 from	 the	perspective	 of	 regulators,	 is	 not	 only	 a	 risk	 estimate	 that	 is	 reasonably	 precise	 –	representative	of	the	‘actual’	risks	–	but	also	‘practical’	–	enabling	risk	management	actions	that	satisfy	a	variety	of	policy	objectives,	including	aspirations	for	economic	development	 and	 regulatory	 consistency.	 This	 ‘goal-oriented’	 approach	 to	regulation	underlines,	as	Jasanoff	(1993,	p.	129)	rightly	argues,	that	the	view	that	it	is	 possible	 to	 separate	 “risk	 assessment	 (what	 we	 know	 about	 risk)	 from	 risk	management	(what	we	wish	to	do	about	risk)	is	one	dogma	that	is	clearly	in	need	of	profound	 and	 critical	 reexamination.”	 Indeed,	 the	 determination	 to	 render	 risks	visible	 so	 that	 they	may	 be	managed	 –	 in	 a	 variety	 of	ways	 and	with	 a	 view	 to	 a	variety	of	policy	goals	–	is	a	defining	characteristic	of	regulatory	activity	that	seeks	to	 maximize	 the	 ‘benefits’	 and	minimize	 the	 ‘risks’	 of	 science	 and	 technology.	 As	Ewald	 (2002,	 p.	 287)	 suggests,	 the	 very	 principle	 of	 ‘sustainable	 development’,	which	underpins	science	policymaking,	“prohibits	inaction	in	the	face	of	uncertainty,	at	the	same	time	that	[it]	seeks	to	limit	as	far	as	possible	its	harmful	consequences.”	Thus,	 pragmatism,	 I	 suggest,	 even	 (or	 perhaps	 especially)	 at	 the	 ‘limits	 of	prediction’,	plays	a	central	role	in	shaping	risk	estimates,	as	well	as	the	‘quantitative’	and	 ‘qualitative’	 techniques	that	 inform	them.	In	the	following	section,	 I	will	argue	that	biosecurity	risk	assessment	in	the	context	of	synthetic	biology	is	an	exemplary	case	of,	what	I	refer	to	as,	‘pragmatism	at	the	limits	of	predictability’.		
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5.3	Biosecurity	risk	assessment	in	synthetic	biology:	In	need	of	a	‘new’	
standard?	Despite	growing	awareness	within	science	policy	circles	that	risk	assessment	does	not	 conform	 to	 an	 absolute	 standard,	 and	 that	 ‘value-neutral’	 policymaking	 is	 an	ideal	and	not	an	empirical	reality,	there	nonetheless	remains	a	strong	attachment	to	the	 scientific	 model	 (NRC	 1983),	 which	 effectively	 remains	 the	 benchmark,	 and,	indeed,	 the	 de	 facto	 ‘standard’	 (Jasanoff	 1987,	 1990,	 1993).	 In	 fact,	 in	 the	 US	regulatory	context,	 Jasanoff	(1987,	p.	197)	has	shown,	“the	 legitimacy	of	American	regulatory	decisions	uniquely	depends	on	rational	justification,	in	scientific	as	well	as	in	economic	and	legal	terms.”	In	practice,	Jasanoff	suggests	(ibid.),	this	means	that	policymakers	and	regulators,	while	often	acknowledging	that	 the	 ‘risks’	associated	with	 advances	 in	 science	 and	 technology	 are	 characterized	 by	 irreducible	uncertainty	and	that	the	policy	process	is	informed	by	both	‘scientific’	and	‘political’	considerations,	 believe	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 “present	 the	 public	 with	 a	 convincing	scientific	 rationale	 for	 actions	 dealing	with	 technological	 hazards,	marshalling	 the	supporting	data	and	rejecting	contrary	evidence	as	persuasively	as	possible.”	In	 the	 context	 of	 the	 life	 sciences,	 this	 conflicted	 stance	 is	 manifest	 in	 an	ambivalent	attitude	towards	biological	risk	assessment,75	which,	on	the	one	hand,	is	judged	 to	 be	 a	more	 or	 less	 subjective	 process,	 and,	 on	 the	 other,	 a	more	 or	 less	objective	 one.	 For	 example,	 this	 stance	 is	 clearly	 visible	 in	 relation	 to	 recent	biosafety	guidelines	 (CDC/NIH	2009),	 jointly	 issued	by	 the	US	Centers	 for	Disease	Control	 and	 Prevention	 (CDC)	 and	 the	 National	 Institutes	 of	 Health	 (NIH),	 which	provide	 guidance	 for	 life	 scientists	 on	 how	 to	 assess	 and	 manage	 biosafety	 and	(more	recently)	biosecurity	 risks	 in	 the	context	of	 the	 laboratory.	On	page	16,	 the	CDC/NIH	 guidelines	 state	 that:	 “Biological	 risk	 assessment	 is	 a	 subjective	 process																																																									
75 ‘Biological risk assessment’, or ‘biorisk assessment’, is a term increasingly employed 
in guidance documents to describe risk assessments directed at assessing the ‘likelihood’ 
and ‘consequences’ of either ‘biosafety risks’ (“risks of accidental infection”) or 
‘biosecurity risks’ (“risks of unauthorized access, loss, theft, misuse, diversion or 
intentional release”) (WHO 2006, p. iii). In this context, ‘biosafety risk assessment’ and 
‘biosecurity risk assessment’ are understood as sub-sets of ‘biorisk assessment’. See 
WHO (2006) for a more detailed discussion of this terminology. 
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requiring	 consideration	 of	 many	 hazardous	 characteristics	 of	 agents	 and	procedures,	 with	 judgments	 based	 often	 on	 incomplete	 information.	 There	 is	 no	standard	approach	for	conducting	a	biological	risk	assessment”.	On	page	107,	that:	“A	biosecurity	risk	assessment	should	analyze	the	probability	and	consequences	of	loss,	 theft	 and	 potential	 misuse	 of	 pathogens	 and	 toxins.”	 In	 other	 words,	‘quantitative	 risk	 assessment’	 (at	 least	 its	 vocabulary	 and	 distinctive	 logics,	 if	nothing	 else)	 remains	 central	 to	 notions	 of	 risk	 manageability;	 even	 when	 life	science	regulators	are	confronted	with	hazards	that	appear	(by	their	own	account)	to	cast	doubt	on	its	singular	capacity	to	objectively	‘calculate’	potential	harm.	A	 closer	 look	 at	 ‘biosecurity	 risk	 assessment’,	 as	 defined	 by	 the	 CDC/NIH,	offers	 a	more	 nuanced	 picture	 of	 how	 assessments	 of	 this	 kind	 are	 conducted	 in	practice.	 Departing	 from	 the	 idealized	 model	 of	 biosecurity	 risk	 assessment	 as	 a	more	or	 less	 ‘quantitative’	procedure,	 relying	on	 the	analysis	of	 ‘probabilities’	and	‘consequences’,	 this	 characterization	 of	 biosecurity	 risk	 assessment	 invites	considerably	more	subjective	 leeway	and	 imagination	on	the	part	of	 life	scientists.	Specifically,	the	CDC/NIH	(ibid,	p.	108)	suggest	that	researchers	should	“[d]evelop	a	list	 of	 possible	 biosecurity	 scenarios”	 that	 take	 into	 account	 both	 the	 risk	characteristics	of	a	particular	agent	and	 the	 “motive,	means,	and	opportunity	of	…	potential	adversaries	[“Insiders”	or	“Outsiders”]”	 to	acquire	and	misuse	this	agent.	Based	 on	 these	 scenarios,	 researchers	 are	 further	 advised	 to	 “[e]valuate	 the	probability	 of	 each	 scenario	 materializing	 (i.e.,	 the	 likelihood)	 and	 its	 associated	consequences”	 (ibid.).	 In	 other	 words,	 they	 are	 advised	 to	 conduct,	 first,	 a	‘qualitative	 scenario	 analysis’	 –	 requiring	 imputations	 of	 potential	 ‘agents’	 and	‘adversaries’	 (including	 their	 ‘motives’)	 –	 with	 a	 view	 to	 possible	 biosecurity	incidents,	 and,	 second,	 a	 ‘quantitative	 risk	 assessment’	 aimed	 at	 evaluating	 the	‘probability’	and	‘consequences’	of	potential	bioterrorism	attacks.	This	 ‘mixed’	 risk	 assessment	 methodology,	 relying	 on	 ‘quantitative’	 and	‘qualitative’	procedures,	when	contrasted	with	the	strictly	‘quantitative’	biosecurity	risk	 assessment	 model	 noted	 earlier	 (CDC/NIH	 2009,	 p.	 107),	 illustrates	 the	apparent	 tensions	 that	 exist	 between	 biosecurity	 risk	 assessment	 in	 practice	 and	idealized	 notions	 of	 biosecurity	 risk	 assessment	 as	 a	 more	 or	 less	 ‘objective’	
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exercise.	 It	 also	 underlines	 that,	 although	 ‘qualitative’	 judgments	 are	 deemed	necessary	in	practice,	‘quantitative	risk	assessment’	persists	as	a	technical	ideal.	It	is	precisely	 this	 faith	 in	 a	 scientific	 risk	 assessment	 standard,	 while	 acknowledging	that	 such	a	 standard	does	not	 exist,	 that	 creates	 a	 fundamental	 tension	 in	 science	policy	 debates	 and	 regulatory	 processes.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 synthetic	 biology,	 this	tension	is	visible	in	relation	to	frequently	voiced	concerns	(see,	for	example,	Bügl	et	al.	 2007;	 NSABB	 2010)	 about	 the	 ‘appropriateness’	 of	 ‘existing’	 risk	 assessment	techniques	 in	 light	 of	 the	 potentially	 ‘novel’	 risks	 engendered	 by	 the	 science.	 The	argument	being,	 ‘novel	risks	 fall	outside	existing	modes	of	risk	assessment	and,	 in	turn,	fall	outside	existing	regulatory	frameworks’.	As	the	National	Science	Advisory	Board	 for	 Biosecurity	 (NSABB	 2010,	 p.	 32)	 describes	 this	 dilemma	 in	 relation	 to	synthetic	biology’s	biosecurity	risks:	“If	it	is	believed	that	there	are	no	new	risks	and	that	we	can	use	an	existing	oversight	structure,	the	situation	would	be	very	different	from	 one	 in	 which	 new	 risks	 are	 apparent	 that	 will	 require	 new	 means	 of	assessment	and	management.”	This	argument,	as	I	have	suggested,	is	premised	upon	the	assumption	 that	 there	does	 indeed	exist	a	 ‘standard’	mode	of	 risk	assessment,	one	that	has	informed,	and	continues	to	inform,	risk	estimates	in	the	context	of	the	life	 sciences.	Moreover,	 as	 the	CDC/NIH	 (2009)	 suggests	 in	 relation	 to	biosecurity	risk	assessment,	it	is	assumed	that	this	standard	is	a	‘scientific’	one.		In	 this	 section,	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 this	 assumption	 does	 not	 reflect	 risk	assessment	 in	 practice,	 neither	 in	 relation	 to	 synthetic	 biology,	 nor	 in	 relation	 to	previous	iterations	of	biotechnology.	Rather,	there	exist	a	variety	of	risk	assessment	techniques	–	quantitative	and	qualitative,	 formal	and	 informal	–	 that	are	used	and	adapted	 to	 assess	 and	 manage	 ‘new’	 and	 ‘emerging’	 risks.	 What	 this	 means,	 in	practice,	 is	 that	 risk	 assessment	 techniques	 are	 not	 so	 much	 ‘surpassed’	 or	‘exceeded’	 by	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 ‘kind’	 of	 ‘risk	 beyond	 measurement’	 or	 ‘risk	beyond	 risk’	 (Ewald	 2002),	 but	 rather	 these	 techniques	 are	 continuously	(re)invented	 to	make	 ‘new’	 risks	 ‘fit’	 existing	 regulatory	 frameworks	 and	 specific	risk	 management	 objectives.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 synthetic	 biology,	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	previous	biotechnologies,	while	 the	 ‘risks’	may	at	 times	be	described	as	 ‘complex’,	even	 ‘beyond	 assessment’,	 they	 are	 nonetheless	 currently	 being	 assessed	 by	 an	
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assortment	of	techniques,	which	do	not	easily	coalesce	under	a	singular,	preexisting	risk	management	framework	or	risk	assessment	standard.	In	the	following,	 I	will	present	my	argument	in	two	parts.	First,	 I	will	argue	that	recombinant	DNA	technology,	a	precursor	to	synthetic	biology,	has	previously	been	 represented	 as	 both	 ‘novel’	 and	 amenable	 to	 ‘practical	 intervention’,	 being	made	 to	 ‘fit’	 an	 existing	 regulatory	 framework	 and	 specific	 risk	 management	objectives.	 Second,	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 synthetic	 biology	 is	 undergoing	 a	 similar	process,	 raising	 familiar	 dilemmas,	 but	 also	 new	 ones.	 What	 is	 perceived	 to	complicate	 risk	 assessment	 in	 relation	 to	 synthetic	 biology,	 I	 suggest,	 is	 not	 only	reflected	 in	 the	 ‘novelty’	attributed	to	 the	science,	but	also	 in	 the	 ‘new’,	or	at	 least	less	 familiar,	 context	 within	 which	 the	 science	 is	 embedded,	 namely,	 the	contemporary	 context	 of	 biosecurity.	 When	 viewed	 in	 relation	 to	 ‘biosecurity',	having	 as	 its	 focus	 the	 problem	 of	 ‘deliberate	misuse’,	 synthetic	 biology	 does	 not	align	easily	with	risk	assessment	 techniques	and	regulatory	 frameworks	 that	have	been	configured	to	address	 issues	of	 ‘biosafety’,	having	as	 its	 focus	the	problem	of	‘unintended	 consequences’	 (Bügl	 et	 al.	 2007).	 Thus,	 beyond	 any	unique	 attributes	that	might	be	attributed	 to	 the	science,	 synthetic	biology	presents	 regulators	 (and	others	who	design	and/or	conduct	biosecurity	risk	assessments)	with	a	different	set	of	challenges	and	priorities,	calling	for	somewhat	different	‘standards’	of	assessment	and	 management.	 In	 the	 following	 section,	 I	 will	 then	 examine	 one	 case	 of	biosecurity	 risk	 assessment	 in	 more	 detail	 –	 specifically,	 the	 case	 of	 the	 US	government’s	 recently	 introduced	 ‘screening	 methodology’	 for	 DNA	 synthesis	providers	(DHHS	2010b)	–	where	these	challenges	are	presently	being	negotiated,	and	risk	assessments	of	this	kind	conceived	and	put	into	practice.		
5.3.1	The	Coordinated	Framework	for	Regulation	of	Biotechnology:	Pragmatism	
written	into	federal	policy	Perceived	 'challenges’	 to	 risk	 assessment	 in	 the	 life	 sciences,	 including	 those	associated	with	scientific	uncertainty	and	the	limits	of	prediction,	did	not	begin	with	synthetic	 biology.	 Rather,	 similar	 perceived	 challenges	 have	 accompanied	 a	
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succession	of	emerging	biotechnologies	–	the	most	common	reference	technology	in	relation	 to	 synthetic	 biology	 being	 ‘recombinant	 DNA	 technology’	 or	 ‘genetic	engineering’.	Like	synthetic	biology,	the	potential	risks	posed	by	genetic	engineering	gained	the	attention	of	scientists	and	science	policymakers	at	an	early	stage	of	the	science’s	development.	Beginning	with	the	Asilomar	Conference	in	1975,	questions	were	 raised	 about	 the	 unknown	 –	 potentially	 unknowable	 –	 consequences	 of	releasing	 genetically	 engineered	 (or	 ‘recombinant’)	 organisms	 into	 the	environment.	These	concerns	contributed	to	a	scientist-led	moratorium	on	certain	kinds	 of	 genetic	 engineering	 experiments.	 Yet,	 this	 moratorium	 was	 temporary.	Over	 the	 following	 decade,	 restrictions	 on	 genetic	 engineering	 experiments	 were	gradually	eased,	with	the	exception	of	several	categories	of	federally	funded	genetic	engineering	experiments	that	were	deemed	to	require	the	NIH	Director’s	approval	on	an	individual	basis	(Office	of	Science	Technology	and	Policy	1986).	In	 the	mid-1980s,	 concerns	 about	 genetic	 engineering	 culminated	with	 the	drafting	 of	 the	 Coordinated	 Framework	 for	 Regulation	 of	 Biotechnology	 (hereafter	referred	 to	 as	 ‘the	Framework’)	 –	 a	policy	 framework	 that	 continues	 to	define	US	regulatory	 requirements	 for	 the	 application	 of	 biotechnology.	A	 closer	 look	 at	 the	Framework	 reveals	 how	 biotechnology	 has,	 since	 it	 inception,	 been	 perceived	 to	pose	 ‘novel’	 risks,	 yet	 has	 been	 made	 to	 ‘fit’	 existing	 regulatory	 frameworks	 and	specific	 risk	management	objectives.	Understanding	 that	 this	has	been	possible	 in	the	past	(or	at	least	‘possible’	according	to	US	regulatory	standards),	I	suggest,	is	an	important	step	towards	demystifying	synthetic	biology,	and	the	‘exceptional’	status	that	is	often	ascribed	to	the	science	and	its	potentially	‘incalculable’	risks.		 Drafted	by	the	Office	of	Science	and	Technology	Policy,	and	published	in	the	Federal	 Register	 on	 26	 June	 1986,	 the	 Framework	 builds	 upon	 the	 findings	 of	 an	interagency	 working	 group	 assembled	 under	 the	 auspices	 of	 the	 (now	 former)	White	House	Cabinet	Council	on	Natural	Resources	and	the	Environment,	which	met	in	 the	spring	of	1984.76	The	Framework	addresses	 the	regulatory	requirements	of																																																									
76 Reminiscent of current regulatory efforts directed at synthetic biology, albeit with a 
view to ‘safety’ and not ‘security’: “The working group sought to achieve a balance 
between regulation adequate to ensure health and environmental safety while maintaining 
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the	 three	primary	 federal	agencies	 responsible	 for	 the	oversight	and	regulation	of	biotechnology.77	 What	 is	 significant	 about	 the	 Framework	 is	 that	 it	 enabled	genetically	 engineered	 organisms	 to	 be	 assessed	 and	 managed	 in	 a	 manner	analogous	 to	 naturally	 occurring	 ones.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 environmental	 or	agricultural	applications	of	biotechnology,	the	Framework	suggests:	“[T]he	 means	 for	 assessing	 rDNA	 [recombinant	 DNA]	 organisms	 can	 be	approached	by	analogy	with	the	existing	data	base	gained	from	the	extensive	use	 of	 traditionally	 modified	 [relying	 on	 selective	 breeding	 practices]	organisms	 in	 agriculture	 and	 the	 environment	 generally.	 With	 step-by-step	assessment	during	the	research	and	development	process,	the	potential	risk	to	the	environment	of	the	applications	of	rDNA	organisms	should	be	minimized.”	(Office	of	Science	Technology	and	Policy	1986,	p.	20)	In	 other	words,	 the	 Framework	 “reflected	 a	 position	 that	 biotechnology	 could	 be	adequately	 regulated	 through	 the	 existing	 federal	 infrastructure	 and	 by	 adapting	existing	 laws	 to	 new	 technologies”	 (Belson	 2000,	 p.	 269).	 The	 assumption	 being,	‘there	is	nothing	inherently	riskier	about	organisms	that	are	assembled	using	genetic	engineering	techniques	than	organisms	that	are	taken	from	the	natural	environment	and	reconfigured	to	produce	ordinary	biological	products’	(NRC	1989).	This	meant	that,	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 oversight	 and	 regulation	 (including	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	developing	 biological	 containment	 standards,	 export	 controls,	 and	 alike),	 a	genetically	 engineered	 organism’s	 risks	 could	 be	 assessed	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	biological	characteristics	of	the	recipient	(the	organism	that	receives	the	DNA)	and	donor	(the	organism	that	donates	the	DNA)	organisms	alone;	effectively	making	the	recombinant	organism	no	riskier	than	the	sum	of	its	parts.78																																																																																																																																																																							
sufficient regulatory flexibility to avoid impeding the growth of an infant industry” 
(Office of Science Technology and Policy 1986, p. 4). 
77 That is, the US Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).	
78 In contrast, EU regulators drew a very different conclusion on the nature of the risks 
posed by recombinant organisms, which, in turn, contributed to a very different policy 
outcome. Specifically, in 1990, under Directive 90/220/EEC on the Release of 
Genetically Modified Organisms, the EU formalized a regulatory approach based on the 
‘precautionary principle’, premised upon the belief that recombinant organisms could in 
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	 Equally	significant	were	the	‘exceptions’.	According	to	the	Framework:	“The	vast	 majority	 of	 industrial	 rDNA	 large-scale	 applications	 will	 use	 organisms	 of	intrinsically	 low	 risk	which	warrant	 only	minimal	 containment”	 (Office	 of	 Science	Technology	 and	Policy	1986,	 p.	 20).79	 In	 other	 cases,	 further	 review,	 and	possibly	further	 biological	 containment,	 would	 be	 necessary.	 However,	 the	 authors	 of	 the	Framework	 underline	 that	 ‘knowing’	 what	 should	 count	 as	 an	 ‘exception’	 is	problematic:	 “Any	 proposal	 to	 regulate	 the	 research	 and	 products	 of	 genetic	manipulation	 techniques	quickly	 confronts	 the	 issue	of	what	organisms	 should	be	considered	appropriate	for	certain	types	of	review”	(ibid,	p.	15).	At	the	same	time,	despite	the	indeterminacies	anticipated	in	determining	which	genetic	manipulations	should	 be	 categorized	 as	 especially	 risky,	 the	 Framework,	 in	 no	 uncertain	 terms,	defines	two	such	cases.	The	first	refers	to	genetic	engineering	work	that	results	 in	an	 “intergeneric	 organism”	 (ibid,	 p.	 15).	 The	 second	 refers	 to	 genetic	 engineering	work	that	involves	a	“pathogen”	(ibid.).	A	closer	look	at	each	of	these	cases	reveals	that	the	reasoning	used	to	interpret	and	define	the	exceptions	as	being	‘exceptional’	relied	on	considerably	more	than	appeals	to	the	‘scientific	evidence’.		 In	 the	case	of	 ‘intergeneric	organisms’	 (also	referred	to	as	 ‘new	organisms’,	presumably	because	the	recombinant	product	is	deemed	to	be	sufficiently	different	from	 either	 the	 donor	 or	 the	 recipient	 organism	 to	 merit	 this	 distinction),	 the	exception	is	based	upon	the	assumption	that	organisms	of	this	kind	(resulting	from	the	 combination	 of	 genetic	 material	 from	 two	 organisms	 from	 two	 different	genera)80	are	likely	to	have	a	“significant	potential	to	exhibit	new	traits”	(ibid,	p.	44,																																																																																																																																																																						
fact prove to be riskier than the sum of their parts, thus meriting exceptional regulatory 
oversight and control. These contrasting assessments, which led to diverging policies, 
underscore the contingent character of science policymaking based on risk analysis. For a 
more detailed discussion on the subject of trans-Atlantic biotechnology policy and its 
divergence, see Lynch and Vogel (2001).  
79 The authors of the Framework draw this conclusion despite making the following aside 
on page 15: “This does not mean to suggest that the behavior of a genetically 
manipulated organism exempted from these definitions is wholly predictable (since any 
biological organism is never 100% predictable), but that the probability of any 
incremental hazard compared to the unmodified organism host is low.”  
80 Biological classification based on Linnaean taxonomy groups species according to 
their shared physical characteristics. Species are ranked according to a hierarchical 
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emphasis	 in	 original),	 thus	 posing	 potentially	 novel	 risks.	 The	 exception	 is	contrasted	with	‘intrageneric	organisms’	(genetic	combinations	from	two	organisms	of	 the	 same	 genera)	 and	 is	 based	 upon	 the	 assumption	 that	 “intra-generic	combinations”	 are	 “less	 likely	 to	 produce	 new	 combinations	 of	 traits	 than	 inter-generic	combinations”	(ibid,	p.	45),	thus	posing	no	novel	risks.	The	 rationale	 behind	 this	 distinction	 (that	 is,	 between	 the	 ‘exception’,	
intergeneric	 organisms,	 and	 the	 ‘non-exception’,	 intrageneric	 organisms)	 is	 not	entirely	 clear.	Why,	 for	 instance,	base	 the	distinction	on	 ‘genera’	 and	not	on	some	other	 taxonomic	 rank,	 such	 as	 ‘species’	 or	 ‘family’?	 For	 that	matter,	 why	 not	 use	some	other	metric	entirely?	Whatever	the	reasoning	behind	the	choice,	what	can	be	said	 about	 this	 distinction	 is	 that	 it	was	 not	 based	 on	 scientific	 evidence	 alone.	 If	anything,	 given	 the	 following	 justification	 offered	 in	 the	 Framework,	 the	 choice	appears	to	have	been	motivated	by	pragmatism,	if	not	a	sense	of	practical	necessity.	From	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 Environmental	 Protection	 Agency	 (EPA):	 “[although]	the	 Agency	 realizes	 that	 science	 provides	 no	 absolute	 standard	 for	 such	distinctions”,	 the	 “EPA	 believes	 the	 approach	 it	 has	 adopted	 is	 practical	 and	facilitates	 the	 identification	 of	 those	 microorganisms	 that	 should	 be	 subject	 to	special	attention	and	also	that	should	be	considered	 ‘new’”	(ibid.).	 In	other	words,	there	 was	 a	 perceived	 need,	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 oversight	 and	 regulation,	 to	definitively	‘know’	which	recombinant	organisms	were	‘riskier’	than	others.	This,	in	turn,	 required	 that	 risk	 assessment	 techniques	 (in	 this	 case	 based	 on	 Linnaean	taxonomy	and	the	opinions	of	the	EPA)	be	crafted	to	make	this	objective	possible.		 In	the	case	of	 ‘pathogens’	–	defined	as	a	“microorganism	that	has	the	ability	to	cause	disease	in	living	organisms”	(ibid,	p.	43)	–	the	reasoning	is	seemingly	more	straightforward.	 The	 exceptional	 status	 attributed	 to	 genetic	 engineering	experiments	 that	 involve	 the	 use	 of	 pathogens	 is	 justified	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	epidemiological	 characteristics	 of	 the	 donor	 and	 recipient	 organisms.	 In	 other	words,	 ‘pathogens	 are	 especially	 risky,	 therefore	 recombinant	 organisms	 derived	from	 pathogens	 are	 also	 especially	 risky’.	 Moreover,	 according	 to	 the	 EPA,																																																																																																																																																																						
classification system composed of seven ranks, from most inclusive to least inclusive: 
kingdom, phylum, class, order, family, genius, species.  
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“[p]athogens	 are	 a	 clearly	 defined	 category	 of	 organisms”,	 which	 makes	 this	category	particularly	practical	 for	 the	purposes	of	 regulation	 (ibid.).	Yet,	 even	 this	seemingly	 ‘straightforward’	 claim	 –	 that	 pathogens	 represent	 a	 ‘clearly	 defined	category’	 –	 is	 not	 (or,	 at	 least,	 is	 no	 longer)	 self-evident.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 synthetic	biology,	as	I	will	discuss	in	the	following,	there	is	no	longer	perceived	to	be	anything	‘clear’	about	a	pathogen	‘category’	based	on	Linnaean	taxonomy.	
	 The	 Framework	 offers	 further	 cases	 of	 ‘pragmatic	 policymaking’,	 including	several	 exceptions	 within	 the	 ‘exceptions’,	 which	 are	 said	 to	 reverse	 their	exceptional	 status.81	 However,	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	my	 argument,	 the	 cases	 that	 I	have	presented	effectively	underline	my	point.	That	is,	previous	biotechnologies	(in	this	case,	genetic	engineering)	have	been	perceived	to	pose	‘novel’	risks.	These	risks,	in	 turn,	 have	 been	 made	 to	 ‘fit’	 existing	 regulatory	 frameworks	 and	 specific	 risk	management	 objectives.	 This	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 relation	 to	 an	 entire	 class	 of	 risk	(‘recombinant	 organisms’)	 or	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 exceptions	 within	 this	 class	(‘intergeneric	 organisms’	 and	 ‘pathogens’).	 In	 both	 cases,	 a	 combination	 of	 risk	assessment	 techniques	 –	 some	 formal,	 others	 informal;	 some	 based	 on	 science,	others	on	the	perceived	needs	of	the	participating	regulators	–	are	brought	to	bear	on	 problematic	 entities,	 and	 used	 to	 render	 them	 visible	 and	manageable.	 In	 the	case	of	 synthetic	biology,	 there	are	 similarities	 to	be	drawn	 from	past	 experience,	and	 there	 are	 differences.	 Although	 not	 necessarily	 ‘unique’,	 the	 case	 of	 synthetic	biology,	I	will	argue,	is	nonetheless	perceived	to	pose	its	own	‘challenges’,	requiring	its	own	‘standards’	of	assessment	and	management.		
																																																								
81 In the case of intergeneric organisms, “excluded are organisms that have resulted from 
the addition of intergeneric materials that is well-characterized and contains only non-
coding regulatory regions such as operators, promoters, origins of replication, terminators 
and ribosome binding regions” (Office of Science Technology and Policy 1986, p. 16).  
In the case of pathogens, “excepted are organisms belonging to a strain used for 
laboratory research or commercial purposes and generally recognized as non-pathogenic 
according to sources identified by a federal agency”, as well as “genetically engineered 
organisms developed by transferring a well-characterized, non-coding regulatory region 
from a pathogenic donor to a non-pathogenic recipient” (ibid, p. 17). 
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5.3.2	Similar,	but	different:	Keeping	pace	with	‘novel’	risks	Before	proceeding	with	 the	 case	 study	 on	 the	DNA	 synthesis	 industry,	 it	 is	worth	taking	 a	 moment	 to	 consider	 how	 ‘biosecurity	 risk	 assessment’	 in	 the	 context	 of	synthetic	biology	contrasts	with	‘biosafety	risk	assessment’	in	the	context	of	genetic	engineering,	and	how	these	differences	are	perceived	to	complicate	the	regulatory	strategy	 described	 in	 the	 Framework.	 Based	 on	 the	 interviews	 conducted	 for	my	research,	as	well	as	the	scientific	and	technical	readings	conducted	for	this	research,	two	sites	of	comparison	(and,	indeed,	conflict)	are	especially	apparent,	one	relating	to	perceptions	of	how	the	science	has	changed,	and	the	other	relating	to	perceptions	of	how	the	context	has	changed.	With	regard	to	the	first	theme,	synthetic	biology	is	perceived	to	complicate	existing	risk	assessment	techniques	(notably,	those	defined	in	 the	 Framework)	 that	 depend	 upon	 ‘knowing’	 the	 risks	 based	 on	 the	 biological	characteristics	of	‘naturally	occurring’	organisms.	With	regard	to	the	second	theme,	the	 problem	of	 risk	 assessment	 in	 synthetic	 biology	 is	 closely	 tied	 to	 the	 broader	issue	 of	 ‘deliberate	 misuse’.	 In	 both	 instances,	 what	 is	 deemed	 to	 be	 especially	problematic	about	 synthetic	biology	 is	 that	 it	does	not	 ‘match	up’	with	 familiar	or	established	‘ways	of	knowing’	the	risks.	Significantly,	these	tensions	raise	questions	not	only	about	how	synthetic	biology’s	risks	should	be	assessed,	 but	also	about	who	
should	be	 responsible	 for	 conducting	 the	assessments.	 Finding	practical	 solutions	 to	these	challenges,	 in	 turn,	 is	perceived	 to	be	central	 to	enabling	synthetic	biology’s	risks	to	be	made	amenable	to	risk	management	or	regulation.		
	 First,	 for	 many	 scientific	 and	 technical	 experts	 seeking	 solutions	 to	 the	problem	of	risk	assessment	 in	 the	context	of	synthetic	biology,	 the	possibility	 that	the	science	might	enable	individuals	to	construct	genetic	sequences	that	do	not	exist	in	nature	 is	deemed	to	be	especially	problematic.	 In	 their	 first	report	on	synthetic	biology,	 which	 addressed	 the	 regulatory	 challenges	 presented	 by	 DNA	 synthesis	technology,	 the	NSABB	 (2006,	 p.	 8)	 cautioned	 that:	 “It	 is	 now	 feasible	 to	 produce	synthetic	 genomes	 that	 encode	 novel	 and	 taxonomically	 unclassified	 agents”,	making	it	“difficult	to	make	a	taxonomic	assignment”	and	thus	difficult	to	conduct	an	assessment	 (ibid,	 p.	 6).	 According	 to	 one	 biodefense	 scientist	 (Volker	 Beck)	
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interviewed	for	my	research,	this	possibility	does	not	just	complicate	the	task	of	risk	assessment	in	synthetic	biology,	but	indeed	makes	it	all	but	impossible:	“There	is	one	issue	that	is	different,	from	my	point	of	view.	There	is	a	gap	now	in	the	existing	regulation	…	all	the	legislation	on	genetic	engineering	is	focused	on	 natural	 template	 DNA.	 But	what	we	 see	 DNA	 synthesis	 companies	 doing	now	 is	 synthesizing	 more	 and	 more	 sequences	 without	 a	 natural	 template,	and,	 at	 present,	 we	 have	 no	 legal	 approach	 to	 this	 because,	 in	 principal,	without	 a	 natural	 template	 you	 can’t	 do	 a	 risk	 assessment	 …	 without	 a	template,	where’s	the	risk?	…	if	you	look	from	the	point	of	view	of	how	we’ve	setup	our	legislation	…	Then	I	would	say	we	have	a	gap	in	understanding	the	real	risks	associated	with	these	kinds	of	materials.”	(Volker	Beck)	This	view	of	risk	assessment,	and	its	perceived	limitations,	clearly	reflects	the	logic	outlined	in	the	Framework,	which,	as	I	have	discussed,	argues	that	a	‘recombinant’	(or,	in	this	case,	‘synthetic’)	organism’s	risks	can	be	assessed,	but	only	in	relation	to	the	naturally	occurring	organisms	from	which	the	DNA	is	derived.	In	1984,	the	year	the	Framework	was	written,	this	effectively	covered	all	cases,	as	it	was	assumed	that	all	genetic	templates	were	effectively	‘natural’,	that	is,	‘found	in	nature’.			 Another	 biodefense	 scientist	 (Richard	Weller)	 interviewed	 for	my	 research	expressed	 similar	 misgivings	 about	 the	 uncertainties	 associated	 with	 synthetic	organisms,	but	did	not	go	so	far	as	to	say	that	these	uncertainties	may	prevent	risk	assessment	entirely,	merely	that	relative	to	genetic	engineering,	which	he	described	as	a	“mature	science”,	the	risks	are	less	predictable:		“I	 think	 there’s	 a	 bit	 more	 predictability	 in	 recombinant	 DNA.	 …	 As	 the	technology	 matured,	 I	 think	 what’s	 happened	 in	 recombinant,	 is	 the	predictability	of	outcomes	have	become,	you	know,	pretty	good.	It’s	not	totally	infallible,	but	the	predictability	is	pretty	good.	Synthetic	biology,	on	the	other	hand,	 you	 truly	 have	 the	 ability,	 if	 I	 really	 understand	 the	 potential	 of	 the	technology,	to	really	create	something	that	is	totally	de	novo.	…	something	that	has	 literally	never	previously	existed	in	the	context	of	 life	on	earth.	…	I	think	the	predictability	of	outcomes,	once	you’ve	got	all	 that	stuff	 together	and	 it’s	truly	novel—	it’s	very	uncertain,	it’s	risky	in	my	opinion.”	(Richard	Weller)	
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These	 examples	 provide	 only	 a	 small	 sample	 of	 the	 arguments	 that	 I	 have	found	 on	 the	 subject	 of	 the	 perceived	 challenges	 to	 risk	 assessment	 posed	 by	genetically	 modified	 organisms	 derived	 from	 ‘synthetic	 DNA’	 or	 ‘non-natural	templates’	or	‘sequences	that	do	not	exist	in	nature’,	and	I	will	return	to	this	subject	in	relation	to	the	DNA	synthesis	industry	case	study	in	the	following	section.	At	this	time,	 what	 I	 wish	 to	 emphasize	 is	 only	 that	 there	 is	 perceived	 to	 be	 a	mismatch	between	 where	 the	 science	 is	 today	 and	 where	 the	 existing	 standards	 of	 risk	assessment	 and	 regulation	 are	 today.	 Whether	 risk	 assessments	 are	 made	‘impossible’	by	synthetic	biology,	or	merely	 ‘less	predictable’,	 there	is	perceived	to	be	a	heightened	level	of	uncertainty	introduced	by	the	science,	complicating	familiar	‘ways	 of	 knowing’	 the	 risks.	 Moreover,	 much	 like	 the	 earlier	 case	 of	 genetic	engineering,	some	believe	that,	“regulators	may	insist	on	developing	new	biosafety	guidelines”,	albeit	 this	 time	with	a	view	to	“synthetic	microorganisms”	that	“lack	a	natural	genetic	pedigree”	(Tucker	and	Zilinskas	2006,	p.	33).	Although	only	a	partial	step	towards	 ‘new	biosafety	guidelines’,	at	 least	one	point	 of	 uncertainty	 has	 been	 addressed	 in	 the	 most	 recent	 NIH	 Guidelines	 For	
Research	 Involving	 Recombinant	 DNA	 Molecules	 (NIH	 2011).	 Specifically,	 the	 NIH	
Guidelines	now	define	“synthetic	DNA	segments”	as	equivalent	to	their	“natural	DNA	counterpart”	 (ibid,	 p.	 10).	 This	 more	 inclusive	 definition	 of	 “recombinant	 DNA	molecules”	 (ibid.)	 effectively	 enables	 ‘synthetic	 DNA’,	 the	 formally	 ‘non-biological’	molecule	composed	of	‘off-the-shelf’	chemicals,	to	be	treated	as	if	it	is	‘natural	DNA’,	the	 widely	 regarded	 informational	 molecule	 that	 encodes	 proteins	 and	 biological	systems.	 According	 to	 the	 NSABB	 (2010,	 p.	 9),	 this	 new	 definition	 enables	 “the	current	risk	assessment	framework	described	in	the	NIH	Guidelines	[to]	be	used	to	evaluate	 synthetically	 produced	 nucleic	 acids”.	 While	 this	 may	 be	 –	 that	 is,	 by	eliminating	the	‘synthetic	DNA/natural	DNA’	distinction	both	entities	can	be	treated	as	 equivalent	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 oversight	 and	 regulation	 –	 this	 (distinctly	pragmatic)	 policy	 effort	 does	 not	 address	 the	 primary	 source	 of	 uncertainty	 and	concern	previously	voiced	by	the	NSABB	(2006),	as	well	as	by	those	interviewed	for	my	research.	That	is,	it	does	not	address	how	scientists	and	regulators	might	assess	the	risks	posed	by	 ‘novel	combinations	of	synthetic	DNA’,	which	might	correspond	
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with	‘biological	properties	that	do	not	exist	in	nature’.	In	other	words,	as	the	NSABB	(2006,	 pp.	 14-15)	 underlined	 at	 the	 conclusion	 of	 their	 first	 report	 on	 synthetic	biology,	under	the	heading,	“Next	Steps	in	Addressing	Biosecurity	Issues:”	“How	can	possible	risks	associated	with	the	generation	of	novel	organisms	be	addressed?”	Similar	 reconfigurations	 of	 existing	 guidelines	 and	 risk	 assessment	standards,	 adapted	 to	 keep	 pace	 with	 heightened	 uncertainties	 about	 synthetic	biology,	are	also	being	developed	beyond	the	US.	Much	of	this	adaptation,	as	I	have	just	 discussed,	 concerns	 the	 (re)definition	 of	 synthetic	 biology	 (and/or	 its	component	parts).	As	Huib	de	Vriend	(2006,	p.	51),	who	has	closely	followed	related	developments	 in	 the	 European	 context,	 describes	 the	 importance	 of	 this	 ongoing	regulatory	 activity:	 “The	 definition	 of	 risks	 related	 to	 synthetic	 biology	 and,	consequently,	 the	 need	 for	 specific	 risk	 management	 measures,	 depends	 on	 the	definition	 of	 synthetic	 biology.”	 In	 other	 words,	 much	 depends	 upon	 whether	synthetic	biology	is	defined	as	something	‘new’	or	as	something	‘similar’	to	existing	biotechnologies,	as	this	definition	is	used	as	a	justification	for	how	risk	management	efforts	should	proceed,	and	whether	regulatory	standards	need	to	change.		As	 I	have	already	explored	 in	 this	 chapter,	 and	as	 I	will	 examine	 in	 further	detail	in	relation	to	the	DNA	synthesis	industry	case	study	in	the	following	section,	there	 is	 a	 tendency	 to	 adapt	 the	 names	 and	 attributes	 of	 new	 technologies	 to	 fit	existing	regulatory	standards.	Huib	de	Vriend’s	research	in	Europe	would	appear	to	lend	 further	 support	 to	 this	 observation,	 as	 evidenced	 by	 the	 following	 account,	explored	 in	 an	 extensive	 report	 on	 synthetic	 biology,	 entitled,	 ‘Early	 social	reflections	on	the	emerging	field	of	synthetic	biology’:	“According	 to	 the	 Forum	 Genforschung	 of	 the	 Swiss	 Academy	 of	 Sciences,	synthetic	 biology	 is	 considered	 a	 new	 research	 field,	 which	 usually	 involves	more	genes	and	results	 in	changes	that	are	more	radical	than	those	resulting	from	genetic	modification.	In	spite	of	this	difference,	with	respect	to	safety,	the	Forum	argues	that	synthetic	biology	is	similar	to	gene	technology	and	can	be	understood	 as	 a	 subdiscipline	 of	 the	 latter.	 From	 this	 rather	 inconsistent	argumentation	the	Forum	draws	the	conclusion	that	in	general,	the	creation	of	synthetic	organisms	is	no	more	risky	than	the	introduction	of	new	species	into	
	 160	
an	ecosystem,	dealing	with	natural	pathogens	or	gene	technology	as	practiced	to	 date.	 Thus,	 the	 criteria	 that	 apply	 for	 the	 risk	 assessment	 of	 genetic	modification	also	apply	to	synthetic	biology.”	(de	Vriend	2006,	pp.	51-52)	Here,	 de	 Vriend	 argues	 that,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Forum	 Genforschung’s	deliberations	 on	 risk	 assessment	 as	 it	 relates	 to	 the	 release	 of	 synthetically	derived	 organisms	 into	 the	 environment,	 synthetic	 biology	 is	 defined	 as	 both	‘new’	and	‘similar’	–	new	enough	to	constitute	a	“new	research	field”,	but	similar	enough	 to	 “gene	 technology”	 that	 it	 can	 be	 considered	 a	 “subdiscipline”	 (ibid.).	This	framing	is	then	used	to	justify	the	Forum’s	claim:	“the	creation	of	synthetic	organisms	 is	 no	 more	 risky	 than	 the	 introduction	 of	 new	 species	 into	 an	ecosystem,	 dealing	 with	 natural	 pathogens	 or	 gene	 technology	 as	 practiced	 to	date”	(ibid.).	 In	essence,	 this	 is	a	 twenty-first	century	rendition	of	 the	argument	put	 forward	 by	 the	 authors	 of	 the	 Framework:	 simply	 replace	 the	 word,	‘recombinant’	with	the	word,	‘synthetic’.		 Second,	 an	 equally	 important	 site	 of	 conflict	 in	 experts’	 accounts	 about	synthetic	 biology	 and	 risk	 assessment	does	not	 concern	 the	perceived	 ‘novelty’	 of	the	 science,	 but	 rather	 the	 perceived	 ‘novelty’	 of	 the	 context	 within	 which	 the	science	is	embedded.	This	conflict	is	again	clearly	discernable	in	relation	to	the	risk	assessment	and	regulatory	standards	developed	in	the	Framework.	The	Framework,	as	 I	 discussed	 above,	 was	 designed	 to	 address	 the	 unintended	 health	 and	environmental	 risks	 that	 might	 arise	 from	 genetically	 engineered	 products.	 The	Framework,	 in	 turn,	 has	 informed	 (among	 other	 control	 measures)	 biosafety	protocols	 for	 the	 safe	 handling	 and	 storage	 of	 genetically	 modified	 organisms	(CDC/NIH	 1999,	 2009).	 These	 protocols	 have	 become	 a	 routine	 aspect	 of	institutional	 science	 and	 rely	 on	 researchers	 or	 institutional	 biosafety	 committees	(IBCs)	to	conduct	the	necessary	risk	assessments,	and,	in	turn,	differentially	control	risky	organisms	(WHO	2006).	According	to	these	protocols	(CDC/NIH	2009,	p.	10),	a	biosafety	risk	assessment	should	address	three	aspects	of	 the	genetically	modified	agent	(again,	with	a	view	to	the	“wild-type”	from	which	the	agent’s	DNA	is	derived),	namely:	“its	capability	to	infect	and	cause	disease	in	a	susceptible	human	or	animal	
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host,	 its	 virulence	 as	 measured	 by	 the	 severity	 of	 disease,	 and	 the	 availability	 of	preventive	measures	and	effective	treatments	for	the	disease”.82	In	 contrast,	 the	 Framework	 says	 nothing	 about	 the	 subject	 of	 ‘deliberate	misuse’,	and,	to	date,	a	policy	approach	equivalent	to	the	Framework	does	not	exist	on	 this	 subject	 (NRC	2004;	Bügl	 et	 al.	 2007;	NSABB	2010).83	At	 the	 same	 time,	 in	2009,	 the	 CDC/NIH,	 observing	 that,	 “[t]he	 events	 of	 September	 11,	 2001,	 and	 the	anthrax	attacks	in	October	of	that	year	re-shaped	and	changed,	forever,	the	way	we	manage	and	conduct	work	in	biological	and	clinical	laboratories”	(CDC/NIH	2009,	p.	iii),	grafted	on	a	biosecurity	risk	assessment	provision	(detailed	at	the	outset	of	this	section)	 to	 the	 existing	 biosafety	 protocols.	 As	 was	 the	 case	 with	 biosafety	 risk	assessment,	life	scientists	are	again	requested	to	conduct	the	assessment.	However,	in	 this	 instance,	 ‘the	 assessment’	 no	 longer	 calls	 for	 only	 an	 appraisal	 of	 the	biological	 characteristics	 of	 the	 (genetically	 modified)	 agent	 (which,	 as	 I	 have	suggested,	 is	 already	 perceived	 to	 be	 complicated	 by	 the	 advent	 of	 synthetic	biology),	but	also	an	evaluation	of	 the	 likely	 identity	and	actions	of	 the	actor	who	might	 choose	 (or	 not	 choose)	 to	 acquire	 and	 deliberately	 misuse	 this	 agent.	Specifically,	the	CDC/NIH	(ibid,	p.	108)	suggests	that	researchers	should	assess	the	“motive,	 means,	 and	 opportunity	 of	 …	 potential	 adversaries	 [“Insiders”	 or	“Outsiders”]”	in	an	effort	an	effort	to	anticipate	and,	to	the	extent	possible,	prevent	the	theft	and	deliberate	misuse	of	dangerous	biological	agents.		
																																																								
82 I will return to this observation and its significance in the following section. Notably, 
in the case of arbitrary sequence information, DNA synthesis providers regularly conduct 
biosecurity risk assessments even though none of these three criteria (which provide the 
basis for biosafety risk assessments) can be anticipated.  
83 Although an equivalent framework that addresses the deliberate misuse of genetically 
modified organisms does not exist, the US government’s Select Agent Program addresses 
the handling, storage and transfer of approximately 80 high-risk pathogens and toxins, 
prohibiting certain individuals from gaining access to these entities (NRC 2010). I will 
discuss the significance of the Select Agent Regulations in the next section of this chapter 
in relation to the DNA synthesis industry. Separate policy on ‘dual-use research of 
concern’ (DHHS 2012), which seeks to address the deliberate misuse of life science 
knowledge (identified as a further gap in life science regulation), has recently been 
released, which I will discuss in detail in the following chapter.    
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Beyond	 the	 problematic	 language	 the	 CDC/NIH	 uses	 to	 describe	 ‘potential	adversaries’,	even	beyond	the	implicit	assumption	that	the	‘adversary’	could	be	the	individual	 researcher	 conducting	 the	 assessment	 (‘Insiders’),	 requesting	 that	 life	scientists	 conduct	 biosecurity	 risk	 assessments	presents	 life	 scientists	with	 a	 task	that,	according	to	some	(including	a	number	of	synthetic	biologists	interviewed	for	my	 research),	 goes	 beyond	 their	 familiar	 areas	 of	 expertise.	 The	 argument	 being,	assessing	 an	 individual’s	 ‘motives’	 is	 rather	 different	 than	 assessing	 a	 genetically	modified	 agent’s	 biological	 characteristics.	While	 both	may	 be	 equally	 difficult	 to	evaluate,	 the	 one	 is	 perceived	 to	 fall	 more	 squarely	 within	 the	 domain	 of	 the	behavioral	 sciences	and	 law	enforcement,	 and	 the	other	more	squarely	within	 the	domain	 of	 the	 life	 sciences.	 As	 one	 prominent	 synthetic	 biologist	 (Rob	 Carlson)	interviewed	 for	my	 research	 put	 it:	 “if	 you	 are	 concerned	 about	 potential	 threats	from	 people	 using	 biology	 or	 developing	 new	 technologies;	 developing	 new	products,	 then	 you	 need	 to	 have	 access	 to	 that	 information”,	 implying	 that	 such	information	is	not	readily	accessible	to	life	scientists.	A	number	of	non-life	scientists	(for	 example,	 Selgelid	 2007,	 p.	 41)	 share	 this	 opinion,	 arguing	 that,	 “the	 scientific	community	 is	 systematically	 denied	 information	 that	 is	 absolutely	 essential	 to	estimate	security	risks.”	Other	life	scientists,	including	those	actively	engaged	in	US	biosecurity	policy,	emphasize	that	the	very	‘thinking’	required	to	assess	biosecurity	risks	is	lacking	among	life	scientists,	as	life	scientists	have	traditionally	been	trained	to	 anticipate	 and	 prevent	 ‘laboratory	 accidents’	 and	 not	 ‘bioterrorist	 threats’.	According	 to	 David	 Relman,	 an	 infectious	 disease	 scientist	 at	 Stanford	 University	and	co-chair	of	the	so-called	‘Lemon-Relman	Committee’,84	“‘[researchers	and	IBCs]	have	not	been	adequately	 informed	[about]	how	you	 think	about	biosecurity,	how	you	think	about	the	potential	misuse	of	science’”	(NRC	2007,	p.	66).	This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 synthetic	 biologists	 (or	 life	 scientists	 by	 any	 other	name)	dismiss	the	importance	of	biosecurity	or	the	need	for	risk	assessments	that																																																									
84 The Lemon-Relman Committee, also known as the ‘Committee on Advances in 
Technology and the Prevention of Their Application to Next Generation Biowarfare 
Threats’, was comprised of scientific and technical experts tasked with examining 
“current trends and future objectives of research in the life sciences that may enable the 
development of a new generation of future biological threats” (NRC 2006, p. VIII).	
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address	 the	 subject	 of	 ‘deliberate	 misuse’.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 as	 discussed	 in	 the	previous	chapter,	synthetic	biologists	(for	example,	LaVan	and	Marmon	2010)	are	at	times	exceptionally	vocal	about	the	potential	‘biosecurity	risks’	engendered	by	their	science	and	the	need	for	greater	education	and	awareness	raising	on	the	subject	of	biosecurity.	 For	 synthetic	 biologists,	 and	 for	 other	 stakeholders	 invested	 in	synthetic	biology’s	scientific	and	industrial	development,	attention	to	biosecurity	is	perceived	 to	be	essential	 for	both	mitigating	 the	 ‘biosecurity	 risks’	 engendered	by	their	work	and	sustaining	the	legitimacy	of	their	science.	In	the	words	of	LaVan	and	Marmon	 (ibid,	 p.	 1012),	 synthetic	 biologists	 at	 the	 Massachusetts	 Institute	 of	Technology,	 biosecurity	 is	 “vital	 for	 safe	 and	 effective	 progress	 within	 synthetic	biology.”	 But,	 it	 is	 to	 say	 that	 a	 common	 attitude,	 at	 least	 among	 the	 synthetic	biologists	interviewed	for	my	research,	is	that	life	scientists	can	‘tell	you	about	the	science’,	 but	 questions	 about	 ‘motives’	 and	 ‘intent’,	 and	 about	 ‘knowing’	who	 is	 a	‘potential	advisory’,	are	questions	better	left	to	law	enforcement.		At	 the	 same	 time,	 experts	 specializing	 in	 aspects	 of	 national	 security,	 who	ostensibly	 possess	 the	 necessary	 information	 (sometimes	 referred	 to	 as	‘intelligence’)	 to	make	an	assessment	of	 this	kind,	question	 the	 limits	of	 their	own	knowledge.	 Specifically,	 they	 claim	 to	 lack	 information	 about	 ‘the	 science’.	 As	Christopher	 Park,	 a	 US	 counter-terrorism	 specialist,	 commented	 during	 an	interview	 for	my	 research:	 “At	 the	 end	of	 the	day,	 I’m	not	 a	 scientist,	 so,	 to	 some	extent,	 I’m	 limited	 by	 what	 information	 I’ve	 got.”	 Or,	 as	 Piers	 Millett,	 a	 senior	administrator	 for	 the	 Biological	 Weapons	 Convention,	 expressed:	 “Only	 the	scientists	 and	 technologists	 know	where	 the	 cutting	 edge	 is.	 And	 they	 only	 know	because	they’re	paid	to	follow	it.		We	can’t	dabble	and	expect	to	understand.”	In	both	instances,	although	neither	interviewee	expressed	that	synthetic	biologists	“should	identify	the	risks,	or	responses	to	those	risks,	on	their	own”	(Piers	Millet),	they	did	express	that	addressing	these	risks	will	require	their	participation.	This	view	of	shared	responsibility,	one	in	which	life	scientists	are	expected	to	actively	participate	 in	conducting	biosecurity	risk	assessments	and	to	engage	with	security	experts	on	matters	of	‘national	security’,	was	particularly	evident	during	an	interview	 conducted	 with	 Special	 Agent	 You	 of	 the	 FBI’s	 Weapons	 of	 Mass	
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Destruction	Directorate.	A	key	figure	in	the	law	enforcement	community’s	outreach	and	awareness	raising	activities	in	synthetic	biology,	Agent	You	reasoned:	“Who	better	to	determine	what	the	risks	are	than	the	people	who	are	actually	conducting	 the	work?	…	 	For	 the	FBI,	 if	we’ve	established	 the	 right	dialogue,	then	the	practitioners	themselves	can	assist	us	in	making	sure	we’ve	allocated	our	resources	to	address	the	risk	in	a	commensurate	manner.”	(Edward	You)	The	question	remains,	is	this	a	role	synthetic	biologists	feel	capable	of	fulfilling	in	the	 first	 place,	 and,	 if	 so,	 are	 they	willing?	While	 it	may	 be	 desirable	 from	 the	perspective	of	the	FBI	that	synthetic	biologists	actively	participate	in	conducting	biosecurity	 risk	 assessments,	 and	 that	 researchers	 liaise	with	 law	 enforcement	agents	on	matters	of	‘national	security’,	it	may	not	be	universally	desirable	from	the	 standpoint	of	 synthetic	biologists.	This	mismatch	 in	views	 represents	 a	key	site	of	tension	that	I	will	return	to	in	Chapter	7	in	relation	to	an	emerging	–	albeit	uneasy	–	 ‘partnership’	between	DIYbio	and	the	FBI,	one	 that	 is	characteristic	of	recent	 efforts	 to	 establish	 a	 new	 ‘culture	 of	 responsibility’	 in	 the	 life	 sciences,	which	increasingly	favors	a	‘self-policing’	scientific	community.	Having	highlighted	some	of	the	key	tensions	that	characterize	biosecurity	risk	 assessment	 in	 the	 context	 of	 synthetic	 biology,	 as	 it	 relates	 to	 an	 earlier	regulatory	 framework	 designed	 to	 address	 the	 unintended	 consequences	associated	with	genetic	engineering,	I	will	now	(in	the	second	half	of	this	chapter)	explore	an	example	of	how	these	tensions	are	nonetheless	being	negotiated	in	an	attempt	 to	 enable	 a	 ‘secure’	 and	 ‘sustainable’	 science.	 The	 case	 of	 the	 DNA	synthesis	industry,	I	will	argue,	much	like	the	earlier	case	of	genetic	engineering	described	in	the	Framework,	represents	a	case	of	 ‘pragmatic	policymaking’	–	an	approach	to	policymaking	that	 is	characterized	by	flexible	modes	of	assessment	(both	 quantitative	 and	 qualitative,	 formal	 and	 informal)	 that	 are	 designed	 and	deployed	 to	 achieve	 a	 variety	 of	 policy	 objectives.	 While	 the	 science	 and	 the	political	and	social	context	have	changed	since	the	advent	of	genetic	engineering	in	 the	 1970s,	 the	 overriding	motivation	 to	 develop	 science	 policies	 that	 are	 at	once	 “accurate	 reflections	 of	 the	world	 ‘out	 there’”	 (Tierney	 1999,	 p.	 220)	and	conducive	to	‘practical	interventions’	remains	much	the	same.	
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Before	proceeding,	 I	should	underline	that	 the	case	of	 the	DNA	synthesis	industry	 represents	 only	 one	 site	where	 biosecurity	 risk	 assessment	 standards	are	being	developed.	 For	 example,	 as	 I	 have	discussed	 already,	 biosecurity	 risk	assessment	has	recently	become	a	 feature	of	 institutional	science,	characterized	by	the	introduction	of	risk	assessment	protocols	that	aim	to	anticipate	and	(to	the	extent	 possible)	 prevent	 the	 ‘loss,	 theft	 and	 potential	 misuse’	 of	 biological	materials	 (WHO	 2006;	 CDC/NIH	 2009).	 A	 further	 example,	 which	 I	 have	 not	discussed	 in	 this	 chapter,	 relates	 to	 the	 role	 played	 by	 journal	 editors	 in	 the	context	of	life	science	publishing,	who	have	recently	been	called	upon	to	identify,	and,	 if	 deemed	 necessary,	 omit	 certain	 research	 findings	 that	 are	 classified	 as	‘dual-use	 research	 of	 concern’.	 These	 examples	 (and	 others)	 represent	 the	plurality	 of	 settings	 within	 which	 biosecurity	 risk	 assessment	 has	 become	 an	integral	 component	of	 risk	management	 in	 the	 life	 sciences.	 In	each	case,	while	addressing	 the	 subject	 of	 ‘deliberate	 misuse’,	 the	 choice	 of	 risk	 assessment	techniques	and	the	manner	in	which	these	techniques	are	deployed,	depend	upon	the	specific	risk	management	objectives	they	are	intended	to	fulfill.		Thus,	while	 I	will	examine	the	case	of	 the	DNA	synthesis	 industry	at	 this	time,	 in	 the	 following	 two	 chapters	 I	 will	 examine	 in	 further	 detail	 how	 this	plurality	of	sites	of	biosecurity	risk	assessment	contributes	to	a	family	of	ways	of	intervening	 that	 together	 constitute	 the	 risk	 regulation	 regime	examined	 in	my	thesis.	This	said,	as	one	of	the	most	vigorous	sites	of	biosecurity	debate,	the	case	of	 the	 DNA	 synthesis	 industry	 is	 illustrative	 of	 many	 of	 the	 challenges	 and	dilemmas	 that	 confront	 life	 science	 regulators,	 life	 scientists,	 security	 officials,	and	others	engaged	 in	the	problematic	 task	of	developing	and/or	 implementing	new	biosecurity	risk	assessment	standards	and	regulatory	strategies	in	synthetic	biology,	 making	 it	 a	 valuable	 site	 of	 empirical	 research	 in	 itself.	 Moreover,	 it	provides	a	window	into	the	particular	‘mentalities	of	government’	(ones	that	are,	in	 this	 case,	 primarily	 ‘managerial’	 or	 ‘administrative’	 in	 function,	 directed	 at	designing	 a	 structured	 risk	 management	 process)	 that	 are	 presently	 being	harnessed	 to	 make	 a	 distinctly	 pragmatic	 objective	 –	 securing	 an	 emerging	science	while	simultaneously	ensuring	scientific	progress	–	possible.	
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5.4	‘Know	your	sequence;	know	your	customer’:	Biosecurity	risk	assessment	in	
the	context	of	the	DNA	synthesis	industry	To	date,	 few	aspects	of	synthetic	biology	have	received	more	policy	attention	than	synthetic	 genomics.	 One	 of	 the	 so-called	 ‘foundational	 technologies’	 (Endy	 2005)	that	constitute	the	‘field’	of	synthetic	biology,	the	capacity	to	direct	the	“construction	of	genetic	material	starting	from	information	and	raw	chemicals”	(Bügl	et	al.	2007,	p.	627)	has,	in	recent	years,	captivated	the	imaginations	of	science	policymakers	and	regulators,	 motivating	 equal	 measures	 of	 enthusiasm	 and	 concern.	 The	 DNA	synthesis	 industry,	 in	 turn,	as	 the	primary	driver	of	 this	 technology,	has	become	a	key	 site	 of	 policymaking	 activity.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 economic	 success	 of	 this	industry,	which	by	some	estimates	generated	between	US$50-$80	million	 in	2008	(NRC	2010),	 lends	support	to	synthetic	biologists’	claims	that	their	science	has	the	potential	 to	 yield	 significant	 economic	 benefits	 to	 governments	 that	 foster	 its	industrial	 development.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 increased	 access	 to	 ‘synthetic	 DNA’,	‘synthetic	genes’,	and	‘synthetic	genomes’,	which	DNA	synthesis	providers	promise	can	reach	customers	within	48	hours	“(from	order	to	delivery)”	(Bügl	et	al.	2007,	p.	627),	 is	 perceived	 to	 be	 at	 odds	 with	 the	 competing	 political	 imperative	 of	biosecurity.	 In	 fact,	 for	 some,	 the	 act	 of	 “keeping	 genes	 out	 of	 terrorists’	 hands”	(Check	2009,	p.	22)	or	“denying	synthetic	DNA	to	terrorists”	(Maurer	2011,	p.	1389)	would	appear	to	be	indistinguishable	from	biosecurity	itself.	In	 light	 of	 its	 perceived	 ‘dual-use	 potential’,	 a	 series	 of	 US	 government-sponsored	 initiatives	 have,	 in	 recent	 years,	 attempted	 to	 balance	 the	 ‘potential	benefits’	 of	 synthetic	 genomics	 against	 its	 ‘potential	 risks’,	 seeking	 to	 enable	 a	‘secure’	 and	 ‘sustainable’	 industry	 for	 synthetic	DNA.	Beginning	with	 the	NSABB’s	2006	 report,	 Addressing	 Biosecurity	 Concerns	 Related	 to	 the	 Synthesis	 of	 Select	
Agents,	which	was	informed	by	an	ad	hoc	working	group	assembled	by	the	NSABB,	including	 consultations	 with	 “industry	 experts”,	 “eminent	 researchers”,	 “[US	government]	 officials”	 representing	 multiple	 agencies	 and	 “key	 stakeholders”	possessing	relevant	knowledge	related	to	biosecurity	and	synthetic	genomics	(ibid,	
	 167	
p.	4),	 the	 tone	of	 these	 initiatives	has	been	one	of	apparent	optimism.	Specifically,	participating	 experts	 have	 conveyed	 that,	 while	 synthetic	 genomics	 (and	 its	application	 in	 the	 DNA	 synthesis	 industry)	 may	 present	 ‘novel’	 biosecurity	 risks,	these	risks	can	nonetheless	be	understood	and	acted	on	with	reasonable	confidence.	In	other	words,	calculating	risk	estimates	that	can	be	used	to	inform	and	to	justify	risk	management	decisions	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	DNA	 synthesis	 industry,	while	 at	times	described	as	“a	prediction	problem	of	the	greatest	complexity”	(NRC	2010,	p.	2),	is	perceived	to	be	possible.	Moreover,	this	belief	has,	I	would	suggest,	never	been	in	serious	doubt.	In	contrast	to	statements	made	by	the	NSABB	(2006)	at	the	outset	of	 their	 deliberations,	 the	 policy	 actions	 taken	 thus	 far	would	 appear	 to	 reflect	 a	policy	 approach	 based	 less	 on	 establishing	 if	 there	 is	 a	 need	 for	 an	 ‘alternative’	regulatory	 framework	 in	 light	 of	 potentially	 ‘novel’	 risks	 and	more	 on	 how	 these	risks	might	be	made	to	‘fit’	a	regulatory	framework	that	already	exists.		Published	in	its	final	form	on	13	October	2010,	the	Department	of	Health	and	Human	 Services’	 (DHHS	 2010b)	 Screening	 Framework	 Guidance	 for	 Providers	 of	
Synthetic	Double-Stranded	DNA	(hereafter	referred	to	as	‘the	Guidance’)	represents	the	 culmination	 of	 the	 US	 government’s	 recent	 policy	 efforts	 directed	 at	 the	 DNA	synthesis	 industry.	Building	on	 the	recommendations	of	 the	NSABB	(2006),	which	called	 for	 a	 series	 of	 scientific	 and	 technical	 reviews	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 US	government	to	address	the	‘biosecurity	implications’	of	synthetic	biology	in	general	and	synthetic	genomics	in	particular,	the	Guidance	is	a	response	to	the	NSABB’s	call	to	 establish,	 “strategies	 and	mechanisms	 that	might	 prevent	 or	mitigate	 potential	misuse	of	synthetic	genomics	while	minimizing	restrictions	on	the	beneficial	uses	of	this	 important	 field	of	 science”	 (ibid,	 p.	 3).	 In	 this	 section,	 I	will	 examine	how	 the	Guidance	 –	 a	 governance	 ‘strategy’	 or	 ‘mechanism’	 intended	 to	 standardize	biosecurity	risk	assessment	practices	across	the	DNA	synthesis	industry	–	attempts	to	fulfill	this	call,	while	simultaneously	remaining	within	the	boundaries	of	existing	institutional	 and	 regulatory	norms	 (in	 this	 instance,	primarily	 the	US	Select	Agent	Regulations).	 Like	 the	 earlier	 Framework,	 the	Guidance,	 I	will	 argue,	 represents	 a	case	 of	 ‘pragmatic	 policymaking’,	 one	 aimed	 at	 facilitating	 the	 assessment	 and	management	of	‘novel’	risks	that	exist	at	the	‘limits	of	prediction’.	
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On	 the	 surface,	 the	 Guidance,	 much	 like	 the	 earlier	 Framework,	 might	 be	described	as	 a	 technical	document	 that	describes	 a	disinterested	approach	 to	 risk	analysis	based	on	appeals	 to	 the	 ‘scientific	 evidence’	 (or,	no	 less	often,	 the	 lack	of	such	evidence).	In	other	words,	it	might	be	described	in	relation	to	the	‘objective’	or	‘value-neutral’	 ideal	 embodied	 by	 the	 scientific	model	 introduced	 at	 the	 outset	 of	this	chapter.	However,	beneath	the	surface,	I	suggest,	the	Guidance	more	accurately	sets	 out	 to	 describe	 a	 more	 or	 less	 structured	 risk	 management	 procedure	 –	combining	an	assortment	of	risk	assessment	techniques	that	have	been	selected	and	ordered	 as	 a	 singular	 ‘strategy’.	 Characteristic	 of	 recent	 trends	 in	 regulatory	decision-making,	 which	 ascribe	 to	 a	 ‘procedural	 rationality’	 (OECD	 2010,	 Annex	3.A1),	this	approach	to	risk	assessment	emphasizes	‘transparency’	and	‘process’	(in	the	absence	of	probability	figures)	as	the	basis	for	coherent	risk	policy	(Power	2007;	Bounds	 2010).	 In	 this	 manner,	 to	 draw	 on	 Michael	 Power’s	 (2007)	 conceptual	understanding	 of	 risk	management	 as	 an	 ‘organizing	 practice’,	 the	 Guidance	 is	 as	much	‘administrative’	or	‘managerial’	in	function	as	it	is	‘calculative’	(in	the	narrow	sense	implied	by	‘quantitative	risk	assessment’).	That	is,	it	endeavors	to	establish	a	‘standardized	 formula’	 or	 ‘blueprint’	 that	 can	be	used	 to	organize	uncertainty	 and	enable	 choice	 and	 decision	 (ibid.).	 Although	 this	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 the	 ‘risks’	 in	question	are	strictly	 ‘manageable’,	 in	the	sense	that	this	risk	management	effort	or	any	other	can	necessarily	prevent	adverse	events	 from	happening,	 it	 is	 to	say	 that	these	risks	are	treated	as	if	they	are	possible	to	manage,	“regardless	of	the	extent	of	information	 about	 probability”	 (ibid,	 p.	 6).	 In	 doing	 so,	 the	 Guidance	 offers	 one	vision	of	how	synthetic	biology’s	biosecurity	risks	can	be	governed.	With	a	view	to	its	functional	or	programmatic	role	as	a	visionary	document,	the	Guidance	can	be	understood	as	a	regulatory	instrument	designed	to	manage	“the	risk	assessment	and	management	process”	 (Power	2007,	p.	19).	More	precisely,	 it	represents	an	approach	to	‘regulatory	governance’	(Wiener	2010)	that	operates	by	way	of	setting	out	instructions	or	guidelines	for	private	companies	to	adhere	to	and	to	 integrate	 into	 their	 daily	 business	 operations.	 In	 the	words	 of	 Power	 (2004,	 p.	21),	 this	 approach	 to	 regulatory	 governance	 acts	 by	 way	 of	 “harnessing	 private	control	activities	for	public	regulatory	purposes”,	enabling	regulatory	organizations	
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to	 “be	 relieved	 of	 much	 of	 the	 economic	 and	 epistemic	 burden	 of	 detailed	 rule-making,	 and	 can	 oversee	 the	 design	 and	 functioning	 of	 local	 systems.”	 Elsewhere,	Power	 (2005,	 p.	 591)	 has	 described	 this	 as,	 working	 “with	 the	 grain	 of	 industry	practice,	 a	 theoretical	 win–win	 convergence	 of	 regulatory	 and	 economic	 capital.”	Sometimes	 referred	 to	 as	 ‘management-based	 regulation’	 (Coglianese	 2010),	‘regulated	 self-regulation’	 (Power	 2004)	 or	 ‘enforced	 self-regulation’	 (Braithwaite	1982;	Ayres	and	Braithwaite	1991),	the	underlying	principle	is	one	of	governing	‘at	a	distance’	 (Rose	2000),	 enabling	 regulatory	agencies	 to	 act	 on	 risks	 indirectly	by	way	 of	 orienting	 risk	management	 efforts	 and	 directing	 (in	 this	 instance)	 private	companies	to	become	responsible	for	managing	the	risks	engendered	by	their	work,	and	internalizing	the	costs	of	production		(Power	et	al.	2009).		
5.4.1	The	‘screening	methodology’	Referred	to	as	the	‘screening	methodology’	(DHHS	2010b),85	the	Guidance	conceives	of	 biosecurity	 risk	 assessment	 as	 encompassing	 two	 individual	 assessments,	 one	addressing	the	risk	aspects	of	the	requested	sequence	and	the	other	the	risk	aspects	of	the	prospective	customer.	To	briefly	summarize	this	methodology,	DNA	synthesis	providers	are	advised	to	conduct	‘sequence	screening’	and	‘customer	screening’	on	an	incoming	order	for	synthetic	double-stranded	DNA.	If	either	of	these	generates	a	‘red	 flag’	 or	 a	 ‘hit’,	 providers	 are	 then	 advised	 to	 conduct	 ‘follow	up	 screening’	 to	ensure	that	the	customer	has	a	 ‘legitimate	end-use’	 for	the	requested	sequence.	At	this	 point,	 if	 there	 remain	 further	 concerns,	 the	 ‘screener’	 –	 according	 to	 the	Guidance,	 this	 is	 an	 in-house	 expert	with	 the	 necessary	 expertise	 to	 “perform	 the	sequence	 screenings,	 analyze	 the	 results	 and	 conduct	 the	 appropriate	 follow-up	research	to	evaluate	the	significance	of	dubious	sequence	matches”	(ibid,	p.	21)	–	is	advised	to	request	the	assistance	of	the	FBI.	In	brief,	as	one	expert	interviewed	for																																																									
85 The terms and concepts in single inverted commas discussed in relation to the 
Guidance in this section are taken directly from various passages of the Screening 
Framework document (DHHS 2010b). In instances where I quote more lengthy excerpts 
from this document, I use double inverted commas, and cite the corresponding page 
number of the quoted material, as elsewhere in my thesis. 
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my	research,	who	participated	in	the	development	of	the	Guidance,	summarized	the	screening	methodology:	“know	your	sequence;	know	your	customer”.	Significantly,	this	shorthand	–	‘know	your	sequence;	know	your	customer’	–	is	not	only	descriptive,	providing	a	brief	overview	of	 the	Guidance,	but	also,	as	 I	will	discuss	below,	provides	‘screeners’	with	a	basic	formula	for	conducting	biosecurity	risk	 assessments,	where	 ‘to	 know’	 is	 synonymous	with	 ‘to	 assess’	 and	 ‘sequences’	and	‘customers’	are	synonymous	with	‘potential	risks’.	Although	purporting	to	be	a	more	 or	 less	 ‘objective’	 procedure	 devised	 to	 ‘standardize’	 biosecurity	 risk	assessment	practices	across	the	DNA	synthesis	 industry,	under	closer	examination	the	screening	methodology	proves	to	be	a	largely	subjective	(if	practical)	regulatory	instrument.	Before	taking	a	closer	look	at	both	‘sequence	screening’	and	‘customer	screening’,	 which	 effectively	 make	 risk	 assessment	 and	 risk	 management	 in	 the	context	 of	 the	 DNA	 synthesis	 industry	 possible	 (again,	 ‘possible’	 with	 respect	 to	existing	 US	 laws	 and	 regulations),	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 briefly	 discuss	 the	 US	government’s	Select	Agent	Regulations,	as	these	represent	the	de	facto	‘framework’	within	which	DNA	synthesis	orders	are	(to	a	large	extent)	made	to	‘fit’.	Select	 Agents,	 as	 I	 have	 touched	 on	 already,	 comprise	 approximately	 80	microorganisms	and	biological	toxins	that	have	been	deemed	by	the	DHHS	and	the	USDA	to	pose	a	significant	threat	to	public,	animal	or	plant	health.86	Significantly,	as	I	will	 discuss	 in	 relation	 to	 ‘sequence	 screening’	 in	 the	 following,	 these	 biological	entities	 correspond	 with	 a	 list	 of	 taxonomic	 names,	 and	 not	 the	 sequence	information	that	describes	individual	pathogens.	Equally	significant,	the	designation	of	 a	 Select	 Agent	 as	 being	 a	 ‘Select	 Agent’	 is	 based	 on	 both	 biological	 and	 non-biological	 criteria,	 which	means	 that	 not	 all	 pathogens	 (existing	 or	 potential)	 are	included,	even	though	they	might	ultimately	pose	a	risk	to	public	health.	According	to	the	‘Committee	on	Scientific	Milestones	for	the	Development	of	a	Gene	Sequence-Based	Classification	System	for	the	Oversight	of	Select	Agents’	(hereafter	referred	to	as	 ‘the	Committee	on	Scientific	Milestones’),87	the	“designation	of	a	microorganism																																																									
86 See http://www.selectagents.gov/. 
87 This committee was the outcome of the NSABB’s earlier recommendation to the US 
government to “convene a group of experts from the scientific community to conduct an 
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as	a	‘Select	Agent’	is	a	judgment	call	and	a	policy	decision.	‘Select	Agent-ness’	is	not	a	strictly	biological	property”	(NRC	2010,	pp.	34-35).	In	other	words,	‘Select	Agent’	is	a	 “regulatory	 term”	 (ibid,	 p.	 35)	 and	 not	 a	 fixed	 property	 that	 is	 intrinsic	 to	microorganisms.	 The	 Select	 Agent	 Regulations,	 in	 turn,	 seek	 to	 restrict	 “access	 to	these	microorganisms	…	and	specify	conditions	under	which	legitimate	research	use	may	occur”	(ibid,	p.	36).	These	regulations	also	require	the	“registration		of	facilities	including	government	agencies,	universities,	 research	 institutions,	and	commercial	entities	 that	 possess,	 use	 or	 transfer”	 Select	 Agents.88	 Finally,	 as	 the	 Select	 Agent	Regulations	are	a	US	legal	requirement,	it	should	be	emphasized	that	the	Guidance,	although	 “voluntary”,	 is	 nonetheless	 intended	 to	 “remind	 providers	 of	 their	obligations	under	existing	regulations”	(DHHS	2010b,	p.	1).			
5.4.1.1	‘Know	your	sequence’:	Constructing	‘controlled	sequences’	Since	 the	 NSABB’s	 2006	 report	 on	 synthetic	 genomics,	 and	 the	 potential	 risks	arising	 from	 the	 DNA	 synthesis	 industry,	 the	 subject	 of	 ‘sequence	 screening’	 has	been	 a	 topic	 of	 particular	 ‘dual-use	 concern’	 for	 regulators	 and	 DNA	 synthesis	providers.	 The	 reason	 being,	 there	 is	 perceived	 to	 exist	 a	 regulatory	 (as	 well	 as	legal)	discrepancy	between	 ‘knowing	the	risks’	associated	with	a	predefined	list	of	biological	 agents	 (which	 are	 covered	 under	 the	 Select	 Agent	 Regulations)	 and	‘knowing	 the	risks’	associated	with	arbitrary	sequence	 information	submitted	 to	a	DNA	 synthesis	 provider	 (which	 may	 or	 may	 not	 encode	 a	 potentially	 dangerous	biological	agent,	or	part	 there	of,	and	which	 is,	 in	any	case,	not	covered	under	 the	Select	Agent	Regulations).	This	discrepancy	is	perceived	to	be	problematic	from	the	perspective	 of	 both	 regulators	 and	 DNA	 synthesis	 providers,	 but	 for	 somewhat	different	 reasons.	 For	 regulators,	 it	 is	 perceived	 to	 pose	 a	 problem	 of	 legal	 and	regulatory	 consistency,	 as	 the	 Select	 Agent	 Regulations	 were	 never	 intended	 to	address	 ‘biological	 information’,	 but	 rather	 ‘biological	 agents’,	 just	 as	 the																																																																																																																																																																						
open and in-depth examination of the Select Agent classification system to determine if it 
is possible to reconcile the current controls for Select Agents with the anticipated 
scientific advances enabled by synthetic genomics” (NSABB 2006, p. 13).  
88 See http://www.selectagents.gov/.	
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Framework	was	never	intended	to	address	‘non-natural	templates’,	but	rather	‘DNA	that	 exists	 in	 nature’.	 For	 DNA	 synthesis	 providers,	 in	 contrast,	 it	 is	 perceived	 to	pose	 a	 business	 risk	 and	 a	 liability	 problem.	 As	 one	 senior	 biodefense	 scientist	expressed	 during	 an	 interview	 conducted	 for	 my	 research:	 “DNA	 synthesis	providers	are	very	aware	that	they	are	dealing	with	risky	materials,	and	it	is	in	their	interest	 to	 not	 be	 accused	 in	 public	 that	 they	 are	 doing	 things	 beyond	 rational	control.”	 Or,	 as	 Christopher	 Park,	 who	 contributed	 to	 the	 development	 of	 the	Guidance	 in	 his	 capacity	 as	 Senior	 Advisor	 for	 Bioterrorism	 in	 the	 Bureau	 of	International	Security	and	Nonproliferation	at	the	US	Department	of	State,	argued:	“DNA	synthesis	providers	have	a	name	to	protect,	and,	more	importantly,	insurance	premiums	to	pay”	and	therefore	are	“always	going	to	exercise	discretion	about	who	they	sell	what	to.”	This	requires,	of	course,	that	DNA	synthesis	providers	first	know	
what	 they	 are	 selling	 –	 an	 objective	 that	 is	 complicated	 by	 the	 indeterminacies	associated	with	arbitrary	sequence	information	and	differences	of	opinion	on	what	should	count	as	a	‘controlled	pathogen’,	and,	in	turn,	a	‘controlled	sequence’.	In	 this	 light,	 there	 exist	 clear	 incentives	 for	 both	 regulators	 and	 DNA	synthesis	providers	to	develop	an	unambiguous	definition	of	what	should	count	as	a	‘dangerous’,	 and,	 depending	 on	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 customer	 placing	 the	 order,	‘prohibited’	sequence.	How	these	parties	have	arrived	at	a	solution	to	this	problem,	however,	 has	 surprised	 many	 onlookers.	 This	 is	 because,	 the	 Guidance,	 as	 I	 will	discuss	 momentarily,	 endorses	 a	 sequence	 screening	 standard	 that,	 by	 many	accounts,	 is	 less	 rigorous	 than	 the	 industry	 sequence	 screening	 standards	 already	adopted	by	many	DNA	synthesis	providers.	For	some	of	the	strongest	critics	of	the	Guidance,	 this	 suggests	 that	 regulators	 have	 opted	 in	 favor	 of	 regulatory	‘convenience’	and	the	perceived	needs	of	industry	over	‘biosecurity’	(Ledford	2010;	Maurer	2011).	While	the	extent	to	which	these	claims	are	justified	is	speculative,	a	closer	 look	 at	 the	 sequence	 screening	 standard	 endorsed	by	 the	Guidance	 reveals	that,	 irrespective	 of	 the	 reasoning	 behind	 this	 particular	 approach	 to	 screening	sequences,	 there	do	exist	 tradeoffs	between	 ‘practicality’	 and	 ‘comprehensiveness’	at	the	level	of	this	(or	any	other)	regulatory	instrument’s	design.	
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According	 to	 the	 Guidance,	DNA	 synthesis	 providers	 should	 screen	 orders	against	sequences	‘unique	to	Select	Agents’	(referred	to	as	 ‘sequences	of	concern’).	Although	 the	Guidance	adds	 that	providers	 are	welcome	 to	 screen	against	 further	sequences,	 this	 is	 not	 a	 formal	 recommendation.	 DNA	 synthesis	 providers	 are	further	 encouraged	 to	 use	 automated	 sequence	 screening	 software	 capable	 of	identifying	when	a	sequence	more	closely	resembles	a	 ‘sequence	of	concern’	(thus	registering	 a	 ‘hit’)	 over	 any	 other	 ‘benign	 sequence’	 (DHHS	 2010b).	 “In	 this	approach,”	 which	 the	 Guidance	 refers	 to	 as	 ‘Best	 Match’,	 “the	 query	 sequence	 is	aligned	 with	 a	 database	 of	 known	 sequences	 (such	 as	 GenBank)	 to	 identify	 the	sequence	with	the	greatest	percent	identity	…	over	each	200	bp	[base-pair]	nucleic	acid	 segment	 and	 corresponding	 amino	 acid	 sequence	 (or	 over	 the	 entire	 query	sequence	 for	 those	 dsDNA	 [double-stranded	 DNA]	 orders	 shorter	 than	 200	 bps)”	(DHHS	 2010b,	 p.	 11).	 These	 recommendations	 –	 the	 first	 relating	 to	 sequence	screening	based	on	a	predefined	list	of	Select	Agents	and	the	second	relating	to	the	use	of	automated	screening	software	that	employs	the	‘Best	Match’	technique	–	are	justified	in	the	Guidance	on	the	basis	of	the	following	(‘scientific’)	arguments.		First,	the	Guidance’s	exclusive	focus	on	Select	Agents	is	largely	justified	on	the	basis	of	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 Committee	 on	 Scientific	 Milestones,	 which	 had	 previously	concluded	 that,	 while	 it	 may	 be	 possible	 to	 augment	 the	 Select	 Agent	 List	 to	accommodate	the	“sequence-based	classification”	of	Select	Agents	(permitting	them	to	 be	 screened),	 it	 is	 not	 currently	 feasible	 to	 develop	 an	 “oversight	 system	 that	predicts	if	a	DNA	sequence	would	result	in	an	organism	that	should	be	regulated	as	a	Select	Agent”	(preventing	them	from	being	screened)	(NRC	2010,	pp.	1-2).	In	other	words,	 ‘due	 to	 difficulties	 in	 predicting	 biological	 properties	 (for	 example,	pathogenicity	 or	 virulence)	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 arbitrary	 sequence	 information,	 it	 is	reasonable	to	focus	only	on	those	biological	entities	that	are	already	known	to	be	of	particular	concern,	namely,	Select	Agents’.	In	effect,	what	this	means	is	that	all	non-Select	 Agents	 (existing	 or	 potential)	 are	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 Guidance’s	sequence	screening	standard	(Maurer	2011).	Although	this	argument,	which	is	used	to	 justify	screening	against	only	Select	Agents,	on	one	level,	captures	an	important	
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empirical	 observation	 (one	 that	 has	 relevance	 not	 only	 to	 the	 case	 of	 the	 DNA	synthesis	 industry,	 but	 also	 to	 the	 wider	 project	 of	 synthetic	 biology),	 namely,	complex	 biological	 systems	 are	 not	 easily	 correlated	 with	 sequence	 information	alone,	it	is,	on	another	level,	misleading;	and	for	at	least	two	reasons.		In	 the	 first	 instance,	 it	 is	 misleading	 because	 it	 assumes	 that	 unfamiliar	sequences	(which	will	be	expressed	as	synthetic	DNA	if	the	order	is	processed)	are	benign,	 or	 at	 least	 they	 can	 be	 treated	 as	 if	 they	 are	 benign	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	enabling	 the	 DNA	 synthesis	 industry	 to	 operate	 in	 the	 face	 of	 intractable	uncertainty,	even	though	the	sequence	might	ultimately	pose	a	risk.	This	biosecurity	guideline,	 as	 it	 relates	 to	 the	 earlier	 biosafety	 guidelines	 established	 for	recombinant	 organisms,	 is	 puzzling.	 This	 is	 because,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 recombinant	organisms,	as	noted	earlier	in	this	chapter,	knowing	an	agent’s	“capability	to	infect	and	cause	disease	in	a	susceptible	human	or	animal	host,	its	virulence	as	measured	by	the	severity	of	disease,	and	the	availability	of	preventive	measures	and	effective	treatments	for	the	disease”	(NIH	2009,	p.	10)	are	the	key	criteria	for	conducting	the	risk	 assessment.	 Moreover,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 knowledge	 about	 these	 properties	(which	 is	precisely	 the	case	when	a	DNA	synthesis	provider	 is	confronted	with	an	unfamiliar	 sequence	order),	 the	biological	 agent	 is	 assumed	 to	be	dangerous	until	proven	otherwise.	“Typically	if	we	get	an	unknown	agent,”	one	biodefense	scientist	(Richard	Weller)	explained	during	an	interview,	“the	standard	global	strategy	is	to	handle	it	at	the	highest	containment	level	possible	until	you	decide	it	can	be	moved	from	a	four	to	a	three	to	a	two.89	But,	where	do	you	begin	with	a	novel	organism?”	In	the	 case	 of	 the	 Guidance,	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 earlier	 biosafety	 guidelines,	 the	corresponding	 unknowns	 are	 glossed	 over	 and	 the	 order	 is	 treated	 as	 ‘safe’	 until	proven	 ‘dangerous’.	 In	 other	 words,	 unfamiliar	 sequences	 can	 be	 overlooked	 on	
account	of	the	limits	of	prediction,	and	not	the	other	way	around.	In	the	second	instance,	it	is	misleading	for	reasons	that	are	apparent	on	the	very	basis	of	the	Select	Agent	Regulations	introduced	above.	That	is,	the	Select	Agent																																																									
89 Biosafety levels (BSL-1 through 4) “are designated in ascending order, by degree of 
protection provided to personnel, the environment, and the community” 
(http://www.cdc.gov/biosafety/publications/bmbl5/bmbl5_sect_iv.pdf). 
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List	omits	not	only	unknown	pathogens	(for	obvious	reasons),	but	also	a	variety	of	
known	 pathogens,	which	 are	 not	 included	because	 they	do	not	meet	 certain	 ‘non-biological’	 and	 ‘non-quantifiable’	 criteria	 for	 inclusion.	 For	 instance,	 the	 reason	 a	number	 of	 Select	 Agents	 are	 on	 the	 Select	 Agent	 List	 is	 not	 because	 they	 are	necessarily	 especially	 pathogenic,	 but	 because	 they	have	been	used	historically	 in	biological	weapons	programs,	for	reasons	such	as	their	capacity	to	be	transformed	into	environmentally	stable	aerosols	that	can	be	disseminated	over	large	areas	(for	example,	 anthrax,	 a	 hardy	 spore-forming	 bacteria	 that	 can	 withstand	 prolonged	exposure	to	harsh	environmental	conditions).90	In	contrast,	the	HIV	virus,	although	unquestionably	a	dangerous	biological	agent,	is	not	a	‘Select	Agent’.	According	to	the	infectious	disease	 scientists,	 Casadevall	 and	Pirofski	 (2004,	 p.	 260),	 this	 is	 due,	 in	part,	to	“the	difficulty	in	delivering	this	virus	to	a	susceptible	host	and	because	the	disease	 occurs	 many	 years	 after	 the	 initial	 infection.”	 In	 other	 words,	 it	 is	 not	 a	Select	Agent	because	it	is	not	perceived	to	be	a	‘suitable’	weapon.	There	 are	 further	 non-biological,	 non-quantifiable	 criteria	 beyond	 a	 Select	Agent’s	weapons	 potential	 that	 are	 also	 used	 to	 justify	 a	 pathogen’s	 inclusion	 (or	non-inclusion)	 on	 the	 Select	 Agent	 List.	 In	 table	 1,	 the	 Committee	 on	 Scientific	Milestones	outlines	several	criteria	of	this	kind,	which	the	DHHS	and	the	USDA	use	to	inform	their	decisions	on	what	should	count	as	a	‘Select	Agent’	(NRC	2010).	Here,	the	criteria	are	intended	to	demonstrate	that	even	if	the	biological	properties	(such	as	 pathogenicity	 or	 transmissibility)	 of	 an	 unknown	 pathogen	 could	 ‘maybe	someday’	 be	 predicted	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 its	 sequence	 information	 (which,	 as	 I	 have	said,	 they	 conclude	 is	 presently	 not	 feasible),	 it	 could	 still	 not	 be	 classified	 as	 a	‘Select	Agent’,	as	there	remain	non-biological	properties	(such	as	‘public	perception’	and	 ‘natural	 prevalence’)	 that	 can	 ‘never’	 be	 predicted	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 sequence																																																									
90 For a more detailed analysis on this point, see Casadevall and Pirofski’s (2004) article, 
‘The weapon potential of a microbe’, which argues that, “from a microbiological vantage 
point, there is no common denominator that ties the microbes on the select agent list 
together on the basis of their virulence or pathogenicity” (ibid, p. 260). Instead, “the 
weapon potential of a microbe”, including its capacity to cause “terror if introduced into 
certain populations”, appears to be the primary “consideration when categorizing certain 
agents as biological weapons” (ibid, p. 259). 
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information	alone.	This	 logic	 is	 then	used	to	 justify	screening	against	only	existing	Select	Agents,	as	these	are	the	only	biological	agents	that	have	been	chosen	on	the	basis	of	both	 their	biological	 and	non-biological	properties.	What	 is	 curious	about	this	argument,	however,	 is	 that	 it	does	not	acknowledge,	as	 I	have	said,	 that	 there	exist	 many	 known	 pathogens,	 which	 could	 be	 Select	 Agents	 on	 account	 of	 their	capacity	to	harm	humans,	animals	or	plants,	but	that	are	consciously	excluded	from	the	‘Select	Agent	List’	on	the	basis	of	the	very	same	non-biological,	non-quantifiable	criteria	that	effectively	exclude	unknown	pathogens.		
Table 1: “Prospects for de Novo Prediction of ‘Select Agent-ness’ from Sequence” 
(Source: NRC 2010, p. 34). 
 	Although	 it	 does	not	 appear	 to	have	been	 the	Committee	on	Scientific	Milestones’	intention	 to	draw	attention	 to	a	gap	or	deficiency	 in	 the	Select	Agent	Regulations,	their	 logic	 effectively	undermines	 the	 comprehensiveness	of	 the	Select	Agent	List;	and	 thus	 its	 utility	 as	 the	 singular	 basis	 for	 sequence	 screening.	 In	 brief,	 it	 draws	attention	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	Select	Agent	List	 is	 incomplete,	 and	not	 just	because	
unknown	 pathogens	 are	 (unavoidably)	 not	 included,	 but	 because	 known	 ones	 are	(consciously)	 not.91	 As	 several	 commentators	 (for	 example,	 Fischer	 and	 Maurer																																																									
91 See McLeish and Nightingale (2007) for a similar discussion on the perceived 
limitations of agent-specific lists developed in the UK context. According to the authors: 
“in interviews several leading UK virologists expressed concern that some pathogens 
they regarded as being particularly ‘dangerous’ were not on the control lists developed by 
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2010;	 Maurer	 2011)	 have	 pointed	 out,	 the	 Guidance	 also	 acknowledges	 that	 the	Select	Agent	List	(and,	thus,	the	list	of	‘controlled	sequences’)	is	incomplete,	but	the	subject	is	not	pursued	further	within	its	pages:	“The	US	Government	recognizes	that	there	are	concerns	that	synthetic	dsDNA	sequences	not	unique	to	Select	Agents	or	Toxins	…	may	 also	 pose	 a	 biosecurity	 concern”	 (DHHS	 2010b,	 p.	 9).	 In	 this	 light,	although	the	Guidance	may	be	‘consistent’	with	the	existing	Select	Agent	List	(when	updated	 to	reflect	 sequence	 information	 in	addition	 to	a	 list	of	 taxonomic	names),	and	 thus	 the	Select	Agent	Regulations,	 it	 consciously	 ignores	other	pathogens	 that	are	 known	 (unknown	 pathogens	 cannot	 be	 addressed	 in	 the	 Guidance	 or	 in	 any	other	screening	framework),	but	that	are	not	designated	‘Select	Agents’.	This	raises	doubts	about	the	‘scientific’	rationality	of	the	Guidance.	In	contrast	to	the	sequence	screening	standard	set	by	the	Guidance,	two	sets	of	industry	standards,	agreed	first	by the International	Association	Synthetic	Biology	(IASB)	and	later	matched	by	the	International	Gene	Synthesis	Consortium	(IGSC),92	call	 for	an	approach	to	sequence	screening	that	 is	not	 limited	to	Select	Agents,	but	rather	includes	all	known	pathogens	for	which	there	exist	sequence	information	in	the	GenBank	database	or	equivalent	sequence	library.	According	to	The	IASB	Code	of	
Conduct	for	Best	Practices	in	Gene	Synthesis:	“DNA	sequences	submitted	as	inquiries	or	 orders	 for	DNA	 synthesis	 by	 customers	will	 be	 screened	 against	GENBANK	 for	reasonable	 sequence	 similarity	 to	 pathogens”	 (IASB	 2009,	 p.	 6).	 According	 to	 the	IGSC’s	Harmonized	Screening	Protocol,	DNA	synthesis	providers	should	“screen	the	complete	DNA	sequence	of	every	synthetic	gene	order	...	against	all	entries	found	in	one	or	more	of	 the	 internationally	coordinated	sequence	reference	databanks	(i.e.,	NCBI/GenBank,	EBI/EMBL,	or	DDBJ)”	(IGSC	2009,	p.	1).		Note	 that	 neither	 private	 sequence	 screening	 standard	 suggests	 that	companies	 should	 screen	 against	 a	 universe	 of	 unknown,	 potentially	 dangerous	sequences,	 as	 they,	 like	 the	 authors	 of	 the	 Guidance	 and	 like	 the	 Committee	 on																																																																																																																																																																						
the UK government, whilst others they considered as not being particularly dangerous 
given the UK’s climate were included” (ibid, p. 1646). 
92 See Fischer and Maurer (2010) for a more detailed account of how these two sets of 
industry standards came to pass, and how they eventually converged on the IASB’s more 
‘rigorous’ standard, despite early resistance from members of the larger IGSC. 
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Scientific	Milestones	that	informed	the	Guidance,	believe	that	this	level	of	prediction	is	currently	not	 feasible.	What	they	do	suggest,	however,	 is	 that	companies	should	screen	against	all	known	pathogens,	 irrespective	of	how	they	have	been	classified.	Moreover,	the	IASB	(2009,	p.	6)	goes	one	step	further,	suggesting	that,	in	the	event	that	 screening	 technologies	 improve	 and	 are	 “empirically	 shown	 to	 detect	 threat	sequences	 at	 reliability	 levels	 that	meet	 or	 exceed	 the	 benchmark	methods”	 used	today,	 members	 will	 consider	 expanding	 the	 scope	 of	 their	 sequence	 screening	assessments	to	include	previously	unscreened	sequences.	For	 onlookers	 who	 have	 closely	 followed	 both	 the	 private	 and	 the	 public	standard-making	 process,	 and	 who	 have	 expressed	 the	 opinion	 that	 the	 US	government	 should	 endorse	 a	 more	 rigorous	 sequence	 screening	 standard	 than	those	 already	 agreed	 by	 industry,	 “it	 seems	 strange	 for	 government	 to	 tell	companies	 that	 current	 screening	 programs	 are,	 in	 effect,	 too	 ambitious”	 (Fischer	and	 Maurer	 2010,	 p.	 21).	 According	 to	 Amy	 Smithson,	 a	 US-based	 chemical	 and	biological	 weapons	 expert	 interviewed	 for	my	 research	who	 has	 closely	 followed	these	 regulatory	 developments,	 she	 is	 “mystified”	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 US	government	has	opted	to	encourage	the	“lower	standard”:	“Instead	 of	 requiring	 a	 screening	 procedure	 that	 required	 that	anything	 that	goes	 out	 the	 door	 does	 not	 have	 dangerous	 potential,	 they	 articulated	 the	lower	standard	of,	‘let’s	screen	against	the	list	of	Select	Agents’.	And,	from	the	get	go,	I	have	been	mystified	…	It’s	just	something	to	hang	your	hat	on:	‘Here,	we	will	be	secure	if	these	“x”	number	of	pathogens	are	restricted’.	…	you	know,	why	focus	on	these,	just	because	it’s	been	done	in	the	past?”	(Amy	Smithson)	Elsewhere	 Smithson	 (2010,	 p.	 124)	 has	 similarly	 argued	 that	 the	 Guidance	represents	 a	 “watered	down	 approach	 that	 does	 not	 stipulate	 investigation	 of	 the	potential	dangers	of	orders	 for	pathogens	or	DNA	fragments	beyond	screening	 for	whether	they	are	on	government	high-risk	lists.”	However,	from	the	perspective	of	at	least	one	contributor	to	the	development	of	the	Guidance,	Dana	Perkins,	a	public	health	official	and	biological	weapons	expert	working	for	the	DHHS,	the	decision	to	screen	against	only	Select	Agents	(and	not	all	known	 pathogens)	 was	 simply	 intended	 to	 “keep	 a	 balance	 between	 risks	 and	
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benefits	or	between	oversight	and	impeding	progress”,	while	holding	the	belief	that	the	 Select	 Agent	 List	 would	 provide	 an	 adequate	 starting	 point	 for	 the	 US	government’s	 involvement	 in	 the	 oversight	 and	 regulation	 of	 the	 DNA	 synthesis	industry.	 According	 to	 Perkins,	 when	 developing	 the	 Guidance,	 the	 government	sought	“the	minimum	threshold	of	security”:		“Our	view	was	 that	we	have	 to	 start	 somewhere.	 So	we	 started	with	Select	Agents	 …	 we	 just	 wanted	 to	 give	 [DNA	 synthesis	 providers]	 the	minimum	threshold	of	security.	So,	some	companies	may	still	decide	to	go	with	higher	levels	 of	 screening,	 but	 for	 those	who	were	 not	 doing	 anything,	 we’re	 just	giving	them	some	guidance	on	how	to	start	evaluating	their	business.”	(Dana	Perkins)	Based	 on	 this	 account,	 which	 does	 not	 necessarily	 represent	 all	 those	 who	participated	 in	 the	development	 of	 the	Guidance,	 it	would	 seem	 that,	 ‘a	minimum	threshold	of	 security’	was	perceived	 to	be	desirable	 from	a	 regulatory	 standpoint,	but	‘burdening	industry’	or	‘impeding	progress’	was	not.	Irrespective	of	which	side	of	the	debate	one	looks,	what	can	be	said	about	the	decision	 to	 link	 the	 sequence	 screening	methodology	 to	 the	 existing	 Select	 Agent	List,	 is	 that	 it	 enables	 biosecurity	 risk	 assessment	 practices	 in	 the	 DNA	 synthesis	industry	 to	 remain	 closely	 in	 line	with	 the	 Select	Agent	Regulations.	Moreover,	 in	doing	 so,	 although	 the	 Guidance	 certainly	 simplifies	 the	 problem	 of	 sequence	screening,	 in	 as	 much	 as	 it	 enables	 DNA	 synthesis	 providers	 to	 screen	 against	 a	finite	 number	 of	 known	 pathogens	 documented	 on	 preexisting	 lists,	 it	 ignores	 a	variety	of	potentially	dangerous	pathogens	that	could	be	(but	are	not)	on	those	lists.	Beyond	the	more	speculative	claims	made	by	some	of	the	most	outspoken	critics	of	the	Guidance,	who	suggest	government	authorities	have	chosen	to	enable	industry	at	 the	 expense	 of	 security,	 the	more	 subtle	 critiques	 argue	 that,	 while	 regulatory	consistency	and	business	efficiency	may	be	worthwhile	objectives,	by	“pruning	the	threat	definition”	–	focusing	exclusively	on	Select	Agents	–	“this	approach	makes	the	problem	too	manageable”	(Maurer	2011,	p.	1424).		
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Second,	by	adopting	an	approach	to	sequence	screening	based	on	a	predefined	list	of	Select	 Agents,	 the	 Guidance	 simultaneously	 endeavors	 to	 enable	 DNA	 synthesis	providers	 to	 use	 automated	 screening	 software93	 to	 screen	 against	 ‘sequences	unique	to	Select	Agents’.	According	to	the	Guidance,	their	 ‘Best	Match’	approach	to	sequence	 screening,	 which	 is	 said	 to	 require	 “appropriate	 sequence	 screening	software”	 based	 on	 a	 “publicly	 available	 suite	 of	 algorithms”	 such	 as	 “the	 BLAST	family	 of	 tools”,94	 will	 permit	 DNA	 synthesis	 providers	 to	 more	 or	 less	unproblematically	 identify	 when	 a	 query	 sequence	 more	 closely	 resembles	 a	‘sequence	 of	 concern’	 over	 any	 other	 ‘benign	 sequence’,	 thus	 registering	 as	 a	 ‘hit’	(DHHS	2010b,	p.	20).	 	 In	advocating	for	this	approach	to	biosecurity,	the	Guidance	once	 again	 appeals	 to	 the	 need	 for	 consistency,	 arguing	 that	 the	 use	 of	 sequence	screening	 software	 will	 enable	 risk	 judgments	 to	 remain	 uniform	 and	 replicable	across	 the	 DNA	 synthesis	 industry	 (DHHS	 2010b).	 In	 other	 words,	 “a	 hit	 for	 one	company	should	register	as	a	hit	for	other	companies	adhering	to	the	guidance.”95	In	contrast,	human	screening,	although	not	deemed	irrelevant,	is	marginalized	as	being	‘inconsistent’.	The	rationale	being	that	human	screeners	are	prone	to	disagree	and	often	arrive	at	different	conclusions	based	on	the	same	data	(Maurer	2011).		Critics	of	 the	Guidance,	however,	point	 to	several	gaps	 in	 this	 logic,	each	of	which	pertains	 to	 the	notion	of	 ‘consistency’.	On	 the	most	basic	 level,	 it	 is	 argued	that,	 “consistency	 is	 not	 accuracy.	 Indeed,”	 as	 Stephen	 M.	 Maurer,	 an	 Associate	Professor	of	Public	Policy	at	Berkeley	University	who	has	been	among	the	strongest	critics	of	the	Guidance,	argues,	“a	system	could	have	a	100%	error	rate	and	still	be	consistent,	provided	it	made	the	same	mistakes	every	time”	(Maurer	2011,	p.	1423).																																																									
93 For example, ‘BlackWatch’, a software package that aims to help DNA synthesis 
providers “screen all client sequences for matches to the sequences of hazardous 
pathogens” in an effort to identify “sequences worthy of concern” 
(http://biotech.craic.com/blackwatch/BlackWatch_Datasheet.pdf). 
94 BLAST refers to ‘Basic Local Alignment Search Tool’, and is used to describe a range 
of software tools used in bioinformatics to compare query sequences against sequence 
libraries in an effort to identify sequences that resemble the query sequence. 
95 ‘Frequently Asked Questions: Screening Framework Guidance for Providers of 
Synthetic Double-Stranded DNA’ (DHHS 2010c), available at: 
http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/legal/guidance/syndna/Pages/faqs.aspx. 
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Moreover,	as	 I	have	underlined	already,	given	that	 the	Guidance	recommends	that	DNA	 synthesis	 providers	 only	 screen	 against	 Select	 Agents,	 even	 if	 the	 software	were	perfectly	accurate,	it	would	still	systemically	overlook	those	sequences	unique	to	pathogens	that	are	not	defined	as	‘Select	Agents’.		The	argument	for	consistency	is	also	challenged	on	the	grounds	that	neither	the	 Guidance	 nor	 the	 Select	 Agent	 Regulations	 are	 free	 of	 subjective	 judgments,	arbitrary	cutoffs,	and	similar	human	‘inconsistencies’.	In	the	case	of	the	Guidance,	as	several	commentators	have	pointed	out,	one	should	recall	that	the	very	decision	to	screen	 against	 ‘synthetic	 double-stranded	 DNA’,	 and	 not	 ‘single-stranded	 DNA’	 or	‘oligonucleotides’	 or	 any	 other	 possible	 candidate	 for	 screening,	 was	 a	 subjective	choice.	Moreover,	by	some	accounts,	including	a	recent	news	feature	in	the	journal	
Nature,	 this	 decision	 has	 “drastically	 restricted	 the	 Guidelines’	 reach”	 (Ledford	2010,	 p.	 898).	 Similarly,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Select	 Agent	 Regulations,	 as	 I	 have	discussed,	the	very	composition	of	the	Select	Agent	List	is	the	product	of	a	range	of	non-biological,	 non-quantifiable	 (i.e.	 subjective)	 criteria	 that	 have	 been	 used	 to	inform	the	choice	of	which	pathogens	get	included	and	which	do	not.		Finally,	perhaps	the	strongest	case	made	against	the	need	for	consistency	is	simply	that	there	is	nothing	necessarily	‘wrong’	with	inconsistency.	For	many	critics	of	 the	 Guidance,	 there	 is	 nothing	 ‘deficient’	 about	 human	 screeners,	 nor	 their	capacity	to	disagree	and	to	draw	different	conclusions	on	the	basis	of	the	same	data.	On	the	contrary,	human	screeners	are	perceived	to	play	a	vital	role	in	checking	each	sequence	 against	 the	 scientific	 literature,	 against	 GenBank,	 and	 against	 similar	resources	 (interview	with	Amy	Smithson),	 and	 are	perceived	 to	 be	more	 likely	 to	pick	 up	 on	 anomalies	 that	 might	 otherwise	 be	 missed	 by	 the	 software	 (Maurer	2011).	 The	 purpose	 of	 these	 arguments,	 I	 would	 suggest,	 is	 not	 to	 dismiss	 the	usefulness	of	 screening	 software,	 but	merely	 to	underline	 that	 ‘consistency’	 is	not	necessarily	a	virtue	in	itself,	and	even	the	most	‘technical’	modes	of	risk	calculation	are	informed	by	‘subjective’	human	judgments,	for	better	or	worse.		Before	taking	a	closer	 look	at	 ‘customer	screening’,	 I	would	 like	to	consider	one	further	aspect	of	the	present	discussion,	namely,	how	might	industry	view	the	Guidance’s	proposed	approach	to	automated	sequence	screening?	As	Maurer	(2010,	
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p.	4)	observes,	from	the	perspective	of	DNA	synthesis	providers,	one	would	expect	that	 most	 providers	 would	 favor	 increased	 reliance	 on	 automated	 screening	software	directed	 at	 a	 finite	 list	 of	 Select	Agents,	 as	 this	would	 enable	 “expensive	human	 screeners”	 to	 “be	 replaced	 by	 computers”.	 In	 other	words,	 it	 is	 “‘fast’	 and	‘cheap’”	 (ibid,	 p.	 16).	 Yet,	 while	 this	 would	 make	 sense,	 in	 principle,	 as	 it	 might	enable	individual	orders	to	be	processed	at	a	lower	cost,	there	is	nothing	to	suggest	that	 DNA	 synthesis	 providers	 necessarily	 wish	 to	 screen	 less	 rigorously.	 On	 the	contrary,	as	Maurer	and	other	critics	of	the	Guidance	argue,	industry’s	endorsement	of	 screening	 all	 known	 pathogens	 (as	 opposed	 to	 only	 Select	 Agents)	 suggests	precisely	the	opposite.	That	is,	relatively	‘rigorous’	screening	procedures	seem	to	be	of	 interest	 to	 many	 DNA	 synthesis	 providers.	 Thus,	 the	 Guidance’s	 approach	 to	sequence	screening	may	not	be	precisely	what	industry	desires.	To	 help	 clarify	why	 this	might	 be,	 and	 to	 help	 shed	 light	 on	 the	 irony	 that	industry	 would	 appear	 to	 favor	 more	 intensive	 screening	 than	 government	regulators,	it	is	worthwhile	to	return	to	Christopher	Park’s	comment	introduced	at	the	outset	of	the	present	discussion.	That	is,	“DNA	synthesis	providers	have	a	name	to	protect,	and,	more	importantly,	insurance	premiums	to	pay”.	In	other	words,	DNA	synthesis	 providers	 are	 as	 concerned	 about	 their	 ultimate	 business	 liability	 (say,	someone	 orders	 synthetic	 double-stranded	 DNA	 that	 is	 then	 used	 to	 produce	 a	viable	pathogen	that	is	deployed	in	a	bioterrorist	attack)	as	they	are	their	overhead	on	screening	individual	orders.	Moreover,	Schmidt	and	Giersch	(2011,	p.	9)	argue,	in	opting	 for	 relatively	 ‘rigorous’	 screening	 procedures,	 industry	 seeks	 to	 pre-empt	potentially	more	restrictive	“state-driven	regulation”	that	could	be	implemented	in	the	future.	Therefore,	ironically,	and	Maurer	(2010)	would	certainly	agree,	while	the	DHHS	 may	 wish	 to	 push	 for	 ‘the	 minimum	 threshold	 of	 security’	 in	 an	 effort	 to	unburden	industry,	industry	may	very	well	wish	for	sequence	screening	to	be	‘less	fast’	and	‘more	expensive’;	not	the	other	way	around.			
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5.4.1.2	‘Know	your	customer’:	Constructing	‘denied	persons’	‘Sequence	screening’	represents	only	the	first	half	of	the	biosecurity	risk	assessment	endorsed	by	the	DHHS.	According	to	 the	Guidance,	 ‘sequence	screening’	should	be	accompanied,	“in	no	particular	order”,	by	‘customer	screening’	(DHHS	2010b,	p.	14).	Yet,	 what	 is	 interesting	 (and,	 I	 would	 suggest,	 particularly	 revealing)	 about	 the	‘screening	 methodology’	 is	 that	 the	 ‘customer’	 component	 of	 the	 assessment	 is	largely	overshadowed	by	the	‘sequence’	component.96	In	fact,	the	‘customer’,	much	like	the	generalized	figure	of	 the	 ‘(bio)terrorist’	 frequently	evoked	 in	(bio)security	policy	discussions,	often	appears	to	be	absent	from	the	risk	calculation	entirely,	or	simply	 characterized	 as	 a	 disembodied	 purveyor	 of	 potentially	 harmful	 sequence	information.	 This	 gives	 the	 impression	 that	 the	 biosecurity	 risk	 assessment	primarily	(if	not	exclusively)	concerns	the	sequence	being	ordered	and	the	synthetic	DNA	it	encodes,	irrespective	of	how	that	DNA	might	be	(mis)used.	Although	there	are	multiple	arguments	that	one	might	put	forward	as	to	why	this	is	the	case,	one	argument,	I	suggest,	is	that	‘customers’,	as	social	actors	imbued	with	human	agency,	are	simply	not	as	familiar	to	 ‘screeners’	–	individuals	who	are	typically	trained	in	bioinformatics	and	related	scientific	and	technical	fields	(DHHS	2010b)	 –	 as	 ‘genes’	 and	 ‘genomes’.	 As	 discussed	 earlier	 in	 this	 chapter,	 there	 is	perceived	 to	 exist	 a	 mismatch	 between	 ‘knowing	 the	 risks’	 associated	 with	‘unintended	 consequences’	 and	 ‘knowing	 the	 risks’	 associated	 with	 ‘deliberate	misuse’.	There	are,	in	effect,	two	types	of	biological	risk	at	play	–	one	that	relates	to	the	biological	 ‘things’	 in	 the	 laboratory,	 on	 the	 lab	bench,	 and	 so	on,	 and	one	 that	relates	to	the	social	actors	who	interact	with	those	things	and	(mis)use	them	–	each	of	 which	 is	 perceived	 to	 benefit	 from	 somewhat	 different	 risk	 assessment	techniques	 and	 different	 types	 of	 expertise.	 Thus,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 secure	knowledge	about	(unknown)	‘customers’,	the	Guidance	favors	(known)	‘sequences’.	Before	proceeding	with	my	discussion	of	‘customer	screening’,	it	is	worth	reflecting																																																									
96 This is also true of critiques about the Guidance. That is, the dominant topic of 
discussion and debate in relation to the Guidance is ‘sequence screening’ and the 
challenges and dilemmas associated with defining and identifying ‘sequences of 
concern’. To date, the topic of ‘customer screening’ has been relatively neglected. 
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on	what	it	means	to	include	a	human	agent	in	the	risk	calculation,	and,	equally,	what	it	means	to	exclude	a	human	agent	from	this	calculation.		In	light	of	the	growing	relevance	of	biosecurity	risk	assessment	in	the	wake	of	2001,	the	role	of	human	agency	as	an	integral	component	of	‘biorisk’	has	become	an	 increasingly	 salient	 subject	 at	 the	 level	 of	 federal	 policy	 in	 the	 US	 context.	 An	excellent	 demonstration	 of	 this	 is	 a	 report	 prepared	 by	 the	 ‘Committee	 on	Methodological	Improvements	to	the	Department	of	Homeland	Security’s	Biological	Agent	 Risk	 Analysis’	 (hereafter	 referred	 to	 as	 ‘the	 Committee	 on	 Methodological	Improvements’).	 Published	 in	 2008,	 this	 report	 critiques	 the	methods	 used	 in	 the	Department	of	Homeland	Security’s	(DHS)	annul	Biological	Threat	Risk	Assessment	(BTRA),97	 offering	 advice	 to	 the	 DHS	 on	 how	 to	 improve	 their	 biosecurity	 risk	assessment	 methodology.	 The	 “fundamental	 problem”	 with	 the	 BTRA,	 the	Committee	 on	 Methodological	 Improvements	 argues,	 is	 that	 it	 treats	 “terrorist	decision	making	 exclusively	 as	 random	 variables,	 as	 is	 appropriate	 in	 the	 case	 of	natural	disasters”	 (NRC	2008,	pp.	2-3).	 In	other	words,	 the	Committee	argues,	 the	BTRA	 fails	 to	 account	 for	 the	 “behavior	 of	 an	 intelligent	 adversary”,	 one	 that	 is	“constantly	adjusting	tactics	to	exploit	any	evident	weakness	in	US	defenses”	(ibid,	p.	5).	Politicized	 language	aside,	 the	point	made	by	 the	Committee	 is	 rather	 clear:	the	DHS	does	not	know	how	to	model	human	agency	for	the	purposes	of	the	BTRA.	Furthermore,	in	the	absence	of	this	capacity,	it	attempts	to	model	social	actors	as	if	they	are	things	(a	‘natural	disaster’)	and	not	persons	(an	‘intelligent	adversary’).	The	Committee	on	Methodological	 Improvements’	critique,	 I	suggest,	especially	 in	 light	of	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 directed	 at	 the	 DHS,	 a	 federal	 agency	 with	 considerable	resources	 at	 its	 disposal,	 is	 a	 powerful	 demonstration	 of	 the	 uncertainties	 and	methodological	challenges	perceived	to	be	 introduced	by	the	subject	of	 ‘deliberate	misuse’.	 It	might	 also	partly	 explain	 the	 relative	 absence	of	 a	human	agent	 (or	 an	
																																																								
97 Although the specifics of the BTRA are classified, the Committee on Methodological 
Improvements describes it as a “computer-based tool that has been applied by DHS to 
assess the risk associated with the intentional release of each of 28 biological threat 
agents categorized by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention” (NRC 2008, p. 1). 
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‘intelligent	 adversary’)	 in	 the	 screening	 methodology,	 as	 well	 as	 in	 the	 broader	debate	on	biosecurity	in	the	context	of	synthetic	biology.			In	 the	absence	of	a	reliable	 (or	even	a	 familiar)	 technique	 for	assessing	 the	risks	associated	with	an	‘intelligent	adversary’,	the	Guidance	is	rather	vague	on	how	screeners	should	go	about	‘knowing	their	customer’.	According	to	the	Guidance:	“The	purpose	of	customer	screening	is	to	establish	the	legitimacy	of	customers	ordering	 synthetic	 dsDNA	 sequences.	 Providers	 should	 develop	 customer	
screening	mechanisms	to	verify	the	legitimacy	of	a	customer	if	the	customer	is	an	organization	or	confirm	customer	identity	if	the	customer	is	an	individual,	to	identify	potential	‘red	flags’”.	(DHHS	2010b,	p.	4)	In	 brief,	 the	 Guidance	 recommends	 that	 screeners	 verify	 the	 ‘identity’	 of	 the	customer,	and,	with	this,	make	an	assessment	on	their	‘legitimacy’.	Here,	‘legitimacy’	refers	to	a	customer’s	legal	right	to	gain	access	to	Select	Agents,	as	stipulated	under	the	 Select	 Agent	 Regulations.	 Beyond	 this	 minimal	 guidance,	 much	 of	 the	responsibility	 for	 deciding	 how	 to	 verify	 a	 customer’s	 identity	 and	 establish	 their	legitimacy	is	the	responsibility	of	the	individual	screener	and	the	‘mechanisms’	they	develop.	 Government	 guidance	 of	 this	 kind	 –	 setting	 out	 the	 basic	 parameters	 for	conducting	assessments,	but	no	more	–	is	indicative	of	regulatory	strategies	aimed	at	managing	 “the	 risk	 assessment	 and	management	process”	 (Power	2007,	p.	 19),	leaving	 much	 of	 the	 practical	 work	 of	 calculating	 risks	 and	 implementing	 risk	management	decisions	to	(in	this	instance)	individual	companies	and	their	in-house	experts.	 This	 mode	 of	 governance,	 sometimes	 referred	 to	 as	 ‘management-based	regulation’,	 “leverages	 the	 private	 sector’s	 knowledge	 about	 its	 particular	circumstances	and	engages	 firms	 in	developing	their	own	 internal	procedures	and	monitoring	practices	that	respond	to	risks”	(Coglianese	2010,	p.	160).	In	 practice,	 screeners	 draw	 on	 a	 set	 of	 ‘indicators’	 (some	 of	 which	 are	outlined	in	the	Guidance;	others	communicated	by	interviewees	who	contributed	to	the	development	of	the	Guidance)	that	effectively	serve	as	proxies	for	‘knowing	their	customer’.	 These	 include,	 requesting	 the	 “[p]rincipal	 user’s	 full	 name	 and	 contact	information”;	 their	 “[b]illing	 address	 and	 shipping	 address	 (if	 not	 the	 same)”,	and/or	 the	 “[p]rincipal	 user’s	 institutional	 or	 corporate	 affiliation	 (if	 applicable)”	
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(DHHS	 2010b,	 p.	 13).	 These,	 according	 to	 Christopher	 Park,	 are	 essentially	indicators	 adapted	 from	 the	 “export	 control	 world”,	 which	 serve	 to	 provide	screeners	 with	 a	 sense	 of	 “whether	 there	 is	 a	 reason	 to	 be	 concerned”.	 Other	indicators	include,	“the	country	of	origin	…	the	method	of	payment	…	types	of	letters	of	credit”;	even	the	“type	of	letterhead”	a	customer	uses	to	place	an	order.	According	to	Park,	although	“nothing	catches	everything”,	 institutional	 letterhead	can	at	 least	provide	screeners	with	a	sense	of	whether	or	not	 the	customer	 is	affiliated	with	a	“real	facility”.	“Then	there	are	the	related	questions,”	he	explained:	“Have	you	ever	dealt	with	 this	customer	before?	 If	 so,	 is	 this	consistent	with	previous	orders?	Is	it	the	same	individual?	Is	it	the	same	mailing	address?	Is	it	consistent	with	the	kind	of	research	you	know	is	going	on	at	the	facility?	If	you	have	 doubts,	 you	 call,	 you	 Google	 them	 …	 fairly	 straight	 forward	 stuff.”	(Christopher	Park)	What	 this	 account	 suggests	 is	 that	 there	 is	 not	 a	 fixed	 approach	 to	 conducting	customer	 screening.	 Rather,	 there	 exist	 a	 variety	 of	 questions	 screeners	 ask	themselves,	which	serve	to	inform	their	risk	judgments	on	which	orders	should	be	filled	 and	 which	 should	 not.	 According	 to	 Park,	 this	 risk	 assessment	 process	 is	informed	as	much	by	intuition	and	experience	as	it	 is	by	objective	 ‘facts’	about	the	identity	 and	 motives	 of	 the	 customer	 in	 question.	 “At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 day,”	 he	explained,	“you	wind	up	having	to	plug	in	educated	guesses	(or	whatever	you	want	to	call	 them),	and	that	winds	up	being,	 to	some	extent,	a	gut	 thing.”	 “It	 is	also,”	he	expressed,	 “reasonable	 to	expect	 that	 companies	will	 exercise	a	 certain	amount	of	common	 sense	 in	 terms	 of	 what	 they	 will	 send	 to	 a	 high	 school	 student	 who	 is	working	on	a	science	fair	project.	But,	to	what	extent,	who	knows?”	As	 a	 matter	 of	 legal	 accountability,	 DNA	 synthesis	 providers	 are	 also	requested	to	check	all	incoming	orders	against	a	number	of	lists	of	‘denied	persons’,	including	the	“Department	of	Treasury	Office	of	Foreign	Assets	Control	(OFAC)	list	of	Specially	Designated	Nationals	and	Blocked	Persons	(SDN	List)”;	the	“Department	of	State	 list	of	persons	engaged	 in	proliferation	activities”,	and	the	“Department	of	Commerce	 Denied	 Persons	 List	 (DPL)”	 (DHHS	 2010b,	 p.	 15).	 For	 international	orders,	 “most	 transactions	 involving	 Cuba,	 Iran,	 and	 Sudan	 are	 [also]	 prohibited”	
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(ibid,	p.	16).	Any	customer	who	is	found	on	one	or	more	of	these	lists	generates	an	immediate	 ‘red	 flag’	 and	 their	 order	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 refused.	 For	 some	 experts,	screening	against	 lists	of	 this	kind	 (unlike	 lists	of	 ‘controlled	sequences’,	 a	 subject	that	 has	 received	 considerably	 more	 attention)	 is	 perceived	 to	 be	 relatively	unproblematic,	 falling	 into	 the	 “no	brainer	 category”.	According	 to	Amy	Smithson,	the	problem	with	lists	of	‘denied	persons’	is	primarily	an	administrative	one:	“Customer	screening	 falls	 into	 the	no	brainer	category.	Governments	already	have	 lists	 of	 known	middlemen,	 bad	 guys,	 criminals—	 There	 should	 be	 one	point,	 one	 stop	 shopping,	 for	 the	 companies	 to	 submit	 that	 customer’s	name	and	 other	 basic	 information,	 so	 that	 they	 can	 quickly	 screen	 through	all	 the	government	 lists.	 In	 the	 United	 States	 there’s	 like	 17	 different	 agencies	 that	have	 these	 lists.	 They	 shouldn’t	 have	 to	 knock	 on	 17	 different	 government	doors	to	get	the	screening	done.	It	should	be	in	one	place.”	(Amy	Smithson)	Similarly,	Andrew	Hessel,	a	prominent	US-based	synthetic	biologist	invited	to	speak	at	the	BWC	on	the	‘security	implications’	of	synthetic	biology	during	my	field	research,	 expressed	 that	 it	 is	 far	more	 difficult	 to	 identify	 and	 screen	 ‘dangerous	sequences’	than	it	is	to	identify	and	screen	‘dangerous	persons’:	“I	think	it’s	actually	harder	to	screen	for	dangerous	sequences,	because	we	can	take	 small	 elements—	 Put	 it	 this	 way,	 anything	 we	 think	 is	 a	 dangerous	sequence,	we	 could	 always	break	 it	 down	 into	 smaller	 and	 smaller	 elements	for	 assembly,	 and	you	 can	 get	past	 that	 filter.	 It’s	 harder	 to	 get	 around	your	
identity.	…		I	think	the	key	is	identity	–	whether	it’s	a	corporate	identity	or	an	individual	identity.	Those	are	unambiguous.”	(Andrew	Hessel)	In	 this	 account,	 unlike	 a	 sequence,	 which	 can	 be	 broken	 down	 into	 smaller	 and	smaller	parts	to	evade	detection	based	on	a	predefined	list	of	‘dangerous	sequences’,	an	 individual’s	 or	 an	 organization’s	 identity	 is	 described	 as	 ‘unambiguous’,	providing	a	more	reliable	metric	for	the	purposes	of	screening.		Yet,	 for	 others,	 the	 process	 of	 ‘customer	 screening’	 is	 anything	 but	straightforward.	 Notably,	 during	 a	 workshop	 on	 the	 dual-use	 implications	 of	
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synthetic	 biology,98	 Mackenzie	 Cowell,	 co-founder	 of	 DIYbio,	 expressed	 his	displeasure	 at	 the	 suggestion	 that	 DNA	 synthesis	 providers	 should	 not	 mail	synthetic	DNA	to	“P.O.	Box	addresses”,	a	requirement	that	threatens	to	marginalize	the	research	activities	of	‘non-institutional’	biologists.	Specifically,	Cowell’s	concerns	stem	from	the	Guidance’s	recommendation	that	all	customers	not	affiliated	with	an	institution	 merit	 follow-up	 screening	 (DHHS	 2010b),	 effectively	 excluding	 DIY-biologists	from	ordering	synthetic	DNA	to	advance	their	research	projects.		In	 this	 light,	 it	 is	 apparent	 that,	while	 the	 ‘indicators’	 used	 by	 screeners	 to	conduct	 their	 assessments	 serve	 to	 fulfill	 a	 specific	 objective	 –	 namely,	 as	 several	interviewees	 expressed,	 they	 enable	 DNA	 synthesis	 providers	 to	 fulfill	 their	 “due	diligence”,	thereby	enabling	orders	to	be	filled	in	accordance	with	existing	laws	and	regulations	 –	 they	 also	 threaten	 to	 exclude	 various	 (‘non-dangerous’)	 actors	 from	gaining	 access	 to	 various	 (‘non-dangerous’)	 strands	 of	 synthetic	 DNA.	 The	 reason	being,	 although	 indicators,	 as	 heuristic	 devices	 or	 simple	 rules	 of	 thumb,	 are	practical,	 they	 also	 (necessarily)	 lack	 precision,	 and	 therefore	 cannot	 subtly	differentiate	 between	 (‘potentially	 dangerous’)	 customers	 on	 a	 case-by-case	 basis.	Moreover,	lacking	this	level	of	precision,	they	threaten	to	exclude	some	individuals	from	 participating	 in	 aspects	 of	 modern	 biology,	 and	 reify	 their	 status	 as	 ‘risky	subjects’	or	‘risks	to	society’	–	labels,	as	I	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter,	that	are	not	without	consequence	for	those	to	whom	the	label	is	applied.		Thus,	in	practice,	in	addition	to	explicitly	including	‘known	middle	men,	bad	guys	and	criminals’,	 lists	of	 ‘denied	persons’	effectively	 include	DIY-biologists,	 and	for	 reasons	 other	 than	 their	 ‘actual’	 motives	 and	 capabilities.	 As	 I	 argued	 in	 the	previous	 chapter,	DIY-biologists	 are	 perceived	 to	 be	 ‘biosecurity	 problems’	 not	 so	much	because	of	what	they	might	do	with	synthetic	biology,	but	because	of	who	they	are	 and	 where	 they	 conduct	 their	 work	 –	 the	 Select	 Agent	 Regulations	 make	 no	provisions	for	those	working	in	their	garage.	Consequently,	DIY-biologists	occupy	a	liminal	position,	neither	 free	 to	 fully	participate	 in	 synthetic	biology	nor	explicitly																																																									
98 ‘Synthetic Biology and Nano-biotechnology Risk and Response Assessment Project’, 
hosted by the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, Turin, 
Italy, 24-25 March 2010. 
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forbidden	 from	 participating.	 Moreover,	 until	 the	 Select	 Agent	 Regulations	 are	updated	to	reflect	the	growing	trend	in	non-institutional	biology	–	a	trend	that	is	at	the	core	of	the	synthetic	biology	project,	which	aims	to	extend	the	tools	of	modern	biology	 to	 more	 people	 in	 less	 formal	 research	 settings	 –	 DIY-biologists	 will	continue	to	don	a	‘black	hat’,	and,	in	the	case	of	the	screening	methodology	endorsed	by	 the	 DHHS,	 elicit	 a	 ‘red	 flag’.	 This	 said,	 although	 a	 troubling	 reality	 for	 DIY-biologists,	 this	 situation	 does	 not	 represent	 a	 coordinated	 or	 deliberate	 act	 of	discrimination	 against	 their	 community.	 Rather,	 their	 status	 (or,	 more	 precisely,	their	 lack	 of	 ‘legitimate’	 status)	 is	 an	 unintended	 consequence	 of	 an	 existing	regulatory	framework	that	was	never	intended	to	encompass	the	present	reality	of	non-institutional	 biology.	 For	 better	 or	 worse,	 in	 opting	 to	 peg	 the	 screening	guidelines	to	this	earlier	framework,	the	Guidance	perpetuates	this	situation.	With	 a	 view	 to	 these	 considerations,	 it	 is	 evident	 that	 the	 ‘challenges’	associated	 with	 ‘customer	 screening’	 go	 well	 beyond	 the	 technical	 difficulties	encountered	 in	 ‘sequence	 screening’.	 In	 contrast	 to	 sequence	 screening,	 customer	screening	 raises	questions	 about	 a	 customer’s	 identity,	motives,	 and	 capabilities	 –	questions	that	not	only	draw	on	unfamiliar	areas	of	expertise	among	screeners,	but	also	 require	 risk	 judgments	 to	 be	made	 that	 affect	 the	 very	 subjects	 they	 seek	 to	render	visible	and	manageable.	 In	 this	manner,	 customer	 screening,	 in	 contrast	 to	sequence	 screening,	 is	 not	 only	 technically	 demanding,	 but	 also	 ethically	problematic.	Deriving	a	 list	of	 ‘denied	persons’,	one	might	argue,	 is	simply	not	 the	same	 as	 deriving	 a	 list	 of	 ‘controlled	 sequences’.	 Persons,	 unlike	 things,	 exhibit	constantly	changing	‘properties’;	they	are	neither	‘sequences’	nor	‘natural	disasters’,	but	rather	social	actors	imbued	with	human	agency	–	an	observation,	perhaps,	that	points	 as	much	 to	 the	 challenges	 inherent	 to	 customer	 screening	as	 it	 does	 to	 the	relative	absence	of	the	‘customer’	in	the	screening	methodology.		To	conclude	this	section,	I	wish	to	return	to	the	subject	of	human	agency,	and	to	the	significance	of	omitting	human	agency	from	the	risk	calculus	described	in	the	Guidance.	 According	 to	 the	 Committee	 on	 Methodological	 Improvements,	 as	discussed	 earlier,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 knowledge	 about	 how	 ‘intelligent	 adversaries’	behave,	the	DHS	opts	to	model	‘persons’	as	‘things’,	and,	in	the	process,	largely	omits	
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the	 ‘intelligent	 adversary’	 from	 the	 assessment	 (NRC	2008).	 In	many	ways,	 this	 is	also	 true	of	 customer	screening.	Specifically,	 in	 the	absence	of	detailed	knowledge	about	the	customer	placing	the	order,	screeners	draw	on	a	set	of	indicators,	which	do	 not	 (and	 cannot)	 reflect	 the	 complexities	 of	 the	 customer	 in	 question	 –	 an	individual	who	 is	 free	 to	 choose	 his	 or	 her	 own	 sequence,	 how	 they	 request	 this	sequence,	and	how	they	ultimately	(mis)use	their	order	if	and	when	it	is	processed.	Thus,	 while	 indicators	 may	 enable	 screeners	 to	 broadly	 differentiate	 between	‘legitimate’	 and	 ‘illegitimate’	 customers,	 thus	 enabling	DNA	 synthesis	 providers	 to	fulfill	 their	 ‘due	 diligence’,	 they	 also	 gloss	 over	much	 of	what	makes	 a	 ‘customer’	distinct	 from	 a	 ‘sequence’	 –	 a	 ‘person’	 distinct	 from	 a	 ‘thing’.	 And,	 while	simplification	 of	 complex	 phenomena	 is	 intrinsic	 to	 risk	 assessment	 in	 practice	(Loasby	1976),	and	a	necessary	feature	of	universalistic	rules	that	strive	to	maintain	business	operations	and	industrial	efficiency	(Braithwaite	1982),	 in	the	case	of	the	
Screening	Framework,	I	would	suggest,	the	stakes	are	higher	than	most.			
5.5	Conclusion	The	 ‘screening	methodology’	 developed	 by	 the	 DHHS	 (2010b)	 scarcely	 resembles	the	strictly	‘scientific’	approach	to	science	policymaking	described	in	the	‘Red	Book’	(NRC	 1983),	 illustrated	 as	 a	 unidirectional	 scientific	 process	 (see	 Figure	 1).	 The	promise	 of	 ‘objective’	 risk	 assessment,	 free	 of	 ‘subjective’	 human	 judgment,	 can	hardly	be	said	to	reflect	the	selective	processes	and	administrative	logics	that	enable	‘sequences’	and	‘customers’	to	be	reconfigured	as	objects	of	thought	and	action.	To	speak	of	 ‘sequence	screening’	in	relation	to	scientific	knowledge	alone	would	seem	oddly	out	of	place	in	light	of	the	‘non-biological’,	‘non-quantifiable’	criteria	drawn	on	by	the	DHHS	and	the	USDA	to	determine	what	should	count	as	a	‘Select	Agent’,	and,	in	 turn,	 a	 ‘controlled	 sequence’.	 The	 assorted	 ‘indicators’	 adopted	 by	 screeners	 to	verify	 a	 customer’s	 ‘identity’	 with	 a	 view	 to	 establishing	 their	 entitlement	 to	synthetic	 DNA	 lacks	much	 of	 the	 disinterested	 ‘scientific	 gaze’	 so	 often	 valued	 by	scientists;	promoted	as	fundamental	to	the	 ‘scientific	process’,	and	favored	(if	only	as	a	technical	ideal)	by	science	policymakers	and	regulators.		
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In	 practice,	 and	 in	 stark	 contrast	 to	 the	 Red	 Book’s	 (NRC	 1983)	 idealized	representation	 of	 risk	 analysis,	 the	 screening	 methodology	 described	 in	 the	Guidance	encompasses	an	array	of	risk	assessment	techniques	that	offer	a	more	or	less	structured	procedure	–	one	that	is,	above	all,	‘administrative’	or	‘managerial’	in	function	 –	 for	 conducting	 biosecurity	 risk	 assessments,	 permitting	 DNA	 synthesis	providers	 to	 tick	 the	necessary	boxes	 to	ship	(or	not)	orders	 for	synthetic	double-stranded	 DNA.	 As	 Power	 (2007)	 argues,	 such	 ‘box-ticking’	 approaches	 to	 risk	assessment	are	‘functional’,	in	the	sense	that	they	serve	as	a	more	or	less	formalized	process	 for	 deriving	 a	 risk	 estimate	 and	 making	 a	 risk	 management	 decision.	Moreover,	 they	are	 ‘auditable’,	 in	 the	sense	 that	 they	serve	 to	explicitly	 show	how	risk	 assessments	 are	 conducted,	 providing	 a	 formalized	 proof	 or	 justification	 for	taking	 a	particular	 course	of	 action.	 In	 this	 light,	 the	Guidance,	 characterized	by	 a	‘procedural	 rationality’,	 can	 partly	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 response	 to	 “increased	pressures	 for	 transparency	 and	 accountability”,	 and	 as	 an	 attempt	 at	 “blame	avoidance”	in	the	event	of	regulatory	failures	(Bounds	2010,	p.	30).	In	this	chapter,	 I	have	argued	that	risk	assessment	 in	the	context	of	science	policymaking	is,	above	all,	a	pragmatic	activity,	premised	upon	the	belief	that	risks	can	 known	 with	 reasonable	 confidence	 and	 made	 the	 subject	 of	 regulatory	intervention	and	control.	Although	rarely	resembling	the	idealized	scientific	model	of	 risk	 analysis	 –	 exemplified	 by	 ‘quantitative	 risk	 assessment’	 –	 science	policymaking	is	nonetheless	concerned	with	establishing	verifiable	procedures	that	can	be	used	 to	 inform	and	 to	 justify	a	variety	of	policy	actions,	policy	actions	 that	cannot	 be	 disassociated	 from	 the	 specific	 risk	 management	 objectives	 they	 are	intended	 to	 fulfill,	 including	 aspirations	 for	 economic	 development,	 regulatory	consistency	 and	 ‘blame	 avoidance’.	Moreover,	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 these	 procedures	are	 adopted	 by	 industry,	 supported	 by	 federal	 agencies,	 codified	 in	 policy	documents	or	simply	endorsed	by	various	scientific	and	technical	experts	who	claim	to	 know	 what	 should	 count	 as	 the	 ‘best’	 approach	 to	 risk	 assessment	 and	 risk	management,	they	are	‘institutionalized’	and	advanced	as	new	‘standards’.	Far	from	being	unique	 to	 synthetic	biology,	 this	approach	 to	assessing	and	managing	 risk,	 I	have	argued,	has	been	applied	to	previous	iterations	of	biotechnology,	and,	indeed,	
	 192	
is	 indicative	of	 ‘science	policy’	(Jasanoff	1990)	itself,	an	activity	that	 is,	and	always	was,	characterized	by	a	‘mix’	of	scientific	and	political	considerations.	Yet,	as	I	have	also	argued	in	this	chapter,	the	case	of	synthetic	biology	is	not	simply	a	repetition	of	what	has	come	before.	Indeed,	the	case	of	synthetic	biology	is	even	 distinct	 from	 its	 nearest	 technological	 relative,	 genetic	 engineering.	 Today,	both	the	science	and	the	context	are	perceived	to	have	changed,	and	scientists	and	science	 policymakers	 envision	 ‘new’	 risks	 –	 risks	 associated	with	 ‘synthetic	 DNA’,	‘non-natural	 templates’	 and	 ‘deliberate	 misuse’	 –	 while	 simultaneously	 imagining	‘new’	ways	of	visualizing	and	managing	these	risks	–	by	way	of	adapting	(more	or	less	 successfully)	 ‘risk	 technologies’	 and	 ‘uncertain	 techniques’	 (Chapter	 2)	 to	contend	with	 the	 indeterminacies	 associated	with	 ‘sequence	 information’	 and	 the	addition	 of	 ‘human	 agency’	 to	 the	 risk	 calculation;	 by	way	 of	 establishing	 lists	 of	‘controlled	 sequences’	 and	 ‘denied	 persons’;	 and	 by	 way	 of	 developing	administrative	procedures	based	on	 ‘box-ticking’	where	probabilistic	knowledge	 is	unobtainable.	While	 there	 is	 no	way	 to	neatly	 summarize	 these	 conclusions,	what	can	 be	 said	 is	 that	 risk	 assessment	 ‘standards’	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 life	 sciences	continue	 to	 change,	 embracing	 an	 array	 of	 risk	 assessment	 techniques	 –	 both	quantitative	and	qualitative,	formal	and	informal	–	that	are	applied	and	adapted	to	the	management	of	emerging	risks	and	emerging	biotechnologies,	even	at	the	‘limits	of	 prediction’.	 The	 case	 of	 biosecurity	 risk	 assessment	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 DNA	synthesis	industry	offers	one	vision	of	how	these	diverse	techniques	are	brought	to	bear	on	a	‘complex	problem’	in	pursuit	of	‘practical	solutions’.	
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6.	Risk	management:	Preventative	controls	on	science	and	the	
limits	of	the	‘classical’	biosecurity	model		
	
6.1	Introduction	Pragmatism,	 I	 have	 argued,	 underpins	 risk	management	processes	directed	 at	 the	design	 and	 development	 of	 ‘optimal’	 science	 policies.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 DNA	synthesis	 industry,	 this	 pragmatism	 is	 visible	 in	 relation	 to	 ongoing	 policy	 efforts	seeking	not	only	to	prevent	synthetic	DNA	from	being	accessed	by	‘denied	persons’,	but	 also	 seeking	 to	 achieve	 this	 outcome	 with	 minimal	 impact	 on	 an	 emerging	industry	and	with	minimal	modification	to	existing	regulatory	frameworks.	Yet,	the	DNA	synthesis	 industry	 is	only	one	 site	where	 this	pragmatic	approach	 to	 science	policymaking	is	being	enacted.	Indeed,	pragmatism,	I	suggest,	 is	a	common	feature	of	 biosecurity	 considerations,	 and	 the	 regulatory	 strategies	 designed	 to	 govern	synthetic	 biology.	 Specifically,	 questions	 are	being	 asked	by	 science	policymakers,	scientists,	security	experts,	bioethicists,	and	others,	about	how	‘best’	to	secure	and	simultaneously	sustain	an	exemplary	case	of	‘dual-use	biotechnology’,	a	technology	defined	by	its	anticipated	capacity	for	‘bioterrorism’	and	‘bioeconomy’.			 It	 is,	 in	 turn,	 with	 a	 view	 to	 this	 sought-after	 balance	 –	 between	 ‘national	security’	 and	 ‘scientific	 progress’	 –	 that	 I	 wish	 to	 consider	more	 broadly	 the	 risk	management	options	 that	have	been	proposed	to	address	 the	dual-use	problem	in	synthetic	 biology.	 In	 doing	 so,	 I	 wish	 not	 only	 to	 highlight	 possible	 ‘options	 for	governance’,	 as	 they	 are	 often	 referred	 to	 in	 the	 policy	 literature	 (for	 example,	Garfinkel	et	al.	2007),	but,	more	 importantly,	 to	 identify	 their	points	of	agreement	and	disagreement;	their	perceived	strengths	and	limitations.	Beyond	the	immediate	aim	of	addressing	how	diverse	groups	of	experts	attempt	 to	negotiate	uncertainty	and	resolve	an	apparent	policy	dilemma,	this	research	is	intended	to	examine	how	risk	 management	 strategies	 are	 designed	 and	 produced	 in	 pursuit	 of	 particular	goals,	helping	to	both	orient	the	‘risk	management	process’	and	establish	new	forms	of	‘risk	responsibility’.	In	light	of	this	overarching	research	aim,	in	this	chapter	and	
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the	next	I	will	address	several	questions,	including:	What	risk	management	options	are	presently	proposed	to	address	the	dual-use	problem	in	synthetic	biology?	What	do	 these	 options	 share	 in	 common,	 and	 how	 are	 they	 different?	 And,	 how	 are	various	 biosecurity	 interventions	 justified	 or	 contested	 in	 relation	 to	 potentially	competing	demands	for	scientific	progress	and	national	security?			 With	a	view	to	these	research	questions,	I	will	argue	that,	while	sharing	the	common	 objective	 of	 enabling	 a	 secure	 and	 sustainable	 science,	 the	 risk	management	strategies	that	have	been	proposed	to	date	(or,	in	some	instances,	that	have	 recently	 been	 implemented)	 seek	 to	 achieve	 this	 objective	 in	 a	 variety	 of	potentially	conflicting	ways.	Specifically,	these	interventions	range	from	‘top-down’	approaches,	 premised	 upon	 a	 logic	 of	 prevention	 or	 precaution	 and	 directed	 at	arresting	flows	of	‘dual-use’	materials	and	information	(the	subject	of	this	chapter),	to	‘bottom-up’	approaches,	premised	upon	a	logic	of	‘prudent	vigilance’	and	directed	at	 shaping	 scientific	 conduct	 (the	 subject	 of	 the	 following	 chapter).	 Significantly,	although	 it	 cannot	 be	 said	 that	 ‘bottom-up’	 approaches	 are	 necessarily	 replacing	‘top-down’	 approaches,	 which	 continue	 to	 be	 endorsed	 under	 the	 ‘classical’	biosecurity	model,	 this	 research	 suggests	 that	 there	 nonetheless	 exists	 a	 growing	belief	that	addressing	the	problem	of	‘deliberate	misuse’	is	likely	to	benefit	less	from	imposing	 new	 restrictions	 on	 access	 to	 science,	 viewed	 by	 many	 as	 threatening	norms	of	 scientific	openness	and	potentially	 limiting	scientific	progress,	and	more	from	encouraging	new	forms	of	responsible	scientific	conduct.		 Before	proceeding,	 I	should	emphasize	that	 the	risk	management	strategies	discussed	in	this	chapter	and	the	next	are	not	necessarily	viewed	as	incompatible	by	their	 authors.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 while	 the	 various	 groups	 of	 experts	 engaged	 in	developing	biosecurity	policies	often	emphasize	one	approach	to	risk	management	over	 another,	 many	 still	 endorse	 aspects	 of	multiple	 risk	management	 strategies,	encouraging	what	 is	 increasingly	 referred	 to	as	a	 ‘web	of	prevention’	or	a	 ‘web	of	deterrence’.99	 In	 other	 words,	 they	 tend	 to	 endorse	 an	 assemblage	 of	 biosecurity																																																									
99 The term ‘web of deterrence’ was first introduced by Graham S. Pearson (1993), an 
international security expert and long-time advocate of chemical and biological weapons 
disarmament, to describe a range of measures to counter the threat of chemical and 
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controls,	 both	 ‘top-down’	 and	 ‘bottom-up’.	 As	 Kwik	 et	 al.	 (2003,	 p.	 32)	 reason,	“governance	 systems	 that	 rely	 on	 voluntary	 standards	…	 cannot,	 alone,	 guarantee	the	prevention	of	bioterrorism”.	Conversely,	“international	treaties	or	national	top-down	 regulation	 cannot,	 on	 their	 own,	 deliver	 such	 promises	 either”	 (ibid.).	Moreover,	 it	 should	 be	 emphasized	 that	 the	 risk	 management	 strategies	 (each	existing	 at	 various	 stages	 of	 development	 and	 implementation)	 discussed	 in	 this	chapter	 and	 the	 next	 are	 by	 no	means	 the	 only	 regulatory	 instruments	 governing	synthetic	biology,	and	modern	biology	more	broadly.	Rather,	they	contribute	to	“an	existing	regime,	comprised	of	a	collection	of	cooperative	and	coercive	national	and	international	 control	 measures”,	 including	 international	 treaties,	 national	 laws,	voluntary	guidelines	and	codes	of	conduct	(McLeish	and	Nightingale	2007,	p.	1638).	Yet,	 as	many	 of	 the	 biosecurity	 controls	 I	will	 discuss	 remain	 at	 an	 early	 stage	 of	deliberation,	 I	 argue	 that	 each	 intervention	 (or	 ‘family’	 of	 interventions)	 merits	being	considered	on	its	own	terms.	As	I	will	argue,	this	 is	because	each	presents	a	somewhat	different	way	of	 understanding	 and	 intervening	upon	biosecurity	 risks,	having	different	implications	for	how	synthetic	biology	is	governed.		
	
6.2	‘Barriers	to	access’:	Risk	management	under	the	‘classical’	biosecurity	
model	In	 this	 section,	 I	will	 consider	a	 range	of	 risk	management	strategies	 for	synthetic	biology	 that	 can	 broadly	 be	 said	 to	 fall	 under	 the	 ‘classical’	 biosecurity	 model.	Introduced	 in	 Chapter	 4,	 this	 model	 is	 premised	 upon	 the	 belief	 that	 (select)	biological	 artifacts	 (tangible	 and	 intangible)	 are	 intrinsically	 dangerous	 things	(McLeish	 and	 Nightingale	 2007)	 and	 that	 biosecurity	 controls	 should	 (and	presumably	 can)	 be	 implemented	 to	 prevent	 them	 from	 falling	 into	 the	 ‘wrong	hands’.	 These	 (more	 or	 less)	 ‘top-down’	 approaches	 to	 biosecurity	 are	 the	 most	common	 risk	 management	 options	 proposed	 to	 address	 the	 deliberate	 misuse	 of																																																																																																																																																																						
biological weapons proliferation. Presently, the term, which is more commonly referred 
to as a ‘web of prevention’, can be found throughout the biosecurity policy literature and 
was referenced by several experts interviewed for my research. 
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synthetic	biology,	and,	 indeed,	to	address	the	dual-use	problem	in	the	 life	sciences	more	 broadly	 (Reppy	 2003).	 Ranging	 from	 the	 preventative	 to	 the	 precautionary,	these	 include	 proposals	 to	 screen	 orders	 submitted	 to	 DNA	 synthesis	 providers	(DHHS	2010b),	to	review	and,	if	deemed	necessary,	omit	certain	research	findings	in	the	 context	 of	 life	 science	publishing	 (Zilinskas	 and	Tucker	2002),	 and,	 indeed,	 to	prevent	certain	life	science	research	projects	from	being	pursued	in	the	first	place	if	they	are	deemed	to	be	especially	dangerous	(Steinbruner	et	al.	2007).	Although	 representing	 a	 diverse	 range	 of	 biosecurity	 interventions,	 which	address	 different	 aspects	 of	 life	 science	 research,	 from	 controls	 on	 biological	materials	 to	 restrictions	 on	 hypothetical	 experiments,	 in	 the	 following	 I	 wish	 to	consider	what	 these	 options	 share	 in	 common,	 that	 is,	 what	 binds	 them	 together	under	 the	 classical	 biosecurity	model?	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 how	 do	 they	 differ	with	regard	 to	 their	 specific	 targets	 of	 intervention	 and	 control?	 And,	 how	 are	 they	justified	or	contested	in	relation	to	their	potential	to	enable	a	secure	and	sustainable	science?	Drawing	primarily	 on	 the	biosecurity	 policy	 literature,	 and	 a	 selection	of	interviews	 with	 science	 policymakers,	 scientists	 and	 security	 experts	 actively	engaged	in	aspects	of	the	synthetic	biology	policy	debate,	I	will	argue	that,	although	these	risk	management	options	continue	to	enjoy	considerable	support,	there	exist	growing	doubts	about	their	capacity	to	prevent	the	deliberate	misuse	of	life	science	research	 and	 concerns	 about	 their	 potential	 impact	 on	 scientific	 progress.	 In	 the	next	chapter,	I	will	then	consider	an	alternative	biosecurity	model	that	has	begun	to	gain	growing	support,	a	model	premised	less	upon	controlling	access	to	science,	and	more	upon	influencing	scientific	conduct,	an	approach	to	risk	management	that	is,	I	suggest,	changing	what	it	means	to	be	a	‘responsible	life	scientist’.	In	an	effort	to	briefly	revisit	and	further	conceptualize	the	distinctive	 logics	that	characterize	the	contemporary	practice	of	biosecurity,	I	would	like	to	begin	by	way	 of	 considering	 the	 following	 question:	 What	 does	 a	 biosecurity	 intervention	that	 attempts	 to	 restrict	 access	 to	 a	 synthetic	 gene	 share	 in	 common	 with	 a	biosecurity	 intervention	 that	 attempts	 to	 restrict	 the	 publication	 of	 research	findings	 describing	 the	de	 novo	 synthesis	 of	 a	 virus?	 At	 a	 glance,	 these	 examples,	both	 of	 which	 are	 familiar	 biosecurity	 controls	 discussed	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	
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synthetic	 biology	policy	 debate,	would	 appear	 to	 be	 rather	 different.	 After	 all,	 the	first	 concerns	 a	 tangible	 entity	 –	 a	 gene	 –	 and	 the	 second	 an	 intangible	 one	 –	research	findings.	Although	targeting	very	different	‘risk	objects’	(Hilgartner	1992),	what	 these	 interventions	 share	 in	 common,	 I	 suggest,	 is	 a	 common	 way	 of	understanding	 what	 constitutes	 a	 ‘biosecurity	 problem’,	 and,	 in	 turn,	 what	constitutes	a	 ‘biosecurity	solution’.	Namely,	both	 interventions	view	biosecurity	 in	relation	 to	 the	 classical	 biosecurity	 model	 introduced	 in	 Chapter	 4,	 which	presupposes	 that	 there	 exist	 various	 biological	 artifacts	 that	 are,	 in	 and	 of	themselves,	dangerous	things,	meriting	oversight	and	control.	For	 supporters	 of	 this	 approach	 to	 biosecurity,	 barriers	 to	 access	 are	perceived	 to	 be	 necessary	 and	 (if	 only	 tacitly	 acknowledged	 by	 their	 authors)	possible	to	construct.	Constructing	barriers	to	access,	in	turn,	serves	as	the	primary	means	whereby	risks	are	made	the	subject	of	intervention	and	control.	This	view	of	biosecurity,	as	I	argued	in	Chapter	4,	can	be	conceptualized	as	a	type	of	 ‘command	and	control’	activity	directed	at	keeping	‘dangerous	tools’	out	of	‘dangerous	hands’.	Conversely,	under	this	model,	risks	are	perceived	to	arise	where	there	exist	gaps	or	‘vulnerabilities’	 in	 biosecurity	 controls,	 whether	 these	 gaps	 are	 perceived	 to	 be	physical,	 digital,	 theoretical	 or	 otherwise.	 As	 I	 have	 argued,	 this	 is	 precisely	 why	synthetic	biology	 is	often	said	 to	be	problematic.	That	 is,	 it	 is	believed	to	have	the	potential	 to	 lower	barriers	 to	access,	whether	by	 ‘de-skilling’	bioengineering	or	by	enabling	 the	 unauthorized	 acquisition	 of	 Select	 Agents.	 In	 turn,	 perceived	differences	 –	 ‘being	 a	 different	 kind	 of	 biologist’	 (for	 example,	 ‘non-institutional	biologists’)	 or	 ‘doing	 biology	 differently’	 (for	 example,	de	 novo	 synthesis	 of	 Select	Agents)	–	have	contributed	 to	an	expanding	 taxonomy	of	 ‘risks’	 that	many	believe	merit	being	taken	seriously	and	made	the	subject	of	risk	management.		This	view	of	biosecurity,	which	essentially	describes	a	mechanism	of	control	or	prevention,	is	clearly	visible	in	relation	to	the	examples	I	have	introduced	above;	yet,	a	second	observation	can	also	be	made	with	regard	to	these	examples,	and	this	concerns	biosecurity’s	 scope.	Namely,	under	 the	 classical	biosecurity	model,	 genes	and	research	findings,	although	two	very	different	types	of	things,	are	both	framed	as	 knowable	 and	 governable	 entities,	 which	 can	 be	 controlled	 by	 way	 of	
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constructing	 barriers	 to	 access.	 In	 this	 light,	 risk	 management	 is	 not	 so	 much	defined	or	constrained	by	the	types	of	‘risk	objects’	under	consideration,	but	by	the	specific	 concepts,	 categories	 and	 ways	 of	 ordering	 used	 to	 render	 these	 objects	amenable	to	thought	and	action.	Moreover,	this	approach	to	risk	management,	as	I	argued	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 DNA	 synthesis	 industry,	 is	primarily	 ‘administrative’	 or	 ‘managerial’	 in	 function,	 describing	 a	 formalized	
process	aimed	at	producing	“a	vision	of	control	…	and	an	imperative	to	manage	and	be	responsible	for	a	newly	visible	range	of	problems”	(Power	2007,	p.	125).	However,	 while	 there	 exist	 similarities	 between	 these	 two	 families	 of	biosecurity	 interventions	 –	 the	 first	 focused	 on	 tangible	 biotechnologies	 and	 the	second	 intangible	 life	 science	 knowledge	 –	 there	 also	 exist	 significant	 differences.	Notably,	 the	 very	 fact	 that	 information	 about	 pathogens	 (not	 just	 physical	pathogens)	 and	 ideas	 for	 experiments	 (not	 just	 experimental	 outcomes)	 are	 now	conceived	as	threats	to	our	collective	security	is	a	significant	development	in	itself.	Formally	existing	outside	the	scope	of	biosecurity,	new	concerns	about	life	science	knowledge	 production	 and	 dissemination	 are	 now	 the	 primary	 sites	 of	 a	 growing	number	of	biosecurity	proposals	(Atlas	and	Dando	2006).	In	other	words,	the	locus	of	 biosecurity	 has	 shifted	 to	 new	 domains	 of	 the	 life	 sciences,	 domains	 that	 are	increasingly	 removed	 from	 the	 tangible	 entities	 that	 are	 ultimately	 viewed	 as	problematic,	 namely,	 dangerous	 pathogens.	 For	 those	 engaged	 in	 the	 design	 and	production	 of	 biosecurity	 policies,	 this	 shift	 is	 coextensive	 with	 new	 anxieties,	uncertainties,	 and	 dilemmas	 about	 an	 emerging	 array	 of	 ‘risks’	 that	must	 now	 be	brought	 under	 a	 framework	 of	 technical	 intervention	 and	 control,	 while	simultaneously	ensuring	that	scientific	progress	is	not	diminished.	It	is,	in	turn,	with	a	view	to	how	this	desired	balance	might	be	achieved	–	both	in	relation	to	the	more	familiar	case	of	tangible	biotechnologies	and	the	more	recent	case	of	intangible	life	science	knowledge	–	that	I	wish	to	turn	to	at	this	time.	
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6.2.1	Preventative	practices:	Controlling	access	to	tangible	biotechnologies	There	exist	a	range	of	biosecurity	controls	(some	of	which	have	already	begun	to	be	put	 into	practice,	while	others	remain	at	 the	 inception	stage)	 for	synthetic	biology	that	seek	to	restrict	access	to	tangible	biotechnologies	(DNA	synthesizers,	chemical	precursors	to	synthetic	DNA,	synthetic	genes,	and	so	on).	Notably,	this	approach	to	biosecurity	 is	 clearly	 visible	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 Department	 of	 Health	 and	 Human	Services’	(DHHS	2010b)	Screening	Framework	 (discussed	 in	the	previous	chapter),	which	 prescribes	 screening	 procedures	 and	 recommends	 screening	 software	 to	detect	 and	 prevent	 the	 unauthorized	 acquisition	 of	 Select	 Agents	 (or	 their	constituent	 parts).	 In	 this	 context,	 predefined	 lists	 of	 ‘denied	 persons’	 and	‘controlled	 sequences’	 serve	 as	 practical	 aids	 or	 heuristic	 devices	 for	 risk	management	 decision-making,	 while	 much	 of	 the	 responsibility	 for	 risk	management	 rests	 with	 the	 ‘screener’	 and	 their	 capacities	 to	 detect	 when	 there	exists	a	mismatch	between	an	ordered	sequence	and	a	prospective	customer.	There	also	 exist,	 what	 are	 rapidly	 becoming,	 ‘standard’	 protocols	 for	 follow-up	 and	reporting	 in	 the	 event	 that	 an	 order	 should	 elicit	 a	 ‘hit’	 or	 a	 ‘red	 flag’,	 including	recently	 introduced	 lines	 of	 communication	 with	 the	 Federal	 Bureau	 of	Investigation	 (FBI).	 To	 the	 extent	 that	 the	 Screening	 Framework	 is	 adopted	 by	industry,	 I	have	argued,	 these	guidelines	provide	a	standardized	risk	management	procedure	 defining	 what	 should	 count	 as	 legitimate,	 morally	 (and,	 in	 the	 case	 of	Select	Agents,	 legally)	defensible	 ‘risk-based’	government,	as	well	as	shifting	much	of	the	burden	of	responsibility	for	risk	management	from	government	agencies	and	institutions	to	DNA	synthesis	companies	and	their	in-house	experts.		Although	 the	 Screening	 Framework	 (DHHS	 2010b)	 is	 currently	 the	 most	visible,	as	well	as	 the	most	detailed,	 regulatory	 instrument	 in	relation	 to	synthetic	biology,	there	exist	other	measures	of	this	kind.	Sometimes	referred	to	as	‘technical	solutions	 for	 biosecurity’	 (Bernauer	 et	 al.	 2008;	 Bennett	 et	 al.	 2009;	 Kelle	 2009),	these	 include	not	only	screening	procedures	and	screening	software	 introduced	 in	the	context	of	 the	DNA	synthesis	 industry,	but	also	biosecurity	proposals	aimed	at	
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monitoring	and	controlling	the	acquisition	and	use	of	specific	pieces	of	equipment	and	specific	chemical	reagents	 that	might	be	used	to	synthesize	synthetic	DNA	for	‘malicious	 purposes’.	 For	 example,	 in	 Synthetic	 Biology:	 Options	 for	Governance	 (a	collaborative	 policy	 effort	 between	 the	 US-based	 J.	 Craig	 Venter	 Institute,	 the	Massachusetts	 Institute	 of	 Technology,	 and	 the	 Center	 for	 Strategic	 and	International	 Studies),	 Garfinkel	 et	 al.	 (2008,	 p.	 32)	 propose	 “methods	 to	monitor	and	control	DNA	synthesizers”,	including	registration	requirements	“(a	requirement	to	 notify	 the	 government	 when	 selling,	 buying,	 or	 otherwise	 possessing	 a	 DNA	synthesizer)”;	 licensing	requirements	“(government	permission	 is	needed	before	a	DNA	synthesizer	can	be	acquired	or	retained)”;	as	well	as	registration	or	 licensing	requirements	 “for	 procuring	 specialized	 raw	 materials	 (especially	 the	phosphoramidite	precursors)	necessary	for	synthesis”	and	for	procuring	“key	spare	parts	of	synthesizers	(such	as	the	capillary	tube	assembly)”.	Here,	DNA	synthesizers	(including	 ‘key	 spare	 parts’)	 and	 chemical	 precursors	 to	 synthetic	 DNA	 are	identified	 as	 objects	 of	 particular	 concern,	 animated	 with	 the	 potential	 to	 enable	nefarious	applications,	and	made	 the	subject	of	a	 risk	management	proposals	 that	call	for	more	intensive	oversight	and	control	of	these	tangible	artifacts.		Similarly,	 George	 Church,	 a	 Harvard	 genetics	 professor	 and	 outspoken	advocate	 for	 biosecurity	 controls	 on	 synthetic	 biology,	 proposes	 licensing	 DNA	synthesizers,	as	well	as	monitoring	“suspect	activities,	such	as	labs	requesting	DNA	that	 is	 related	 to	 potentially	 harmful	 biological	 agents”	 and	 the	 “purchase	 of	precursor	chemicals,	nucleic	acids,	genes	and	designer	cells”	(Church	2005,	p.	423)	that	might	be	used	as	raw	ingredients	for	producing	‘dangerous	genetic	constructs’.	With	 a	 view	 to	 increasingly	 technical	 (if	 not	 futurist)	 modes	 of	 surveillance	 and	prevention,	 Church	 also	 proposes	 using	 electronic	 locators	 to	 track	 where	 DNA	synthesizers	are	located	in	space,	as	well	as	programming	DNA	synthesizers	so	that	they	 are	 unable	 to	 produce	 dangerous	 sequences	 (Church,	 cited	 in	 Chyba	 2006).	Here,	Church	elaborates	a	 risk	management	option	 that	might	be	used	 to	monitor	and	 control	 flows	 of	 ‘dual-use	 hardware’,	 linking	 this	 equipment	 with	 concerns	about	 ‘harmful	 biological	 agents’	 and	 ‘suspect	 activities’.	 	 Other	 proposals	 of	 this	kind	 include	 building	 a	 ‘self-destruct	mechanism’	 or	 ‘safety	 switch’	 into	 synthetic	
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microorganisms,	 which	 would	 be	 triggered	 in	 the	 event	 of	 an	 unexpected	environmental	 release,	 disabling	 “undesirable	 neo-organisms”,	 with	 a	 view	 to	enhancing	biosafety	and	biosecurity	(LaVan	and	Marmon	2010,	p.	1010).	A	further	“solution”,	some	scientists	argue,	“would	be	to	create	a	[genetic]	‘serial	number’	that	could	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 individual	 synthesis	 laboratories	 or	 even	 individual	synthesis	machines”,	verifying	a	synthetic	microorganism’s	origins	(ibid.).	According	to	 these	 scientists,	 “[s]afety	 must	 be	 designed	 into	 the	 [biosecurity]	 system”,	enabling	“safe	and	effective	progress	within	synthetic	biology”	(ibid.).	Bennett	et	al.	(2009)	have	referred	to	such	approaches	as	‘safety	by	design’.		While	 there	 exist	 further	 proposals	 of	 this	 kind,	 these	 represent	 a	characteristic	range	of	risk	management	strategies	that	seek	to	design	and	produce	‘technical	solutions	for	biosecurity’.	Although	most	lack	the	visibility,	level	of	detail,	and	institutional	support	associated	with	the	Screening	Framework	(DHHS	2010b),	and	therefore	may	or	may	not	become	active	regulatory	instruments,	each	attempts	to	 identify	 specific	 tangible	 artifacts	 of	 concern	 and	 proposes	 recipes	 for	 their	management.	 A	 relatively	 common	 proposal	 made	 by	 scientific	 and	 technical	experts	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 synthetic	 biology	 biosecurity	 debate,	 these	 risk	management	 options	 are	 nonetheless	 contested;	 often	 with	 a	 view	 to	 equally	positivist	 arguments	 put	 forward	 by	 other	 experts	 of	 this	 kind.	 Introduced	 in	Chapter	4,	the	primary	critique	among	scientists,	science	policymakers,	and	security	experts	leveled	at	these	kinds	of	biosecurity	interventions	is	that	they	posit	that	the	various	 tangible	 artifacts	 linked	 with	 synthetic	 biology	 (DNA	 synthesizers,	precursor	 chemicals,	 synthetic	 genes,	 and	 alike)	 can	 be	 both	 unambiguously	classified	 (identified,	 defined,	 and	 listed)	and	 kept	 out	 of	 the	 hands	 of	 ‘terrorists’.	Although	 a	 desirable	 possibility,	 according	 to	many	 of	 the	 scientific	 and	 technical	experts	 interviewed	 for	 my	 research	 as	 well	 as	 the	 prevailing	 tide	 of	 policy	literature	 on	 this	 subject	 (NRC	 2004,	 2006,	 2011),	 this	 view	 of	 biosecurity	 is	perceived	to	be	increasingly	impractical,	if	not	‘bad’,	in	excess,	for	science.		These	 objections,	 as	 I	 touched	 on	 in	 Chapter	 4,	 tend	 to	 be	 justified	 on	 the	basis	 of	 the	 ‘dual-use	 dilemma’,	 a	 concept	 that	 describes	 biotechnology’s	 ‘latent	potential’	 for	 both	 ‘good’	 and	 ‘bad’.	 It	 is	 argued,	 for	 example,	 that	 biosecurity	
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controls	on	tangible	biotechnologies	are	impractical	because	they	require	that	finite	lists	of	pathogens,	genes,	laboratory	equipment,	and	so	on,	be	developed,	monitored,	and	periodically	updated,	while,	 in	practice,	biotechnology	 is	 said	 to	be	 inherently	‘dual-use’,	rapidly	evolving	and	globally	distributed	(Atlas	2005b).	Thus,	boundaries	between	‘good’	biotechnology	and	‘bad’	biotechnology	are	not	only	perceived	to	be	blurred,	 but	 also	 difficult	 to	maintain,	monitor	 and	 enforce.	Moreover,	 it	 is	 agued	that	 biosecurity	 interventions	 of	 this	 kind,	 in	 excess,	 are	 disruptive	 to	 science	(Relman	et	al.	2006).	The	argument	being,	the	very	biosecurity	controls	intended	to	make	it	difficult	for	‘illegitimate’	actors	to	gain	access	to	pathogens,	genes,	chemical	precursors	 to	 synthetic	 DNA,	 and	 so	 on,	 also	 stand	 to	 make	 it	 more	 difficult	 for	‘legitimate’	scientists	to	conduct	their	work	(Atlas	and	Dando	2006).		Yet,	 as	 the	 previous	 examples	 suggest,	 despite	 these	 perceived	 challenges,	preventative	 controls	 on	 tangible	 biotechnologies	 are	 a	 distinct	 feature	 of	 the	synthetic	 biology	 regulatory	 landscape,	 and,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 DNA	 synthesis	industry,	are	beginning	to	be	implemented	(DHHS	2010b).	In	this	light,	the	‘dual-use	dilemma’,	 contrary	 to	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 the	 concept	 is	 usually	 framed	 in	 life	science	policy	discussions,	represents	less	a	source	of	uncertainty	that	discourages	biosecurity	 interventions,	 and	 more	 a	 source	 of	 motivation	 that	 mobilizes	 risk	management	 efforts	 that	 are	 adapted	 to	 new	 and	 emerging	 risks,	 new	 sites	 of	understanding	 and	 intervening.	 While	 this	 can	 be	 said	 of	 biosecurity	 controls	directed	at	tangible	biotechnologies,	in	the	following	I	will	argue	that	in	relation	to	
intangible	 life	 science	 knowledge	 there	 exist	 an	 even	 broader	 range	 of	 risk	management	 strategies,	 having	 different	 implications	 for	 how	 synthetic	 biology	 is	governed,	and	generating	more	pronounced	tensions	between	demands	for	national	security	 and	 demands	 for	 scientific	 progress.	 Significantly,	 while	 these	 strategies	remain	at	an	early	stage	of	deliberation	(that	is,	they	exist	as	‘proposals’,	rather	than	fully	 fledged	regulatory	 instruments	 that	have	been	rolled	out	by	government	and	adopted	by	 scientists	 and	 industry),	 aspects	 of	 these	proposals	 are	now	visible	 in	the	form	of	new	US	policy	on	‘dual-use	research	of	concern’	(DHHS	2012).				
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6.2.2	Precautionary	practices:	Controlling	access	to	intangible	life	science	knowledge	Discussed	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 ‘Fink	 Report’	 (NRC	 2004)	 in	 Chapter	 4,	 there	 exist	growing	concerns,	not	only	about	tangible	biotechnologies,	but	also	about	intangible	life	science	knowledge	falling	into	the	‘wrong	hands’.	What	this	means,	in	practice,	I	have	suggested,	 is	 that	 suspicions	about	modern	biology	 increasingly	 relate	 to	 the	production	 and	 dissemination	 of	 potentially	 dangerous	 information,	 research	findings,	 scientific	 protocols,	 and	 alike.	 In	 turn,	 the	 scope	 of	 biosecurity	 has	expanded	 to	 include	new	arenas	of	 the	 life	 sciences.	 It	was,	 in	 fact,	with	a	view	to	concerns	 of	 this	 kind,	 and	 how	 these	 concerns	might	 be	 addressed,	 that	 the	 Fink	Committee	 was	 convened	 (under	 the	 auspices	 of	 the	 US	 National	 Academy	 of	Sciences)	to	begin	with.	Specifically,	concerns	were	raised	about	the	publication	of	several	 high-profile	 life	 science	 articles	 that	 some	 critics	 feared	 would	 “[alert]	bioterrorists	to	new	ways	of	producing	biological	weapons	and	[provide]	them	with	explicit	instructions	for	doing	so”	(Selgelid	2009,	p.	721).		One	 article,	 in	 particular,	 entitled	 ‘Chemical	 synthesis	 of	 poliovirus	 cDNA:	Generation	of	 infectious	virus	 in	the	absence	of	natural	template’,	published	in	the	journal	 Science	 in	 2002,	 and	 authored	 by	 the	 virologists	 Cello,	 Paul	 and	Wimmer,	generated	 considerable	 controversy	 upon	 publication,	 drawing	 attention	 to	 the	potential	 risks	 that	 might	 arise	 if	 ‘terrorists’	 were	 to	 replicate	 the	 experiment	following	the	procedures	outlined	in	the	scientific	protocols.	In	other	words,	it	was	viewed,	as	several	authors	have	pointed	out	(for	example,	Reppy	2003;	Atlas	2005a;	McLeish	and	Nightingale	2007;	Vogel	2008c),	 as	providing	a	 ‘blueprint’	 or	 ‘recipe’	for	bioterrorism,	as	it	might	enable	‘malicious	actors’	to	gain	access	to	a	dangerous	pathogen.	 In	 recent	 years,	 this	 article,	 and	 several	 others	 linked	 with	 synthetic	biology,100	 has	 become	 synonymous	 with	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘dual-use	 research	 of	concern’,	raising	questions	about	whether	some	research	should	be	censored	prior																																																									
100 Other life science articles that have similarly become inextricably linked with this 
discussion include: ‘Characterization of the Reconstructed 1918 Spanish Influenza 
Pandemic Virus’ (Tumpy et al. 2005), noted for resurrecting an extinct pandemic virus, 
and ‘Expression of mouse interleukin-4 by a recombinant ectromelia virus suppresses 
cytolytic lymphocyte responses and overcomes genetic resistance to mousepox’ (Jackson 
et al. 2001), noted for inadvertently engineering a more lethal poxvirus. 
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to	publication,	and,	indeed,	whether	some	research	should	be	pursued	at	all	(ibid.).	In	brief,	the	synthetic	poliovirus	experiment	served	as	a	key	vector	for	debate	on	the	need	for	biosecurity	controls	on	‘fundamental	research’.101	Although	 restrictions	 on	 the	 communication	 of	 information	 related	 to	advances	 in	 science	and	 technology	are	not	altogether	new,	 regulatory	controls	of	this	kind	(which	take	as	their	focus	the	perceived	threat	of	bioterrorism)	have,	until	recently,	never	been	seriously	considered	in	the	context	of	the	life	sciences	(Reppy	2003).	To	help	place	the	significance	of	this	development	in	context,	in	the	following	I	 will	 briefly	 introduce	 how	 potentially	 dangerous	 scientific	 knowledge	 has	historically	been	made	the	subject	of	regulatory	control	in	the	US	context.	I	will	then	briefly	 underline	 the	 key	 challenges	 that	 now	 face	 life	 scientists	 and	 life	 science	policymakers	 who	 are	 confronted	 with	 a	 similar	 set	 of	 concerns	 and	 dilemmas,	which	 threaten	 to	 place	 national	 security	 considerations	 in	 conflict	 with	 strongly	held	 norms	 for	 scientific	 openness	 and	 demands	 for	 scientific	 progress	 in	 the	 life	sciences.	I	will	then	use	the	remainder	of	this	section	to	explore	the	various	policy	proposals	 that	have	 recently	been	put	 forward	 that	attempt	 to	enable	contentious	life	 science	 knowledge	 in	 synthetic	 biology	 (and	 related	 research	 domains)	 to	 be	managed	in	such	a	way	that	the	science	can	be	both	secured	and	sustained.		
6.2.2.1	Historical	precedents	First,	 it	 is	 widely	 recognized	 that	 the	 censorship	 of	 scientific	 knowledge	 is	 not	unprecedented	 (Atlas	 2003,	 2009;	 Rappert	 2003;	 Relyea	 2003;	 Reppy	 2003;	Gorman	2006;	Selgelid	2007).	 Indeed,	 in	 the	US	context,	 “information	(or	secrecy)	policy”,	 which	 focuses	 on	 “the	 need	 to	 secure	 information	 upon	 which	 national	security	 [relies]”	 (Gorman	 2006,	 p.	 62),	 has	 historically	 been	 deployed	 to	 control	access	to	scientific	knowledge	“bearing	directly	[or]	exclusively	on	national	defense”																																																									
101 In the US science policy context, ‘fundamental research’ has been defined as: “basic 
and applied research in science and engineering, the results of which ordinarily are 
published and shared broadly within the scientific community” (National Security 
Decision Directive 189, 21 September 1985, available at: 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-189.htm). 
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(Relyea	2003,	p.	403).	Notably,	in	the	case	of	nuclear	technology,	restrictions	of	this	kind	date	back	 to	 the	Second	World	War,	becoming	 law	under	 the	Atomic	Energy	Act	in	1946	(Gorman	2006).	Moreover,	a	sub-set	of	this	information,	perceived	to	be	of	greatest	 relevance	 to	 the	production	of	nuclear	weapons,	has	 traditionally	been	“born	classified”,	accessible	to	only	a	handful	of	military	scientists	and	others	with	security	 clearance	 (interview	with	 senior	biodefense	 scientist,	David	Franz).	More	broadly,	secrecy	has	become	a	familiar	aspect	of	the	day-to-day	workings	of	security	and	 intelligence	 agencies,	 as	 well	 as	 much	 of	 the	 private	 sector	 (Roberts	 2006).	Whether	motivated	by	heightened	concerns	about	national	security	or	demands	for	industrial	 growth,	 information	 is	 restricted	 with	 the	 intent	 of	 protecting	‘intelligence’	or	‘trade	secrets’	from	falling	into	the	‘wrong	hands’.		Nor	 are	 policy	 discussions	 on	 the	 potential	 conflicts	 between	 scientific	openness	and	national	 security	altogether	new.	 In	 the	US	context,	deliberations	of	this	kind	date	back	to	at	least	the	early	1980s.	At	this	time	–	during	the	last	decade	of	the	Cold	War	–	questions	were	similarly	asked	about	how	to	balance	demands	for	scientific	openness	against	demands	for	national	security,	albeit	with	a	view	to	fields	of	 science	 and	 technology	 that	 were	 perceived	 to	 be	 especially	 problematic	 in	relation	to	possible	military	conflict	with	the	Soviet	Union,	including	cryptography,	very	high-speed	integrated	circuits	and	artificial	 intelligence	(National	Academy	of	Sciences	 1982).	 Informed	 by	 the	 so-called	 ‘Corson	 Report’	 (ibid.),	 the	 Regan	Administration	 ultimately	 decided	 on	 a	 policy	 approach	 that,	 “to	 the	 maximum	extent	possible”,102	would	maintain	a	culture	of	scientific	openness,	while	reserving	the	right	to	classify	scientific	information	of	direct	relevance	to	“national	security”.	Enshrined	under	National	Security	Decision	Directive	189	(NSDD-189),	this	remains	the	cornerstone	of	US	policy	on	scientific	communication.		More	 recently,	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 2001	 and	 growing	 concerns	 about	international	 terrorism,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 renewed	 emphasis	 on	 “secrecy	 in	 the	interests	 of	 national	 security”	 (Gorman	 2006,	 p.	 58),	 drawing	 into	 focus	 the	underlying	 dilemma	 associated	 with	 governance	 measures	 aimed	 at	 censoring																																																									
102 National Security Decision Directive 189. 21 September 1985, available at: 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-189.htm. 
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science.	 According	 to	 Brian	 J.	 Gorman,	 Associate	 Professor	 in	 the	 Department	 of	Sociology,	Anthropology	and	Criminal	Justice	at	Towson	University:		“It	is	widely	recognized	that	science	advances	at	its	greatest	pace	in	an	open	environment	 where	 findings	 are	 accessible,	 transparent	 and	 replicable	 by	any	interested	party.	The	problem,	however,	is	that	the	open	science	model	is	not	universally	appropriate	if	it	provides	terrorists	with	a	free	ride	from	open	research	in	pursuit	of	malevolent	goals.”	(Gorman	2006,	p.	58)	With	a	view	to	this	dilemma,	it	is	widely	argued	that,	while	censorship	may	mitigate	one	set	of	problems,	namely	the	potential	misapplication	of	scientific	knowledge	by	‘terrorists’,	 it	 simultaneously	 raises	 another	 set	 of	 problems.	 Specifically,	 familiar	concerns	have	been	voiced	about	governments	“over-classifying	information	to	the	detriment	 of	 much	 needed	 transparency”	 and	 about	 undermining	 the	 pace	 of	scientific	progress	due	to	constraints	on	the	publication	process	(ibid.).		
6.2.2.2	New	dilemmas	Second,	 despite	 this	 familiar	 history,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 life	 sciences,	 questions	related	 to	 the	 classification	 of	 information,	 much	 less	 questions	 related	 to	 the	prevention	of	certain	types	of	life	science	knowledge	from	being	pursued	in	the	first	place	due	to	concerns	about	bioterrorism,	are	relatively	new	(Reppy	2003).		Indeed,	as	 the	 calls	 for	 censorship	 that	 accompanied	 the	 synthetic	 poliovirus	 publication	made	 apparent,	 biosecurity	 concerns	 about	 ‘fundamental	 research’	 in	 the	 life	sciences	 not	 only	 mark	 a	 discursive	 shift	 in	 the	 dominant	 biosecurity	 frame	(traditionally	focused	on	restricting	access	to	tangible	artifacts),	but	also	a	possible	movement	 towards	 more	 ‘draconian	 controls’	 that	 could,	 in	 “the	 worst	 of	 all	possible	worlds”,	both	“damage	legitimate	research	and	have	no	significant	effect	on	security”	 (McLeish	and	Nightingale	2007,	 p.	 1646).	Whether	 concerns	of	 this	 kind	are	 warranted,	 it	 is	 apparent	 that	 questions	 are	 increasingly	 being	 posed	 by	 life	science	 policymakers,	 national	 security	 experts,	 and	 some	 life	 scientists	 (among	others)	 about	 whether	 it	 is	 appropriate	 to	 publish	 life	 science	 research	 that	describes	how	to	construct	or	manipulate	potentially	dangerous	biological	entities.	
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Moreover,	 questions	 are	 being	 posed	 about	 whether	 certain	 research	 projects	should	be	pursued	in	the	first	place	in	light	of	their	‘dual-use	potential’.	With	a	view	to	these	concerns,	life	scientists,	life	science	journal	editors,	and	professional	 bodies	 representing	 these	 groups,	 have	 simultaneously	 been	 called	upon	 (or,	 in	 some	 instances,	 have	 voluntarily	 taken	 up	 the	 call)	 to	 address	 the	perceived	risks	associated	with	their	work;	with	the	added	admonition	that	if	they	do	not,	 then	 federal	 authorities	will,	 and	with	 a	 view	 to	 implementing	biosecurity	controls	 that	 could	 undermine	 long-held	 norms	 of	 scientific	 openness	 and	 limit	scientific	 progress	 (Atlas	 2003;	 Check	 2003;	 Rappert	 2003;	 Vastag	 2003).	 The	challenge	now,	as	one	commentator	argued	during	a	 recent	 roundtable	discussion	on	“the	dangers	of	keeping	genetic	information	public”,	is	one	of	determining	“what	information	to	oversee,	 limit,	or	even	prevent	and	how	to	do	it”	(Hunger	2008),103	while	minimizing	 the	 “inhibition	of	 critical	biomedical	advances	and	 the	economic	development	of	biotechnology”	(Atlas	and	Dando	2006,	p.	282).		
6.2.2.3	Managing	restraint:	What	information	to	prevent,	and	how	to	do	so?	Although	 the	Fink	Report	 is	 the	most	well	known	proposal	directed	at	preventing	the	 deliberate	 misuse	 of	 life	 science	 knowledge	 –	 popularizing	 the	 concept,	‘experiments	of	concern’	–	it	is	by	no	means	the	only	risk	management	proposal	of	its	 kind;	 nor	 is	 it	 the	most	 restrictive	 (Atlas	 and	 Dando	 2006).	 In	 recent	 years,	 a	variety	of	similar	proposals	have	been	made,	with	synthetic	biology	cited	as	a	field	of	 research	 of	 particular	 ‘dual-use	 concern’	 (NRC	 2011,	 p.	 21).	 These	 include	proposals	made	by	security	experts	in	conjunction	with	life	scientists	(Zilinskas	and	Tucker	 2002),	 science	 journal	 editors	 (Journal	 Editors	 and	 Authors	 Group	 2003;	Campbell	 2006),	 bioethicists	 (Douglas	 and	 Savulescu	 2010),	 biosecurity	 advisory	bodies	(NSABB	2007),	and	security	policy	groups	(Steinbruner	et	al.	2007).	Whereas	some	 of	 these	 proposals	 have	 followed	 the	 Fink	 Committee’s	 example,	 seeking	 to																																																									
103 Hunger, I. (2008). ‘Is the availability of genetic information dangerous?’ Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists. Roundtables discussion, available at: 
http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/roundtables/is-the-availability-genetic-
information-dangerous. 
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restrict	access	to	information	related	to	a	finite	number	of	experiments;	calling	for	life	 scientists	 to	 decide	 when	 dual-use	 risks	 exist,	 others	 seek	 to	 anticipate	 and	prevent	any	experiment	from	being	conducted	that	might	yield	dangerous	biological	products	 or	 information;	 endorsing	 independent	 review	 panels	 and	 external	oversight.	In	each	case,	while	the	Fink	Report	has	in	many	ways	set	a	precedent	for	others	 to	 follow,	 in	 no	 small	 part	 because	 it	 has	 helped	 establish	 a	 common	vocabulary	 for	 the	 description	 of	 ‘dual-use	 research	 of	 concern’,	 each	 proposal	represents	 a	 somewhat	 different	 attempt	 at	 defining	 intangible	 ‘risk	 objects’	 and	developing	ideal	frames	for	their	management	(Power	2007).		In	 Table	 2,	 I	 outline	 a	 range	 of	 risk	 management	 proposals	 of	 this	 kind.	Although	a	non-exhaustive	list,	these	proposals,	I	suggest,	are	illustrative	of	ongoing	efforts	 to	 develop	 governance	 mechanisms	 that	 seek	 to	 address	 the	 ‘problem’	 of	‘dual-use	 research’,	 each	 of	 which	 relates	 (more	 or	 less	 directly)	 to	 synthetic	biology.	For	each	proposal,	which	I	have	listed	chronologically	in	Table	2,	I	indicate	the	source	of	the	proposal	(column	1),	provide	a	summary	(column	2),	identify	the	specific	 objects	 of	 intervention	 (or	 ‘risk	 objects’)	 (column	 3),	 and	 present	 the	various	risk	management	actions	that	are	advised	under	the	proposal	(column	4).	In	the	following,	drawing	on	these	proposals	as	examples,	I	will	consider	the	manner	in	which	each	is	designed	to	offer	a	rationalized	risk	management	strategy	capable	of	balancing	‘risks’	against	‘benefits’;	demands	for	‘scientific	progress’	against	demands	for	‘national	security’.	I	will	then	follow	this	analysis	by	way	of	an	example	of	how	a	recent	 controversy	 related	 to	 the	 censorship	 of	 ‘dual-use	 research’	 has	motivated	new	 federal	 policy	 that	 combines	 elements	 of	 these	 proposals	 under	 a	 single	 risk	management	strategy.	This	development,	I	suggest,	marks	a	significant	step	towards	the	 ‘institutionalization’	 and	 ‘standardization’	 of	 biosecurity	 controls	 that	 target	intangible	 life	 science	 knowledge.	 Finally,	 in	 the	 last	 section	 of	 this	 chapter,	 I	will	offer	 a	 more	 general	 critique,	 advanced	 largely	 by	 social	 scientists	 and	 gaining	growing	support	among	biological	weapons	experts	who	have	begun	to	increasingly	challenge	the	appropriateness	of	a	‘command	and	control’	approach	to	biosecurity,	concerned	less	with	the	content	of	each	proposal	and	more	with	their	common	view	of	risk	management	under	the	classical	biosecurity	model.	
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Table 2: Range of risk management proposals directed at controlling the production and 
dissemination of ‘potentially dangerous’ life science knowledge. 
Source Risk management 
proposal 
Objects of 
intervention  
Risk management 
actions 
Zilinskas and 
Tucker (2002) 
Limiting the 
Contribution of 
the Open 
Scientific 
Literature to the 
BW Threat 
Restrict dissemination 
of research results that 
concern a Select Agent 
and one of six 
‘weaponization 
criteria’; primary 
responsibility should 
rest with funding 
agency and journal 
editors  
Research findings that 
might be directly 
relevant to military or 
‘terrorist’ use of 
pathogens or toxins 
Identify ‘restricted’ 
research project; 
restrict dissemination 
of ‘sensitive’ portions 
of published paper; 
access to restricted 
material controlled by 
journal editor in 
cooperation with 
funding agency 
NRC (2004) 
Biotechnology 
research in an 
age of terrorism 
(‘Fink Report’) 
 
Enhance oversight and 
review of seven 
‘experiments of 
concern’; primary 
responsibility should 
rest with life scientists 
 Experiments that might 
be used to enhance 
microbial threats 
Identify dual-use 
research of concern; 
modify research; 
discontinue research; 
limit communication 
of research results 
NSABB (2007) 
Proposed 
framework for 
the oversight of 
dual-use life 
sciences 
research 
Enhance oversight and 
review of experiments 
that might yield one of 
seven categories of 
dangerous research 
products; primary 
responsibility should 
rest with life scientists 
Experiments that might 
yield research products 
that could be directly 
misapplied to threaten 
public health or 
national security 
Identify dual-use 
research of concern; 
modify research, 
discontinue research; 
limit communication 
of research results 
Steinbruner et 
al. (2007) 
Controlling 
dangerous 
pathogens: A 
prototype 
protective 
oversight system 
Implement a tiered 
system of controls on 
potential research, 
matching degree of risk 
with information 
disclosure and review 
requirements; primary 
responsibility should 
rest with ‘independent’ 
review bodies  
Experiments that might 
yield dangerous 
pathogens, where a 
potential pathogen’s 
risk is measured as a 
function of its 
anticipated virulence 
and transmissibility (a 
measure of its ‘intrinsic 
danger’) 
Consider extended 
implications of 
knowledge to be 
generated; classify 
according to three 
levels of concern; 
forego research 
project; limit 
communication of 
research results 
Douglas and 
Savulescu 
(2010)  
Synthetic 
biology and the 
ethics of 
knowledge 
 
 
Develop principles for 
determining when it is 
ethical to produce 
and/or disseminate 
dangerous scientific 
knowledge (‘ethics of 
knowledge’); primary 
responsibility should 
rest with bioethicists 
Knowledge generated 
by synthetic biology 
that might be 
deliberately misused, 
especially knowledge 
related to the synthesis 
of ‘novel entities’, for 
example, vaccine-
resistant smallpox 
Do not pursue or 
disseminate scientific 
knowledge when risks 
of misuse are 
sufficiently high so as 
to be ‘ethically 
problematic’; select 
‘appropriate’ risk 
reduction strategies  
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	Before	 proceeding	 with	 my	 analysis	 and	 comparison	 of	 the	 risk	 management	proposals	outlined	in	Table	2,	several	general	observations	can	be	made	about	these	proposals.	 First,	 in	 addition	 to	 ascribing	 to	 the	 underlying	 logics	 of	 the	 ‘classical’	biosecurity	model,	the	proposals	outlined	in	Table	2	share	a	further	characteristic	in	common,	 which	 I	 have	 alluded	 to	 already.	 Namely,	 they	 each	 address	 aspects	 of	biotechnology	that	are	‘intangible’.	In	other	words,	the	‘objects’	they	are	intended	to	control	 are	 not	 biological	 entities	 such	 as	 pathogens	 or	 DNA.	 They	 are	 not	 even	types	 of	 laboratory	 equipment	 or	 reagents	 that	 might	 be	 applied	 (more	 or	 less	directly)	 to	 the	 production	 of	 such	 entities.	 Rather,	 these	 objects	 are	 more	ephemeral	 types	 of	 things,	 ranging	 from	 information	 transmitted	 in	 research	protocols	 to	 ideas	 for	 experiments.	 Therefore,	 these	 biosecurity	 controls	 can	 be	thought	 of	 as	 acting	 upon	 objects	 that	 exist	 ‘upstream’	 of	 the	 tangible	biotechnologies	 discussed	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 previous	 family	 of	 controls.	 In	 other	words,	 they	 act	 upon	 objects	 that	 could	 yield	 ‘downstream’	 products,	 such	 as	synthetic	genes	or	genetically	modified	organisms,	if	the	corresponding	information	were	 produced,	 disseminated	 and	 applied	 to	 various	 applications	 by	 experienced	scientists.	At	the	same	time,	this	relative	lack	of	materiality	does	not	mean,	I	suggest,	that	 the	 objects	 in	 question	 are	 any	 less	 ‘real’	 than	 the	 tangible	 biotechnologies	discussed	previously;	much	 less	 the	biosecurity	 interventions	proposed	 to	 control	them.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 the	 very	 act	 of	 designing	 and	 producing	 new	 ideas,	descriptions,	 and	 categories	 directed	 at	 organizing	 and	 managing	 intangible	 life	science	 knowledge	 equally	 constitutes	 a	 practice.	 As	 Hacking	 (2002,	 p.	 166)	observes:	as	“new	modes	of	description	come	into	being,	new	possibilities	for	action	come	 into	 being	 in	 consequence.”	 Therefore,	 these	 objects,	 and	 the	 biosecurity	interventions	 proposed	 to	 control	 them,	 are	 every	 bit	 as	 significant	 (and,	 indeed,	‘real’)	in	relation	to	how	synthetic	biology	can	be	governed.	Second,	while	the	proposals	outlined	 in	Table	2	are	directed	at	similar	 ‘risk	objects’,	these	objects	are	not	identical.	Rather,	the	specific	objects	these	proposals	are	 designed	 to	 control	 can	 be	 divided	 into	 at	 least	 three	 distinct,	 yet	 related,	categories,	 which	 correspond	 with	 different	 ‘phases’	 of	 life	 science	 knowledge	
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production	and	dissemination.	Listed	from	the	furthest	‘downstream’	to	the	furthest	‘upstream’,	these	are:	types	of	research	findings	(Zilinskas	and	Tucker	2002),	types	of	 experiments	 (NRC	 2004;	 NSABB	 2007;	 Steinbruner	 et	 al.	 2007),	 and	 types	 of	knowledge	 (Douglas	 and	 Savulescu	 2010).	 Although	 these	 categories	 are	 not	 as	sharply	 defined	 as	 I	 present	 them	 here,	 and	 some	 of	 the	 proposals	 in	 Table	 2	address	 more	 than	 one	 phase	 of	 life	 science	 knowledge	 production	 and	dissemination,	these	groupings	can	usefully	enable	a	comparative	analysis.	A	closer	look	at	how	each	of	 these	objects	 is	conceived	as	potentially	dangerous	within	the	context	 of	 each	 proposal	 (or	 set	 of	 related	 proposals),	 and	 the	 risk	 management	actions	 (column	 4)	 proposed	 to	 address	 these	 potential	 dangers,	 offers	 deeper	insight	into	how	experts	produce	“visions	of	‘risk’	manageability”	(Power	2007,	p.	6)	through	the	design	of	risk	management	strategies,	and	how	these	strategies	might	affect	the	communication	of	life	science	knowledge	in	synthetic	biology.			 Finally,	it	should	also	be	underlined	that	the	proposals	outlined	in	Table	2	are	the	product	of	multiple	groups	of	experts	engaged	 in	aspects	of	biosecurity	policy.	Characteristic	of	‘biosecurity	policy’,	which	has	been	described	as	involving	diverse	“ecologies	of	experts	and	organizations”	(Lakoff	and	Collier	2008,	p.	9),	the	various	contributors	to	these	proposals	represent	multiple	institutions,	academic	disciplines	and	 scientific	 specialties.	With	 a	 view	 to	 this	 broad	 spectrum	of	 policy	 actors	 and	organizations,	 it	 can	 also	 be	 said	 that	 biosecurity	 policy	 is	 characteristic	 of	‘regulatory	science’	more	generally.	As	Irwin	et	al.	(1997,	p.	19)	suggest,	regulatory	science	 is	 frequently	 “very	 heterogeneous	 in	 character	 –	 in	 institutional,	geographical	 and	 specialty	 terms.”	At	 the	 same	 time,	 beyond	 the	 institutional	 and	cultural	 differences	 that	 exist	 between	 these	 groups	 (which	 contributes	 to	disagreements	at	 the	 level	of	what	constitutes	 ‘good’	or	 ‘better’	biosecurity	policy)	what	 binds	 these	 groups	 together,	 I	 would	 suggest,	 is	 that	 each	 views	 ‘dual-use	research’	as	a	first-order	‘thing’	that	can	be	known	and	made	the	subject	of	specific	forms	of	regulation.	The	following	analysis,	in	turn,	attends	to	these	proposals	in	an	attempt	to	shed	light	on	their	points	of	agreement	and	disagreement,	as	well	 their	justifications	for	what	constitutes	‘good’	or	‘better’	biosecurity	policy.			
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To	 begin,	 the	 furthest	 ‘downstream’	 risk	 management	 proposals	 directed	 at	restricting	 access	 to	 life	 science	 knowledge	 concern	 restrictions	 on	 the	dissemination	of	certain	types	of	information	that	could	be	transmitted	through	the	publication	 of	 research	 findings.	 These	 concerns,	 as	 I	 have	 suggested,	 have	 been	linked	 with	 several	 articles	 that	 have	 described	 synthetic	 biology	 experiments,	which	 some	 fear	may	 provide	 a	 ‘blueprint’	 or	 ‘recipe’	 for	 bioterrorism,	 as	well	 as	with	 broader	 concerns	 about	 the	 open	 publication	 of	 sequence	 information.	Zilinskas	and	Tucker’s	(2002)104	proposal,	which	relays	the	findings	of	a	workshop	organized	by	the	US-based	Center	for	Nonproliferation	Studies	and	supported	by	the	US	Defense	Threat	Reduction	Agency,	is	illustrative	of	biosecurity	proposals	of	this	kind.	 “The	workshop”,	according	to	Zilinskas	and	Tucker	(ibid.),	 “brought	 together	two	groups	of	professionals	who	usually	do	not	communicate,	the	first	consisting	of	scientists,	 journal	 editors,	 and	grant	 administrators	 and	 the	 second	of	 intelligence	and	security	experts”.	The	scope	of	the	workshop,	Zilinskas	and	Tucker	(ibid.)	note,	was	 to	address	 “possible	approaches	 to	minimize	 the	 risk	 that	 ‘sensitive’	 research	findings	could	be	misused	for	biological	warfare	(BW)	or	terrorism.”		According	 to	Zilinskas	and	Tucker	 (2002,	 emphasis	 added),	 although	 “[t]he	two	 groups	 of	 professionals	 –	 scientists	 and	 security	 experts	 –	 could	 not	 reach	 a	consensus	 on	 how	 sensitive	 information	 from	 scientific	 research	 should	 be	handled”,	most	 agreed	 that	 restrictions	on	 the	publication	of	dual-use	 research	 (if	any)	 should	 be	 limited	 to	 a	 “small	 proportion	 of	 findings	 directly	 relevant	 to	 the	military	 or	 terrorist	 use	 of	 pathogens	 and	 toxins”	 –	 described	 elsewhere	 as	“‘forbidden	 knowledge’”	 (Atlas	 and	 Dando	 2006,	 p.	 282)	 –	 in	 the	 interest	 of	safeguarding	 norms	 of	 “scientific	 freedom”	 and	 enabling	 “scientific	 enterprise”	(Zilinskas	 and	 Tucker	 2002).	 Based	 on	 these	 considerations,	 and	 with	 a	 view	 to	NSDD-189	and	the	existing	Select	Agent	Regulations,	workshop	participants	agreed	to	 a	 tentative	 risk	 management	 proposal	 that	 qualifies	 “restricted	 research”	 as	research	 involving	 both	 a	 “Select	 Agent”	 and	 one	 of	 six	 “weaponization	 criteria”.	Select	 Agents,	 as	 I	 have	 discussed	 previously,	 include	 approximately	 80																																																									
104 See Zilinskas, R.A. and Tucker, J.B. (2002). Limiting the Contribution of the Scientific 
Literature to the BW Threat, available at: http://cns.miis.edu/stories/021216a.htm. 
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microorganisms	and	toxins	that	have	been	deemed	especially	suitable	to	biological	weapons	development	by	the	US	Department	of	Health	and	Human	Services	and	the	US	Department	of	Agriculture.	The	 ‘weaponization	 criteria’,	which	 are	 a	 recurrent	feature	of	the	proposals	outlined	in	Table	2	(varying	subtly	in	number	and	framing),	concern	modifications	to	pathogens	that	could	enhance	their	effectiveness	for	use	as	weapons,	such	as	increasing	their	infectivity,	pathogenicity	or	antibiotic	resistance.	Based	on	this	conceptual	framework,	the	risk	management	actions	proposed	call	for	life	science	journal	editors,	in	cooperation	with	federal	funding	agencies,	to	identify	manuscripts	containing	information	of	this	kind	with	a	view	to	restricting	access	to	“sensitive	portions”	of	the	research	prior	to	publication.		What	 is	 significant	 about	 the	 design	 of	 this	 proposal,	 I	 suggest,	 is	 that	 it	effectively	 subsumes	 new	 concerns	 about	 dual-use	 information	 under	 the	 Select	Agent	Regulations	–	an	existing	regulatory	framework	designed	to	restrict	access	to	a	 limited	 number	 of	 physical	 pathogens	 –	 shifting	 the	 biosecurity	 frame	 from	tangible	biotechnology	towards	intangible	life	science	knowledge.	At	the	same	time,	these	concerns	are	organized	around	a	finite	number	of	‘weaponization	criteria’	that	can	be	unambiguously	defined,	 listed	and	reproduced,	providing	a	standard	metric	for	the	purposes	of	risk	management.	In	other	words,	while	one	might	imagine	a	far	longer	 list	 of	 ‘weaponization	 criteria’	 (it	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 “microbiology	 is	just	one	part	of	research	that	could	be	abused”,	Campbell	2006,	p.	S20)	and	choose	to	 align	 these	 criteria	 with	 any	 number	 of	 dangerous	 pathogens	 (not	 just	 Select	Agents),	workshop	participants	opted	for	a	 far	narrower	definition	of	what	should	count	 as	 ‘dual-use	 research’,	 endorsing	 a	 risk	 management	 strategy	 that	 is	 in	keeping	with	 institutional	 and	 regulatory	norms.	 In	 this	manner,	 the	 rationale	 for	this	 proposal,	 I	 suggest,	 can	 be	 traced	 to	 its	 practical	 capacity	 to	 organize	 and	“delineate	 a	 conceptual	 framework	 for	 presenting	 and	 describing	 choice	 and	decision”	(Power	2007,	p.	185).	It	is,	in	other	words,	a	further	instance	of	‘pragmatic	policymaking’	 (introduced	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter);	 one	 that	 attempts	 to	 balance	demands	 for	security	against	 ‘administrative’	or	 ‘managerial’	 conditions	 that	 favor	standardization	and	the	fulfillment	of	the	risk	management	process.				
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Equally	 significant	 is	 the	manner	 in	which	 this	proposal	 (and,	 indeed,	 each	proposal	 in	Table	2)	 effectively	 combines	 a	plurality	of	 (opposing)	 views	on	what	should	 count	 as	 ‘dual-use	 research’	 and	 presents	 a	 singular	 risk	 management	strategy;	in	this	case	assigning	responsibility	for	risk	management	to	science	journal	editors,	on	the	one	hand,	and	federal	funding	agencies,	on	the	other.	Touched	on	by	Zilinskas	 and	 Tucker	 (2002)	 in	 their	 synopsis	 of	 the	 workshop	 proceedings,	referencing	 the	 difficulties	 encountered	 by	 the	 “two	 groups	 of	 professionals	 who	usually	do	not	communicate”	in	reaching	a	‘consensus’	on	the	subject	of	censorship,	it	is	widely	argued	that	scientists	and	security	experts	hold	very	different	views,	not	only	 on	 the	 technical	 feasibility,	 but	 also	 on	 the	 desirability	 of	 censoring	‘fundamental	 research’.	 While	 scientists	 tend	 to	 call	 for	 greater	 openness	 in	scientific	 communication,	 security	 experts,	 it	 is	 suggested,	 tend	 to	 call	 for	 greater	caution	(Vastag	2003;	Selgelid	2007).	Each	‘community’	–	“the	security	community”	and	 the	 “academic	research	community”	 (Reppy	2003,	p.	46)	–	 is	also	skeptical	of	the	 other’s	 contribution	 to	 the	 risk	management	process,	 both	 in	 relation	 to	 their	perceived	competencies	and	their	professional	interests	(ibid.).		For	 their	 part,	 scientists	 argue	 that	 security	 experts	 and	 government	authorities	 lack	an	appreciation	 for	how	science	 is	 conducted,	and	 thus	 “scientists	cannot	 rely	 on	 the	 government	 to	 define	 the	 standards	 and	 to	 establish	 the	 right	framework	for	conducting	science”	(Atlas	2003,	p.	16).	For	example,	they	argue	that	research	projects,	which	tend	to	be	represented	as	‘discoveries’	by	security	experts	and	public	officials,	really	represent	incremental	contributions	to	the	advancement	of	 scientific	 knowledge,	 and	 are	 thus	 not	 singularly	 dangerous	 (Vastag	 2003;	Campbell	 2006).	 Moreover,	 as	 publication	 represents	 only	 one	 mode	 of	communication	 used	 by	 scientists	 (others	 include	 informal	 meetings,	 academic	conferences,	and	email),	 they	argue	that	censoring	published	results	alone	may	be	misguided	 (Campbell	 2006).	 More	 generally,	 it	 is	 argued	 that	 censorship	“contravenes	a	fundamental	principle	of	published	science	–	that	it	be	both	open	and	replicable”	 (ibid,	 p.	 S21).	 In	 other	 words,	 censorship	 is	 perceived	 to	 not	 only	 go	against	 scientific	 norms,	 but	 also	 to	 infringe	 upon	 the	 primary	 means	 whereby	scientists	are	permitted	to	scrutinize	colleagues’	work	and	to	refute	or	revise	their	
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research	protocols	or	results	(Atlas	2003;	Campbell	2006).	As	Ronald	Atlas	(2005a,	p.	 21),	 former	 chair	 of	 the	 American	 Society	 for	 Microbiology,	 succinctly	 states:	“censorship	could	fundamentally	change	the	very	definition	of	science”.		For	their	part,	security	experts	(among	others,	for	example,	ETC	Group	2007;	Selgelid	 2007;	 Maurer	 2011)	 have	 questioned	 the	 appropriateness	 of	 making	scientists	 (including	science	 journal	editors)	 “the	guardians	of	 sensitive	materials”	(Zilinskas	and	Tucker	2002).	They	question	not	only	the	competency	of	scientists	to	engage	 in	 aspects	 of	 security,	 a	 ‘field’	 characterized	 by	 its	 own	 claims	 to	authoritative	 knowledge	 and	know-how	 (Bigo	2006),	 but	 also	 their	willingness	 to	limit	 aspects	 of	 life	 science	 knowledge	 production	 or	 dissemination.	 For	 example,	according	to	one	virologist	and	chemical	and	biological	weapons	expert	at	Harvard	University,	 commenting	 on	 possible	 approaches	 to	 restricting	 the	 publication	 of	various	 types	 of	 sequence	 information:	 “The	 concept	 that	 there	 might	 be	 some	information	not	worth	 knowing	 is	 anathema	 to	 scientists”	 (Kuhn	2008),105	 calling	into	question	the	willingness	of	scientists	 to	make	security	 judgments	of	 this	kind.	Others	have	similarly	argued	that	censorship	is	“antithetical	to	the	scientific	spirit”	(Enserink	and	Malakoff	2012,	p.	22),	which	values	“both	freedom	of	inquiry	and	the	free	sharing	of	information”	(Selgelid	2007,	p.	36),	and	that	the	concept	of	“sensitive	information”	 is	 fundamentally	at	odds	with	a	 life	 science	culture	 that	assumes	 “an	inherent	right	to	know”	(Harris	and	Steinbruner	2005,	p.	1).	Moreover,	as	publishing	tends	 to	 be	 closely	 tied	 to	 career	 development,	 some	 question	 to	 what	 extent	scientists	 would	 be	 willing	 to	 place	 restrictions	 on	 their	 own	 research	 (Nexon	2011).	 In	 brief,	 while	 norms	 of	 scientific	 openness	 and	 scientific	 autonomy	 are	perceived	to	be	essential	to	science	and	scientific	progress,	they	are	perceived	to	be	problematic	 in	 relation	 to	 security,	 thus	 generating	 “a	 sharp	 dilemma	 and	 a	fundamental	problem	of	policy”	(Harris	and	Steinbruner	2005,	p.	1).	
																																																								
105 Kuhn, J.H. (2008). ‘Is the availability of genetic information dangerous?’ Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists. Roundtables discussion, available at: 
http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/roundtables/is-the-availability-genetic-
information-dangerous. 
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Taken	 together,	 what	 these	 points	 of	 disagreement	 or	 conflict	 suggest	 is	 a	more	 complex	 picture	 of	 ‘consensus	 building’	 (Stirling	 2010)	 than	 the	 formal	proposal	 introduced	 above	 might	 suggest.	 In	 this	 case,	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 each	proposal	 in	Table	2,	 there	exist	points	of	disagreement	between	experts	about	 the	nature	of	the	risks	in	question,	and	about	who	should	ultimately	be	responsible	for	guiding	 the	 risk	 management	 process.	 Yet,	 what	 is	 perhaps	 most	 remarkable,	 I	suggest,	 is	 not	 so	 much	 that	 there	 exist	 disagreements	 between	 experts	 (this	 is	hardly	 uncommon	 in	 relation	 to	 policy	 discussions	 concerning	 emerging	 fields	 of	science	 and	 technology),	 but	 rather	 that	 despite	 these	 disagreements	 two	 very	different	 groups	 of	 experts	 are	 broadly	 united	 in	 their	 belief	 that	 biosecurity	controls	of	this	kind	are	both	necessary	and	possible.	Although	in	part	this	might	be	explained	 by	 the	 very	 nature	 of	 expert	 advice,	 which	 is	 “usually	 presented	 in	aggregated	 and	 consensual	 form”	 (Stirling	 2010,	 p.	 1030),	 it	 also	 suggests	 a	willingness	 on	 behalf	 of	 scientific	 and	 technical	 experts	 to	 reach	 agreement	 on	issues	 that	challenge	 their	 individual	values	 in	pursuit	of	a	secure	and	sustainable	‘scientific	 enterprise’	 (Zilinskas	 and	Tucker’s	 2002).	 This	 shared	belief,	 or	 at	 least	willingness	to	compromise,	I	suggest,	is	significant	in	as	much	as	it	organizes	diverse	experts	 around	 a	 common	 goal,	 motivating	 the	 design	 and	 production	 of	 risk	management	proposals	(however	tentative	or	loosely	agreed	they	may	be)	that	are	presently	 defining	 a	 new	 constellation	 of	 biosecurity	 interventions	 directed	 at	controlling	the	dissemination	and	production	of	life	science	knowledge.			The	next	furthest	‘downstream’	set	of	risk	management	proposals	outlined	in	Table	2	address	the	question	of	whether	some	kinds	of	research	should	be	pursued	in	the	first	place	in	light	of	its	‘dual-use	potential’.	Although	the	authors	of	these	proposals	may	 equally	 be	 concerned	 about	 the	 dissemination	 of	 potentially	 dangerous	information,	they	are,	in	the	first	instance,	concerned	about	its	production.	In	other	words,	 these	proposals	are	primarily	directed	at	preventing	potentially	dangerous	research	from	being	conducted,	or	modifying	aspects	of	a	research	project	prior	to	an	experiment,	with	a	view	to	precluding	the	need	for	future	censorship	of	research	findings.	 As	 Stephen	 M.	 Maurer,	 Associate	 Professor	 of	 Public	 Policy	 at	 Berkeley	
	 217	
University,	 reasons	 in	 relation	 to	 this	 approach	 to	 risk	 management:	 “Unlike	censorship,	 this	 strategy	 can	do	 little	 to	 suppress	unexpected	 results.	At	 the	 same	time,	 it	has	the	practical	advantage	that	a	blocked	experiment	produces	no	results	and	is	therefore	far	easier	to	suppress”	(Maurer	2011,	p.	1412).	For	 the	 authors	 of	 these	 proposals,	 this	 approach	 to	 risk	 management	 is	desirable	in	as	much	as	it	requires	that	scientists,	as	well	as	federal	funding	agencies	and	other	governmental	actors	and	organizations	engaged	in	aspects	of	biosecurity	policy,	address	biosecurity	concerns	 from	the	outset	of	 the	research	process	 (NRC	2004;	NSABB	2007;	Steinbruner	et	al.	2007),	avoiding	not	only	the	(‘primary’)	risks	that	 might	 be	 enabled	 by	 the	 research	 project	 itself,	 but	 also	 the	 ‘downstream’	challenges,	 controversies	 and	 reputational	 (‘secondary’)	 risks	 (Power	 et	 al.	 2009)	associated	with	censoring	or	classifying	‘sensitive’	research	findings	once	they	have	been	produced	 (Enserink	and	Malakoff	2012).	Yet,	 as	one	might	 imagine,	 and	as	 I	will	discuss	in	further	detail	below,	this	approach	to	risk	management	nonetheless	presents	 its	 own	 challenges	 and	 dilemmas.	 Specifically,	 it	 can	 be	 interpreted	 as	producing	a	more	pronounced	tension	between	scientific	freedom,	on	the	one	hand,	and	national	security,	on	the	other.	In	Table	2,	I	outline	three	biosecurity	proposals	of	 this	 kind,	 with	 the	 first	 two	 proposals	 (NRC	 2004;	 NSABB	 2007)	 sharing	considerably	more	in	common	than	the	third	(Steinbruner	et	al.	2007).		In	the	case	of	the	first	two	proposals,	the	Fink	Committee	and	the	NSABB	(a	biosecurity	advisory	body	 to	 the	US	government,	which	was	recommended	by	 the	Fink	Committee	 in	2004)	call	 for	enhanced	oversight	and	review	of	seven	types	of	experiments	–	 ‘experiments	of	concern’	–	that	might	enhance	pathogens	for	use	as	weapons,	all	of	which	(theoretically)	apply	to	synthetic	biology.	These	experiments	capture	 the	 same	 ‘weaponization	 criteria’	 introduced	 above,	 but	 are	 not	 strictly	limited	to	experiments	involving	Select	Agents,	and	therefore	apply	to	a	larger	field	of	 potential	 research	 activities.	 For	 some	 (Steinbruner	 et	 al.	 2007),	 the	 broader	scope	 of	 both	 proposals	 is	 perceived	 to	 be	 impractical,	 and	possibly	 disruptive	 to	science,	 as	 they	 not	 only	 “capture	 a	wide	 swath	 of	 research”,	 but	 they	 also	 fail	 to	discriminate	between	the	relative	risks	of	individual	research	projects	(ibid,	p.	13).	For	example,	two	experiments,	both	employing	the	same	research	techniques,	might	
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be	categorized	as	equally	dangerous	under	both	proposals,	even	though	one	might	involve	 a	 Select	Agent	 and	 the	 other	 a	 non-Select	Agent.	 In	 other	words,	 the	 Fink	Committee’s	 and	 the	 NSABB’s	 criteria,	 which	 “focus	 exclusively	 on	 research	activities,	 rather	 than	 a	 combination	 of	 agents	 and	 activities”,	 could	 result	 in	unwarranted	or	excessive	constraints	on	research	(ibid.).	This	objection,	in	essence,	appeals	to	the	perceived	strengths	of	the	previous	risk	management	option,	which	presents	a	narrower	definition	of	 ‘dual-use	research’,	organizing	risk	management	efforts	around	a	more	discrete	set	of	information	requirements,	thereby	providing	a	stable	reference	point	for	the	purposes	of	risk	management	decision-making.		Irrespective	of	the	specificity	of	the	Fink	Committee’s	criteria	(subsequently	reproduced	and	subtly	adapted	by	the	NSABB),106	the	very	invention	of	the	concept,	‘experiments	 of	 concern’	 (as	well	 as,	 ‘dual-use	 research	of	 concern’,	 an	 equivalent	concept	 popularized	 by	 the	 Fink	 Committee),	 I	 suggest,	 is	 perhaps	 the	 most	significant	aspect	of	this	proposal,	as	well	as	the	aspect	that	has	been	most	widely	adopted	as	a	category	of	understanding	and	descriptor	for	problematic	research	in	an	age	of	bioterrorism.	To	describe	this	concept	as	an	 ‘invention’	 is	not	 to	suggest	that	 seven	 types	of	experiments	only	 recently	came	 into	being,	or	even	 to	 suggest	that	these	research	activities	have	only	recently	come	to	be	viewed	as	problematic.	On	the	contrary,	one	can	hardly	argue	that	prior	to	the	Fink	Report	experiments	of	this	 kind	 did	 not	 exist;	 or	 that	 there	 was	 not	 a	 degree	 of	 awareness	 about	 their	potential	 risks.	Rather,	 in	 this	 context,	 to	 speak	of	 ‘invention’	 is	 to	 suggest	 that	 in	introducing	 the	 concept,	 ‘experiments	 of	 concern’,	 the	 Fink	 Committee	 effectively	mobilized	 and	 focused	 concerns	 related	 to	 a	 disparate	 set	 of	 research	 activities,																																																									
106 The NSABB’s seven categories of ‘dual-use research’ specifically refer to 
“descriptors of information, products, or technologies” (NSABB 2007, p. 18) that might 
be considered dual-use research if the corresponding pathogen or pathogenic properties 
were produced, whereas the Fink Committee’s categories refer to ‘experiments’ or 
‘experimental techniques’. In other words, the NSABB has chosen to modify the Fink 
Committee’s original categories to reflect research products as opposed to research 
processes; yet with a view to the same fundamental aim, namely, vetting experiments 
before they are conducted or before they are published. Thus, this discrepancy between 
the two reports, although noted as a significant modification by the NSABB (ibid, pp. 17-
18) – “the NSABB categories have a different purpose and meaning from those of the 
NRC report” – in fact makes little substantive difference. 
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organizing	 them	 around	 a	 new	 set	 of	 problems	 associated	with	 bioterrorism,	 and	linking	 them	 with	 the	 contemporary	 practice	 of	 biosecurity.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	concept,	‘experiments	of	concern’	(as	well	as	‘dual-use	research	of	concern’),	has	to	a	 large	 degree	 enabled	 these	 research	 activities	 to	 be	 understood	 as	 ‘biosecurity	risks’,	 which	 can	 and	 (according	 to	 the	 Fink	 Committee,	 the	 NSABB,	 and	 many	others)	should	be	assessed	and	managed.	Once	again,	to	draw	on	Hacking’s	(2002)	conceptual	understanding	of	 ‘risk’	as	a	performative	category	or	label,	risks	of	this	kind	–	‘experiments	of	concern’	or	‘dual-use	research	of	concern’	–	effectively	came	into	being	hand-in-hand	with	their	naming	and	classification.	Both	 proposals	 also	 agree	 that	 life	 scientists	 should	 take	 primary	responsibility	for	identifying	cases	of	dual-use	research,	and,	in	the	event	that	dual-use	 research	 is	 identified,	 that	 they	 should	 be	 responsible	 for	 implementing	‘appropriate’	 risk	 management	 actions.	 Yet,	 the	 NSABB	 builds	 upon	 the	 Fink	Committee’s	earlier	recommendations,	specifying	a	sequence	of	actions	and	a	set	of	risk	management	protocols	for	scientists	and	research	institutions	to	follow.	In	the	first	 instance,	 they	 suggest	 that	 it	 should	 be	 the	 responsibility	 of	 the	 principal	investigator	 (PI)	 to	 address	 possible	 dual-use	 risks	 that	 might	 arise	 from	 their	research;	in	the	second	instance,	the	institutional	biosafety	committee	(IBC)	where	the	 research	 is	 being	 conducted;	 and,	 in	 the	 third	 instance,	 the	 NSABB	 or	 other	“federal	government	entities”	(NSABB	2007,	p.	ii).	Details	on	how	risk	assessments	should	 be	 conducted	 are	 also	 elaborated	 in	 the	 NSABB’s	 report.	 Provided	 in	Appendix	4,	 “Points	To	Consider	 in	Risk	Assessment	and	Management	of	Research	That	 is	 Potentially	 Dual	 Use	 of	 Concern”,	 are	 a	 list	 of	 supporting	 questions	(essentially	 a	 ‘checklist’)	 that	PIs	 and	 IBCs	 (and,	 if	 necessary,	 the	NSABB	or	 other	‘federal	government	entities’)	may	wish	to	consider	in	their	evaluations	of	potential	research	projects,	ultimately	asking:	“Do	the	potential	risks	outweigh	the	potential	benefits?”	 If	 the	answer	 is,	 ‘yes’,	 the	NSABB	proposes	 that	 they	 “consider	whether	the	research	should	be	modified	or	discontinued”	(ibid,	p.	51).			A	 distinctly	 pragmatic	 question,	 having	 significant	 consequences	 for	 the	production	and	dissemination	of	life	science	knowledge,	the	NSABB’s	own	views	on	the	 feasibility	 of	 this	 risk	management	 action	 are	 ambivalent,	 or	 at	 least	 they	 are	
	 220	
ambivalent	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 scientific	 model	 of	 risk	 analysis	 (discussed	 in	 the	previous	 chapter).	 For	 example,	 on	 page	 iii,	 the	 NSABB	 asserts	 that	 institutional	review	of	dual-use	research	should	involve	an	assessment	of	“the	likelihood	that	the	information	might	be	misused	[and]	the	potential	impacts	of	misuse”,	reflecting	the	scientific	model	of	risk	analysis,	which	calls	for	a	‘quantitative	risk	assessment’	that	takes	into	account	the	‘probability’	and	‘consequences’	of	a	potential	‘adverse	event’.	Whereas,	 on	 page	 2,	 the	 NSABB	 claims	 that	 during	 the	 course	 of	 their	 own	deliberations,	“it	was	not	possible	to	quantify	the	risk	of	misuse	of	information	from	that	research	[their	own	seven	‘experiments	of	concern’],	but	there	was	a	consensus	among	 NSABB	 members	 that	 there	 is	 indeed	 the	 potential	 for	 misuse”.	 In	 other	words,	 NSABB	 members	 believe	 there	 exists	 a	 potential	 dual-use	 problem	associated	with	seven	types	of	experiments,	but	one	that	is	 impossible	to	quantify,	while	at	the	same	time	advising	that	scientists	derive	a	binary	answer	(‘yes/no’)	to	a	question	that	does	not	lend	itself	(by	their	own	account)	to	calculation.		Here,	as	I	have	suggested	previously,	is	an	approach	to	risk	management	that,	while	 continuing	 to	 appeal	 to	 the	 vocabulary	 and	 methods	 of	 ‘quantitative	 risk	assessment’,	has	 in	 fact	become	untethered	 from	this	 idealized	scientific	model.	 In	its	place,	as	Power	(2007,	p.	36)	reasons	in	relation	to	the	“managerial	turn”	that	has	come	to	characterize	many	domains	of	contemporary	life	formally	occupied	by	the	“positivism	of	numbers”,	 is	an	approach	to	governing	that	is	more	administrative	–	relying	 on	 the	 “organization	 of	 uncertainty	 in	 the	 form	 of	 frameworks	 which	emphasize	management	process”	 –	 than	 calculative	 (or	 at	 least	 ‘calculative’	 in	 the	narrow	sense	of	 ‘quantitative	risk	assessment’).	Thus,	instead	of	offering	advice	on	how	 to	 conduct	 quantitative	 risk	 assessment	 (guidance	 that	 one	 might	 have	expected	 in	 light	 of	 the	 NSABB’s	 endorsement	 of	 quantitative	 methods)	 what	 is	proposed	 is	 Appendix	 4	 (NSABB	 2007,	 pp.	 51-52)	 –	 a	 ‘structured	 protocol’	 or	‘checklist’	that	PIs,	IBCs,	and,	indeed,	the	NSABB	itself,	are	intended	to	draw	upon	to	determine	what	should	count	as	‘dual-use	research	of	concern’.	In	 keeping	 with	 the	 NSABB	 and	 the	 Fink	 Committee’s	 calls	 for	 limited	external	 oversight,	 and	 once	 again	with	 a	 view	 to	NSDD-189,	 both	 proposals	 also	advocate	 for	 the	 “free	 and	 open	 conduct	 and	 communication	 of	 life	 sciences	
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research”	 and	 emphasize	 that	 “the	 ‘default’	 position	 should	 be	 the	 unfettered	progress	and	communication	of	science”	(NSABB	2007,	p.	7).	However,	while	both	proposals	 speak	 to	 the	 need	 for	 scientific	 openness	 and	 scientific	 autonomy	 (an	observation	 that	 is	not	altogether	 surprising	 in	 light	of	 the	 fact	 that	both	 the	Fink	Committee	 and	 the	 NSABB	 have	 significant	 representation	 from	 life	 science	 and	research	communities,	and	thus	a	strong	interest	in	supporting	scientific	endeavors)	the	 ‘risk	 management	 actions’	 under	 consideration	 are	 no	 less	 problematic	 in	relation	to	the	communication	of	life	science	knowledge.	On	the	contrary,	as	I	have	suggested,	 under	 both	 proposals	what	 is	 at	 stake	 is	 not	 ‘only’	 the	 possibility	 that	research	 findings	 may	 be	 censored	 once	 they	 have	 been	 produced,	 but	 also	 the	possibility	 that	 research	 projects	 may	 be	 modified	 or	 discontinued	 altogether,	effectively	 arresting	 flows	of	 life	 science	 knowledge	production.	This	 represents	 a	distinctly	different	approach	to	biosecurity	than	the	previous	proposal,	which	calls	for	 censorship	 at	 the	 point	 of	 publication	 (Zilinskas	 and	 Tucker	 2002),	 as	biosecurity	interventions	of	this	kind	are	designed	to	exert	their	force	at	the	level	of	the	 research	process	 itself	with	 a	 view	 to	validating	 certain	 research	projects	 and	invalidating	 others	 based	 on	 possible	 experimental	 outcomes	 (outcomes,	 as	 the	NSABB	suggests,	that	are	foreseeable,	but	impossible	to	quantify).	Beyond	 the	 fact	 that	 predicting	 the	 outcome	 of	 an	 experiment	 prior	 to	conducting	the	experiment	is	at	odds	with	the	research	process	in	practice,	which	is	characterized	 as	 much	 by	 chance	 and	 serendipity	 as	 it	 is	 formulaic	 protocols	 (a	subject	I	will	return	to	in	the	final	section	of	this	chapter)	(Kwik	et	al.	2003;	Suk	et	al.	 2011),	 some	 argue	 that	 classifying	 a	 subset	 of	 experiments	 as	 ‘experiments	 of	concern’	 could	 discourage	 promising	 research	 projects	 from	 being	 pursued.	 For	example,	according	to	one	prominent	synthetic	biologist	(Rob	Carlson)	interviewed	for	 my	 research,	 an	 experiment	 that	 aims	 to	 modify	 an	 animal	 pathogen’s	 ‘host-range’	for	the	purposes	of	developing	a	vaccine	for	humans	would	be	qualified	as	an	‘experiment	 of	 concern’	 under	 both	 the	 Fink	 Committee’s	 and	 the	 NSABB’s	proposals,	possibly	acting	as	a	“negative	 incentive”	 for	conducting	the	experiment.	In	other	words,	 it	 is	believed	that	these	risk	management	proposals	could	have	an	unintended	 “chilling	 effect”	 on	 research	 (ibid.).	 Other	 synthetic	 biologists	 (Drew	
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Endy;	Andrew	Hessel)	interviewed	for	my	research	raised	similar	concerns,	not	only	in	 relation	 to	 individual	 experiments,	 but	 also	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 field	 of	 synthetic	biology	 more	 generally.	 These	 concerns	 were	 voiced	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 “negative	expectations”	 that	might	be	generated	by	risk	management	proposals	of	 this	kind,	which	 they	 believe	 could	 “discourage	 investment”	 in	 an	 emerging	 bioeconomy	 or	derail	promising	research	initiatives	“before	they	get	off	the	ground”.			This	approach	to	biosecurity	is	taken	further	in	relation	to	the	third	proposal	of	 this	 kind	 outlined	 in	 Table	 2.	 Steinbruner	 et	 al.	 (2007),	 of	 the Center	 for	International	 and	 Security	 Studies	 at	Maryland,	 propose	 an	 oversight	 system	 that	would	endeavor	to	anticipate	and	prevent	any	research	project	(not	just	seven	types	of	experiments)	 that	might	yield	a	dangerous	pathogen	(not	 just	Select	Agents).	 In	other	words,	a	 finite	number	of	 ‘experiments	of	concern’	 is	effectively	replaced	by	an	unlimited	number	of	‘experiments	that	could	be	of	concern’.	In	this	instance,	the	authors,	 based	on	what	 they	 refer	 to	 as	 “an	 intensive	 effort	by	 a	diverse	group	of	scientists,	 public	 policy	 experts,	 and	 lawyers	 to	 grapple	with	 the	many	 challenges	posed	 by	 advanced	 biotechnology”	 (ibid,	 Acknowledgments),	 present	 different	criteria	for	determining	what	should	count	as	 ‘dual-use	research’.	Specifically,	they	propose	vetting	experiments	according	to	“an	intrinsic	definition	of	danger”	(ibid,	p.	23)	 based	 on	 a	 potential	 pathogen’s	 (that	 is,	 a	 pathogen	 that	might	 result	 from	 a	potential	 experiment)	 virulence	 and	 transmissibility	 (two	 epidemiological	properties	that	they	suggest	can	be	used	to	estimate	the	risks	posed	by	a	potential	pathogen,	and,	by	extension,	the	risks	posed	by	a	potential	experiment).		Significantly,	in	relation	to	the	design	of	this	proposal,	‘an	intrinsic	definition	of	danger’	is	said	to	simplify	the	task	of	risk	assessment.107	Specifically,	it	is	argued	that	 this	 approach	 to	 risk	 assessment	 enables	 a	 potential	 pathogen’s	 risks	 to	 be	assessed	 according	 to	 just	 two	 epidemiological	 properties	 (or	 criteria),	 offering	 a																																																									
107 What the authors do not acknowledge is that, given that their proposal effectively 
applies to an open-ended range of research activities, the task of risk assessment would 
presumably be significantly more complicated than they suggest. That Steinbruner et al. 
(2007) do not acknowledge this is ironic given that this ‘open-endedness’ is precisely 
what the authors object to in relation to the Fink Committee’s and the NSABB’s 
proposals, which they view as too broad (see above). 
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“basic	 conceptualization	of	danger”	 (ibid.),	permitting	experiments	 to	be	validated	or	invalidated	with	relative	ease.	Yet,	this	relative	simplicity	is	also	said	to	come	at	the	expense	of	empirical	precision.	According	to	the	authors,	“any	disease	outbreak	is	also	affected	by	environmental	circumstances,	public	health	measures,	individual	immune	system	reactions	and	 therapeutic	 treatment”,	but,	 “for	a	given	set	of	 such	conditions	pathogens	clearly	vary	in	terms	of	transmissibility	and	virulence”	(ibid.).	In	 other	words,	 the	 authors	 point	 to	 the	more	 complex	 social	 and	 environmental	‘context’	that	contributes	to	disease	transmission	and	helps	determine	the	course	of	a	 disease	 outbreak,	 yet	 consciously	 choose	 to	 ignore	 this	 context	 in	 favor	 of	 ‘an	intrinsic	 definition	 of	 danger’.	 This	 choice,	 once	 again,	 underlines	 that	 risk	assessments	are	not	only	 intended	to	be	reasonably	precise	(representative	of	 the	‘actual’	risks),	but	also	practical	(achievable	with	relative	ease).		Equally	 significant,	 the	 authors	 emphasize	 that	 the	 determination	 of	 this	quotient	of	danger	should	reside	outside	the	life	science	research	group	conducting	the	 experiment,	 as	 “[n]o	 individual or	 research	 team,	 however	 competent,	honorable,	and	patriotic, should carry the burden or be given the authority	to	 make	 research	 decisions	 that	 might	 put	 an	 appreciable	 fraction	 of	 the	 human	species	 as a	 whole	 at	 risk”	 (ibid,	 p.	 6).	 Instead,	 they	 call	 for	 local,	 regional	 and	international	 oversight	 bodies,	 composed	 of	 “a	 broadly	 representative	 group,	including,	 scientists,	 security	and	public	health	experts	 and	public	 representatives	not	directly	involved	in	the	research	question”	(ibid,	p.	7).	Although	limited	external	oversight	 is	 a	 feature	 of	 the	 previous	 proposals,	 in	 as	 much	 as	 ‘federal	 funding	agencies’	(Zilinskas	and	Tucker	2002)	and	‘federal	government	entities’	(NRC	2004;	NSABB	2007)	effectively	represent	‘risk	managers	of	last	resort’	(Power	2007)	who	could	 possibly	 override	 scientists’	 security	 judgments	 (for	 example,	 they	 could	withdraw	 funding	 or	 recommend	 censoring	 published	 results)	 in	 the	 event	 of	 a	disagreement	or	protracted	dispute,	this	proposal	envisions	a	far	more	limited	role	for	life	scientists	(at	least	the	ones	‘directly	involved	in	the	research	question’)	in	the	risk	management	decision-making	process.		More	 than	 a	 design	 element	 introduced	 to	 produce	 a	 ‘better’	 risk	management	 option,	 this	 discrepancy,	 I	 suggest,	 represents	 a	 fundamental	
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difference	 of	 opinion	 about	 who	 should	 be	 responsible	 for	 governing	 dual-use	research.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 diminished	 role	 of	 scientists	 in	 risk	 management	decision-making	is	justified	on	the	basis	of	the	risks	themselves,	which	Steinbruner	et	 al.	 (2007)	 argue	 are	 sufficiently	 large	 so	 as	 to	merit	 assessment	 by	 a	 group	 of	experts	with	a	broader	set	of	competencies,	ranging	from	national	security	to	public	health.	 Yet,	 on	 the	 other,	 this	 diminished	 role	 is	 justified	 less	 on	 the	 basis	 of	competency	(or	a	lack	of	competency)	and	more	on	the	problematic	status	ascribed	to	scientists.	That	is,	according	to	Steinbruner	et	al.	(ibid,	p.	3),	dual-use	information	is	not	only	likely	to	be	“extracted	from	the	legitimate	research	community”,	but	also	to	be	misused	by	those	“trained	within	that	community”.	Thus,	scientists	are	framed	not	only	as	purveyors	of	‘risky	information’,	but	also	as	‘risky	subjects’	(a	view,	as	I	have	 suggested	 previously,	 that	 is	 shared	 by	 many	 contributors	 to	 the	 synthetic	biology	biosecurity	debate,	but	one	that	is	rarely	explicitly	stated).	In	this	light,	the	opinion	 that,	 “meaningful	 protection	 can	 only	 be	 achieved	 by	 imposing	 some	constraint	 on	 freedom	 of	 action	 at	 the	 level	 of	 fundamental	 research”	 (ibid,	 p.	 2)	represents	 considerably	 more	 than	 an	 endorsement	 of	 preventative	 controls	 on	science.	 Specifically,	 it	 reflects	 an	 underlying	 suspicion	 about	 what	 ‘freedom	 of	action’	might	actually	mean	in	the	hands	–	the	‘wrong	ones’	–	of	some	scientists.		Finally,	 the	 furthest	 ‘upstream’	 risk	 management	 option	 outlined	 in	 Table	 2	describes	an	effort	to	identify	types	of	life	science	knowledge	that	are	perceived	to	be	beyond	the	scope	of	legitimate	scientific	enquiry.	According	to	the	University	of	Oxford	 bioethicists,	 Douglas	 and	 Savulescu	 (2010),	 there	 exist	 certain	 types	 of	knowledge	 –	 above	 all	 knowledge	 generated	 by	 synthetic	 biology,	 which	 they	believe	 “may	 be	 a	 part	 of	 the	 blueprint	 for	 humanity’s	 destruction,	 easily	 pieced	together	by	fanatics,	psychopaths	or	ideologues”	(ibid,	p.	692)	–	that	are	sufficiently	dangerous	so	as	 to	be	 “ethically	 impermissible”.	 Identifying	 ‘unethical’	knowledge,	in	turn,	is	said	to	take	priority	over	‘downstream’	risk	management	efforts	that	seek	to	 place	 restrictions	 on	 potentially	 dangerous	 experiments	 (NRC	 2004;	 NSABB	2007;	Steinbruner	et	al.	2007)	or	prevent	 the	dissemination	of	 ‘sensitive’	research	findings	 (Zilinskas	 and	 Tucker	 2003).	 What	 is	 needed,	 Douglas	 and	 Savulescu	
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propose,	 is	 an	 “ethics	 of	 knowledge”,	 which	 takes	 into	 consideration	 not	 only	“empirical	facts”	about	potential	risks,	but	also	“questions	of	value”,	including	values	related	 to	 “economic	 growth,	 scientific	 freedom	 and	 the	 intrinsic	 value	 of	knowledge”;	 considerations,	 they	 suggest,	 that	 bioethicists	 are	 uniquely	 suited	 to	addressing	(Douglas	and	Savulescu	2010,	p.	690).		Although	similar	to	the	previous	set	of	risk	management	options,	in	as	much	as	 this	biosecurity	 intervention	 (were	 it	 to	be	adopted)	would	effectively	 limit	 the	production	of	 scientific	knowledge,	 the	authors	of	 this	proposal	do	not	attempt	 to	provide	 a	 ‘scientific’	 interpretation	 of	 ‘dual-use	 research’.	 Rather,	 Douglas	 and	Savulescu	justify	their	proposal	on	the	basis	of	an	ethical	imperative	to	not	produce	knowledge	 of	 a	 particular	 kind.	 In	 other	 words,	 they	 justify	 their	 proposal	 on	grounds	 that	 exist	 outside	 the	 more	 familiar	 (in	 relation	 to	 biosecurity)	epistemological	 domains	 of	 biology,	 public	 health	 and	 national	 security.	 In	 this	context,	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘risk’	 (as	 conceived	 under	 the	 scientific	 model	 of	 risk	analysis)	 is	 effectively	 replaced	 by	 that	 of	 ‘ethics’,	 which	 is	 presented	 as	 an	‘objective’	mode	of	determining	an	‘optimal’	balance	between	scientific	freedom	and	a	range	of	other	value	considerations	(‘value	considerations’,	it	must	be	emphasized,	that	 are	 no	 less	 intrinsic	 to	 each	 proposal	 outlined	 in	 Table	 2,	 and	 indeed	 risk	analysis	processes	more	generally,	even	though	Douglas	and	Savulescu	suggest	that	what	 sets	 their	 proposal	 apart	 is	 that	 it	 is	 based	 on	more	 than	 ‘empirical	 facts’).	Moreover,	 the	 authors	 suggest	 that	 bioethicists	 (neither	 security	 experts	 nor	scientists)	should	play	the	primary	role	as	arbiters	of	what	types	of	knowledge	are	to	be	considered	off	limits.	In	brief,	in	contrast	to	the	previous	proposals,	an	‘ethics	of	knowledge’	is	neither	justified	on	the	basis	of	epidemiology	nor	on	the	‘weapons	potential	 of	 a	 microbe’;	 nor	 does	 it	 attempt	 to	 derive	 its	 authority	 from	 the	assertions	 of	 life	 scientists	 or	 security	 experts.	 Rather,	 it	 calls	 on	 bioethicists	 “to	develop	principles	[which	are	not	further	defined]	for	determining	when	producing	or	disseminating	dangerous	knowledge	is	impermissible”	(ibid.).	While	 I	 have	 yet	 to	 encounter	 a	 scientific	 or	 technical	 critique	 that	 strictly	relates	to	an	‘ethics	of	knowledge’	(a	concept,	according	Douglas	and	Savulescu,	that	has	yet	to	receive	mainstream	attention	even	among	bioethicists),	the	design	of	this	
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risk	management	option	can	be	further	contrasted	with	the	previous	proposals	in	at	least	 three	ways.	 First,	 an	 ‘ethics	 of	 knowledge’	 (the	 furthest	 ‘upstream’	 proposal	outlined	 in	 Table	 2)	 is	 a	 distinctly	 precautionary	 approach	 to	 biosecurity,	 as	 it	 is	directed	at	controlling	the	production	of	life	science	knowledge	at	the	very	point	of	its	 conception,	 before	 it	 is	 tested	 by	 way	 of	 experimentation,	 and	 before	 it	 is	translated	into	published	results.	Therefore,	in	practice,	it	would	effectively	prohibit	all	 ‘downstream’	 research	 activities	 associated	 with	 that	 knowledge.	 By	 contrast,	Zilinskas	 and	 Tucker’s	 (2003)	 proposal,	 which	 calls	 for	 restrictions	 on	 the	publication	of	“findings	directly	relevant	to	the	military	or	terrorist	use	of	pathogens	and	toxins”,	offers	a	narrower	(and,	one	might	easily	argue,	more	precise)	framing	of	the	problem	that	each	proposal	ostensibly	seeks	to	address,	namely,	the	deliberate	misuse	of	pathogens.	Therefore,	 in	practice,	Zilinskas	and	Tucker’s	proposal	would	have	 a	 more	 limited	 impact	 on	 the	 production	 and	 dissemination	 of	 life	 science	knowledge.	 Second,	 and	 related	 to	 this	 first	 point,	 this	 proposal	 is	 largely	disconnected	 from	 the	 potential	 harms	 it	 seeks	 to	 prevent,	 saying	 little	 about	 the	epidemiological	properties	of	pathogens	and	their	capacity	to	inflict	harm	on	public	health.	Third,	an	‘ethics	of	knowledge’,	which	relies	exclusively	on	the	reasoning	of	bioethicists	 to	 distinguish	 between	 ‘ethical’	 and	 ‘unethical’	 knowledge,	 based	 on	unspecified	 ‘principles’,	 shares	 little	 in	 common	 with	 the	 ‘process-based’	 risk	management	 strategies	 discussed	 previously,	 and	 therefore	 aligns	 uneasily	 with	these	modes	of	governing.	In	raising	these	points	of	consideration,	I	do	not	mean	to	suggest	that	this	proposal	is	any	less	justifiable	than	any	other,	only	that	biosecurity	interventions	 of	 this	 kind	 would	 have	 extensive	 ramifications	 for	 knowledge	production	and	dissemination;	are	relatively	disconnected	from	the	subject	matter	that	is	of	most	immediate	relevance	to	the	risks	they	claim	to	address,	and	rely	less	on	‘procedures’	and	‘processes’	and	more	on	‘ethical	reasoning’.		In	 the	 preceding	 discussion,	 I	 examined	 a	 range	 of	 risk	 management	 proposals	(none	 of	 which	 have	 yet	 to	 be	 directly	 implemented	 as	 regulatory	 instruments)	directed	at	restricting	access	to	various	aspects	of	intangible	life	science	knowledge.	In	each	case,	the	authors	of	these	proposals	not	only	attempt	to	justify	the	urgency	
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of	 ‘risks’	 of	 a	 particular	 kind	 (for	 example,	 ‘sensitive	 research	 findings’)	 and	 to	propose	risk	management	strategies	that	might	be	used	to	mitigate	those	risks	(for	example,	‘censoring	sensitive	portions	of	manuscripts	prior	to	publication’),	but	also	to	 justify	 the	 ‘administrative’	or	 ‘managerial’	merits	of	doing	 so	according	 to	 their	own	risk	assessment	criteria	(for	example,	‘seven	experiments	of	concern’)	and	their	own	 risk	 management	 protocols	 (for	 example,	 a	 ‘checklist’	 enabling	 the	identification	 and	management	 of	 ‘dual-use	 research	of	 concern’).	 In	 other	words,	the	 relative	 strengths	 and	 limitations	 of	 each	 proposal	 are	 weighed	 against	 each	other	 as	much	with	 a	 view	 to	 their	 practical	 capacity	 to	 enable	 risk	management	decision-making,	as	 they	are	 to	 their	 technical	capacity	 to	objectively	 ‘measure’	or	‘quantify’	risks.	In	this	manner,	I	suggest,	each	proposal	represents	a	contribution	to	an	ongoing	competition	(albeit	a	‘competition’	that	is	waged	as	much	at	the	level	of	an	 individual	 proposal’s	 rationalized	 design	 as	 it	 is	 at	 the	 level	 of	 its	 singular	capacity	 to	 ‘calculate’	 risks	 according	 to	 the	 scientific	 model	 of	 risk	 analysis)	 to	produce	 a	 risk	 management	 ‘standard’	 that	 is	 best	 suited	 to	 the	 challenges	 and	dilemmas	 associated	 with	 ‘regulating’	 or	 ‘managing’	 –	 a	 distinction	 that	 is	increasingly	blurred	(Power	2007)	–	dual-use	research.			 Over	 the	 last	 ten	 years	 –	 since	 the	 first	 risk	management	 proposals	 of	 this	kind	began	to	consider	how	regulatory	authorities	might	restrict	access	to	‘sensitive’	life	 science	 research	 –	 this	 competition	 has	 contributed	 to	 the	 expansion	 and	diversification	 of	 risk	 management	 proposals	 directed	 at	 controlling	 access	 to	intangible	 life	 science	 knowledge.	Moreover,	 each	 of	 these	 proposals	 promises	 to	achieve	 an	 ‘optimal’	 balance	 between	 scientific	 freedom,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	national	security,	on	the	other.	Yet,	as	I	have	discussed,	these	proposals	can	equally	be	interpreted	as	generating	a	more	pronounced	tension	between	these	potentially	competing	objectives,	 as	each	of	 these	biosecurity	 controls	 seeks	 to	act	upon	 ‘risk	objects’	that	exist	increasingly	‘upstream’	of	the	tangible	entities	that	are	ultimately	viewed	as	problematic,	namely,	dangerous	pathogens.		Although	it	is	tempting	to	suggest	that	these	‘precautionary’	strategies	reflect	a	 trend	 towards	 increasingly	 restrictive	 biosecurity	 policies	 that	 will	 inevitably	undermine	a	culture	of	scientific	openness	and	diminish	scientific	progress,	as	some	
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fear,	 this	 is	 not	 necessarily	 the	 most	 likely	 outcome	 or	 even	 the	 most	 accurate	representation	 of	 the	 present	 trend.	 Rather,	 what	 seems	 apparent	 in	 relation	 to	these	 diverse	 proposals	 is	 a	 distinctly	 pragmatic	 desire	 to	 enable	 a	 secure	 and	sustainable	 ‘scientific	 enterprise’	 (Zilinskas	 and	 Tucker	 2002);	 and	 risk	management	 strategies,	 whether	 developed	 by	 scientists,	 security	 experts,	bioethicists	or	others,	have	been	crafted	to	make	this	objective	possible.	However,	which	risk	management	option(s)	might	prevail	as	the	‘best’	mode	of	governing,	and	how	restrictive	“information	(or	secrecy)	policy”	(Gorman	2006,	p.	62)	and	a	culture	of	scientific	openness	might	coexist,	are	nonetheless	questions	that	remain	without	an	 answer.	And	while	no	 single	 ‘answer’	 is	 likely	 forthcoming,	 recent	 events	have	precipitated	a	US	policy	response	that	goes	some	way	towards	understanding	how	an	 emerging	 ‘standard’	 for	managing	 ‘dual-use	 research	 of	 concern’	 has	 begun	 to	take	shape,	as	well	as	what	is	at	stake	in	relation	to	this	new	standard.		
6.3	Institutionalizing	‘dual-use	research	of	concern’	On	 29	 March	 2012,	 the	 US	 Department	 of	 Health	 and	 Human	 Services	 (DHHS)	released	new	federal	policy	on	the	oversight	of	 ‘dual-use	research	of	concern’108	in	an	attempt	to	address	a	perceived	gap	in	 life	science	regulation,	made	apparent	 in	light	of	two	controversial	research	projects	that	required	that	 ‘federal	government	entities’	(notably	the	NSABB)	make	security	judgments	on	the	question	of	censoring	fundamental	 research.	Reminiscent	of	 the	earlier	controversy	 that	 surrounded	 the	publication	 of	 synthetic	 poliovirus	 (Cello	 et	 al.	 2002)	 (and	 several	 other	controversial	 synthetic	biology	papers	published	around	 this	 time,	as	 I	have	said),	which	 helped	 motivate	 a	 biosecurity	 policy	 debate	 concerned	 primarily	 with	 the	dilemma	 posed	 by	 the	 publication	 of	 ‘dual-use	 research’,	 this	 most	 recent	controversy	has	motivated	a	policy	response	that	attempts	to	resolve	this	dilemma.	The	result,	as	I	will	discuss	in	this	section,	has	been	the	design	and	production	of	a																																																									
108 United States Government Policy for Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of 
Concern, available at: 
http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/biosecurity/pdf/united_states_government_policy_for_oversigh
t_of_durc_final_version_032812.pdf.	
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risk	 management	 framework	 that	 attempts	 to	 balance	 demands	 for	 scientific	freedom	against	demands	for	national	security.	Capturing	aspects	of	 the	proposals	discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	 this	 framework,	 I	 suggest,	 can	 similarly	 be	understood	 as	 an	 attempt	 to	 enable	 risk	 management	 decision-making,	 while	remaining	within	the	boundaries	of	existing	regulatory	and	institutional	norms.	Yet,	before	 taking	 a	 closer	 look	 at	 this	 new	 policy,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 provide	 a	 brief	overview	of	the	events	surrounding	the	controversial	research	projects	that	helped	precipitate	this	policy	response,	and	which	help	shed	light	on	the	tensions	that	exist	between	‘national	security’	and	‘scientific	openness’.		
6.3.1	Pandemic	potential	and	global	controversy	In	 2011,	 two	 manuscripts	 under	 review	 by	 the	 high-profile	 journals	 Nature	 and	
Science	raised	concerns	among	journal	editors	about	the	 ‘dual-use	potential’	of	the	research.	Although	both	 journals	had	 in	place	procedures	 for	addressing	potential	security	 issues	 (motivated	 by	 the	 earlier	 controversial	 life	 science	 publications,	introduced	 already)	 (Journal	 Editors	 and	 Authors	 Group	 2003),	 few	 manuscripts	had	 previously	 been	 flagged	 for	more	 intensive	 review	 (Vastag	 2003).	 Moreover,	each	 of	 these	manuscripts	 had	 ultimately	 been	 published	 in	 full	 (Campbell	 2006;	Enserink	and	Malakoff	2012).	However,	in	this	instance,	the	two	studies	–	one	led	by	Dr.	 Yoshihiro	Kawaoka,	 of	 the	University	 of	Wisconsin	 (reviewed	 by	Nature),	 and	the	other	led	by	Dr.	Ron	Fouchier,	of	the	Erasmus	Medical	Center	in	the	Netherlands	(reviewed	 by	 Science),	 both	 of	 which	 received	 funding	 from	 the	 US	 National	Institutes	 of	 Health	 (NIH)	 –	 were	 deemed	 to	 be	 especially	 problematic,	 raising	serious	doubts	about	the	appropriateness	of	publishing	the	research	in	full.		The	 manuscripts	 in	 question	 described	 the	 successful	 synthesis	 of	 a	 more	lethal	variant	–	one	capable	of	airborne	transmission	between	mammals	–	of	highly	pathogenic	 avian	 influenza	 (H5N1).	 In	 recent	 years,	H5N1	has	been	 the	 subject	of	intense	public	health	concern	and	media	attention	due	to	its	high	mortality	rate	in	humans.	 Prior	 to	 these	 experiments,	 the	 virus	 could	 only	 be	 transmitted	 through	direct	contact	with	infected	birds.	Although	the	authors	of	both	studies	claimed	that	
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the	research	was	necessary	to	raise	awareness	about	the	pandemic	potential	of	the	virus	 (which	 was	 also	 the	 NIH’s	 justification	 for	 funding	 the	 studies	 in	 the	 first	place),	 concerns	 were	 simultaneously	 raised	 about	 the	 open	 publication	 of	 the	research	and	related	scientific	protocols,	as	it	might	enable	others	to	synthesize	the	virus,	 providing	 “a	 blueprint	 on	 how	 to	 set	 off	 a	 flu	 pandemic”	 (Enserink	 and	Malakoff	2012,	p.	20).	For	many,	 including	many	national	governments,	 the	World	Health	Organization	(WHO),	members	of	the	scientific	community,	the	international	media,	and	members	of	the	general	public,	the	announcement	of	both	experiments	highlighted	 the	 challenges	posed	by	 the	 communication	of	dual-use	 research,	 and,	indeed,	 whether	 some	 types	 of	 research	 should	 be	 conducted	 in	 the	 first	 place	(Malakoff	and	Enserink	2012).	Specifically,	the	question	was	asked	by	many:	“How	do	you	balance	 the	universal	mandate	 for	scientific	openness	against	 the	 fear	 that	terrorists	 or	 rogue	 states	 might	 follow	 the	 researchers'	 work	 –	 using	 it	 as	catastrophic	cookbooks	for	global	influenza	contagion?”	(Garrett	2012).	In	 light	 of	 these	 dual-use	 concerns,	 in	 the	 fall	 of	 2011,	 both	 journals	requested	the	assistance	of	the	US	government	to	help	determine	what	(if	anything)	should	be	done	to	restrict	 the	dissemination	of	 the	research.	The	NSABB	was	then	requested,	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 US	 government,	 “to	 assess	 the	 dual-use	 research	implications	 of	 [the]	 two	 as-yet-unpublished	manuscripts”;	 “to	 consider	 the	 risks	and	benefits	of	 communicating	 the	 research	 results”,	 and	 “to	provide	 findings	and	recommendations	 regarding	 the	 responsible	 communication	 of	 [the]	 research”	(Berns	 et	 al.	 2012,	 p.	 153).109	Upon	 reviewing	 the	manuscripts,	 a	NSABB	working	group	(composed	of	eight	voting	members,	including	scientists	and	security	experts,	and	a	dozen	ex-officio	members	 from	a	variety	of	 federal	 agencies)	 (Enserink	and	Malakoff	 2012)	 concluded	 that,	 in	 both	 cases,	 the	manuscripts	 provided	 sufficient	information	to	enable	others,	including	“those	who	wish	to	do	harm”,	to	repeat	the	experiments	 (Berns	 et	 al.	 2012,	 p.	 153).	 This	 possibility,	 the	 NSABB	 argued,	represented	a	public	health	and	national	security	risk	of	“unusually	high	magnitude”																																																									
109 This editorial (Berns et al. 2012, p. 153), published in both Nature and Science, was 
written by members of the NSABB and was intended to, “explain [the NSABB’s] 
recommendations on the communication of experimental work on H5N1 influenza.” 
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and	 posed	 a	 “grave	 concern	 for	 global	 biosecurity”	 (ibid.).	 Yet,	 the	 NSABB	 also	argued	that	the	research,	which	highlighted	the	pandemic	potential	of	H5N1,	“may	be	valuable	 for	 improving	 the	public-health	 response	 to	a	 looming	natural	 threat”	(ibid.).	In	light	of	these	considerations,	the	NSABB	unanimously	recommended	that	the	 basic	 conclusions	 of	 each	 study	 should	 be	 published,	 but	 that	 the	 relevant	“methods	and	details”,	which	might	permit	the	experiments	to	be	replicated,	should	be	 omitted	 (ibid.).	 “The	 goal”,	 the	 NSABB	 argued,	 “was	 to	 deliver	 the	 critical	information	 about	 the	 H5N1	 potential	 for	 pandemic	 spread	while	minimizing	 the	possible	risk	that	the	information	could	be	used	for	nefarious	purposes”	(ibid.).		This	recommendation	was,	in	the	words	of	the	NSABB	(Berns	et	al.	2012,	p.	154),	 “unprecedented”,	 and	 the	decision	 sparked	both	 “fierce	 criticism	and	 strong	support”	 (Enserink	 and	 Malakoff	 2012,	 p.	 20).	 For	 supporters	 of	 the	 NSABB’s	recommendation,	censorship	was	argued	to	be	a	necessary	(if	undesirable)	action,	as	the	risk	of	misuse	simply	outweighed	the	benefits	of	full	publication.	Critically,	for	these	 supporters,	 omitting	 the	methods	 sections	 from	 the	 published	material	was	perceived	 to	 be	 an	 effective	 means	 of	 preventing	 others	 from	 replicating	 the	experiments	and	thus	preventing	the	deliberate	misuse	of	the	research.	For	critics	of	the	NSABB’s	recommendation,	the	decision	to	censor	the	two	manuscripts	was	not	only	argued	to	set	a	dangerous	precedent,	possibly	leading	to	further	constraints	on	science,	 but	 also	 to	 do	 little	 to	 enhance	 biosecurity.	 For	 many,	 censorship	 was	argued	to	be	“impossible	to	enforce	and	ultimately	useless	within	scientific	circles”	(Garrett	 2012),	 as	 scientists	 could	 either	 gain	 access	 to	 the	 information	 by	 other	means	 or	 already	 knew	 the	 basic	 techniques	 needed	 to	 conduct	 the	 experiments	(Enserink	and	Malakoff	2012).	For	others,	the	important	question	was	not	so	much	whether	or	not	restricting	access	to	the	information	was	feasible,	but	rather	whether	or	 not	 it	 was	 desirable.	 From	 this	 perspective,	 the	 call	 for	 censorship	 raised	fundamental	 questions	 about	 the	 role	 of	 the	 state	 in	 the	 “policing	 of	 science”	(Garrett	 2012).	 For	 the	 WHO,	 the	 matter	 of	 censorship	 (or,	 alternatively,	 full	publication)	seemed	to	be	a	question	without	a	reasonable	answer.	 In	a	statement	
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released	on	30	December	2011,110	WHO	officials	expressed,	on	 the	one	hand,	 that	they	 were	 “deeply	 concerned”	 about	 the	 possibility	 that	 the	 research	 might	 be	misused	 if	 published	 in	 full,	 and,	 on	 the	 other,	 that	 “critical	 scientific	 knowledge	needed	 to	 reduce	 the	 risks	 posed	 by	 the	 H5N1	 virus”	must	 increase.	 Censorship,	they	feared,	might	discourage	the	sharing	of	information	vital	to	mounting	a	global	public	health	response	to	a	future	H5N1	pandemic.	Irrespective	of	which	side	of	the	debate	one	looked,	it	was	clear	that	the	implications	of	censorship	went	“far	beyond	a	couple	of	paragraphs	in	a	pair	of	papers”	(Enserink	and	Malakoff	2012,	p.	20).		
6.3.2	(Re)assessing	censorship	“Stung	 by	 growing	 global	 controversy	 …	 and	 worried	 about	 heavy-handed	government	 regulation”,	 H5N1	 researchers	 agreed	 to	 a	 60	 day	 moratorium	 on	“H5N1	 transmissibility	 research”	 on	 20	 January	 2012	 (Malakoff	 and	 Enserink	2012).111	 Likened	 to	 the	 Asilomar	 Conference,	 which	 in	 1975	 culminated	 in	scientists	 calling	 for	 a	 temporary	 moratorium	 on	 a	 range	 of	 genetic	 engineering	experiments	(discussed	in	Chapter	5),	this	call	was	celebrated	by	some	scientists	as	an	act	of	prudent	self-regulation	and	dismissed	by	others	as	“‘strictly	symbolic’”	and	as	“‘[a]n	empty	gesture’”	intended	“‘to	assure	the	public’”	(biologist	Richard	Ebright,	cited	 in	 Malakoff	 and	 Enserink	 2012).	 Regardless	 of	 the	 motivation	 for	 this	 self-imposed	moratorium	–	and	 ‘self-regulation’	more	generally	(a	subject	 I	will	return	to	in	the	following	chapter)	–	this	act	did	not	address	the	more	immediate	problem	of	what	to	do	with	Kawaoka’s	and	Fouchier’s	controversial	manuscripts.	In	 February	 2012,112	 in	 light	 of	 “the	 global	 relevance	 of	 these	 issues”,	 the	WHO	convened	a	group	of	experts	“to	clarify	key	facts	about	the	studies”	and	to	find	“practical,	 feasible,	ad	hoc	solutions	to	the	questions	of	access	to	research	findings																																																									
110 See ‘WHO concerned that new H5N1 influenza research could undermine the 2011 
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework’, 30 December 2011, available at: 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2011/pip_framework_20111229/en/. 
111 This voluntary moratorium was later extended to one year (Malakoff 2013). 
112 See World Health Organization (2012). Report on technical consultation on H5N1 
research issues, Geneva, 16-17 February 2012, available at: 
http://www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/mtg_report_h5n1.pdf.	
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and	 management	 of	 the	 laboratory-modified	 viruses.”	 Hearing	 from	 members	 of	Kawaoka’s	and	Fouchier’s	research	teams,	participating	experts	were	granted	“full	disclosure”	to	the	uncensored	manuscripts	and	were	provided	with	further	details	on	 both	 studies	 (ibid.).	 Satisfied	 with	 the	 value	 of	 the	 work	 in	 relation	 to	 the	advancement	of	scientific	knowledge	about	the	H5N1	virus,	as	well	as	the	biosafety	and	 biosecurity	 precautions	 taken	 by	 both	 research	 teams,	 experts	 agreed	 that,	“from	a	public	health	perspective”,	 the	unrestricted	publication	of	the	manuscripts	was	 preferable	 to	 censorship	 (ibid.).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 participating	 experts	emphasized	 that	 the	 publication	 of	 both	 studies	 raised	 “important	 and	 valid	concerns”	 about	 the	 threat	 of	 deliberate	misuse,	 and	 that	ultimately	 a	mechanism	that	 might	 “realistically	 resolve	 concerns	 about	 dual-use	 research”	 was	 needed	(ibid.).	However,	 “[e]stablishing	such	a	mechanism	and	 implementing	 it	effectively	in	 the	very	short	 term	was	not	 considered	 to	be	 feasible”	 (ibid.).	 In	 the	 interim,	 it	was	agreed	that	Kawaoka’s	and	Fouchier’s	manuscripts	should	be	published	in	full,	but	 with	 two	 provisions,	 namely,	 that	 greater	 emphasis	 be	 given	 (1)	 to	 the	significance	 and	 rationale	 for	 the	 studies	 and	 (2)	 to	 the	 laboratory	 precautions	undertaken	to	ensure	safety	and	security	during	the	research	process	(ibid.).		With	a	view	to	the	“new	and	clarified	information”113	generated	at	the	WHO	meeting	 (and,	one	would	be	 remiss	not	 to	add,	 the	global	 controversy	 sparked	by	their	 initial	 call	 for	 censorship,	 an	 observation	 that	 does	 not	 figure	 in	 official	statements	 released	 by	 either	 the	 NSABB	 or	 the	 NIH),	 the	 NSABB	 opted	 to	reconsider	 their	position	on	censorship,	and	extended	the	same	recommendations	(the	two	agreed	at	the	WHO	meeting)	to	both	sets	of	authors.	On	29-30	March	2012,	the	NSABB	reviewed	 the	 revised	manuscripts	and	unanimously	 recommended	 the	full	publication	of	the	Kawaoka	manuscript,	and	“in	a	12-to-6	decision,	that	the	data,	methods,	 and	 conclusions	 presented	 in	 the	 revised	 [Fouchier]	 manuscript	 …	 be	communicated	after	appropriate	scientific	review	and	revision”	(NSABB	2012,	p.	1).	In	 a	 statement	 (see	 footnote	 113)	 released	 on	 20	 April	 2012,	 Francis	 S.	 Collins,																																																									
113 See ‘Statement by NIH Director Francis Collins, M.D., Ph.D. on the NSABB Review 
of Revised H5N1 Manuscripts’, 20 April 2012, available at: 
http://www.nih.gov/about/director/04202012_NSABB.htm. 
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Director	of	the	NIH,	summarized	the	NSABB’s	response	to	the	revised	manuscripts	and	confirmed	that	both	the	NIH	and	the	DHHS	supported	these	recommendations.	According	 to	 Collins,	 “the	 information	 in	 the	 two	 manuscripts	 should	 be	communicated	 fully”,	 as	 “[t]his	 information	 has	 clear	 value	 to	 national	 and	international	public	health	preparedness	efforts	and	must	be	shared	with	those	who	are	poised	to	realize	the	benefits	of	this	research”	(see	footnote	113).114	While	much	can	be	said	on	the	subject	of	the	NSABB’s	change	in	position	on	the	 question	 of	 censorship,	 what	 I	 wish	 underline	 here	 is	 only	 that	 the	 NSABB’s	reversal	–	from	calling	for	censorship	to	endorsing	full	publication	–	did	not	reflect	any	changes	in	the	‘risks’	themselves.	That	is,	the	‘dual-use	information’	contained	in	the	manuscripts	was	 the	 same	both	 before	 and	 after	 the	 authors’	 revisions.	What	changed	 is	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 these	 risks	 were	 framed.	 Specifically,	 further	context	was	added	to	the	two	manuscripts,	which	made	the	public	health	benefits	of	the	 research	more	 apparent,	 and	 the	 biosafety	 and	 biosecurity	 precautions	 taken	more	 explicit,	 offering	 a	 more	 favorable	 interpretation	 of	 the	 ‘risk/benefit	calculations’	used	by	the	NSABB	to	justify	their	decision.	For	critics	of	the	NSABB’s	initial	 call	 for	 censorship,	 this	 (re)assessment	 or	 (re)interpretation	 of	 the	 two	manuscripts	 (and,	 in	 turn,	 the	 ‘risks’	 they	 are	 claimed	 to	 have	 contained)	merely	underlined	what	 was	 evident	 from	 the	 very	 beginning,	 namely,	 that	 the	 NSABB’s	recommendations	were	made	on	the	basis	of	 ‘expert	opinion’,	and	not	on	the	basis	of	 an	 ‘objective	 assessment’	 of	 the	 ‘actual’	 risks	 (or,	 for	 that	 matter,	 the	 ‘actual’	benefits)	 of	 publishing	 (or	 not	 publishing)	 the	 research.	 As	 one	 science	 blogger,	biologist	 Vincent	 Racaniello,115	 expressed	 after	 the	 NSABB’s	 initial	 call	 for	censorship,	reflecting	a	sense	of	frustration	about	the	lack	of	transparency	related	to	the	 risk	 assessment	 ‘methods’	 used	 by	 the	 NSABB	 to	 arrive	 at	 their	 conclusions:	“What	data	did	 they	 consider	when	making	 this	decision?	What	were	 the	benefits	
																																																								
114 The Kawaoka article (Imai et al. 2012) was ultimately published in Nature on 21 June 
2012 and the Fouchier article (Herfst et al. 2012) in Science on 22 June 2012. 
115 See ‘The NSABB speaks on influenza H5N1. Virology Blog: About Viruses and Viral 
Disease’, 31 January 2012, available at: http://www.virology.ws/2012/01/31/the-nsabb-
speaks-on-influenza-h5n1/. 
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and	 the	potential	harms,	and	how	did	 they	weigh	 them?	Apparently	we	must	 take	the	word	of	the	panel	that	they	reached	the	right	decision.”	Based	on	 the	NSABB’s	 own	account	 of	 their	 initial	 call	 for	 censorship,	 it	 is,	indeed,	 difficult	 to	 discern	 any	 formal	 ‘methods’	 for	 conducting	 the	 ‘cost/benefit	calculations’	 they	 claim	 to	 have	 used	 to	 arrive	 at	 their	 conclusions	 (Berns	 et	 al.	2012).	The	NSABB	says	only	that	the	working	group	assessed	“the	risks	and	benefits	of	communicating	the	research	results”,	and	because	of	the	“significant	potential	for	harm	in	fully	publishing	[the]	results”,	and	because	this	harm	“exceeded	the	benefits	of	publication”,	“we	therefore	recommended	the	work	not	be	fully	communicated	in	an	open	forum”	(ibid,	p.	154).	Reference	to	risks	of	an	“unusually	high	magnitude”	(ibid.),	 although	 suggestive	 of	 the	 vocabulary	 common	 to	 ‘quantitative	 risk	assessment’,	does	not	in	itself	say	anything	about	how	the	risks	were	‘calculated’,	or	even	whether	‘quantitative’	methods	were	used.		In	their	account	of	their	reversal	of	their	initial	call	for	censorship,	however,	the	 NSABB	 (2012)	 is	 more	 forthcoming	 about	 their	 risk	 assessment	 methods.	Specifically,	 the	 NSABB	 refers	 to	 “analytical	 frameworks”	 used	 to	 arrive	 at	 their	decision	 to	 publish	 both	 manuscripts	 in	 full	 (ibid,	 p.	 2).	 Under	 closer	 inspection,	these	 ‘analytical	 frameworks’	 (noted	 in	 footnotes	 3	 and	 4	 of	 the	 NSABB’s	recommendations)	 reveal	 themselves	 to	 be	 none	 other	 than	 the	 NSABB’s	 own	
Proposed	Framework	for	the	Oversight	of	Dual	Use	Life	Sciences	Research:	Strategies	
for	Minimizing	the	Potential	Misuse	of	Research	Information	(NSABB	2007,	outlined	in	 Table	 2	 and	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 section).	 Presumably,	 the	 ‘analytical	frameworks’	 they	 are	 referring	 to	 are	 contained	 in	 Appendix	 4	 (ibid,	 pp.	 51-52):	“Points	 To	 Consider	 in	 Risk	 Assessment	 and	 Management	 of	 Research	 That	 is	Potentially	Dual	Use	of	Concern”.	As	I	discussed	earlier,	Appendix	4	is	a	‘checklist’	or	‘structured	protocol’	intended	to	help	PIs	and	IBCs	(and,	if	necessary,	the	NSABB	or	other	 ‘federal	 government	 entities’)	 determine	 what	 should	 count	 as	 ‘dual-use	research	of	 concern’,	 enabling	an	 ‘either/or’	 risk	management	decision	–	either	 to	‘modify’	 or	 to	 ‘discontinue’	 the	 research.	 It	 does	 not,	 however,	 represent	 an	‘objective’	means	 of	 determining	 the	 ‘actual’	 risks	 or	 (for	 that	matter)	 the	 ‘actual’	benefits	 enabled	 by	 an	 experiment,	 even	 though	 ‘quantitative’	 methods	 are	
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variously	 endorsed	 and	 contested	 (on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 NSABB’s	 own	 experiences	trying	to	employ	these	methods)	throughout	the	oversight	framework	(ibid.).		To	 summarize	 the	NSABB’s	 (2012)	 account	 of	 the	decision-making	process	that	 led	 to	 their	 decision	 to	 recommend	 full	 publication	 after	 their	 initial	 call	 for	censorship:	the	NSABB	working	group	assessed	both	revised	manuscripts	according	to	 the	NSABB’s	own	oversight	 ‘checklist’	 (NSABB	2007),	which	revealed	 that	what	was	 once	 ‘dual-use	 research	 of	 concern’	 was	 no	 longer	 ‘dual-use	 research	 of	concern’,	 and	 not	 because	 of	 any	 changes	 in	 the	 ‘risks’	 themselves,	 but	 because	further	 context,	which	emphasized	 the	 ‘benefits’	 of	 the	 research	and	 the	biosafety	and	biosecurity	precautions	taken	during	the	research	process,	was	added,	which,	in	turn,	shifted	the	balance	of	the	‘cost/benefit	calculations’	(NSABB	2012).	For	 the	 NSABB,	 the	 NIH,	 and	 the	 WHO,	 what	 this	 recent	 experience	 has	underlined	is	an	apparent	gap	in	life	science	regulation,	rendered	visible	in	light	of	the	lack	of	a	risk	management	standard	that	could	effectively	address	the	challenges,	dilemmas,	 and	 global	 controversies	 associated	 with	 governing	 dual-use	 research.	According	 to	 the	 NSABB	 (2012,	 p.	 6),	 following	 their	 reversal	 on	 the	 question	 of	censorship:	 “The	 need	 for	 an	 effective,	 practical,	 and	 feasible	 mechanism	 for	selectively	 sharing	 sensitive	 scientific	 information	 has	 never	 been	 more	apparent”.116	In	turn,	it	is	precisely	this	perceived	deficiency	that	has	motivated	the	US	government	to	move	quickly	to	establish	(or	attempt	to	establish)	a	rationalized,	morally	defensible,	risk	management	strategy	that	might	be	used	to	prevent	future	‘primary’	and	‘secondary’	risks	associated	with	the	publication	of	controversial	dual-use	research.	From	the	perspective	of	regulators,	the	recent	controversy	has	made	apparent	 that	 a	 federally	 mandated	 standard	 (or,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 WHO,	 an	internationally	 agreed	 standard)	 for	 screening	dual-use	 research	 –	well	 before	 the	
point	 of	 publication	 –	 is	 urgently	 needed	 to	 avert	 not	 only	 potential	 public	 health																																																									
116 This need is made all the more apparent in light of the NSABB’s belief that, while full 
publication was justified in this instance, “research findings will likely emerge in the very 
near future that should not be widely disseminated because of a high risk of misuse but 
that nevertheless should be made available to certain researchers and public health 
officials around the world who have a legitimate need to know” (NSABB 2012, p. 6). 	
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risks,	 but	 also	 the	 reputational	 risks	 associated	 with	 the	 problematic	 task	 of	censoring	‘sensitive’	research	findings	once	they	have	been	produced.	Made	equally	clear	during	this	experience,	is	that	any	such	standard	will	need	to	carefully	balance	potential	 tradeoffs	 between	 national	 security	 and	 scientific	 freedom	 –	 a	 goal	 that	would	seem,	at	least	for	the	time	being,	to	be	anything	but	straightforward.		
6.3.3	The	policy	response	The	United	States	Government	Policy	for	Oversight	of	Life	Sciences	Dual	Use	Research	
of	 Concern	 (DHHS	 2012)	 represents	 an	 attempt	 to	 produce	 just	 such	 a	 standard.	Announced	at	 the	close	of	 the	NSABB’s	deliberations	on	Kawaoka’s	and	Fouchier’s	revised	 manuscripts,	 “[t]he	 fundamental	 aim	 of	 this	 oversight	 is	 to	 preserve	 the	benefits	 of	 life	 science	 research	 while	 minimizing	 the	 risk	 of	 misuse	 of	 the	knowledge,	information,	products	or	technologies	provided	by	such	research”	(ibid,	p.	1).	Although	the	policy	overview	only	acknowledges	the	NSABB’s	(2007)	earlier	proposed	 oversight	 framework	 as	 helping	 guide	 the	 design	 of	 this	 new	 policy,	reflecting	 the	 institutional	 links	 that	 have	 been	 established	 between	 the	 US	government	 and	 its	 primary	 biosecurity	 advisory	 body,	 this	 risk	 management	framework	 captures	 aspects	 of	 each	 proposal	 outlined	 in	 Table	 2.	 Also	 like	 these	proposals,	 this	 framework	 can	 be	 understood	 as	much	 as	 a	 pragmatic	 attempt	 to	enable	choice	and	decision	(Power	2007),	as	it	can	an	attempt	to	‘objectively’	assess	and	manage	the	‘actual’	risks	posed	by	‘dual-use	research	of	concern’.	Like	 previous	 proposals	 of	 this	 kind,	 the	 new	 federal	 policy	 endeavors	 to	make	 new	 concerns	 about	 intangible	 life	 science	 knowledge	 ‘fit’	 existing	institutional	 and	 regulatory	 norms.	 As	 described	 in	 the	 policy	 overview	 (DHHS	2012,	 p.	 1),	 the	 new	 risk	 management	 framework	 is	 intended	 to	 compliment	“existing	 United	 States	 Government	 regulations	 and	 policies”	 (notably,	 the	 Select	Agent	Regulations	and	existing	federal	funding	arrangements)	and	seeks	to	produce	“flexible	 approaches	 that	 leverage	 existing	 processes,	 and	 endeavors	 to	 preserve	and	foster	the	benefits	of	research.”	To	achieve	this	objective,	the	new	framework	is	organized	around	the	existing	oversight	model	established	for	federally	funded	life	
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science	 research.	 Specifically,	 federal	 departments	 and	 agencies	 that	 fund	 life	science	research,	which	already	conform	to	“regulations	and	policies	governing	the	possession	 and	handling	 of	 pathogens	 and	 toxins	 [in	 other	words,	 Select	Agents]”	(ibid.),	 must	 now	 also	 be	 aware	 of,	 attempt	 to	 identify,	 and	 implement	 “risk	mitigation	 measures”	 to	 address,	 ‘dual-use	 research	 of	 concern’	 in	 current	 and	future	 research	 projects	 (ibid.).	 As	 outlined	 in	 the	 new	 policy,	 these	 new	 ‘risk	mitigation	 measures’	 can	 include	 anything	 from	 enhancing	 biosecurity	 efforts	during	 any	 stage	 of	 the	 research	 process	 (decisions	 that	 will	 be	 made	 in	collaboration	 with	 the	 participating	 scientists	 and	 scientific	 institutions)	 to	requesting	 the	 censorship	 of	 published	 results,	 classifying	 research	 in	 accordance	with	 NSDD-189,	 or	 terminating	 (or	 simply	 not	 providing)	 research	 funding	(decisions	that	will	be	made	by	federal	departments	and	agencies	alone).	Also	 like	 previous	 proposals	 of	 this	 kind,	 the	 new	 risk	 management	framework	 sets	 out	 a	 finite	 list	 of	 criteria	 that	 are	 intended	 to	 enable	 risk	management	 decision-making.	 Specifically,	 the	 framework	 defines	 ‘dual-use	research	of	concern’	as	research	involving	one	or	more	agents	or	toxins	(15	in	total)	
and	 one	 or	 more	 categories	 of	 experiments	 (seven	 in	 total).	 These	 two	 sets	 of	criteria,	both	of	which	can	be	found	in	earlier	proposals,	provide	a	standard	metric	for	 the	 purposes	 of	 risk	 management,	 while	 simultaneously	 linking	 existing	concerns	about	a	 finite	number	of	pathogens	and	 toxins	with	new	concerns	about	particular	types	of	experiments	or	experimental	techniques.		In	 relation	 to	 the	 list	 of	 agents	 and	 toxins,	 which	 serve	 as	 the	 first	 set	 of	criteria,	 it	 is	noteworthy	that	only	15	pathogens	and	toxins	are	included	under	the	new	 framework,	 instead	of	 the	approximately	80	currently	 listed	under	 the	Select	Agent	 Regulations.	 In	 contrast,	 a	 number	 of	 previous	 proposals	 defined	 dual-use	research	in	relation	to	the	complete	list	of	Select	Agents	(for	example,	Zilinskas	and	Tucker	 2002),	 or	 chose	 to	 abandon	 the	 Select	 Agent	 list	 altogether	 (for	 example,	Steinbruner	et	al.	2007).	Under	 the	new	 framework,	 the	shorter	 list	of	agents	and	toxins	 produces	 a	 definition	 of	 ‘dual-use	 research	 of	 concern’	 that	 is	 relatively	narrow,	 limiting	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 policy,	 while	 simultaneously	 enabling	 risk	management	decisions	 to	be	made	based	on	 fewer	 information	requirements.	As	 I	
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have	discussed	in	relation	to	previous	proposals,	a	narrower	definition	of	dual-use	research,	 while	 perceived	 to	 be	 practical,	 is	 also	 criticized	 for	 being	 less	comprehensive.	 Equally	 noteworthy	 are	 the	 specific	 pathogens	 and	 toxins	 that	makeup	this	list.	In	addition	to	a	number	of	‘classical’	biological	weapons	candidates	(anthrax,	 smallpox,	 Ebola	 virus,	 and	 so	 on),	 the	 list	 also	 includes	 “Avian	 influenza	(highly	 pathogenic)”	 and	 “Reconstructed	 1918	 influenza”,	 which	 are	 more	 recent	additions	 to	 the	 biological	 weapons	 discussion.	 The	 inclusion	 of	 these	 ‘newer’	biological	weapons	candidates,	especially	in	light	of	the	framework’s	shorter	list	of	agents	and	toxins	‘of	concern’,	not	only	reflects	an	active	interest	on	the	part	of	the	US	 government	 to	 address	 the	 earlier	 controversies	 surrounding	 these	 biological	entities,	 but	 also	 renewed	 concerns	 about	 the	 synthetic	 biology	 techniques	 that	enabled	 their	 synthesis.	 In	 effect,	 these	 pathogens,	 and	 the	 synthetic	 biology	techniques	used	 to	 construct	 them,	have	been	 identified	 –	 indeed,	 they	have	been	
institutionalized	–	as	‘risk	objects’	of	particular	‘dual-use	concern’.	In	relation	to	the	seven	categories	of	experiments,	which	serve	as	the	second	set	 of	 criteria,	 this	 list	 has	 essentially	 been	 conserved	 from	 previous	 proposals.	Although	 the	 language	 adopted	 in	 the	 new	 policy	 to	 describe	 these	 seven	problematic	 research	 endeavors	most	 closely	 resembles	 the	 language	 used	 in	 the	NSABB’s	 (2007)	 earlier	 oversight	 framework,	 these	 categories	 reflect	 the	 same	‘weaponization	 criteria’	 presented	 in	 the	earliest	proposals	directed	at	 controlling	access	 to	 various	 aspects	 of	 life	 science	 knowledge	 (for	 example,	 Zilinskas	 and	Tucker	 2002).	 Yet,	 while	 these	 categories	 have	 been	 highly	 conserved	 between	proposals	over	 the	 last	 ten	years,	 reflecting	broad	(or	at	 least	 tacit)	agreement	on	the	 types	 of	 research	 activities	 that	 are	 most	 problematic,	 their	 use	 in	 the	 new	federal	 policy	 further	 validates	 and	 reinforces	 their	 perceived	 legitimacy,	 and,	indeed,	moves	them	one	step	closer	to	becoming	a	regulatory	 ‘norm’	or	 ‘standard’.	Consequently,	today,	more	than	ever	before,	a	formally	disparate	set	of	experiments	and	 experimental	 techniques,	 increasingly	 known	 as	 ‘experiments	 of	 concern’	 or	‘dual-use	research	of	concern’,	can	be	said	to	have	emerged	as	a	distinct	category	of	understanding	 and	 intervening	 –	 one	 that	 describes	 and	 simultaneously	 produces	
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‘risk	objects’	of	a	particular	kind,	which	can,	in	turn,	be	defined,	listed,	reproduced,	and	used	as	a	standard	metric	for	the	purposes	of	risk	management.		In	 relation	 to	 the	 specific	 protocols	 or	 procedures	 for	 conducting	 risk	assessments	 and	 making	 risk	 management	 decisions	 on	 ‘dual-use	 research	 of	concern’,	 the	 new	 oversight	 framework	 largely	 defers	 to	 the	 earlier	 oversight	framework	 produced	 by	 the	 NSABB	 (2007).	 “For	 additional	 guidance	 on	 how	 to	conduct	 the	 risk	 assessment”,	 the	 new	 federal	 policy	 states,	 “departments	 and	agencies	may	refer	to	the	 ‘Proposed	Framework	for	the	Oversight	of	Dual	Use	Life	Sciences	 Research:	 Strategies	 for	 Minimizing	 the	 Potential	 Misuse	 of	 Research	Information’,	which	identifies	useful	assessment	tools”	(DHHS	2012,	p.	4).	As	I	have	already	discussed	the	NSABB’s	(2007)	oversight	framework	(especially	Appendix	4,	which	 provides	 a	 ‘checklist’	 for	 assessing	 and	 managing	 ‘dual-use	 research	 of	concern’),	I	will	not	comment	at	length	on	the	new	federal	policy’s	endorsement	of	this	 method	 of	 deriving	 biosecurity	 risk	 estimates,	 and	 making	 biosecurity	 risk	judgments.	 I	 will	 only	 say	 that,	 in	 endorsing	 this	 particular	 approach	 to	 risk	management	 –	 one	 that	 is	 as	 much	 ‘administrative’	 or	 ‘managerial’	 as	 it	 is	‘calculative’	 (in	 the	 sense	 implied	 by	 ‘quantitative	 risk	 assessment’)	 –	 the	 new	federal	 policy	 has,	 for	 better	 or	worse,	 privileged	 one	way	 of	 thinking	 about	 and	acting	upon	‘dual-use	risks’	at	the	expense	of	others.	As	the	authors	of	an	editorial	published	 in	Nature	 in	2006	expressed	about	 the	NSABB’s	checklist,	while	 “hardly	profound	or	original”,	“what's	new	is	the	idea	that	such	a	checklist	should	itself	be	widely	 disseminated	 to	 raise	 awareness	 and	 to	 help	 peer	 reviewers,	 university	administrators,	 students,	 government	 officials	 and	 experienced	 investigators	examine	 research	 critically”	 (Nature	 2006,	 p.	 715).	 Under	 the	 new	 federal	 policy,	this	observation	would	appear	to	be	further	reinforced.	In	 light	 of	 this	 brief	 (comparative)	 analysis	 of	 the	 recent	 federal	 policy,	 it	seems	 apparent	 that	 the	 United	 States	 Government	 Policy	 for	 Oversight	 of	 Life	
Sciences	Dual	Use	Research	of	Concern	(DHHS	2012)	is	not	the	first	risk	management	framework	of	 its	kind.	It	 is	not	altogether	 ‘novel’	or	 ‘inventive’.	Previous	proposals	(see	Table	 2)	 have	 attempted	 to	 develop	 risk	management	 strategies	 that	 seek	 to	restrict	 access	 to	 various	 aspects	 of	 life	 science	 knowledge	 deemed	 to	 pose	
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biosecurity	risks.	A	number	of	these	proposals,	 in	fact,	would	appear	to	have	done	much	 of	 the	 conceptual	 work	 of	 defining	 various	 ‘risk	 objects’,	 grouping	 them	together	 into	 categories,	 and	 developing	 rationalized	 strategies	 for	 their	management.	 Yet,	 its	 lack	 of	 novelty	 does	 not	 make	 the	 recent	 federal	 policy	unimportant.	On	the	contrary,	in	relation	to	federally	funded	research	in	the	US	(and	one	 can	 only	 speculate	 as	 to	 how	 far	 this	 new	 policy	 may	 be	 extended	 to	 non-federally	 funded	 research	 projects	 in	 the	 US	 or	 how	 far	 it	 may	 travel	internationally),	 the	 new	 policy	 defines	 a	 new	 space	 for	 regulatory	 intervention.	Moreover,	 as	 Bounds	 (2010,	 p.	 22)	 suggests:	 “Once	 regulatory	 or	 policy	 solutions	have	been	identified	and	become	owned	by	stakeholders	it	is	extremely	difficult	for	alternative	 approaches	 to	 be	 given	 serious	 consideration	 even	 if	 their	 merits	 are	supported	 by	 robust	 analysis.”	 Thus,	 to	 the	 ‘Select	 Agent	 Regulations’,	 I	 would	suggest,	 one	 might	 also	 add	 the	 new	 federal	 policy	 on	 the	 oversight	 of	 ‘dual-use	research	 of	 concern’,	 and	 with	 it,	 new	 concerns	 and	 dilemmas	 related	 to	 the	production	and	dissemination	of	intangible	life	science	knowledge.	The	new	federal	policy	has,	 in	essence,	 institutionalized	 the	concept	 ‘dual-use	 research	of	 concern’,	and	validated	a	 set	of	 risk	management	practices	directed	at	 controlling	access	 to	life	 science	 knowledge,	 from	 the	 conception	 of	 an	 idea	 for	 an	 experiment	 to	 the	publication	of	research	findings.	In	the	balance,	are	controversial	choices	related	to	national	 security	 and	 scientific	 freedom;	 and,	 as	 recent	 experience	 suggests,	potential	tradeoffs	between	these	two	objectives	pose	a	clear	dilemma.			
6.4	Beyond	the	‘classical’	biosecurity	model:	Reframing	‘biosecurity’	As	I	have	suggested,	there	exists	a	more	general	critique	that	applies	to	both	families	of	risk	management	strategies	that	I	have	discussed	in	this	chapter	(and	throughout	much	of	my	thesis).	This	critique,	advanced	largely	by	social	scientists	and	gaining	growing	support	among	biological	weapons	experts	(for	example,	Tucker	2011)	and	other	scientific	and	technical	experts	contributing	to	biosecurity	policy	discussions	in	 the	 US	 context	 and	 beyond,	 relates	 to	 the	 common	 way	 in	 which	 biosecurity	proposals	under	the	classical	biosecurity	model	conceptualize	the	problem	posed	by	
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biotechnology.	 Specifically,	 as	 the	 science	 and	 technology	 scholars	 McLeish	 and	Nightingale	(2007,	p.	1644)	observe,	“the	traditional	way	of	thinking	about	dual	use	policy”	 is	 in	terms	of	“technology	transfer”.	This	way	of	 thinking	reflects	the	belief	that	technology	has	“intrinsic	(fixed)	functions”	that	can	be	applied	in	benevolent	or	malevolent	 ways	 with	 relative	 ease	 (ibid.).	 Consequently,	 the	 policy	 problem	 is	“understood	 in	 terms	 of	 …	 preventing	 intrinsically	 dangerous	 research	 and	technology	 getting	 into	 hostile	 hands”	 (ibid,	 emphasis	 in	 original).	 Of	 particular	concern	in	relation	to	the	classical	biosecurity	model,	as	I	have	shown,	are	questions	of	 access	 to	 the	material	 or	 informational	 elements	 that	makeup	modern	 biology,	ranging	from	pathogens	and	oligonucleotides	to	reagents	and	DNA	synthesizers,	as	well	as	codified	knowledge,	such	as	information	found	in	journal	articles,	scientific	textbooks,	genomic	databases,	and	alike	(Vogel	2008a).	This	 way	 of	 understanding	 biosecurity	 reflects	 the	 prevailing	 logic	 of	 the	‘dual-use	 dilemma’,	 a	 concept	 that	 infers	 that	 biotechnology	 embodies	 a	 ‘latent	potential’	for	‘good’	and	‘bad’.		It	is	also	the	way	in	which	the	security	risks	posed	by	other	advanced	technologies	(for	example,	nuclear	technology	and	its	application	in	the	production	of	nuclear	weapons)	have	traditionally	been	conceived,	as	well	as	the	arms	control	regimes	that	have	been	invented	to	manage	these	risks	(McLeish	and	Nightingale	 2007).	 Yet,	 this	 approach	 to	 security,	 one	 that	 is	 premised	 upon	restricting	access	 to	 intrinsically	dangerous	artifacts,	at	 least	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 life	sciences,	 is	 increasingly	 contested.	 Not	 only	 is	 this	 because	 biotechnology	 is	perceived	 to	 be	 widely	 accessible	 (motivating	 some	 to	 argue	 that	 biotechnology	cannot	be	kept	out	of	 the	hands	of	 ‘terrorists’),	but	also	because	 it	 is	perceived	 to	misrepresent	how	science	is	conducted	in	practice.	In	practice,	life	science	research,	especially	 advanced	 research	 in	 synthetic	 biology	 and	 related	 fields	 of	biotechnology,	requires	considerably	more	than	access	to	equipment,	reagents	and	scientific	 protocols.	 In	 particular,	 it	 is	 said	 to	 require	 tacit	 knowledge,	 teamwork,	and	 even	 a	 degree	 of	 luck	 (Vogel	 2008c),	 which	 are	 all	 ‘ingredients’	 in	 relatively	short	supply.	Acknowledging	that	this	is	the	case,	in	turn,	complicates	the	dominant	biosecurity	frame,	and	opens	up	space	for	alternative	biosecurity	models.		
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	 The	work	of	the	sociologist	Kathleen	Vogel	has	helped	shed	light	on	some	of	the	underlying	challenges	that	make	advanced	biotechnology	difficult	to	exploit	for	malevolent	purposes	(or,	for	that	matter,	for	benevolent	ones).	For	example,	some	of	her	 fieldwork	 has	 looked	 at	 the	 contingencies	 that	 were	 encountered	 by	 the	Wimmer	research	team	in	producing	synthetic	poliovirus	(Cello	et	al.	2002),	which,	as	 I	 have	 said,	 generated	 considerable	 controversy	 upon	 the	 publication	 of	 the	results	and	accompanying	scientific	protocols.	 “When	 the	poliovirus	experiment	 is	discussed	in	policy	circles,”	Vogel	(2008c,	p.	48)	observes,	“the	focus	tends	to	be	on	how	 the	Wimmer	group	obtained	 information	 about	 the	 genome	 sequence	off	 the	Internet	 and	 ordered	 commercially	 available	 oligonucleotides	 to	make	 the	 virus”.	Yet,	 based	 on	 her	 interviews	 with	 members	 of	 Wimmer’s	 research	 team,	 the	research	experience	was	anything	but	straightforward.		According	 to	 Vogel	 (2008c),	 certain	 aspects	 of	 the	 synthetic	 poliovirus	experiment,	 especially	 difficulties	 encountered	 in	 isolating	 the	 cell-free	 extracts	needed	for	several	viral	assembly	steps,	were	perceived	to	be	especially	challenging,	requiring	 that	 the	 virologists	 develop	 “particular	 intellectual	 insights,	 laboratory	practices,	 team-work,	and	trouble-shooting	efforts”	(ibid,	p.	49)	to	overcome	these	obstacles.	Therefore,	the	success	of	the	experiment,	Vogel	argues,	was	not	so	much	“based	 on	 cutting	 edge	 technologies”,	 but	 on	 “evolutionary	 and	 well-established	laboratory	practices	and	techniques”	(ibid.).	Of	particular	importance,	she	suggests,	was	 the	 role	 of	 ‘tacit	 knowledge’,	 which,	 unlike	 ‘explicit	 knowledge’,	 cannot	 be	communicated	in	writing,	but	must	be	learned	through	practice	and	trial	and	error.	Therefore,	even	though	published	in	full,	including	step-by-step	instructions	on	how	to	produce	‘cell-free	extracts’,	Vogel’s	research	suggests	that	the	Wimmer	article	is	not	 (as	 it	 is	 sometimes	 claimed)	 a	 ‘cookbook	 for	 bioterrorism’	 (ibid.).117	Although	equivalent	 fieldwork	 has	 yet	 to	 be	 undertaken	 on	 the	 controversial	 H5N1	experiments,	 which	 drew	 similar	 concerns	 about	 providing	 ‘recipes	 for																																																									
117 According to Wimmer (cited in Vastag 2003), what is also often overlooked is that his 
research team’s synthetic poliovirus was considerably less virulent than the naturally 
occurring variety, reflecting not so much the unqualified success of the experiment (and, 
in turn, the efficacy of synthetic genomics), but rather its challenges and limitations. 
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bioterrorists’,118	 a	 closer	 look	 at	 the	 social	 and	 technical	 challenges	 encountered	during	 these	 experiments	 might	 equally	 temper	 concerns	 about	 the	 deliberate	misuse	of	the	published	findings	and	scientific	protocols.		 This	more	nuanced	picture	of	what	 it	 takes	to	(mis)use	synthetic	biology	in	practice	–	that	is,	a	perspective	that	takes	into	consideration	the	social	context	and	indeterminacies	associated	with	advanced	bioengineering	work	–	has	been	adopted	by	 some	 biological	 weapons	 experts	 and	 advanced	 in	 their	 own	 arguments	 that	question	the	basic	assumptions	underpinning	the	classical	biosecurity	model.	In	his	article,	 ‘Could	 Terrorists	 Exploit	 Synthetic	 Biology?’,	 Jonathan	B.	 Tucker,	 a	 former	chemical	and	biological	weapons	expert,	credits	Vogel’s	work,	emphasizing	that	the	need	 for	 tacit	 knowledge	may	effectively	 go	against	 synthetic	biology’s	 ‘deskilling’	agenda,	 limiting	 its	 potential	 for	deliberate	misuse	 (Tucker	2011).	Although	 some	commentators	 –	 often	 drawing	 on	 synthetic	 biologists’	 voiced	 expectations	 for	revolutionary	 advances	 in	 biotechnology	 and	 predictions	 of	 “easy-to-use	 tabletop	synthesizers”	(Maurer	2011,	p.	1400)	–	express	the	belief	that	synthetic	biology	will	inevitably	 ‘black-box’	 the	 various	 steps	 required	 to	 synthesize	 a	 virus,	 thereby	diminishing	 the	need	 for	 tacit	 knowledge	and	enabling	bioterrorism	 (for	example,	Chyba	 and	Greninger	 2004;	 Chyba	2006;	Gorman	2006),	 according	 to	Tucker	 this	view	of	synthetic	biology	is,	if	nothing	else,	premature:	“To	date,	the	de-skilling	of	synthetic	genomics	has	affected	only	a	few	elements	of	what	is	actually	a	complex,	multi-step	process.	Practitioners	of	de	novo	viral	synthesis	note	that	the	most	challenging	steps	do	not	involve	the	synthesis	of	DNA	 fragments,	 which	 can	 be	 ordered	 from	 commercial	 suppliers,	 but	 the	assembly	of	 these	 fragments	 into	 a	 functional	 genome	and	 the	 expression	of	the	viral	proteins.”	(Tucker	2011,	p.	72)	Similarly,	 the	NSABB,	 in	contrast	to	many	of	their	statements	on	synthetic	biology,	which	 appear	 to	 lend	 support	 to	 the	 underlying	 assumptions	 of	 the	 classical	biosecurity	model,	has	suggested	that:																																																									
118 For example, Robert Webster, a flu scientist and advisor to the NSABB during their 
deliberations on the H5N1 manuscripts, expressed that: “‘I don’t think science should be 
putting out recipes’ for bioterrorists” (cited in Eserink and Malakoff 2012, p. 22). 
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“[Although	 the]	 technology	 for	 synthesizing	 DNA	 is	 readily	 accessible,	straightforward	and	a	fundamental	tool	used	in	current	biological	research	…	the	science	of	constructing	and	expressing	viruses	in	the	laboratory	is	more	complex	and	somewhat	of	an	art.	It	is	the	laboratory	procedures	downstream	from	 the	 actual	 synthesis	 of	 DNA	 that	 are	 the	 limiting	 steps	 in	 recovering	viruses	from	genetic	material.”	(NSABB	2006,	p.	4)	In	 practice,	 Tucker	 (2011,	 p.	 73)	 has	 argued,	 “only	 a	 limited	 number	 of	 scientists	have	 the	 requisite	 skills	 and	 tacit	 knowledge”	 needed	 to	 effectively	 achieve	 a	successful	experimental	outcome	using	this	technology.	Several	synthetic	biologists	interviewed	for	my	research	also	share	this	view.	According	 to	 Rob	 Carlson,	 who	 has	 gained	 considerable	 recognition	 for	modeling	both	 the	 rapidly	 falling	 costs	 of	 DNA	 synthesis	 and	 its	 increasing	 productivity	(Carlson	2009),	a	projection	that	has	motivated	equal	measures	of	hope	and	anxiety	about	the	potential	(mis)applications	of	synthetic	biology:	“If	you	go	 talk	 to	people	who	build	viruses	 for	a	 living	–	who	build	 those	 flu	viruses;	who	are	funded	to	the	tune	of	tens	of	millions	a	year,	and	have	dozens	of	people	working	in	their	labs	–	they	fail	a	lot.	They	fail	most	of	the	time.	The	vast	majority	of	the	time	their	experiments	don’t	work.	The	notion	that,	say,	in	the	zero	to	five	year	time	period,	‘anyone’	will	be	building	artificial	pathogens,	or	 even	 rebuilding	 naturally	 occurring	 pathogens,	 is	 not	 credible.”	 (Rob	Carlson)	From	the	perspective	of	DIY-biologists	 (also	known	as	 ‘biohackers’,	 a	name	embraced	by	some	members	of	this	community,	but	one	that	often	carries	pejorative	connotations	 in	the	context	of	biosecurity),	who	do	not	have	access	to	comparable	financial	or	technical	resources,	this	assessment	is	said	to	be	especially	true:	“[DIY-biology]	 has	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 far	 more	 difficult	 than	 many	 people	expected,	 to	 actually	get	 anything	up	and	 running,	 even	basic	 stuff,	 like	DNA	extraction	 and	 things	 like	 that.	 I	mean	 biology	 is	 hard.	 It’s	 really	 hard	 to	 do	successfully,	particularly	when	you’re	trying	to	do	it	on	a	budget	of	100	dollars	and	with	household	materials	…	and	if	you	were	to	read	the	protocols	of	any	published	 paper	 and	 then	 go	 in	 your	 own	 lab	 and	 try	 to	 reproduce	 those	…	
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they	leave	so	much	out,	there’s	so	much	left	to	be	desired,	because	there’s	a	lot	of	 it	 that’s	 tacit	 knowledge	 that	 took	months	 and	months	 of	 work,	 and	 that	they	may	 gloss	 over	 in	 the	 description	 of	 their	methods…”	 (Jason	 Bobe,	 co-founder	of	DIYbio)	In	 this	 light,	 DIY-biologists,	 who	 are	 perhaps	 the	 most	 scrutinized	 individuals	 in	relation	 to	 the	 possible	 deliberate	misuse	 of	 synthetic	 biology,	 take	 on	 a	 different	image	–	from	nefarious	‘biohackers’	working	with	synthetic	pathogens	in	the	garage	to	‘hobbyists’	struggling	to	make	even	simple	experiments	work.			 There	 then	 exists	 a	 further	 dimension	 that	 is	 often	 glossed	 over	 by	biosecurity	proposals	 that	ultimately	 seek	 to	 restrict	 access	 to	pathogens;	namely,	‘access	 to	 pathogens’	 is	 not	 synonymous	 with	 ‘access	 to	 biological	 weapons’.	According	 to	 Tucker	 (2011)	 (see	 also	 Tucker	 and	 Zilinskas	 2006),	 successfully	synthesizing	 a	 virus	 is	 only	 the	 first	 step	 towards	 producing	 a	 biological	weapon.	The	 remaining	 steps,	 including	 culturing	 sufficient	 quantities	 of	 the	 desired	biological	 agent,	 “formulating	 the	 agent	 with	 chemical	 additives	 to	 enhance	 its	stability	 and	 shelf	 life”,	 “processing	 the	 agent	 into	 a	 concentrated	 slurry	 or	 dry	powder”,	and	developing	a	suitable	delivery	system	“that	can	disseminate	the	agent	as	 a	 fine-particle	 aerosol	 that	 infects	 through	 the	 lungs”	 (Tucker	2011,	 p.	 73),	 are	perceived	to	be	equally	challenging,	and	equally	dependent	upon	tacit	knowledge.	In	fact,	 according	 to	 a	number	of	biological	weapons	experts	 (David	Franz	and	 three	other	senior	biodefense	scientists	interviewed	for	my	research),	these	steps	are	far	more	of	an	‘art’	–	“known	by	few,	and	practiced	by	even	fewer”	(David	Franz)	–	than	the	 task	 of	 constructing	 infectious	 microorganisms,	 which,	 as	 I	 have	 said,	 many	consider	 an	 ‘art’	 itself.	 “If	 you	 take	 your	 thinking	 all	 the	way	 through	 the	 con-ops	(the	 concepts	 of	 operation),”	 David	 Franz	 explained	 about	 the	 challenges	 of	producing	viable	biological	weapons,	“the	risks	look	very	different”.	Moreover,	and	in	stark	contrast	to	the	dominant	biosecurity	frame,	a	number	of	 biological	 weapons	 experts	 interviewed	 for	 my	 research	 believe	 that	 some	aspects	 of	 biological	 weapons	 production	 are	 far	 more	 dependent	 upon	 “the	 old	profession	 of	 weapons	 development”	 (David	 Franz)	 than	 they	 are	 cutting-edge	biotechnology.	 For	 example,	 in	 a	 revealing	discussion	 (held	during	 a	 recess	 of	 the	
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BWC)	 with	 one	 senior	 biodefense	 scientist	 and	 biological	 weapons	 expert,	 he	explained	that	he	sees	little	value	in	restricting	access	to	synthetic	biology;	not	only	because	the	science	is	perceived	to	be	relatively	complicated,	but	also	because	it	is	perceived	to	be	less	‘useful’	than	some	of	the	tried	and	tested	techniques	(referred	to	 as,	 “the	 dark	 arts”)	 developed	 in	 the	 context	 of	 former	 biological	 weapons	programs.	By	contrast,	he	(and	David	Franz	expressed	a	similar	view)	does	advocate	for	the	classification	of	“practical	information”	that	relates	to	some	of	the	“old	tools”	used	 by	 these	 programs	 (for	 example,	 techniques	 used	 in	 the	 “environmental	stabilization	of	organisms”),	which	he	believes	have	“no	real	value	for	the	legitimate	life	science	community”,	and	may	actually	pose	a	significant	risk. 		 This	 view	 is	 similarly	 expressed	 in	 a	 recent	 study	 by	 a	 group	 of	 biological	weapons	experts	who	endeavor	to	look	beyond	the	question	of	‘access’	to	advanced	biotechnology	 to	 address	 the	 question	 of	 how	 this	 technology	 might	 actually	 be	exploited	 (or	 not)	 in	 practice.	 In	 this	 study,	 the	 authors	 (Suk	 et	 al.	 2011,	 p.	 1)	“reviewed	 27	 assessments	 (published	 between	 1997	 and	 2008)	 that	 address	 the	links	between	life	science	research	and	bioterrorism”	with	a	view	to	ranking	these	assessments	 according	 to	 the	 level	 of	 expertise	 and	 technical	 infrastructure	 that	would	 likely	 be	 needed	 to	 successfully	 perpetrate	 each	 attack.	 According	 to	 the	authors,	 while	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 the	 published	 assessments	 focus	 on	 the	deliberate	misuse	 of	 advanced	 biotechnology,	 they	 fail	 to	 adequately	 consider	 the	level	 of	 expertise	 and	 technical	 infrastructure	 that	 would	 (based	 on	 their	 own	assessments)	 be	 needed	 to	 successfully	 misuse	 the	 technology.	 Contrary	 to	 the	dominant	biosecurity	frame,	which	privileges	 ‘high-tech’	acts	of	bioterrorism,	their	research	 “suggests	 that	 ‘low	 tech’	 activities	 may	 be	 especially	 attractive	 to	bioterrorists”,	as	these	could	most	easily	be	exploited	(ibid,	p.	2).	Moreover,	as	one	of	the	authors	of	this	report	(Iris	Hunger)	expressed	during	an	interview:		“The	historical	record	also	suggests	that	terrorists	will	use	simple	methods.	So,	first	 of	 all,	 they	 will	 take	 what’s	 there	 [‘for	 example,	 pathogens	 found	 in	nature’],	and	not	create	something	new	[‘constructing	a	novel	pathogen	using	synthetic	biology	or	genetic	engineering	techniques’],	and	then	distribute	it	in	a	way	that’s	fool	proof	[‘for	example,	contaminating	food’].”	(Iris	Hunger)	
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Emphasizing	 the	 importance	of	 tacit	knowledge,	and	 its	 limited	availability,	Suk	et	al.	 (2011,	 p.	 3)	 conclude	 that,	 “[b]iosecurity	 policy	 discussions	 could	 gain	 more	nuance	and	credibility	by	adopting	more	sophisticated	notions	about	the	challenges	inherent	in	conducting	and	replicating	advanced	research.”		 Taken	 together,	 these	views	suggest	 that	 the	deliberate	misuse	of	 synthetic	biology	 (and	 biotechnology	 more	 broadly)	 is	 more	 than	 just	 a	 question	 of	‘technology	 transfer’.	 In	 other	 words,	 access	 to	 biotechnology	 (tangible	 or	intangible)	does	not	necessarily,	 in	and	of	 itself,	constitute	a	 ‘biosecurity	problem’.	Conversely,	restricting	access	to	this	technology,	which	is	the	fundamental	tenant	of	the	 classical	 biosecurity	model,	 does	 not	 necessarily,	 in	 and	 of	 itself,	 constitute	 a	‘biosecurity	solution’.	Significantly,	this	alternative	framing	of	the	problem	posed	by	biotechnology	not	only	represents	a	form	of	technical	critique,	calling	into	question	the	feasibility	of	biosecurity	interventions	based	on	the	classical	biosecurity	model,	but	also	suggests	the	possibility	of	other	modes	of	intervening	upon	biotechnology	that	may	be	more	desirable	in	relation	to	balancing	potentially	competing	demands	for	national	security	and	scientific	progress.	After	all,	 for	some,	as	a	number	of	the	arguments	 discussed	 in	 this	 chapter	 suggest,	 biosecurity	 controls	 aimed	 at	restricting	 access	 to	 science,	 especially	 intangible	 life	 science	 knowledge,	 are	 not	only	technically	demanding	to	implement,	but	also	potentially	counterproductive,	as	they	may	limit	scientific	openness	and	diminish	scientific	progress.		In	 this	 light,	 there	 exists	 growing	 interest	 in	 alternative	 approaches	 to	biosecurity,	 ones	 that	move	 beyond	 the	 classical	 biosecurity	model.	 In	 particular,	there	exists	a	growing	belief	that	what	is	needed	are	biosecurity	interventions	that	rely	 less	 on	 ‘top-down’	 risk	 management	 efforts	 that	 seek	 to	 restrict	 access	 to	science,	 and	more	 on	 ‘bottom-up’	 risk	management	 efforts	 that	 seek	 to	 influence	scientific	 conduct.	 However,	 as	 I	 will	 discuss	 in	 the	 following	 chapter,	 this	alternative	 approach	 to	 biosecurity	 not	 only	 brings	 with	 it	 new	 biosecurity	interventions,	but	also	new	challenges	and	dilemmas.	Although	some	view	a	 ‘risk-aware’	synthetic	biology	community	as	perhaps	the	most	sustainable	‘solution’	to	a	seemingly	 intractable	 policy	 ‘problem’,	 others	 question	 the	 appropriateness	 of	making	 life	 scientists	 the	 ‘guardians	 of	 sensitive	 materials’	 (Zilinskas	 and	 Tucker	
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2002).	Moreover,	 it	 is	unclear	 to	what	extent	synthetic	biologists	wish	 to	be	made	responsible	 for	 biosecurity,	 and	 how	 biosecurity	 practices	 may	 influence	perceptions	of	an	emerging	science	and	its	diverse	practitioners.	
	
6.5	Conclusion	In	this	chapter,	I	have	examined	a	range	of	risk	management	strategies	that	might	be	applied	(or,	in	some	instances,	that	have	recently	begun	to	be	applied)	to	synthetic	biology.	These	strategies,	often	referred	to	as	‘top-down’	approaches	to	biosecurity,	share	a	common	understanding	of	what	constitutes	a	‘biosecurity	problem’,	and,	in	turn,	what	constitutes	a	 ‘biosecurity	solution’.	Specifically,	 they	each	ascribe	to	the	‘classical’	 biosecurity	 model,	 a	 model	 premised	 upon	 the	 belief	 that	 there	 exist	tangible	 and	 intangible	 artifacts	 that	 are,	 in	 and	 of	 themselves,	 dangerous	 things,	meriting	oversight	and	control.	Under	this	model,	biosecurity	depends	upon,	and	is	indeed	defined	by,	its	capacity	to	construct	 ‘barriers	to	access’,	which	are	intended	to	prevent	certain	(dangerous)	persons	from	gaining	access	to	certain	(dangerous)	things.	As	one	biodefense	scientist	described	this	 ‘command	and	control’	approach	to	biosecurity	during	an	 interview	at	 the	BWC	(introduced	 in	Chapter	4):	 this	 is	 a	world	 of	 “guns,	 gates,	 and	 guards”,	 a	world	 of	 active	monitoring	 and	preventative	controls.	Albeit	a	convenient	shorthand	to	describe	the	classical	biosecurity	model,	biosecurity	policies	of	this	kind,	as	I	have	shown,	are	not	only	differentiated	on	the	basis	 of	 their	 ‘technical’	 capacity	 to	 account	 for	 and	 prevent	 the	 most	 urgent	dangers,	the	most	pressing	threats.	They	are	also	differentiated	on	the	basis	of	their	‘practical’	 capacity	 –	 one	 that	 is,	 above	 all,	 ‘administrative’	 or	 ‘managerial’	 in	function	–	to	enable	these	dangers	and	threats	to	be	organized	as	risks	and	made	the	subject	 of	 regulation.	 In	 this	 light,	 a	diverse	 range	of	 biosecurity	 controls,	 ranging	from	 those	 that	 seek	 to	 restrict	 access	 to	 synthetic	 genes	 to	 those	 that	 seek	 to	restrict	 the	 publication	 of	 research	 findings	 describing	 the	de	 novo	 synthesis	 of	 a	virus,	 take	 on	 a	 distinctive	 rationality,	 one	 indicative	 of	 a	 particular	 ‘mentality’	 of	governing.	This	is	the	first	conclusion	that	can	be	drawn	from	this	chapter.	
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The	 second	 conclusion	 that	 can	 be	 drawn	 from	 this	 chapter	 is	 that,	 while	there	exist	 similarities	between	 these	risk	management	strategies,	 there	also	exist	significant	 differences.	 In	 particular,	 I	 have	 discussed	 two	 broad	 ‘families’	 of	biosecurity	controls	(some	of	which	remain	at	the	inception	stage,	while	others	have	recently	 been	 implemented).	 The	 first,	 exemplified	 by	 the	 Screening	 Framework	(DHHS	 2010b)	 for	 DNA	 synthesis	 providers,	 seeks	 to	 restrict	 access	 to	 tangible	biotechnologies,	 including	genes,	chemical	precursors	to	synthetic	DNA,	and	so	on.	These	 interventions	 are	 designed	 to	 maintain	 a	 physical	 or	 spatial	 separation	between	 a	 select	 number	 of	 physical	 pathogens	 (or	 their	 constituent	 parts)	 and	particular	 kinds	 of	 (denied)	 persons.	 The	 second,	 exemplified	 by	 the	 recent	oversight	 policy	 on	 ‘dual-use	 research	 of	 concern’	 (DHHS	 2012),	 seeks	 to	 restrict	access	 to	 various	 aspects	 of	 intangible	 life	 science	 knowledge,	 including	 research	findings,	scientific	protocols,	and	so	on.	Significantly,	this	new	policy	is	designed	to	act	 upon	 ‘risk	 objects’	 that	 exist	 ‘upstream’	 of	 the	 tangible	 biotechnologies	addressed	by	the	previous	family	of	biosecurity	controls.	Indeed,	it	seeks	to	act	upon	the	 very	 production	 and	 dissemination	 of	 life	 science	 knowledge	 –	 restricting	 or	arresting	 flows	 of	 ‘dual-use	 information’	 –	 posing	 a	 different	 set	 of	 technical	challenges	 and	 ethical	 dilemmas;	 generating	 a	more	 pronounced	 tension	 between	national	security,	on	the	one	hand,	and	scientific	freedom,	on	the	other.		 Finally,	 the	 third	 conclusion	 that	 can	 be	 drawn	 from	 this	 chapter	 is	 that,	while	the	classical	biosecurity	model	has	proven	to	be	remarkably	adaptive	–	having	been	applied	to	the	management	of	diverse	‘risk	objects’	–	and	while	it	continues	to	dominate	much	biosecurity	policy	discussion,	 it	 is	also	 increasingly	contested.	Not	only	do	different	groups	of	scientific	and	technical	experts	engaged	in	the	design	and	production	 of	 biosecurity	 interventions	 of	 this	 kind	 disagree	 at	 the	 level	 of	 detail	about	 the	 content	 and	 scope	 of	 individual	 proposals,	 details	 which	 are	 variously	interpreted	 as	 more	 readily	 ‘enabling	 misuse’	 or	 ‘inhibiting	 scientific	 progress’,	there	 also	 exist	 growing	 doubts	 about	 the	 basic	 assumptions	 that	 underpin	 the	classical	biosecurity	model.	Specifically,	the	traditional	framing	of	biotechnology	as	a	 ‘technology	 transfer	 problem’,	 which	 assumes	 that	 technology	 possesses	 ‘fixed’	functions	that	can	be	applied	to	benevolent	or	malevolent	ends	with	relative	ease,	is	
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increasingly	 viewed	 as	 antithetical	 to	 the	 research	 experience.	 Recent	 scholarship	by	social	scientists,	which	is	gaining	growing	support	among	scientific	and	technical	experts	engaged	in	aspects	of	biosecurity	policy,	suggests	a	far	more	complex,	more	nuanced,	picture	of	biotechnology.	This	alternative	view	of	biotechnology	suggests	that	‘tacit	knowledge’,	as	well	as	inherent	uncertainties	associated	with	the	research	process,	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	making	 advanced	 biotechnology	work	 (or	 fail).	This	perspective	underlines	that	bioterrorism	might	require	more	than	access	to	a	list	 of	 ingredients	 and	 scientific	 protocols;	 and,	 conversely,	 that	 biosecurity	might	require	more	than	preventing	access	to	science.		
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7.	‘Prudent	vigilance’:	Towards	a	new	‘culture	of	responsibility’	
	
7.1	Introduction	In	the	previous	chapter,	I	examined	a	range	of	risk	management	strategies	that	are	intended	 to	 restrict	 access	 to	 various	 aspects	 of	 tangible	 or	 intangible	biotechnology.	In	keeping	with	the	‘classical’	biosecurity	model,	these	strategies	are	premised	upon	 the	 assumption	 that	 there	 exist	 ‘intrinsically	 dangerous’	 biological	artifacts	that	can	(and	should)	be	selectively	controlled.	However,	this	approach	to	biosecurity,	I	argued,	is	increasingly	contested;	not	only	because	it	is	perceived	to	be	technically	 demanding	 to	 keep	 ‘dangerous	 tools’	 out	 of	 ‘dangerous	 hands’	 –	 a	perspective	 on	 science	 that	 over-simplifies	 the	 research	 experience,	 treating	biotechnology	as	a	‘technology	transfer	problem’	–	but	also	because	some	believe	it	may	 undermine	 norms	 of	 scientific	 openness	 and	 limit	 scientific	 progress.	 In	 this	light,	there	exists	growing	interest,	I	concluded,	in	an	alternative	biosecurity	model,	one	 that	 relies	 less	 upon	 controlling	 access	 to	 science	 (from	 the	 ‘top-down’)	 and	more	upon	influencing	scientific	conduct	(from	the	‘bottom-up’).		In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 will	 examine	 the	 second	 approach	 to	 biosecurity,	 with	 a	view	 to	 risk	 management	 strategies	 that	 are	 presently	 being	 developed	 and	deployed	 to	raise	 ‘biosecurity	awareness’	among	synthetic	biologists.	Whereas	 the	former	 set	 of	 risk	 management	 strategies	 address	 the	 ‘dual-use	 potential’	 of	 the	science,	with	little	reference	to	the	social	actors	who	might	(mis)use	the	technology,	the	 latter	 set	of	 risk	management	 strategies	 takes	as	 its	 target	of	 intervention	 the	very	 capacities	 of	 synthetic	 biologists.	 Ranging	 from	 calls	 on	 the	 part	 of	governments	and	professional	organizations	for	the	adoption	of	professional	‘codes’	(Rappert	2003)	to	the	development	of	educational	materials	designed	to	encourage	university	 students	 to	 reflect	 on	 the	 dilemmas	 posed	 by	 ‘dual-use	 research’	(interview	 with	 Malcolm	 Dando,	 Professor	 of	 International	 Security	 at	 the	University	 of	 Bradford)	 to	 the	 outreach	 and	 awareness	 raising	 activities	 of	 the	Federal	 Bureau	 of	 Investigation	 (FBI)	 (which	 provides	 the	 primary	 case	 study	
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examined	 in	 this	 chapter),	 these	 governance	 measures	 are	 intended	 to	 enable	synthetic	biologists,	and	life	scientists	more	broadly,	 to	take	“a	more	active	role	 in	guarding	against	misuse”	(McLeish	and	Nightingale	2007,	p.	1648).	Part	 of	 a	 wider	 trend	 in	 the	 life	 sciences	 to	 cultivate	 a	 new	 ‘culture	 of	responsibility’,	 these	 risk	 management	 efforts	 seek	 to	 strengthen	 an	 existing	regulatory	 regime	by	way	of	 encouraging	 greater	 reliance	on	 scientists	 to	 ‘govern	themselves’.	While	few	argue	that	this	should	replace	more	conventional	‘top-down’	approaches	to	regulation,	limited	‘self-governance’	is	believed	to	be	an	increasingly	important	 component	 of	 effective	 biosecurity	 policy.	 Moreover,	 for	 some	 (for	example,	 Kwik	 et	 al.	 2003),	 it	 is	 perceived	 to	 be	 the	 most	 effective	 means	 of	addressing	the	 ‘dual-use	problem’	 in	biotechnology,	as	 life	scientists	are	perceived	to	be	in	the	best	position	to	evaluate	the	vulnerabilities	of	their	work	and	to	identify	possible	 misapplications.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	 role	 of	 governmental	 actors	 and	organizations	 engaged	 in	 aspects	 of	 biosecurity	 policy	 can	 be	 conceptualized	 as	governing	 through	 ‘indirect	 action’	 –	 promoting	 specific	 types	 of	 ‘self-control’	 or	‘self-management’	 (Rose	 2000).	 With	 a	 view	 to	 this	 ongoing	 process	 of	‘responsibilization’,	I	will	address	several	questions	in	this	chapter,	including:	How	are	synthetic	biologists	encouraged	to	be	responsible	for	biosecurity,	and	why	is	this	perceived	to	be	necessary?	What,	exactly,	constitutes	‘responsible	life	science’	in	this	context,	and	how	does	this	contrast	with	existing	forms	of	responsibility	in	the	life	sciences?	 What	 challenges	 or	 resistances	 are	 encountered	 during	 this	 process	 of	‘responsibilization’,	 and	how	might	a	new	 ‘culture	of	 responsibility’	 influence	how	scientists	perceive	themselves,	and	how	they	are	perceived	by	others?	While	 limited	 ‘self-governance’	 has	 been	 a	 feature	 of	 the	 life	 sciences	 for	some	 time,	 visible	 in	 relation	 to	 biosafety	 practices	 that	 have	 become	 a	 routine	aspect	of	institutional	science,	biosecurity	practices	are	a	relatively	new	addition	to	the	 day-to-day	 responsibilities	 of	 life	 scientists	 (Reppy	 2003).	 In	 relation	 to	biosecurity,	synthetic	biologists	(including	‘DIY-biologists’	and	other	groups	aligned	with	the	‘field’	of	synthetic	biology)	are	encouraged	to	consider	their	research	with	a	view	to	how	it	might	be	 ‘deliberately	misused’	and	to	consider	the	actions	of	 their	colleagues	 with	 a	 view	 to	 how	 they	 may	 transgress	 community	 norms,	 posing	
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‘biosecurity	risks’.	In	other	words,	synthetic	biologists	are	encouraged	(to	the	extent	possible)	to	become	‘experts	in	biosecurity’,	making	routine	what	has,	until	recently,	been	a	predominately	 ‘top-down’	exercise	and	 the	primary	 jurisdiction	of	 security	professionals	 (ibid.).119	 Indeed,	 linkages	between	 these	 formally	distinct	groups	of	actors	 are	 not	 only	 visible	 in	 relation	 to	 a	 specific	 type	 of	 ‘risk-thinking’,	 one	oriented	 around	 the	 subject	 of	 ‘deliberate	 misuse’,	 but	 also	 in	 relation	 to	 an	emerging	web	of	connections	that	are	presently	bringing	the	worlds	of	science	and	national	security	into	closer	contact	in	the	name	of	biosecurity.	In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 this	 represents	 a	 new	 –	 or	 at	 least	 a	substantially	reconfigured	–	form	of	life	science	‘responsibility’,	one	that	is	distinct	from	existing	demands	for	biosafety,	and	one	that	is	redefining	what	it	means	to	be	a	‘responsible	 life	 scientist’.	 Today,	 and	 increasingly,	 I	 suggest,	 ‘responsible	 life	science’	 is	characterized	by	the	need	 for	scientists	 to	demonstrate	 that	 they	are	at	once	 ‘prudent’	 and	 ‘vigilant’	 –	 ‘self-disciplined’	 and	 ‘watchful’	 –	 an	 orientation	 on	risk	 management	 that	 is	 closely	 associated	 with	 growing	 concerns	 about	bioterrorism	and	heightened	demands	for	biosecurity.	Whereas	 ‘prudence’	 implies	an	 underlying	 responsibility	 for	 monitoring	 one’s	 own	 conduct	 in	 the	 face	 of	 an	uncertain	 future	 (O’Malley	 1992),	 ‘vigilance’	 implies	 monitoring	 the	 conduct	 of	others	 in	the	face	of	 ‘deliberate	threats’.	Being	a	 ‘responsible	 life	scientist’,	 in	turn,	means	knowing	what	biosecurity	 risks	 look	 like,	knowing	where	 to	 look	 for	 them,	how	to	measure	them,	and	how	to	respond	to	them;	it	means	embracing	unfamiliar	vocabularies	 linked	 with	 ‘terrorism’	 and	 ‘national	 security’	 and	 engaging	 with	unfamiliar	cultures	more	commonly	associated	with	security	and	defense.	The	case	of	synthetic	biology,	which	is	closely	associated	with	contemporary	concerns	 about	 bioterrorism,	 offers	 unique	 insight	 into	 this	 emerging	 web	 of																																																									
119 Reppy, among others (for example, McLeish and Nightingale 2007), refers to these 
actors as comprising ‘the security community’. In opting to use the term, ‘security 
professionals’ (see Bigo 2000), my intention is to underline that a wide variety of actors 
and institutions, in the US alone, participate in aspects of ‘national security’. Similarly, as 
a variety of actors comprise ‘the scientific community’ (a term that is, again, frequently 
encountered in the literature), I attempt to differentiate between specific groups of 
scientists, such as ‘synthetic biologists’ or ‘DIY-biologists’. 
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connections,	as	well	as	the	struggles	and	resistances	that	accompany	this	ongoing	(it	largely	 remains	 to	 be	 seen	 to	 what	 extent	 this	 biosecurity	 model	 will	 result	 in	 a	‘successful’	change	in	scientific	behaviour)	process	of	 ‘responsibilization’.	Although	many,	 including	many	synthetic	biologists	 (IRGC	2009),	view	these	connections	as	necessary,	 and	 argue	 that	 biosecurity	 awareness	 raising	 is	 not	 only	 needed	 to	enhance	‘national	security’,	but	also	to	sustain	the	legitimacy	of	an	emerging	science	that	 is	 perceived	 to	 be	 of	 particular	 ‘dual-use	 concern’,	 this	 approach	 to	 risk	management	 is	 nonetheless	 contested.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 there	 exist	 doubts	 about	synthetic	biologists’	capacity	to	 ‘police	themselves’,	and	questions	about	the	utility	of	 ‘self-governance’	 as	 a	 means	 of	 preventing	 the	 deliberate	 misuse	 of	 modern	biology.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 although	 supportive	 of	 ‘self-governance’	 as	 an	alternative	 to	potentially	more	 restrictive	 forms	of	 regulation,	 synthetic	 biologists	are	resistant	to	biosecurity	messages	that	simultaneously	cast	them	as	‘biosecurity	risks’	 and	as	 ‘strategic	partners’	 in	biosecurity	–	 a	 label	 some	 feel	 is	unwarranted	and	a	 role	 others	 are	hesitant	 to	 fill.	Negotiating	 these	 sites	 of	 resistance,	 in	 turn,	represents	 a	 formidable	 challenge	 to	 risk	 management	 in	 synthetic	 biology,	 and	raises	new	questions	about	the	role	of	national	security	in	science.		
7.2	A	new	‘Asilomar	moment’?	Following	the	recent	controversy	surrounding	the	H5N1	experiments	(discussed	in	the	 previous	 chapter),	 which	 motivated	 scientists	 to	 declare	 a	 temporary	moratorium	on	research	projects	of	 this	kind	(Malakoff	and	Enserink	2012),	many	drew	 a	 parallel	 with	 the	 Asilomar	 Conference,	 connecting	 this	most	 recent	 act	 of	‘self-regulation’	 or	 ‘self-governance’	 with	 the	 self-restraint	 shown	 by	 genetic	engineers	in	1975	(Berns	et	al.	2012;	Casadevall	and	Shenk	2012).	Some	referred	to	this	 as	 a	 new	 ‘Asilomar	moment’.	 In	 the	words	 of	 Stanley	 Falkow,	 a	microbiology	professor	and	former	participant	at	the	Asilomar	Conference:	“[T]he	parallels	of	Asilomar	can	be	applied	 to	 the	problem	 facing	biomedical	science	today.	We	should	move	 forward	to	establish	standardized	guidelines,	using	common	sense	and	scientific	 creativity.	The	onus	of	 responsibility	 falls	
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on	 the	 individual	scientist	and	 involves	 the	education	of	a	new	generation	of	scientists	 into	 the	 social	 and	 ethical	 implications	 of	 genetic	 engineering	 in	 a	new	age	of	genomics	and	synthetic	biology.”	(Falkow	2012,	p.	1)	Falkow’s	 comments,	 and	 the	 claim	 that	 the	 life	 sciences	 are	 experiencing	 a	new	‘Asilomar	moment’,	on	the	one	hand,	reaffirm	scientists’	stated	commitment	to	responsible	 ‘self-governance’,	underlining	the	belief	that	scientists	should	continue	to	play	a	central	role	in	managing	the	‘risks’	engendered	by	their	work.	On	the	other	hand,	 these	comments,	and	the	claim	that	 the	 life	sciences	are	experiencing	a	new	‘Asilomar	 moment’,	 do	 not	 capture	 how	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘responsibility’	 in	 the	 life	sciences	has	 changed	–	or	 is	beginning	 to	 change	–	 in	 response	 to	 a	newly	visible	range	of	social	problems.	Today,	unlike	the	earlier	case	of	genetic	engineering,	calls	for	 responsible	 ‘self-governance’	 point	 to	 a	 different	 set	 of	 moral	 and	 practical	obligations,	which	are	tightly	coupled	with	the	perceived	threat	of	bioterrorism	and	growing	 demands	 for	 biosecurity.	 Embracing	 multiple	 governance	 measures,	ranging	 from	prescriptions	 for	biosecurity	 ‘best	practices’	 in	 institutional	 research	settings	 (for	 example,	 WHO	 2006)	 to	 codes	 of	 ethics	 that	 set	 out	 aspirational	standards	 by	which	 scientists	might	 judge	 their	 conduct	 (for	 example,	 Somerville	and	Atlas	 2005)	 to	 a	 variety	 of	 educational	 resources	 for	 scientists	 to	 learn	more	about	 the	nature	 of	 ‘biosecurity	 risks’	 and	what	 they	 can	do	 to	 prevent	 them	 (for	example,	NSABB	2011,	pp.	2-3),	calls	 for	a	new	‘culture	of	responsibility’	suggest	a	new	orientation	on	‘responsible	life	science’.	Namely,	they	convey	the	growing	belief	that	 scientists	 must	 not	 only	 guard	 against	 biotechnology’s	 ‘unintended	consequences’	(biosafety),	but	also	its	‘deliberate	misuse’	(biosecurity).		Although	a	uniform	definition	of	this	new	vision	of	‘responsible	life	science’	cannot	be	articulated,	as	multiple	actors	and	organizations	are	presently	engaged	in	imagining	 this	 new	 ‘culture	 of	 responsibility’,	 the	 US	 Presidential	 Commission	 for	the	Study	of	Bioethical	 Issues	(PCSBI	2010)	expresses	a	view	that	 is	 illustrative	of	the	 underlying	 logics	 of	 these	 recommendations.	 According	 to	 the	 PCSBI	 (2010),	synthetic	biologists	should	adopt	a	culture	of	‘prudent	vigilance’	if	their	science	is	to	flourish	 as	 a	 secure	 and	 sustainable	 ‘scientific	 enterprise’.	 Included	 in	 this	 call	 for	responsibility,	 the	 PCSBI	 (ibid,	 p.	 145)	 points	 to	 the	 need	 for	 “‘enhanced	
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watchfulness’”,	 which	 “requires	 the	 scientific	 community	 to	 recognize	 the	 varied	risks	 associated	with	 synthetic	 biology	 and	 develop	 internal	 processes	 to	 identify	and	respond	to	potential	threats	rapidly	and	effectively.” In	essence,	as	I	will	discuss	in	further	detail,	a	scientist	that	is	both	‘prudent’	and	‘vigilant’	is	one	that	has	been	sensitized	to	the	threat	of	bioterrorism	and	made	aware	of	potential	avenues	for	the	‘loss,	 theft,	 and	 potential	 misuse’	 of	 their	 work,	 thereby	 becoming	 an	 integral	component	of	a	wider	biosecurity	regime.	In	brief,	it	represents	an	‘ideal	type’	of	life	scientist	–	one	capable	of	playing	an	active	role	in	biosecurity.		In	 the	context	of	 the	 laboratory,	 for	example,	 the	WHO	(2006,	p.	26)	 states	that	scientists	have	a	“moral	responsibility	to	ensure	that	the	materials	they	handle	are	 accounted	 for	 and	 secured”	 and	 that	 “this	 responsibility	 lies	 with	 the	 facility	managers,	 the	 principal	 investigators	 and	 the	 laboratory	 staff:	 all	 laboratory	personnel	 have	 a	 responsibility	 to	 take	 reasonable	 precautions	 against	 theft	 or	misuse.”	Similarly,	the	NSABB	(2011,	p.	2)	has	encouraged	synthetic	biologists	(and	related	groups,	 including	do-it-yourself	 (DIY)	biologists),	not	only	to	be	mindful	of	their	own	research,	but	also	“to	consider	options	on	how	best	to	minimize	the	risk	that	 their	 findings	 may	 be	 misused	 or	 misapplied	 toward	 malevolent	 goals.”	Emphasized	in	the	Fink	Report	(NRC	2004),	widely	recognized	as	having	motivated	much	of	the	present	policy	discussion	(at	least	in	the	US	life	science	policy	context)	on	the	role	life	scientists	should	play	in	biosecurity	(Atlas	2005b),	cultivating	a	new	‘culture	of	responsibility’	will	 require	“that	national	and	 international	professional	societies	 and	 related	 organizations	 and	 institutions	 create	 programs	 to	 educate	scientists	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 dual	 use	 dilemma	 in	 biotechnology	 and	 their	responsibilities	to	mitigate	its	risks”	(NRC	2004,	p.	4).	“We	now	need	to	build	upon	the	Asilomar	experience”,	the	Fink	Committee	concludes,	“to	develop	a	uniform	set	of	criteria	to	manage	this	new	set	of	risks”	(ibid,	p.	113).		Yet,	as	the	science	and	technology	scholar	Judith	Reppy	(2003,	p.	48)	rightly	argues,120	these	new	governance	measures	are	non-trivial,	as	they	demand	“nothing	less	than	a	cultural	shift”.	Specifically,	scientists	are	encouraged	to	adopt	not	only	a																																																									120	See, also, Caduff (2008).	
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new	way	of	thinking	about	biological	risks,	but	also	a	new	set	of	practices,	routines	and	behaviors,	which	help	shape	 the	space	within	which	 life	 science	 is	 conducted,	and	help	define	what	 it	means	 to	be	a	 ‘responsible	 life	scientist’.	Moreover,	Reppy	(ibid.)	underlines,	a	cultural	shift	of	this	kind	“cannot	be	imposed	from	above”,	but	must	elicit	the	cooperation	of	biologists	“and,	indeed,	the	whole	network	of	actors”	engaged	 in	 the	 life	 sciences.	 For	 the	 various	 organizations	 and	 actors	 engaged	 in	imagining	this	new	‘culture	of	responsibility’,	this	means	devising	risk	management	strategies	that	foster	cooperation	–	building	connections	between	life	scientists	and	security	 professionals,	 two	 ‘communities’	 that	 are	 often	 said	 to	 “speak	 different	languages	and	face	very	different	incentive	structures”	(ibid,	p.	49).	Indeed,	as	Kwik	et	al.	 (2003,	p.	32)	suggest:	 “Part	of	 the	current	 lack	of	awareness	stems	 from	the	fact	that	the	professional	worlds	of	bioscience	and	national	security	do	not	interact	very	much	or	demonstrate	a	good	understanding	of	each	other’s	concerns”.	 In	this	light,	as	the	NSABB	(2010,	p.	12)	puts	it,	if	sustained	‘biosecurity	awareness’	is	to	be	achieved,	 “education	 efforts	 and	 oversight	 requirements	 should	 be	 tailored	 to	 the	audience”	they	are	intended	to	reach.	Or,	as	Filippa	Lentzos	(2007)	suggests,	it	will	be	 necessary	 to	 find	 “constructive	ways	 of	 incorporating	 concern	 about	 potential	misuse	into	the	professional	norms	of	biological	scientists”.121		Representing	both	an	opportunity	and	a	challenge,	connections	of	 this	kind	contribute	 to	 bringing	 the	 worlds	 of	 ‘science’	 and	 ‘national	 security’	 into	 closer	contact,	 and	 it	 is	 at	 the	 intersection	of	 science	and	national	 security	 that	 this	new	‘culture	of	responsibility’	is	perceived	to	be	possible.	Illustrated	in	Figure	3,	security	professionals	(in	this	instance	represented	as	a	police	officer)	and	scientists	(in	this	instance	 represented	 as	 a	 public	 health	 researcher)	 are	 increasingly	 conceived	 as	‘strategic	 partners’,	 sharing	 a	 common	 responsibility	 for	 guarding	 against	“[i]ntentional	 misuse”	 (WHO	 2006,	 p.	 26).	 According	 to	 the	 WHO	 (ibid.),	 “those	working	in	biological	laboratories	have	unwittingly	become	partners	sharing	in	the	moral	responsibility	to	ensure	that	the	materials	they	handle	are	accounted	for	and	secured,	 and	 consequently	 in	 the	 protection	 of	 global	 public	 health.”	 And,	 yet,	 for																																																									
121 See http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd85/85bwc.htm. 
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many	 life	scientists,	at	 least	 those	working	outside	of	biodefense	research	settings	or	 other	 laboratory	 environments	 that	 routinely	 handle	 dangerous	 pathogens	(Rappert	 2003),	 the	 place	 of	 national	 security	 considerations	 in	 science	 remains	unfamiliar,	challenging	traditional	notions	of	responsibility,	which	have	historically	(as	 I	 have	 suggested)	 centered	 on	 the	 problem	 of	 managing	 the	 ‘unintended	consequences’	of	biological	research.	For	some	commentators,	including	the	French	biological	weapons	expert	Elisande	Nexon	(2011,	p.	6),	this	lack	of	familiarity	means	that,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 “adequate	 communication	 to	 raise	 awareness,	 biosecurity	measures	may	 be	 perceived	 as	 an	 unwelcome	 and	 unnecessary	 constraint	 …	 and	barely	understandable	from	the	point	of	view	of	a	scientist.”			
							 											
Figure 3: The intersection of security and science (Source: WHO 2006, p. 24). 	Thus,	the	claim	that	the	life	sciences	are	experiencing	a	new	‘Asilomar	moment’	does	not	fully	capture	the	extent	to	which	the	roles	and	responsibilities	of	 life	scientists	are	currently	being	 redefined	 to	accommodate	biosecurity	practices	 in	addition	 to	those	 of	 biosafety.	 In	 brief,	 ‘responsible	 life	 science’	 in	 an	 age	 of	 bioterrorism	 is	characterized	 by	 a	 different	 relationship	 between	 scientists	 and	 risk.	 From	‘prudence’	 (characteristic	of	biosafety)	 to	 ‘vigilance’	 (characteristic	of	biosecurity),	scientists	 are	 increasingly	 expected	 to	 be	 both	 ‘self-disciplined’	 and	 ‘watchful’;	
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encouraged	to	cooperate	with	law	enforcement	and	intelligence	agencies	on	matters	of	 ‘national	 security’	 (Ball	 2004).	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 this	 form	 of	 responsibility	embraces,	and	seeks	to	extend,	familiar	logics	of	‘self-regulation’,	wherein	scientists,	as	 ‘prudent	 subjects’,	 are	 encouraged	 to	 “practise	 and	 sustain	 their	 autonomy	 by	assembling	 information,	 materials	 and	 practices	 together	 into	 a	 personalized	strategy	 that	 identifies	 and	minimizes	 their	 exposure	 to	 harm”	 (O’Malley	 2000,	 p.	465).	For	some	time,	this	has	been	the	mainstay	of	‘responsible	life	science’,	relying	on	the	individual	scientist	to	develop	an	awareness	of	hazards	in	the	workplace	and	to	 take	measures	 to	 anticipate	 and	prevent	 the	 unintended	 consequences	 of	 their	research.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 these	 calls	 for	 responsibility	 point	 to	 something	different,	 namely,	 the	 role	 of	 life	 scientists	 is	 increasingly	 characterized	 as	 one	 of	‘self-policing’	(see,	for	example,	Ball	2004)	rather	than	‘self-management’.	Nor	is	this	new	‘culture	of	responsibility’	precisely	comparable	to	concurrent	efforts	 in	 research	 ethics	 that	 aim	 to	 maintain	 research	 standards,	 and	 to	 avert	scientific	 misconduct	 and	 academic	 scandal.	 Although	 similarly	 encouraging	scientists	to	look	beyond	their	own	work	to	consider	the	actions	of	their	peers	and	colleagues	 –	 in	 a	 sense,	 encouraging	 scientists	 to	 ‘police	 themselves’	 –	 risk	management	 efforts	 of	 this	 kind	 nonetheless	 draw	 upon	 and	 seek	 to	 activate	familiar	capacities	in	life	scientists.	In	the	case	of	monitoring	potentially	fraudulent	conduct	 in	 life	 science	 research,	 for	 example,	 this	 activity	 largely	 depends	 upon	scientific	 considerations	 and	 scientific	 knowledge.	 These	 forms	 of	 knowledge	 and	modes	 of	 understanding	 are	 arguably	 more	 easily	 accessed	 and	 mobilized	 by	scientists	as	a	means	of	auditing	and	verifying	potential	transgressions	within	their	‘community’.	Biosecurity,	 in	contrast,	 is	said	to	depend	upon	cultivating	a	different	set	of	capacities,	ones	that	are	closely	aligned	with	‘national	security’	considerations	and	the	traditional	roles	and	responsibilities	of	security	professionals.		Before	considering	in	closer	detail	how	this	new	‘culture	of	responsibility’	is	presently	 being	 cultivated	 in	 the	 context	 of	 synthetic	 biology,	 and	 to	 what	 effect,	there	 remains	 at	 least	 one	 further	 point	 of	 comparison	 with	 the	 Asilomar	Conference	 that	 bears	 consideration,	 and	 which	 suggests	 an	 enduring	 feature	 of	‘responsible	life	science’.	Specifically,	as	the	history	of	science	scholar	Susan	Wright	
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(1986,	 p.	 615)	 has	 shown,	 the	 Asilomar	 Conference	 was	 not	 simply	 an	 effort	 by	scientists	to	mitigate	the	‘biosafety	risks’	posed	by	genetic	engineering,	but	also	an	effort	 to	protect	“biomedical	research	 from	external	regulation.”	 In	other	words,	 it	was	not	only	an	attempt	to	determine	the	best	means	of	doing	genetic	engineering	responsibly,	 but	 also	 a	 means	 of	 demonstrating	 that	 genetic	 engineers	 could	 be	responsible.	 By	 taking	 it	 upon	 themselves	 to	 become	 their	 own	 risk	managers,	 a	view	 that	 is	 currently	 supported	 by	 many	 synthetic	 biologists	 (see,	 for	 example,	IRGC	 2009),	 genetic	 engineers	 sought	 to	 free	 themselves	 from	 other	 (potentially	more	restrictive)	forms	of	oversight	and	regulation.	In	this	light,	the	recent	research	moratorium	 called	 by	 H5N1	 scientists,122	 often	 favorably	 described	 as	 a	 new	‘Asilomar	moment’,	can	equally	be	understood	as	an	effort	by	scientists	to	forestall	“heavy-handed	government	regulation”	(Malakoff	and	Enserink	2012).	Therefore,	 although	 the	 roles	 and	 responsibilities	 of	 life	 scientists	 are	presently	being	redefined	in	response	to	growing	concerns	about	bioterrorism	and	heightened	 demands	 for	 biosecurity,	 the	 perceived	 need	 to	 demonstrate	 practical	action	 in	 the	 face	 of	 uncertain	 risks	 remains	 much	 the	 same.	 Although	 rarely	featuring	in	policy-accounts	of	the	Asilomar	Conference,	this	meeting	(and	the	more	recent	moratorium	on	H5N1	research,	albeit	with	a	view	to	biosecurity,	as	opposed	to	 biosafety)	 was	 instrumental	 in	 more	 than	 one	 sense.	 It	 served	 as	 a	 means	 of	enhancing	 biosafety,	 and	 it	 served	 as	 a	 means	 of	 sheltering	 an	 emerging	biotechnology	 from	 potentially	 more	 restrictive	 forms	 of	 regulation.	 In	 both	instances,	 these	objectives	were	 facilitated	by	 the	call	 for	 ‘prudent	self-regulation’.	This	perspective	on	the	Asilomar	Conference,	 I	suggest,	 is	equally	 indicative	of	 the	‘Asilomar	 experience’,	 and	 equally	 characteristic	 of	 current	 calls	 for	 ‘self-governance’	 in	 synthetic	 biology.	 Yet,	 as	 the	 preceding	 discussion	 suggests,	scientists’	 willingness	 to	 participate	 in	 biosecurity	 –	 a	 practice	 that	 envisions	scientists	as	not	only	their	own	risk	managers,	but	also	their	own	police	–	 is	more	tenuous	than	that	of	biosafety,	raising	new	questions	and	dilemmas.																																																									
122 The moratorium, which was announced in a letter signed by 39 leading influenza 
researchers on 20 January 2012, has now come to an end, after approximately one year. 
By some accounts, this marks the end of the H5N1 controversy (Malakoff 2013). 
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7.3	Cultivating	a	new	‘culture	of	responsibility’	In	recent	years,	I	have	suggested,	there	has	been	a	growing	emphasis	on	establishing	a	 new	 ‘culture	 of	 responsibility’.	 Justified	 in	 part	 by	 heightened	 concerns	 about	bioterrorism,	 and	 in	part	 by	 a	perceived	 lack	of	 biosecurity	 awareness	 among	 life	scientists,	 including	 synthetic	 biologists	 (Kelle	 2007),	 as	 well	 as	 growing	 doubts	about	 the	efficacy	and	desirability	of	 restricting	access	 to	 ‘dual-use	biotechnology’	(Chapter	 6),	 biosecurity	 education	 and	 awareness	 raising	 has	 come	 to	 be	increasingly	favored	as	a	practical	means	of	engaging	scientists	to	play	a	more	active	role	 in	 countering	 the	 threat	 of	 ‘deliberate	 misuse’.	 As	 the	 NSABB	 (2011,	 p.	 2)	suggests	 in	 relation	 to	 its	 so-called	 “strategic	 plan	 on	 outreach	 to	 all	 stakeholder	communities	about	dual	use	research	…	a	successful	system	of	oversight	depends	on	the	 ability	 of	 researchers	 to	 recognize	 the	dual	 use	potential	 of	 their	work	 and	 to	consider	 options	 on	 how	 best	 to	 minimize	 the	 risk	 that	 their	 findings	 may	 be	misused	 or	 misapplied	 toward	 malevolent	 goals.”	 To	 achieve	 this	 objective,	 the	NSABB	 (2010,	 p.	 9)	 suggests,	 “outreach	 and	 educations	 [sic]	 strategies”	 must	 be	developed	“that	target	relevant	communities.”	In	the	case	of	synthetic	biology,	these	include:	 “researchers	 who	 are	 a)	 not	 subject	 to	 federal	 biosafety	 and	 biosecurity	requirements	 (e.g.,	 private	 sector),	 b)	 not	 formally	 affiliated	 with	 universities	 or	research	institutions,	and	c)	students	(at	all	levels)”	(ibid,	p.	14).	In	 this	 section,	 drawing	 on	 interviews	with	 (amateur)	 synthetic	 biologists,	law	enforcement	agents,	and	biological	weapons	experts	interviewed	in	the	context	of	the	BWC,	as	well	as	data	from	the	biosecurity	policy	literature,	I	will	consider	how	biosecurity	awareness	raising	activities	(especially	those	of	the	FBI	in	their	ongoing	engagement	with	DIY-biologists)	 attempt	 to	 enable	 synthetic	biologists	 to	become	active	 contributors	 to	 biosecurity.	More	 precisely,	 I	will	 consider	 how	biosecurity	awareness	 raising	 activities	 seek	 to	 enable	 a	 particular	 kind	 of	 ‘responsible	 life	scientist’	 (one	 who	 is	 both	 ‘prudent’	 and	 ‘vigilant’)	 and	 how	 a	 new	 ‘culture	 of	responsibility’	 is	 beginning	 to	 emerge,	 and	 to	 what	 effect.	 Taken	 together,	 I	 will	argue,	 although	 this	 approach	 to	 biosecurity	 is	 viewed	 by	many	 (including	many	
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synthetic	biologists)	as	a	promising	and	efficient	means	of	countering	the	threat	of	bioterrorism,	 as	 well	 as	 sustaining	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 an	 emerging	 science	 that	 is	closely	associated	with	 ‘dual-use	concerns’,	 there	remain	diverging	opinions	about	the	 role	 synthetic	 biologists	 should	 play	 in	 biosecurity.	Moreover,	 there	 exists	 an	uneasy	 relationship	 between	 the	 worlds	 of	 science	 and	 national	 security,	complicating	functional	partnerships	between	scientists	and	security	professionals,	and	raising	new	questions	about	the	role	of	security	in	science.	Much	like	the	risk	management	strategies	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter	(and	the	case	of	the	DNA	synthesis	industry,	Chapter	5),	which	I	argued	are	intended	to	 ‘manage’	 or	 ‘organize’	 the	 material	 and	 informational	 elements	 that	 makeup	synthetic	 biology	 in	pursuit	 of	 a	 secure	 and	 sustainable	 ‘scientific	 enterprise’,	 this	research	suggests	that	biosecurity	awareness	raising	activities	directed	at	synthetic	biologists	presuppose	 that	 it	 is	possible	 to	 reform	human	beings,	 to	 reshape	 their	attributes	and	 to	direct	 their	 capacities	 towards	productive	ends	 (Miller	and	Rose	1990;	 Dean	 1999;	 Rose	 2000).	 From	 ‘administering	 things’	 to	 ‘administrating	persons’,	the	same	logics	of	‘manageability’	that	are	applied	to	‘synthetic	genes’	and	‘dual-use	 research’	 are	 equally	 apparent	 in	 relation	 to	 biosecurity	 ‘outreach	 and	education	 strategies’	 (NSABB	 2010)	 directed	 at	 influencing	 the	 conduct	 of	 life	scientists.	 However,	 unlike	 the	 risk	management	 strategies	 discussed	 in	 previous	chapters,	which	primarily	address	 the	organization	and	management	of	 inanimate	‘risk	 objects’,	 synthetic	 biologists	 are	 free	 to	 interpret	 and	 to	 resist	 biosecurity	messages,	and,	thus,	these	messages	must	be	made	understandable	and	acceptable	to	 scientists	 on	 their	 own	 terms.	 This,	 in	 turn,	 requires	 successfully	 tailoring	biosecurity	messages	to	the	life	science	audiences	they	are	intended	to	reach.		From	a	 regulatory	 standpoint,	 this	 research	also	 suggests	 that	 limited	 ‘self-governance’,	as	a	mode	of	regulation,	is	increasingly	viewed	as	an	efficient	means	of	allocating	responsibility	and	managing	risk.	As	Bounds	(2010)	suggests:	“The	careful	allocation	of	responsibility	for	risk	management	has	the	potential	to	produce	greater	economic	benefits	by	allowing	risks	to	be	managed	at	the	level	 of	 society	 where	 it	 will	 be	 most	 effective.	 This	 can	 include	 reducing	unnecessary	 reliance	 on	 government	 involvement	 in	 individual’s	 lives,	
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thereby	 building	 a	 more	 resilient	 society	 and	 allowing	 opportunities	 for	adaptive	behaviour.”	(Bounds	2010,	p.	25)	Or,	 as	 Kwik	 et	 al.	 (2003,	 p.	 33)	 argue	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 life	 sciences,	 an	 effective	“governance	system	for	bioscience	should	engage	the	practitioners	of	science	in	an	integrated	 management	 of	 biosecurity	 concerns.”	 This	 is	 because	 “scientists	themselves”,	 they	 suggest,	 “best	 understand	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 craft	 and	business	of	biological	science	might	be	most	efficiently	governed”	(ibid.).	Before	 proceeding,	 two	 qualifications	 are	 also	 necessary.	 First,	 although	opinions	differ	as	to	the	role	life	scientists	should	play	in	‘policing	science’,	and	who	should	 ultimately	 be	 accountable	 for	 biosecurity,	 ‘self-governance’,	 as	 a	 mode	 of	regulation,	 is	 by	 no	 means	 perceived	 to	 be	 undesirable	 from	 the	 standpoint	 of	synthetic	biologists.	 “Within	 the	 synthetic	biology	 community,”	 the	 IRGC	 (2009,	p.	10,	citing	Campos	2009)	suggests,	“there	is	considerable	support	for	approaches	to	oversight	 that	 rely	 on	 measures	 developed	 and	 implemented	 by	 the	 community	itself”.	 Indeed,	 by	 as	 early	 as	 2006,	 “[a]t	 the	 Second	 International	 Meeting	 on	Synthetic	Biology	(SynBio	2.0)	in	Berkeley	…	participants	put	forward	a	declaration	on	the	governance	of	the	field,	which	focused	on	biosecurity	issues	and	emphasised	self-regulation”	(ibid.).	Similarly,	synthetic	biologists	are	not	the	passive	recipients	of	 biosecurity	 awareness	 raising	 efforts	 coordinated	 on	 behalf	 of	 government	authorities.	On	the	contrary,	it	is	equally	perceived	to	be	in	the	interests	of	synthetic	biologists	to	cultivate	their	‘biosecurity	awareness’.	At	the	same	time,	to	what	extent	this	reflects	an	advanced	concern	about	the	‘biosecurity	implications’	of	their	work,	versus	a	desire	to	avoid	more	intrusive	government	oversight	and	regulation,	and	to	avoid	 familiar	 lessons	 (notably,	 GM	 crops)	 associated	 with	 minimal	 societal	engagement	on	matters	of	public	concern,	is	open	to	question	(ibid.).		Second,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 underline	 that	 there	 exist	 further	 examples	 of	‘biosecurity	 awareness	 raising’	 that	 I	 do	 not	 attempt	 to	 address	 in	 this	 section.	Moreover,	while	each	of	these	efforts	ostensibly	share	an	overarching	commitment	to	 enabling	 scientists	 to	 play	 a	 more	 active	 role	 in	 biosecurity,	 they	 do	 so	 by	 a	variety	 of	 means,	 reflecting	 different	 institutional	 commitments	 and	 priorities,	contributing	 to	 somewhat	 different	 understandings	 of	 what	 should	 count	 as	
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‘appropriate’	self-governance.	For	example,	in	the	case	of	 ‘codes	of	conduct’,	which	represent	one	method	of	raising	biosecurity	awareness	that	have	received	“renewed	interest	 …	 as	 a	 means	 of	 mobilizing	 the	 scientific	 community	 across	 many	organizations	and	countries”,	Rappert	(2003,	p.	167)	notes	that	there	exist	varying	competing	 opinions	 on:	 “who	 should	 devise	 codes,	 whether	 they	 should	 be	voluntary,	 what	 purpose	 they	 might	 serve,”	 as	 well	 as	 “what	 issues	 they	 should	cover,	by	what	mechanisms	they	could	be	agreed,	whether	a	new	code	is	necessary	or	 existing	 ones	 should	 be	 augmented,	 and	 whether	 there	 should	 be	 a	 single	universal	 code	 or	 varied	 local	 ones.”	 In	 this	 light,	 it	 is	 apparent	 that,	 while	 the	specific	awareness	raising	activities	discussed	in	this	section	highlight	a	number	of	key	biosecurity	messages	 that	 can	be	used	 to	help	 characterize	 ongoing	 efforts	 to	establish	a	‘risk-aware’	life	science	community,	there	is	neither	a	uniform	vision	for	how	this	might	be	achieved,	nor	a	consensus	view	of	what	exactly	a	‘community’	of	this	 sort	 might	 look	 like.	 This	 is	 because	 ‘biosecurity	 awareness	 raising’	 takes	multiple	forms	and	is	the	product	of	diverse	actors	and	organizations,	ranging	from	government	 agencies	 to	 professional	 organizations,	 biotechnology	 industries	 to	academia.	Moreover,	 “life	 scientists”	 (despite	 frequent	 portrayals	 to	 the	 contrary)	“are	a	highly	heterogeneous	population”	(Relman	2010,	p.	276).	
	
7.3.1	‘Building	Bridges	Around	Building	Genomes’:	Getting	to	know	your	‘local	WMD	
Coordinator’	On	4-5	August	2009,	the	FBI	hosted	a	conference	in	San	Francisco	entitled	‘Building	Bridges	 Around	 Building	 Genomes’.	 Its	 goal	 was	 to	 bring	 together	 “science	 and	security	 communities	 to	 come	 to	 an	 understanding	 to	 promote	 a	 culture	 of	responsibility”123	 and	 to	 consider	 steps	 that	 might	 be	 taken	 to	 ensure	 that	 DNA	synthesis	technology	is	used	only	for	beneficial	applications.	For	Special	Agent	You,	of	the	FBI’s	Weapons	of	Mass	Destruction	(WMD)	Directorate,	the	Building	Bridges	conference	 marked	 an	 important	 turning	 point	 in	 the	 FBI’s	 engagement	 with																																																									
123 Edward You, cited in Lempinen (2011), available at: http://www.aaas.org/news/fbi-
aaas-collaborate-ambitious-outreach-biotech-researchers-and-diy-biologists. 
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(amateur)	synthetic	biologists.	During	my	interview	with	Agent	You,	a	leading	figure	in	the	FBI’s	outreach	and	awareness	raising	activities	with	life	scientists,	he	recalled	that	 the	 conference	 (and	 other	 initiatives	 of	 this	 kind)	 signaled	 a	 “paradigm	 shift	because	there’s	always	been	a	rift,	or	a	gap	of	mistrust,	between	academia	and	law	enforcement”,	whereas	now	“we’re	basically	acting	as	a	resource,	trying	to	establish	a	partnership,	and	academia	is	very	receptive,	and	want	more	of	this	engagement.”	For	 Jason	Bobe,	 co-founder	of	DIYbio,124	 and	 a	participant	 at	 the	Building	Bridges	conference,	 this	 meeting	 was	 equally	 significant,	 but	 for	 somewhat	 different	reasons.	According	to	Bobe,	the	Building	Bridges	conference	marked	the	beginning	of	 a	 constructive	 –	 yet,	 at	 times,	 uneasy	 –	 engagement	 between	 “DIYbio	 and	 law	enforcement”,	 one	 that	 has	 seen	 growing	 interest	 in	 amateur	 biology,	 and	 its	indirect	pairing	with	the	themes	of	“biosecurity”	and	“bioterrorism”.		 While	 the	 Building	 Bridges	 conference	 represents	 only	 one	 site	 of	engagement	 between	 life	 scientists	 and	 security	 professionals,	 it	 is,	 I	 suggest,	illustrative	 of	 an	 ongoing	 process	 of	 ‘responsibilization’	 that	 sees	 the	 worlds	 of	science	and	national	security	interacting	in	new	ways	in	the	name	of	biosecurity.	For	Agent	You,	 and	 for	other	experts	 interviewed	 for	my	 research	 (David	Franz;	Piers	Millett;	 Christopher	 Park;	 Dana	 Perkins;	 Amy	 Smithson),	 this	 engagement	 is	perceived	 to	 be	 necessary	 because	 synthetic	 biology	 (and	 amateur	 biology,	 as	 a	demonstration	of	‘democratized’	science)	calls	into	question	the	foundational	logics	of	‘biosecurity’,	a	defensive	practice	premised	upon	keeping	‘dangerous	tools’	out	of	‘dangerous	 hands’	 (Chapter	 4).	 In	 light	 of	 broad	 based	 capabilities	 in	 the	 life	sciences,	 and	 an	 expanding	 portfolio	 of	 equipment,	 information	 and	 research	techniques	 that	 have	 been	 identified	 as	 ‘biosecurity	 risks’	 to	 be	 ‘managed’,	 a	‘command	 and	 control’	 approach	 to	 biosecurity	 is	 viewed	 as	 increasingly	impractical,	 and	 possibly	 ‘bad	 for	 science’	 (Chapter	 6).	 For	many,	 this	 suggests	 a	need	for	a	new	approach	to	biosecurity,	one	that	relies	less	on	controlling	access	to	science,	and	more	on	enabling	scientists	to	become	their	own	‘risk	managers’,	and,	in	many	ways,	their	own	‘police’.	According	to	Agent	You:																																																										
124 See http://diybio.org/. 
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“The	 most	 effective	 method	 [of	 biosecurity]	 is	 to	 engage	 the	 life	 science	community,	 so	 they	 can	 police	 themselves	…	 so	 they	 can	 be	 in	 a	 position	 to	identify	 not	 only	 the	 risks	 and	 vulnerabilities,	 but	 also	 potential	 nefarious	activity,	 and	 then	 to	 be	 in	 a	 position	 to	 report	 it	 to	 the	 appropriate	 parties,	which	includes	the	FBI,	of	course.”	(Edward	You)	From	the	perspective	of	DIY-biologists	like	Jason	Bobe	and	McKenzie	Cowell,	Bobe’s	colleague	and	co-founder	of	DIYbio,	cooperating	with	 law	enforcement	and	becoming	active	participants	in	biosecurity	is	equally	perceived	to	be	important,	but	not	strictly	because	they	feel	they	are	best	suited	to	the	task	of	identifying	the	‘risks’	and	 ‘vulnerabilities’	 associated	 with	 amateur	 biology.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 they	acknowledge	 there	 exist	 concerns	 about	 DIY-biology’s	 “potential	 for	 deliberate	misuse”,	 and	 express	 a	 willingness	 to	 participate	 in	 biosecurity	 initiatives	 (Jason	Bobe	and	McKenzie	Cowell	interviews).	On	the	other	hand,	they	are	“very	conscious	of	 law	 enforcement’s	 interest	 in	 DIYbio”,	 which	 leads	 them	 to	 believe	 that	 the	sustainability	 of	 the	 “amateur	 biology	 movement”	 partially	 depends	 upon	demonstrating	a	“culture	of	safety	and	security”	(Jason	Bobe	and	McKenzie	Cowell	interviews).	In	Bobe’s	opinion,	biosecurity	awareness	within	the	DIYbio	community,	and	being	seen	to	participate	in	biosecurity	initiatives,	is	essential	because	“DIYbio	has	been	cast	as	such	a	controversial,	high-risk	activity	for	society”,	and	there	is	“a	real	 worry”	 that	 a	 perceived	 lack	 of	 responsibility	 (or,	 in	 the	 worst	 case,	 a	“biosecurity	incident”)	on	the	part	of	amateur	biologists	might	generate	a	“knee-jerk	reaction”	that	could	“set	back	the	whole	field	of	synthetic	biology.”	In	this	light,	the	emerging	‘partnership’	between	the	FBI	and	DIYbio	reveals	itself	 to	 be	 one	 based	 upon	 a	 sense	 of	 reciprocity,	 but	 one	 that	 is	 understood	somewhat	differently	by	their	respective	spokespersons.	For	Agent	You,	“it’s	about	recognizing	that	we	all	have	a	role	to	play,	and	that	we	are	all	dependent	upon	one	another,	and	that	we	all	need	to	work	together	to	address	these	risks.”	This,	in	turn,	has	motivated	the	FBI	to	reach	out	to	local	DIYbio	‘chapters’	across	the	US,	as	well	as	to	undergraduate	teams	at	the	annual	International	Genetically	Engineered	Machine	
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(iGEM)	 Competition125	 and	 to	 academic	 institutions	 across	 the	 country,	 to	 “build	bridges”	between	scientists	and	local	FBI	field	agents	(“WMD	Coordinators”)126	in	an	effort	 to	 “educate	 students	 about	 responsible	 conduct	 …	 priming	 that	 next	generation	of	 synthetic	 biology	practitioners	 to	 be	 able	 to	 address	 these	 issues	 in	the	future.”	For	Agent	You,	the	FBI’s	WMD	Coordinators	are	the	“educators	and	also	the	bridge	 lines,	 so	 if	 there	was	ever	an	 incident	of	 some	kind,	 they	would	be	 the	bridge	between	the	local-level	and	the	headquarters-level,	where	I	sit.”	Whereas,	 for	 Jason	Bobe,	 engaging	with	 law	enforcement	 is	 not	 only	 about	mitigating	‘biosecurity	risks’,	but	also	limiting	the	controversy	surrounding	amateur	biology	activity.	According	to	Bobe,	 if	 this	means,	 “getting	to	know	our	 local	WMD	Coordinator,	‘Dan’,	that’s	fine”.	“The	problem”,	he	explained,		“is	 that	at	 the	end	of	 the	day,	 their	 job	 is	 still	 to	enforce	 the	 law.	And	 if	 they	come	in	[to	a	DIYbio	community	lab]	and	see	that	somebody	is	mailing—	you	know,	if	the	lab	isn’t	up	to	code	or	something	–	if	something	breaks	the	law	–	it	just	causes	concern	among	community	members,	and	they	may	be	less	willing	to	participate	in	an	open	and	transparent	manner.”	(Jason	Bobe)	As	 Bobe’s	 account	 suggests,	 although	 willing	 to	 meet	 with	 their	 ‘local	 WMD	Coordinator’,	in	part	because	this	is	perceived	to	provide	the	necessary	assurances	that	 their	 local	 DIYbio	 group	 is	 not	 causing	 harm,	 some	 ‘community	 members’	continue	to	view	law	enforcement	agents	as	outsiders	and	their	visits	can	generate	‘concern’.	Because,	as	Bobe	suggests,	their	WMD	Coordinator’s	‘job’	is	‘to	enforce	the	law’,	he	worries	that	some	DIY-biologists	may	feel	“they	are	putting	themselves	in	a	legal	 liability	 situation	 by	 asking	 for	 help.”	 Consequently,	 Bobe	 believes	 “there’s	some	 negotiation	 that	 needs	 to	 happen	 here	 [with	 law	 enforcement]	 to	 make	 it	
																																																								
125 See http://igem.org/Main_Page. 
126 Agent You offered further background on the FBI’s WMD Coordinators: “In each of 
our 56 field offices across the US, there’s one Special Agent who’s designated the WMD 
Coordinator for their region. They receive training above and beyond their training as an 
Investigator. They’re educated about CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological, and 
nuclear] issues. And they are the point of contact for, and they liaise with, industry, 
academia, even the amateur biology groups (if they happen to be in their area).”	
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acceptable	 for	 individuals;	 to	 not	 feel	 threatened	by	doing	 these	 activities,	 and	 so	there’s	a	whole	lot	of	work	that	needs	to	go	into	that.”	In	 many	 ways,	 I	 suggest,	 the	 Building	 Bridges	 conference,	 and	 the	 FBI’s	ongoing	 engagement	 with	 DIYbio,	 represents	 a	 test	 case	 for	 a	 larger	 project	 or	program	 that	 aims	 to	 bring	 together	 life	 science	 and	 security	 ‘communities’	 to	jointly	 address	 the	 problem	of	 ‘deliberate	misuse’.	 On	 a	 larger	 scale,	 there	 exist	 a	growing	number	of	policy	 initiatives	calling	for	cooperation	between	life	scientists	and	 security	 professionals,	 emphasizing	 the	 need	 for	 “Creating	 New	 Partnerships	Between	 the	 Science	 and	 Security	 Communities”	 (NRC	 2007,	 p.	 81)127	 and	 for	“'joined-up'	 thinking	 across	 all	 responsible	 sectors,	 namely	 government,	 the	scientific	 community	 and	 the	 biotechnology	 and	 pharmaceutical	 industries”	 (ICRC	2004)128	 to	 address	 the	 threat	 of	 bioterrorism.	 Whether	 in	 the	 form	 of	interdisciplinary	 working	 groups	 (for	 example,	 NRC	 2007)	 or	 joint	 policy	 papers	(for	example,	Bügl	et	al.	2007),	each	site	of	engagement	between	life	scientists	and	security	 professionals	 suggests	 a	 promising	 opportunity	 for	 collaboration.	 At	 the	same	 time,	 as	 the	 FBI-DIYbio	 case	 suggests,	 there	 exists	 an	 underlying	 tension	between	 these	 groups,	 each	 of	 which	 is	 perceived	 to	 possess	 different	 cultural	frames,	 professional	 interests,	 expectations	 and	 concerns,	which	 puts	 science	 and	security	 communities,	 it	 has	 been	 suggested,	 at	 risk	 of	 “‘talking	 past	 each	 other’”	(NRC	 2007,	 p.	 77).	 From	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 FBI,	 and	 for	 others	 in	 favor	 of	encouraging	 greater	 reliance	 on	 ‘self-management’	 or	 ‘self-policing’	 in	 the	 life	sciences,	scientists	are	viewed	as	an	invaluable	resource,	constituting	“a	distributed,	self-reinforcing,	and	adaptive	protection	system”	(Relman	2010,	p.	277)	capable	of	detecting	and	(it	is	hoped)	preempting	potential	‘nefarious	activity’.	For	 life	 scientists,	 their	 engagement	 with	 law	 enforcement	 and	 security	communities	 is	 at	once	a	 reflection	of	 their	 concern	about	 the	 ‘primary’	 risks	 that	might	 arise	 in	 the	 context	 of	 their	 research	 and	 the	 ‘secondary’	 or	 ‘reputational’																																																									
127 See National Research Council (NRC 2007, pp. 77-84), ‘Partnerships for Science and 
Security’, available at: http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12013&page=77. 
128 See International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC 2004), ‘Responsibilities of 
Actors in the Life Sciences to Prevent Hostile Use’, available at: 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/5vdjlw.htm. 
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risks	that	might	arise	from	a	perceived	failure	to	act	responsibly	(Power	et	al.	2009).	In	 the	 case	 of	 DIYbio,	 this	 means	 that,	 irrespective	 of	 whether	 their	 ongoing	collaboration	 with	 law	 enforcement	 is	 perceived	 to	 be	 ideal,	 it	 is	 nonetheless	perceived	 to	 be	 important	 to	 demonstrate	 their	 willingness	 to	 participate	 in	biosecurity	 initiatives	 –	 a	 view	 that	 would	 appear	 to	 be	 shared	 by	 the	 wider	‘synthetic	 biology	 community’,	 which	 is	 frequently	 noted	 for	 its	 commitment	 to	‘upstream	engagement’	(Lentzos	2009).	Indeed,	it	is	evident	that	many	life	scientists	believe	 that,	 “the	 best	way	 to	 keep	 the	 pursuit	 of	 knowledge	 open	 and	 free	 is	 for	researchers	 to	 exercise	 a	 demonstrable	 sense	 of	 responsibility”	 (Nature	 2006,	 p.	715),	 and	being	 a	 ‘responsible	 life	 scientist’,	 especially	 in	 post-9/11	America,	 can,	quite	arguably,	no	longer	be	separated	from	participating	in	biosecurity.		In	 this	 light,	 the	 outreach	 and	 awareness	 raising	 activities	 of	 the	 FBI	with	DIYbio,	which	have	been	among	the	most	vigorous	sites	of	biosecurity	engagement	with	 (amateur)	 synthetic	 biologists	 in	 the	 United	 States,	 take	 on	 a	 strategic	coherence.	From	the	perspective	of	both	parties,	 there	are	perceived	to	be	mutual	benefits	 to	 cooperation.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 this	 cooperation	 is	not	without	 its	own	challenges	and	dilemmas,	especially	from	the	perspective	of	DIY-biologists,	who	are,	if	 indirectly,	framed	as	both	‘allies’	and	‘potential	threats’.	The	FBI-DIYbio	case	can	equally	be	understood	as	one	manifestation	of	a	more	general	trend	that	is	bringing	the	worlds	of	science	and	national	security	into	closer	contact	in	pursuit	of	a	‘secure’	and	 ‘sustainable’	 science.	 Yet,	 whether	 ‘partnerships’	 of	 this	 kind	 will	 flourish	remains	 open	 to	 question.	 For	Agent	You,	 the	 ‘gap	 of	mistrust’	 between	 scientists	and	law	enforcement	appears	to	be	closing,	whereas	DIY-biologists	express	a	more	ambivalent	 attitude.	 For	 the	 time	 being,	 it	 would	 appear	 that	 DIY-biologists	 view	their	partnership	with	the	FBI	as	one	that	is	no	less	a	matter	of	self-preservation,	as	it	 is	a	matter	of	shared	conviction.	Yet,	according	 to	McKenzie	Cowell,	despite	 this	evident	tension,	“both	sides	benefit	(for	now)	from	that	relationship.”		
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7.3.2	Making	scientists	‘experts	in	biosecurity’	The	challenge	of	building	a	sense	of	mutual	trust	between	life	science	and	security	communities	 is	 interconnected	 with	 the	 broader	 challenge	 of	 cultivating	 a	 new	‘culture	 of	 responsibility’.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 FBI’s	 engagement	 with	 DIYbio,	 and	across	 multiple	 sites	 of	 ongoing	 biosecurity	 awareness	 raising,	 a	 variety	 of	educational	 resources,	 incentives	 and	 penalties	 (for	 example,	 in	 the	 form	 of	 legal	requirements	under	the	Select	Agent	Regulations)	are	presently	being	mobilized	to	motivate	 and	 enable	 life	 scientists	 to	 become	 (to	 the	 extent	 possible)	 their	 own	‘experts	 in	 biosecurity’.	 Embracing	 a	 distinctive	 form	 of	 ‘advanced	 liberal’	government,	 one	 that	 is	 characterized	 by	 “steering	 and	 regulating	 rather	 than	rowing	 and	 providing”	 (Rose	 2000,	 p.	 324),	 international	 organizations,	 federal	agencies,	 scientific	 institutions,	 and	 others,	 are	 presently	 developing	 risk	management	 strategies	 that	 are	 intended	 to	 enable	 life	 scientists	 to	 play	 a	 more	active	 role	 in	 biosecurity.	 In	 the	 following,	 continuing	 to	 draw	 upon	 the	 FBI’s	outreach	 and	 awareness	 raising	 activities	with	 (amateur)	 synthetic	 biologists,	 but	with	 a	 view	 to	 the	wider	 biosecurity	 policy	 debate,	 I	will	 highlight	 the	manner	 in	which	this	new	form	of	‘responsible	life	science’	is	presently	being	pursued.		 From	 the	perspective	of	Agent	You,	among	others	 (for	example,	Kwik	et	al.	2003),	life	scientists	are	perceived	to	be	in	the	best	position	to	identify	biosecurity	risks	that	might	arise	in	the	context	of	their	work,	which	should	then,	according	to	Agent	 You,	 be	 reported	 to	 the	 FBI	 or	 other	 “appropriate	 parties”.	 In	 this	 light,	beyond	 the	 challenge	 of	 creating	 channels	 of	 communication	 between	 WMD	Coordinators	and	(amateur)	synthetic	biologists,	there	is	perceived	to	exist	a	further	challenge	 of	 ensuring	 that	 scientists	 are	 made	 aware	 of	 how	 to	 identify,	 assess,	manage	and	communicate	risks	of	 this	kind.	As	Agent	You	described	 in	relation	to	one	 aspect	 of	 the	 FBI’s	 outreach	 and	 awareness	 raising	 activities:	 at	 the	 outset	 of	presentations	to	“undergraduate	students,	all	the	way	up	to	university	leadership”,	“I	 like	 to	 quote	 Spiderman:	 ‘With	 great	 power,	 comes	 great	 responsibility’”.	What	follows	–	both	in	relation	to	Agent	You’s	didactic	PowerPoint	presentations	(which	I	have	 had	 the	 opportunity	 to	 see	 on	 two	 occasions)	 and	 in	 relation	 to	 an	 ongoing	
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process	of	 ‘responsibilization’	more	generally	–	are	a	series	of	message	points	that	endeavor	to	communicate	what	form	this	‘responsibility’	might	take.		 Although	a	uniform	approach	to	biosecurity	awareness	raising	does	not	exist,	as	 evidenced	 by	 an	 array	 of	 educational	 resources,	 codes	 of	 conduct,	 appeals	 to	norms,	 and	 alike,	 which	 have	 recently	 come	 to	 populate	 the	 life	 science	 policy	literature,	 the	 general	 aim	of	 these	 activities,	 I	 suggest,	 is	 to	 establish	 a	 degree	 of	situational	awareness	among	life	scientists,	enabling	them	to	become	(to	the	extent	possible)	 their	 own	 ‘experts	 in	 biosecurity’.	 For	 example,	 at	 the	 Building	 Bridges	conference,	 introduced	 above,	 the	 FBI	 ran	 a	 “tabletop	 exercise”	 that,	 according	 to	Agent	You,	aimed	at	“instilling	that	nugget	of	knowledge	about	biosecurity	issues,	so	that	 scientists	 can	 consider	 these	 questions	 and	 identify	 these	 issues	 later	 on	 in	their	careers.”	Agent	You’s	description	of	this	tabletop	exercise	helps	shed	light	on	the	kinds	questions	that	scientists	are	encouraged	to	consider:	“We	provided	 some	hypothetical	 scenarios.	 For	 example,	 if	 someone	 tried	 to	illicitly	 gain	 access	 to	 sequences	 or	 dangerous	 pathogens	 or	 toxins,	 or	 if	someone	 was	 showing	 suspicious	 behavior	 within	 the	 community,	 or	 if	someone	noticed	that	someone	was	trying	to	exploit	them	for	information,	and	so	on.	We	provided	 them	with	a	story	 line,	and	asked:	 ‘What	would	you	do?’	‘How	would	you	react?’	‘Who	would	you	notify?’	And	it’s	very	enlightening	for	the	participants	to	realize	that:	‘You	know	what,	these	are	possible	threats,	and	if	 I	do	encounter	 them,	who	do	 I	need	 to	 contact?	What	actions	 can	 I	 take?’”	(Edward	You)	According	to	Agent	You,	the	FBI	uses	variations	of	this	tabletop	exercise	at	meetings	and	conferences	across	the	US,	using	“scenario	stories”	in	combination	with	“a	series	of	didactic	presentations”	to	help	give	scientists	“a	law	enforcement	perspective	on	biosecurity	…	introducing	them	to	another	world,	basically.”	In	 addition	 to	 providing	 a	 platform	 for	 engagement	 between	 scientists	 and	security	 professionals,	 outreach	 and	 awareness	 raising	 activities	 of	 this	 kind,	 as	Agent	 You’s	 account	 suggests,	 are	 intended	 to	 introduce	 scientists	 to	 ‘another	world’.	This	 ‘other	world’	 is	 the	world	of	 ‘law	enforcement’	and	 ‘national	security’,	professional	domains	characterized	by	a	different	way	of	thinking	about	laboratory	
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equipment,	 scientific	 knowledge,	 and	 the	 day-to-day	 activities	 of	 life	 scientists.	According	to	David	Relman	(2010,	p.	275),	a	microbiologist	and	active	contributor	to	biosecurity	policy	discussions	 in	the	US,	 “the	 life-sciences	research	and	national	security	 communities”	 have	 “widely	disparate	 cultures	 and	 styles”,	 each	having	 “a	different	 understanding	 of	 the	 global	 life-sciences	 landscape”	 and	 use	 “different	criteria	for	defining	and	interpreting	incongruities	in	this	landscape”.	Consequently,	Relman	 and	 others	 argue	 that	 raising	 biosecurity	 awareness	 among	 life	 scientists	ultimately	 requires	 teaching	 them	 to	 think	differently	 about	 their	work	and	about	the	risks	that	might	arise	in	the	course	of	their	research	activities.	In	the	case	of	the	FBI’s	tabletop	exercise,	for	example,	scientists	are	encouraged	to	consider	a	range	of	scenarios	 that	may	 be	 unfamiliar	 to	 them,	 including	 the	 possibility	 that	 someone	might	 attempt	 to	 “illicitly	 gain	 access	 to	 sequences	 or	 dangerous	 pathogens	 or	toxins”.	 They	 are	 encouraged	 to	 be	 mindful	 of	 “suspicious	 behavior	 within	 their	community”,	and	to	be	aware	of	whom	to	contact	in	the	event	that	biosecurity	risks	should	 be	 identified.	 These	 are	 among	 the	many	 contingencies,	 “possible	 threats”,	and	practical	actions	synthetic	biologists	are	encouraged	to	consider	 in	relation	 to	their	new	responsibilities	as	‘strategic	partners’	in	biosecurity.		Awareness	raising	activities	of	this	kind,	in	brief,	can	be	thought	of	as	efforts	to	teach	scientists	to	think	more	like	security	professionals,	encouraging	them	to	adopt	a	new	perspective	on	biological	risks	and	their	responsibilities	as	life	scientists.	As	Agent	You	expressed	on	several	occasions,	the	FBI’s	approach	to	awareness	raising	is	about	“encouraging	scientists	to	think	about	how	these	technologies	could	be	used	for	 nefarious	 purposes”;	 about	 finding	 ways	 to	 “prevent	 the	 exploitation	 or	 the	subversion	of	the	technology	for	nefarious	use”;	and	about	“providing	scientists	with	the	 situational	 awareness	 that	 there	 are	 these	 potential	 risks	 and	 vulnerabilities,	and	possible	threats.”	Others	interviewed	for	my	research,	including	Amy	Smithson,	a	 chemical	 and	 biological	 weapons	 expert	 who	 regularly	 conducts	 outreach	 and	awareness	 raising	 activities	 with	 scientists,	 argue	 that	 it	 is	 important	 to	 teach	scientists	to	think	about	“the	potential	downsides	of	an	experiment”,	which	can	help	“start	to	change	the	laboratory	environment.”	
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Further	details	on	‘responsible	life	science’	are	visible	in	the	form	of	a	variety	of	educational	resources,	which	are	available	to	life	scientists	through	an	assortment	of	mediums.	For	example,	a	recent	publication	by	the	NSABB	(2011,	p.	3)	describes	YouTube	videos,	brochures	and	DVDs	that	have	been	designed	to	offer	“a	conceptual	introduction	to	the	dual	use	research	issue”,	and	which	have	been	made	available	to	scientists	 online,	 at	 presentations	 and	 poster	 sessions.	 One	 video,	 hosted	 on	 the	National	Institutes	of	Health	website,	entitled	“Dual	Use	Research	–	A	Dialogue”,129	features	 prominent	 life	 scientists,	 public	 health	 officials,	 medical	 doctors,	 and	biological	weapons	experts	discussing	the	nature	of	‘dual-use	risks’	and	the	various	actions	 that	 scientists	might	 take	 to	mitigate	 these	risks.	The	video	 is	divided	 into	three	parts,	including	sections	on:	“What	is	dual	use	research?”	“What	can	be	done?”	and	“How	should	we	prepare	for	the	future?”	In	this	video,	scientists	are	reminded	that:	 “We	 have	 a	 responsibility,	 not	 only	 to	 our	 personal	 research,	 but	 to	 the	scientific	community	…	and	to	the	communities	we	live	in.”	Other	experts	interviewed	for	my	research	recommend	more	intensive	forms	of	 education,	 introducing	 concepts	 such	 as	 “ethics”,	 “membership”,	 “enlightened	leadership”,	 “openness”	 and	 “trust”.	 For	 example,	 according	 to	Amy	Smithson,	 she	believes	scientists	should	receive	“ethical	instruction,	raising	awareness	of	their	membership	in	mankind,	and	the	 fact	 that	 they’re	 part	 of	 the	 human	 race	 and	 it’s	 not	 all	 about	 ‘Do	 I	publish	or	perish?’	or	‘Do	I	beat	my	competition	to	discovery	‘x’?’	When	you	are	 dealing	 with	 these	 areas	 of	 science,	 which	 have	 the	 potential	 to	devastate	the	planet,	I	think	there	are	larger	responsibilities	at	hand,	and	it	ought	to	be	mandatory	to	have	that	type	of	instruction.”	(Amy	Smithson)	In	 another	 interview,	 David	 Franz,	 a	 senior	 biodefense	 scientist	 and	 former	member	of	the	Fink	Committee	(NRC	2006),	expressed	that	he	believes	that,	“while	there	 are	 places	 for	 guns,	 gates	 and	 guards”,	 the	 best	 mechanism	 of	 risk	management	 in	 the	 life	 sciences	 is	 through	 “soft	 power”	 and	 “hearts	 and	minds”.	According	 to	 Franz,	 biosecurity	 awareness	 raising	 should	 be	 about	 encouraging:																																																									
129 Available at: http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/biosecurity.html. 
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“Enlightened	 leadership,	 quality	 research,	 vision,	 responsibility,	 honesty	 and	openness,	full	and	total	access	…	[and]	building	a	culture	of	trust.”	Irrespective	of	the	content	and	scope	of	the	biosecurity	guidance	offered	to	life	scientists,	 this	 guidance	 is,	 necessarily,	 non-exhaustive.	 Instead,	 it	 functions	 as	 a	primer,	encouraging	a	new	way	of	thinking	about	biological	risks,	and	providing	an	introductory	vocabulary	for	talking	about	biosecurity.	As	Agent	You	commented	in	relation	 to	 the	FBI’s	 tabletop	exercise,	 for	 example,	 the	primary	aim	of	 awareness	raising	activities	of	this	kind	is	“to	prompt	discussion”,	“to	get	everyone	talking”,	to	provide	“that	nugget	of	knowledge	about	biosecurity	issues”.	It	is,	in	turn,	expected	that	 scientists	will	 carry	 this	 knowledge	 forward,	 translating	biosecurity	 guidance	into	 practical	 action,	 while	 simultaneously	 remaining	 engaged	 with,	 and	 seeking	support	 from,	 a	 wider	 ‘security	 community’	 (of	 which,	 it	 would	 seem,	 they	 are	increasingly	a	part).	According	to	Gretchen	Lorenzi,	an	intelligence	analyst	with	the	FBI,	she	believes	“that	the	science	community	 ‘has	an	ability	to	deal	with	and	take	responsibility	for	its	own	vulnerabilities,	but	…	the	FBI	can	be	an	asset	in	that	fight’”	(cited	in	NRC	2007,	p.	83).	Or,	as	Dana	Perkins,	a	public	health	official	and	biological	weapons	 expert	 who	 conducts	 outreach	 and	 awareness	 raising	 activities	 with	amateur	 biologists	 at	 DIYbio	 community	 labs,	 explained	 during	 an	 interview:	“[community	labs]	can	ask	for	support	from	a	federal	agency	like	the	FBI.	That’s	up	to	them.	That	is	their	due	diligence.	We	basically	put	the	ball	in	their	court,	so	they	will	have	to	decide	what	constitutes	their	due	diligence.”	These	 accounts	 illustrate	 that	 (amateur)	 synthetic	 biologists	 are,	 to	 a	 large	extent,	made	to	enact	their	own	form	of	‘responsible	life	science’,	where	biosecurity	guidance	serves	as	much	to	activate	scientists’	individual	capacities	to	think	and	act	responsibly,	 as	 it	does	 to	educate	 them	on	how	to	be	 responsible.	For	example,	 in	the	case	of	the	FBI’s	tabletop	exercise,	the	FBI	first	attempts	to	educate	and	orient	scientists	 to	 think	 about	 their	 work	 with	 a	 view	 to	 biosecurity,	 and,	 second,	encourages	scientists	to	interpret	the	best	course	of	action	in	light	of	the	biosecurity	
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guidance	 they	 have	 received.130	 In	 essence,	 this	 is	 the	 underlying	 principle	 of	governance	strategies	that	seek	to	enable	 individuals,	 families	and	communities	to	play	 a	more	 active	 role	 in	 their	 own	 self-management,	 and	who	 are,	with	 limited	guidance,	 intended	 to	 provide	 for	 their	 own	 security.	 As	 Rose	 (2000,	 p.	 327)	suggests,	 this	 form	 of	 government	 can	 be	 characterized	 by	 “the	 metaphor	 of	 the	facilitating	 state,	 the	 state	 as	 partner	 and	 animator	 rather	 than	 provider	 and	manager.”	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 FBI’s	 awareness	 raising	 activities	 with	 (amateur)	synthetic	biologists,	FBI	agents	describe	themselves	as	‘educators’	and	‘facilitators’	–	or	as	 ‘assets’	 in	 the	 fight	against	bioterrorism	(NRC	2007,	p.	83)	–	while	scientists	are	encouraged	to	take	a	leading	role	in	the	management	of	biosecurity	risks.		This	approach	to	‘responsible	life	science’,	one	that	“depends	on	the	scientific	community’s	will,	capacity,	and	commitment	to	regulate	itself”	(Maurer	and	Zoloth	2007,	 p.	 17),	 is	 further	 reinforced	 by	 calls	 for	 scientists	 to	 support	 the	 efforts	 of	security	 professionals	 by	 way	 of	 providing	 information	 and	 guidance	 that	 might	improve	 their	 own	 capacity	 to	 mitigate	 potential	 biosecurity	 risks.	 The	 notion	 of	scientists	educating	security	experts	 is	 clearly	visible	 in	 relation	 to	 two	comments	made	 by	 Agent	 You.	 In	 the	 first	 instance,	 Agent	 You	 emphasizes	 that	 synthetic	biologists	 can	 educate	 the	 FBI	 on	 “the	 state-of-the-art”	 in	 synthetic	 biology	 and	“what	 they	 see	 coming	 over	 the	 horizon”,	 thereby	 equipping	 the	 FBI	 with	 the	necessary	knowledge	to	“develop	the	proper	security	measures”:	“It’s	 a	 two-way	 street.	 It’s	 not	 just	 about	 us	 preaching	 to	 the	 communities	about	 security,	but	 it’s	 a	 two-way	educational	process,	where	we	 learn	more	about	 the	 field,	 what	 the	 state-of-the-art	 is,	 what	 they	 see	 coming	 over	 the	horizon,	 and	 that	 equips	 us	 with	 the	 knowledge	 about	 how	 we	 can	 best	prepare	 for	 it	 and	 ensure	 that	 we	 develop	 the	 proper	 security	 measures.”	(Edward	You)	
																																																								
130 As discussed in Chapter 5, the Department of Health and Human Services’ (DHHS 
2010b) Screening Framework serves a similar function, providing ‘screeners’ with a 
more or less structured procedure for conducting biosecurity risk assessments, which is 
then adapted according to a screener’s experience and intuition. 
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In	 the	 second	 instance,	 Agent	 You	 emphasizes	 that	 synthetic	 biologists	 can	 also	“assist”	 the	 FBI	 in	 conducting	 biosecurity	 risk	 assessments,	 provided	 they	 have	developed	the	necessary	“situational	awareness”:	“If	we’ve	engendered	their	trust,	provided	them	with	the	situational	awareness	that	there	are	these	potential	risks	and	vulnerabilities,	and	possible	threats	…	the	practitioners	themselves	can	then	engage	us	 in	 law	enforcement,	educate	us,	and	help	us	define	what	those	risks	potentially	could	be	and	help	assist	us	in	the	assessment.”	(Edward	You)	The	notion	of	scientists	assisting	security	experts,	not	only	on	matters	of	science,	but	also	on	matters	of	security	is,	in	many	ways,	an	inversion	of	the	typical	allocation	of	responsibilities	that	one	might	expect	of	a	security	regime.		Taken	 a	 step	 further,	 Piers	 Millett,	 a	 senior	 administrator	 for	 the	 BWC,	imagines	a	future	where	the	“security	community”	plays	a	minimal	role	in	‘policing	science’.	According	to	Millett:		“If	we	can	influence	the	behavior	of	the	practitioners	…	we’ve	suddenly	got	a	resource	we	 can	use.	More	 importantly,	we	end	up	with	an	appreciation	of	[biosecurity]	that	goes	across	everywhere.	It’s	no	longer	just	a	security	issue	for	 the	 security	 community	 to	 deal	 with.	 This	 becomes	 an	 issue	 for	 the	synthetic	biology	community	to	deal	with	and	hopefully	people	like	me	won’t	be	needed	in	five	years	time	because	this	is	something	they’re	doing	off	their	own	back,	completely	unaided.”	(Piers	Millett)	The	extent	 to	which	 this	 level	of	self-sufficiency	will	 come	to	 fruition	 is,	of	course,	uncertain.	What	 is	 clear,	 however,	 is	 that	 some	 security	 professionals	 desire	 (and	anticipate)	a	larger	security	role	for	scientists.	However,	 there	 are	 others	 who	 are	 critical	 of	 this	 vision	 of	 responsibility,	arguing	 that	 synthetic	 biologists	 (or	 life	 scientists	 by	 any	 other	 name)	 neither	possess	the	moral	authority	nor	the	technical	competency	to	take	responsibility	for	anticipating	 and	 preventing	 acts	 of	 bioterrorism	 (for	 example,	 ETC	 Group	 2007;	Selgelid	 2007,	 2009;	 Steinbruner	 et	 al.	 2007).	 In	 relation	 to	 the	 question	 of	scientists’	technical	competency,	the	bioethicist	Michael	J.	Selgelid	argues	that:	
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“Scientists	might	be	best	able	to	recognize	a	discovery’s	scientific	or	technical	implications	 for	 the	making	of	particular	biological	weapons,	but	 they	have	no	 special	 expertise	 to	 determine	 the	 identity,	 abilities,	 or	 intentions	 of	potential	 bioterrorists.	 And	 scientists	 have	 no	 special	 expertise	 to	 assess	what	 the	 security	 –	 as	 opposed	 to	 health	 –	 implications	 of	 attack	 [sic]	with	particular	biological	weapons	would	be.”	(2007,	p.	41)	 	In	 addition	 to	 this	 perceived	 lack	 of	 expertise,	 Selgelid	 (ibid,	 p.	 41)	 questions	scientists’	 objectivity	 to	 make	 security	 decisions	 that	 could	 diminish	 scientific	freedom:	“just	as	governmental	officials	are	likely	to	have	values	biased	in	favor	of	security	over	the	promotion	of	science,	scientists	and	science	editors	are	likely	to	be	biased	 in	 favor	 of	 the	 promotion	 of	 science	 over	 security.”	Moreover,	 for	 Selgelid,	and	for	other	bioethicists	who	have	chosen	to	address	the	subject	of	biosecurity,	the	‘dual-use	 dilemma’	 is	 above	 all	 a	 question	 demanding	 ‘ethical’	 attention,	 and	ethicists	(neither	scientists	nor	security	professionals)	are	said	to	be	best	suited	to	this	task	(Selgelid	2007,	2009;	Douglas	and	Savulescu	2010).	Civil	 society	 organizations,	 such	 as	 the	 ETC	 Group	 (2007),	 have	 been	particularly	critical	of	proposals	for	‘self-governance’	in	synthetic	biology,	asserting	that	 the	 ‘implications’	 of	 the	 science	 –	 including	 social	 and	 ethical	 considerations	beyond	those	of	biosecurity	–	are	too	great	to	leave	in	the	hands	of	scientists,	who	they	 believe	 are	 primarily	 interested	 in	 minimal	 oversight	 and	 regulation.	 In	reference	to	the	 legacy	of	 the	Asilomar	Conference,	 the	ETC	Group	rejects	calls	 for	“‘Asilomar	 2.0’”	 (ibid,	 p.	 47)	 and	 is	 unwilling	 to	 accept	 the	 view:	 “Trust	 us,	we’re	experts”	(ibid,	p.	46).	The	authors	argue	that,	just	as	“Asilomar participants	focused	narrowly	 on	 biosafety	 issues”,	 synthetic	 biologists	wish	 to	 focus	 on	 a	 finite	 set	 of	issues	 related	 to	 biosecurity	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 broader	 social	 debate	 (ibid.).	 “If	 a	small	circle	of	synthetic	biologists	get	their	way,”	they	claim,	“governance	of	extreme	genetic	engineering	will	be	left	entirely	in	their	hands”	(ibid.).		 	Yet,	 for	 their	 part,	 synthetic	 biologists	 have	 expressed	 ambivalent	 attitudes	about	 ‘policing	 themselves’.	 Beyond	 the	 fact	 that	 ‘self-governance’	 is	 generally	viewed	 as	 preferable	 to	 potentially	 more	 restrictive	 forms	 of	 oversight	 and	regulation,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 that	 scientists	wish	 to	 take	primary	 responsibility	 (or	 at	
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least	be	held	accountable)	for	biosecurity.	On	the	one	hand,	they	assert	their	shared	concern	about	biosecurity	risks,	and	a	common	interest	in	preventing	the	deliberate	misuse	of	their	science.	On	the	other	hand,	they	resist	the	notion	that	they	should	be	held	personally	accountable	(and	possibly	liable)	for	biosecurity.	For	example,	in	an	article	 entitled	 ‘DNA	 synthesis	 and	 biological	 security’	 (a	 joint	 policy	 paper	published	 in	 Nature	 Biotechnology,	 which	 included	 the	 prominent	 synthetic	biologists	George	Church	and	Drew	Endy	among	its	lead	authors),	Bügl	et	al.	(2007,	p.	628)	argue	that,	although	scientists	and	public	health	agencies	have	an	important	role	to	play	in	assisting	law	enforcement,	“ultimately,	it	is	the	specific	responsibility	of	 law	 enforcement	 authorities	 to	 protect	 individuals	 and	 communities	 against	threats	that	may	arise	through	the	misuse	of	this	promising	technology.”	As	Rappert	(2003)	points	out,	 this	ambivalent	stance	towards	responsibility	 is	not	uncommon	among	 scientists	 and	 other	 professionals	 when	 confronted	 with	 the	 issue	 of	‘accountability’,	 a	 subject	 that	 necessarily	 goes	 hand-in-hand	 with	 calls	 for	‘responsible	self-governance’.	In	reference	to	Cunningham-Burley	and	Kerr’s	(1999)	work	 on	 genetics	 and	 social	 responsibility,	 Rappert	 (ibid,	 p.	 305)	 notes:	“Professional	 responsibilities	 were	 defined	 so	 to	 make	 researchers	 vital	 for	addressing	social	problems	but	ultimately	not	responsible	for	them.”		In	light	of	these	underlying	tensions,	it	is	unclear	precisely	what	configuration	of	 ‘responsibility’	 will	 ultimately	 emerge	 in	 synthetic	 biology,	 and	 to	 what	 extent	synthetic	 biologists	 are	 prepared	 –	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 technical	 competencies	and	their	willingness	–	to	‘police	themselves’.	Yet,	as	I	will	discuss	now,	there	are	at	least	 signs	 to	 suggest	 that,	 within	 some	 segments	 of	 the	 ‘synthetic	 biology	community’,	 biosecurity	 awareness	 raising	 efforts	 have	 begun	 to	 motivate	 a	 new	orientation	 on	 ‘self-governance’,	 one	 that	 favors	 a	 culture	 of	 ‘prudent	 vigilance’.	Moreover,	 while	 this	 development	 suggests	 new	 opportunities	 for	 science	 and	security,	 it	 also	holds	 the	possibility	of	unforeseen	 consequences,	 as	 scientists	 are	increasingly	represented	as	not	only	 their	own	 ‘risk	managers’,	but	also	 their	own	‘police’;	made	to	negotiate	a	policy	landscape	that	portrays	them,	at	least	tacitly,	as	‘biosecurity	risks’	and	as	‘strategic	partners’	in	biosecurity.		
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7.3.3	Scientists	who	‘police	themselves’	If	 the	 purpose	 of	 biosecurity	 awareness	 raising,	 as	 a	 number	 of	 the	 preceding	accounts	 suggest,	 is	 to	 “change	 the	 laboratory	 environment”	 (Amy	 Smithson),	 to	“influence	 the	behavior	of	 practitioners”	 (Piers	Millett),	 to	 encourage	biologists	 to	think	 about	 how	 their	 research	 “could	 be	 used	 for	 nefarious	 purposes”	 (Edward	You),	 to	enable	 scientists	 (to	 the	extent	possible)	 to	become	 their	own	 ‘experts	 in	biosecurity’,	 then,	 to	 some	 extent,	 a	 new	 ‘culture	 of	 responsibility’	 has	 begun	 to	emerge	 among	 some	 life	 science	 communities.	 Already,	 according	 to	 Agent	 You,	there	are	promising	signs	that	a	significant	level	of	biosecurity	awareness	has	been	established	among	DIY-biologists	as	a	result	of	awareness	raising	activities	initiated	by	 the	FBI.	 In	reference	 to	Genspace,131	a	DIYbio	community	 lab	 in	New	York	City	that	has	been	the	target	of	some	of	these	initiatives,	Agent	You	explained:	“They’re	 kind	 of	 the	 poster	 child,	 and	 hopefully	 they’re	 developing	 best	practices	 that	 can	 be	 conveyed	 to	 other	 future	 community	 labs	 that	 come	online	across	the	US,	because	they’re,	for	all	intents	and	purposes,	the	leaders	now	–	the	local	amateur	groups	will	probably	be	looking	to	them	as	to	how	to	develop	their	own	community	spaces.”	(Edward	You)	Agent	You’s	enthusiasm	about	Genspace’s	leadership,	and	their	potential	interest	in	developing	 their	 own	 biosecurity	 ‘best	 practices’,	 although	 not	 necessarily	representative	of	wider	biosecurity	awareness	raising	projects	in	synthetic	biology	and	 the	 life	 sciences	 more	 broadly,	 is	 a	 testament	 to	 an	 emerging	 ‘culture	 of	responsibility’	that	has,	by	some	accounts,	advanced	to	the	stage	that	scientists	are	beginning	to	be	viewed	as	their	own	‘educators’	in	biosecurity.		Similarly,	 recent	 outreach	 efforts	 by	 the	 FBI	 (Edward	 You)	 and	 the	 BWC’s	Implementation	Support	Unit	 (ISU)	(Piers	Millett)	at	 the	annual	 iGEM	Competition	have,	by	some	accounts,	begun	to	influence	the	research	process.	In	an	effort	to	raise	biosecurity	 awareness	 among	 student	 teams,	 the	 FBI	 and	 the	 ISU	 have	 held	workshops	covering	“dual-use	issues,	dual-use	research	of	concern,	and	responsible	research”,	generating	discussions	that	were,	according	to	Agent	You,	“phenomenal”.																																																									
131 See http://genspace.org/. 
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Moreover,	 as	 a	 component	 of	 the	 iGEM	 Competition’s	 ‘Human	 Practices’	 award,	student	 teams	 have	 begun	 to	 incorporate	 biosecurity	 considerations	 into	 their	research	 projects.	 For	 example,	 one	 student	 team	 at	 the	 2010	 iGEM	 Competition	developed	 a	 software	 package	 called	 ‘GenoTHREAT’,132	 which	 is	 intended	 to	 help	DNA	synthesis	companies	detect	possible	sequences	that	could	be	used	to	produce	Select	Agents.	In	this	instance,	‘biosecurity	thinking’	is,	quite	literally,	‘built-in’	to	the	research	experience,	made	an	integral	component	of	the	research	output.	These	examples	suggest	that	biosecurity	awareness	 is	growing	within	some	segments	of	the	‘synthetic	biology	community’,	and,	in	some	instances,	is	becoming	integral	 to	 the	 research	 experience.	 And,	 while	 a	 uniform	 definition	 of	 this	 new	‘culture	of	responsibility’	does	not	exist,	the	biosecurity	messages	outlined	by	Agent	You,	 and	 other	 experts	 who	 have	 played	 a	 role	 in	 framing	 this	 new	 vision	 of	responsibility,	 point	 to	 a	 change	 in	 research	 culture	 and	 practice.	 Codified	 in	laboratory	 manuals	 and	 educational	 brochures;	 recorded	 on	 DVDs;	 presented	 at	biosecurity	 workshops,	 these	 messages	 –	 including	 calls	 for	 “‘enhanced	watchfulness’”	 (PCSBI	 2010,	 p.	 145),	 for	 thinking	 about	 “the	 downsides	 of	 an	experiment”	(Amy	Smithson),	and	for	preventing	the	“exploitation	or	subversion”	of	scientific	 knowledge	 (Edward	 You)	 –	 describe	 a	 new	 orientation	 on	 risk	management	and	an	emerging	set	of	responsibilities	and	moral	obligations.	Before	concluding	this	chapter,	I	wish	to	reflect	on	the	significance	of	this	new	orientation	on	risk	management,	one	that	favors	a	culture	of	‘prudent	vigilance’.		 While	multiple	biosecurity	messages	have	been	attached	to	recent	calls	for	a	new	‘culture	of	responsibility’,	a	common	feature	of	these	messages	is	that	scientists	should	 play	 a	 larger	 role	 in	 monitoring	 not	 only	 their	 own	 conduct,	 but	 also	 the	conduct	of	those	in	their	‘community’.	In	other	words,	scientists	are	encouraged	not	only	to	be	prudent,	but	also	vigilant.	Whereas	 ‘prudence’	 is	a	familiar	aspect	of	 life	science	 culture	 and	 practice,	 exemplified	 by	 biosafety	 protocols	 that	 call	 for	scientists	to	show	discretion	in	the	safe	handling	of	biological	materials,	the	concept	of	 ‘vigilance’	 is	a	relatively	new	addition	to	the	 lexicon	of	 ‘responsible	 life	science’.																																																									
132 See http://2010.igem.org/Team:VT-ENSIMAG/Genothreat. 
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This	 concept,	 I	 suggest,	which	 signifies	 the	 emergence	 of	 biosecurity	 (rather	 than	biosafety)	 as	 the	 primary	 site	 of	 regulatory	 concern	 in	 the	 US	 (Atlas	 2005a),	 is	bound	up	with	a	different	way	of	thinking	and	talking	about	biological	risks,	and	a	new	 way	 of	 interacting	 with	 biology	 and	 biologists	 in	 (community)	 labs.	 For	 the	synthetic	biologists	 interviewed	 for	my	research,	 this	 is	a	significant	development,	even	though	they	may	not	speak	of	 their	new	responsibilities	 in	 terms	of	 ‘prudent	vigilance’.	 Rather,	 they	 speak	 of	 ‘biosecurity’,	 of	 a	 research	 project’s	 ‘potential	 for	deliberate	misuse’,	and	of	‘getting	to	know	their	local	WMD	coordinator’.		As	the	DIYbio-FBI	case	suggests,	it	is	with	some	ambivalence	that	(amateur)	synthetic	 biologists	 engage	 in	 this	 new	 dialogue.	 While	 scientific	 fields	 such	 as	nuclear	 physics	 have	 a	 relatively	 long	 tradition	 of	 engaging	 with	 security	communities,	and	nuclear	physicists	have	for	some	time	been	taught	to	consider	the	‘potential	downsides’	and	‘security	implications’	of	their	work,	this	is	not	the	case	in	the	 life	 sciences	 (observations	 that	 were	 touched	 on	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter	 in	relation	to	the	subject	of	censoring	‘sensitive’	scientific	research).	For	DIY-biologists	like	 Jason	 Bobe	 and	 Mackenzie	 Cowell,	 their	 engagement	 with	 the	 FBI	 is	 a	 new	phenomenon,	and	they	express	a	sense	of	uncertainty	and	unease	about	their	new	‘partnership’	 with	 law	 enforcement,	 and	 their	 new	 responsibilities	 as	 ‘strategic	partners’	 in	 biosecurity.	 As	 Bobe	 suggests,	 although	 it	 may	 be	 increasingly	commonplace	 for	DIY-biologists	 to	know	 their	 ‘local	WMD	Coordinator’	 (in	Bobe’s	case,	on	a	 first-name	basis),	 the	presence	of	FBI	 field	agents	 in	DIYbio	community	labs	 is	 unfamiliar,	 and,	 for	 some,	 unsettling.	 Bobe	 also	 worries	 about	 the	associations	that	have	been	made,	 if	 indirectly,	between	DIY-biology	(‘biohacking’)	and	 the	 theme	 of	 “weapons	 of	 mass	 destruction”.	 He	 is	 concerned	 that	 some	members	of	 the	DIYbio	community	may	not	wish	 to	reach	out	 to	 law	enforcement	for	 fear	 of	 exposing	 themselves	 to	 “legal	 liability”,	 and	 even	 that	 some	 research	activities	may	be	“driven	underground”	(interview	with	Jason	Bobe).		From	the	perspective	of	life	scientists,	it	is,	to	some	extent,	unclear	whether	they	are	“suspects”	or	“saviors”	(Atlas	2005a,	p.	23)	–	‘allies’	or	‘potential	threats’	–	and	 not	 just	 from	 outside	 their	 communities,	 but	 also	 from	within.	 Biosecurity	 is	said	to	demand	‘enhanced	watchfulness’	on	the	part	of	the	individual	scientist,	and	
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colleagues	 are	 to	 be	 monitored	 for	 ‘suspicious	 behavior’.	 In	 the	 event	 that	‘biosecurity	risks’	are	identified,	new	lines	of	communication	have	been	established	to	enable	scientists	to	voice	their	suspicions	to	law	enforcement	agents.	Agent	You	emphasized	 that	 it	 is	 important	 that	 synthetic	biologists	understand	 that	 “there	 is	someone	on	your	speed	dial	who	you	can	contact	and	feel	confident	that	you’ll	get	the	 right	 response.”	 Local	 WMD	 Coordinators	 are	 described	 as	 not	 only	 “the	educators”,	 but	 “also	 the	 bridge	 lines”	 (Edward	 You)	 –	 linking	 scientists	 with	security	 experts	 –	bridging	not	only	 a	physical,	 but	 also	 a	 cultural	divide	 (Relman	2010).	At	the	same	time,	this	biosecurity	guidance	is	finite,	as	it	is	ultimately	up	to	the	 individual	 scientist	 to	 negotiate	 ‘real-world’	 scenarios,	 demonstrating	 their	capacities	 as	 ‘experts	 in	 biosecurity’.	 And	 while	 scientists	 may	 draw	 upon	 their	lessons	 in	 biosecurity,	 and	 may	 request	 assistance	 from	 the	 FBI	 or	 other	 federal	agencies	at	any	time,	the	threshold	of	suspicion	rests	with	the	individual	scientist,	as	only	 they	 (they	 are	 told)	 are	 “in	 a	 position	 to	 identify	 not	 only	 the	 risks	 and	vulnerabilities,	but	also	potential	nefarious	activity”	(Edward	You).	Yet,	 it	 aught	 to	 be	 underlined	 that	 the	 emerging	 ‘partnership’	 between	 life	science	and	security	communities	has	not	been	imposed	on	scientists,	nor	have	their	responsibilities	 as	 ‘strategic	 partners’	 in	 biosecurity.	 Recent	 connections	 between	DIYbio	and	the	FBI	are	not	the	result	of	coercion	or	the	directed	efforts	of	the	FBI	(or	any	 one	 else)	 to	 expand	 the	 remit	 of	 security	 into	 new	 fields	 of	 science	 and	technology.	 In	 other	words,	 this	 is	 not	 a	 case	 of	 ‘securitization’,	motivated	 by	 the	overriding	 interests	of	 security	professionals	or	government	elites	 (Wæver	1995).	Rather,	this	engagement	is	voluntary	–	motivated	by	a	sense	of	mutual	benefit	that	has	 drawn	 science	 and	 security	 communities	 together	 in	 pursuit	 of	 a	 secure	 and	sustainable	 ‘scientific	 enterprise’.	 For	 Bobe,	 DIYbio’s	 participation	 in	 biosecurity	initiatives	and	their	engagement	with	the	FBI	is	viewed	as	helping	maintain	public	support	 for	 their	 research	 activities,	 as	 well	 as	 offering	 their	 community	 the	possibility	of	averting	potentially	more	restrictive	forms	of	oversight	and	regulation.	More	 broadly,	 there	 exists	 a	 growing	 belief	 among	 life	 scientists	 that,	 in	 light	 of	recent	calls	for	censorship	in	life	science	publishing,	‘self-governance’	may	very	well	provide	the	best	means	of	protecting	scientific	freedom	(Nature	2006).		
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For	Agent	You,	and	for	others	who	endorse	a	‘self-policing’	synthetic	biology	community	(as	one	component	of	a	wider	regulatory	regime),	scientists	are	viewed	as	 offering	 a	 promising	 and	 efficient	 means	 of	 defending	 against	 the	 threat	 of	deliberate	misuse.	 It	 is	believed	 that	by	harnessing	and	directing	 the	 capacities	of	synthetic	biologists	 to	 take	on	greater	responsibility	 for	biosecurity,	 they	can	both	improve	risk	management	efforts	in	the	life	sciences	and	enable	a	‘new	generation’	of	 scientists	 to	 be	 better	 prepared	 for	 a	 wider	 range	 of	 contingencies.	 Moreover,	from	a	 regulatory	perspective,	 a	greater	 reliance	on	 ‘self-governance’	 is	viewed	as	reducing	 the	 ‘costs’	 of	 regulation	 (Hutter	 2005),	 allocating	 responsibility	 to	 those	communities	 that	 are	 perceived	 to	 be	 the	 most	 knowledgeable	 about	 the	 risks	engendered	by	 their	work.	From	 this	perspective,	 the	FBI’s	biosecurity	 awareness	raising	 efforts	 (and,	 in	 many	 ways,	 biosecurity	 awareness	 raising	 activities	 more	broadly)	 can	be	understood	as	a	practical	 attempt	at	 enhancing	 ‘national	 security’	while	minimizing	more	conventional	(‘top-down’)	regulatory	demands.			In	 brief,	 for	 synthetic	 biologists	 and	 for	 security	 professionals,	 there	 exist	legitimate	 reasons	 for	wanting	 to	 raise	 biosecurity	 awareness.	 By	 some	 accounts,	this	approach	to	biosecurity	is	viewed	as	a	common	sense	‘solution’	to	a	seemingly	intractable	 policy	 ‘problem’.	 According	 to	 Piers	Millett,	 a	 senior	 administrator	 for	the	BWC,	a	 sensitized	synthetic	biology	 community	–	one	capable	of	providing	 (at	least	 in	part)	 for	 its	own	biosecurity	–	 is	a	 “win-win.”	According	 to	Millett,	 even	 if	there	is	never	a	‘biosecurity	incident’,	“[w]e	end	up	with	a	generation	of	young,	up-and-coming	 scientists	 who	 are	 aware	 of	 dual-use	 issues,	 and	 who	 appreciate	 the	security	 implications	 of	 the	 biology	 they’re	 doing.”	 Yet,	 while	 one	 can	 hardly	disagree	with	the	sentiment	that	a	‘risk-aware’	‘synthetic	biology	community’	offers	appreciable	benefits,	in	this	section	I	have	attempted	to	highlight	that	early	signs	of	an	 emerging	 ‘culture	 of	 responsibility’	 suggest	 that,	 for	 at	 least	 some	 (amateur)	synthetic	biologists,	being	an	‘expert	in	biosecurity’	–	adopting	a	culture	of	‘prudent	vigilance’	–	also	carries	potentially	unforeseen	consequences.		
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7.4	Conclusion	In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 have	 examined	 an	 approach	 to	 biosecurity	 that	 seeks	 to	 enable	synthetic	 biologists	 to	 take	 on	 a	 greater	 role	 in	 ensuring	 the	 security	 and	sustainability	of	their	science.	Unlike	the	biosecurity	interventions	discussed	in	the	previous	 chapter,	 which	 are	 directed	 at	 controlling	 access	 to	 science,	 these	interventions	seek	to	encourage	and	enable	synthetic	biologists	to	(at	least	in	part)	‘govern	 themselves’.	 Although	 there	 is	 nothing	 novel	 about	 ‘self-governance’	 as	 a	mode	of	 risk	management	 in	 the	 life	 sciences	 –	 biosafety	practices	 have	 relied	 on	this	principle	for	some	time	–	what	is	unusual	about	the	case	of	‘self-governance’	in	synthetic	biology	is	that	scientists	are	(more	than	ever	before)	encouraged	to	be,	not	only	their	own	‘risk	managers’,	but	also	their	own	‘police’.	Visible	in	relation	to	new	partnerships	between	science	and	security	communities,	and	in	relation	to	growing	demands	for	‘prudent	vigilance’,	this	new	vision	of	responsibility	brings	the	worlds	of	 science	 and	 national	 security	 into	 closer	 contact	 in	 the	 name	 of	 biosecurity,	suggesting	new	opportunities,	but	also	new	challenges	and	dilemmas.		 It	is,	I	have	argued,	through	a	process	of	‘responsibilization’	(Rose	2000)	that	this	new	orientation	on	risk	management	is	presently	being	fostered,	where	the	role	of	governmental	actors	and	organizations	engaged	in	aspects	of	biosecurity	policy	is	to	 enable	 scientific	 communities	 to	 more	 effectively	 ‘govern	 themselves’.	Specifically,	the	aim	of	a	number	of	biosecurity	awareness	raising	activities	directed	at	 (amateur)	 synthetic	biologists	and	discussed	 in	 this	 chapter	 is	 to	enable	a	 ‘new	generation’	of	scientists	 to	become	 ‘risk-aware’,	 capable	of	actively	contributing	 to	biosecurity.	 In	many	ways,	 this	 process	 involves	 initiating	 scientists	 into	 “another	world”	 (Edward	 You)	 –	 a	 world	 that	 is	 closely	 aligned	 with	 ‘national	 security’	considerations,	and	the	traditional	roles	and	responsibilities	of	law	enforcement	and	security	communities.	On	a	conceptual	level,	this	approach	to	risk	management	can	be	understood	as	a	form	of	‘advanced	liberal’	government,	exemplified	by	the	notion	of	governing	‘at	a	distance’	(Rose	2000).	Under	this	form	of	government,	as	Nikolas	Rose	suggests,	 “[i]ndividuals,	 families,	 firms,	organizations,	communities	are	urged	
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to	 take	 upon	 themselves	 the	 responsibility	 for	 the	 security	 of	 their	 property	 and	their	persons,	and	for	that	of	their	own	families”	(ibid,	p.	327).			 While	 enabling	 synthetic	 biologists	 to	 become	 their	 own	 ‘experts	 in	biosecurity’	 is	 viewed	by	many	as	 a	key	element	 in	 a	broader	 ‘web	of	prevention’	(which	 includes	 preventative	 controls	 on	 science,	 Chapter	 6),	 holding	 out	 the	possibility	 of	 enhanced	 security	 and	 a	 more	 sustainable	 science,	 there	 also	 exist	doubts	about	this	form	of	risk	management.	On	the	one	hand,	some	believe	synthetic	biologists	should	not	be	permitted	to	 ‘self-regulate’,	as	 the	risks	are	 too	great,	and	scientists	may	choose	to	act	in	their	own	self-interest.	On	the	other	hand,	synthetic	biologists	 are	 uncertain	 about	 the	 desirability	 of	 ‘policing	 themselves’.	 As	 the	DIYbio-FBI	case	suggests,	scientists	do	not	necessarily	feel	best	suited	to	the	task	of	biosecurity,	 nor	 do	 they	 necessarily	 wish	 to	 be	 held	 accountable	 for	 biosecurity	risks.	Scientists	also	express	ambivalent	attitudes	about	their	engagement	with	law	enforcement	 and	 security	 communities,	 and	 are	 concerned	 about	 the	 associations	that	 have	 been	made	 between	 (amateur)	 synthetic	 biology	 and	 ‘weapons	 of	mass	destruction’.	 Indeed,	one	might	argue	that	an	unintended	consequence	of	 this	new	orientation	on	risk	management	–	one	that	favors	a	culture	of	‘prudent	vigilance’	–	is	the	 introduction	 of	 a	 vocabulary	 and	 a	 way	 of	 thinking	 that	 serves	 to	 augment	perceptions	 of	 synthetic	 biology	 and	 synthetic	 biologists,	 who	 are	 increasingly	imagined	as	both	‘biosecurity	risks’	and	as	‘strategic	partners’	in	biosecurity.				
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8.	Conclusion		
	
8.1	Introduction	For	 the	 scientific	 and	 technical	 experts	 consulted	 for	 my	 research,	 there	 would	appear	 to	 be	 little	 doubt	 that	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 ‘identify’,	 ‘assess’	 and	 ‘manage’	synthetic	 biology’s	 ‘biosecurity	 risks’.	Moreover,	 for	 these	 experts,	 preventing	 the	deliberate	 misuse	 of	 synthetic	 biology	 and	 enabling	 its	 scientific	 and	 industrial	potential	are	not	mutually	exclusive	policy	goals,	but	rather	simultaneous	objectives	that	 constitute	 ‘good	 governance’.	 Although	 there	 exist	 uncertainties	 about	 the	nature	 of	 the	 risks	 themselves,	 and	 doubts	 about	 the	 suitability	 of	 familiar	 risk	assessment	techniques	and	the	appropriateness	of	existing	regulatory	frameworks,	there	also	exists	an	unyielding	belief	that	it	is	possible	to	reconfigure	even	the	most	intractable	 ‘uncertainties’	as	 ‘calculable	risks’	 that	can	be	managed.	And,	while	 the	conviction	to	‘manage’	risks	that	exist	at	the	limits	of	scientific	knowledge	may,	for	some,	suggest	an	attempt	to	“feign	control	over	the	uncontrollable”	(Beck	2002,	p.	41,	emphasis	in	original),	my	thesis	suggests	this	is	not	the	case.	Contrary	 to	 the	 ‘risk	 society’	 thesis	 (Beck	 1992),	 my	 thesis	 demonstrates	that,	 in	the	case	of	regulating	synthetic	biology,	practical	and	legitimate	efforts	are	being	made	to	‘assess’	and	‘manage’	risks	that	would	appear	to	exceed	the	limits	of	scientific	 knowledge.	 Indeed,	 my	 thesis	 underlines	 that	 uncertainty	 is	 not	 an	inhibition	 to	 risk	 management,	 but	 a	 call	 for	 more	 creative	 and	 more	 intensive	methods	 of	 ‘risk	 calculation’	 –	 an	 activity	 that	 is	 grounded	 in	 the	 belief	 that	 risks	(once	defined	as	‘risks’	and	not	uncertain	‘dangers’)	can	be	known	with	reasonable	confidence	and	made	the	subject	of	regulatory	intervention	and	control.	Therefore,	while	 the	 risk	 assessment	 techniques	 and	 risk	 management	 strategies	 that	 have	been	 devised	 to	 govern	 synthetic	 biology	may	 not	 ‘fit’	 the	 technical	 ideal	 of	 risk,	exemplified	by	‘quantitative	risk	assessment’,	they	nonetheless	aspire	for	‘reasoned	estimation’	 and	 seek	 to	 inform	 and	 to	 justify	 responsible	 action	 in	 the	 face	uncertainty.	In	this	context,	‘risk’	can	be	conceptualized	as	an	adaptive	‘technique	of	
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government’,	 which	 is	 regularly	 adapted	 and	 deployed	 to	 achieve	 a	 variety	 of	instrumental	 goals.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 numbers,	 as	 I	 have	 shown	 throughout	 my	thesis,	 other	metrics	 –	 other	ways	of	 ‘knowing’	 and	 ‘intervening’	 –	 are	brought	 to	bear	on	complex	policy	‘problems’	with	a	view	to	practical	‘solutions’.		In	this	conclusion,	I	wish	to	reflect	on	how	the	‘risk	regulation	regime’	(Hood	et	al.	2001)	examined	in	my	thesis	is	presently	rendering	(in	practical	and	legitimate	ways)	 synthetic	 biology	 ‘governable’,	 and	 how	 it	 is	 simultaneously	 producing	 a	particular	 vision	 of	 an	 emerging	 science	 and	 its	 diverse	 practitioners	 that	 is	 not	without	 consequence	 for	 our	 collective	 understanding	 of	 modern	 biology,	 its	‘potential	risks’,	and	the	kinds	of	‘responsibility’	deemed	necessary	to	manage	these	risks.	In	doing	so,	I	will	highlight	several	key	themes	that	have	emerged	through	the	course	 of	 my	 research,	 which,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 underline	 risk’s	 capacity	 as	 an	adaptive	‘technique	of	government’,	and,	on	the	other,	its	capacity	to	both	describe	and	produce	the	very	‘risks’	it	seeks	to	visualize	and	control.	The	risk	management	process	discussed	here,	and	throughout	my	thesis,	is	one	that	enables	new	space	for	thought	and	action,	while	simultaneously	limiting	the	scope	of	what	can	be	expected	of	 synthetic	 biology.	 Not	 only	 contributing	 to	 the	 advancement	 of	 risk	 theory	 in	sociology	that	challenges	the	 ‘risk	society’	 thesis	(Beck	1992),	on	the	grounds	that	complex	technological	hazards	are	currently	being	governed	through	an	assortment	of	“technical	means	for	 intervening	 in	reality	 for	the	achievement	of	specific	ends”	(Dean	1999,	p.	184),	this	research	also	sheds	light	on	the	performative	dimensions	of	 a	 regulatory	 process	 that	 envisions	 advances	 in	 modern	 biology	 as	 posing	 a	‘bioterrorist	threat’,	requiring	some	sort	of	‘biosecurity	response’.	
	
8.2	Risk	calculation	in	the	absence	of	numbers	The	claim	that	we	are	living	in	a	‘post-risk	calculation’	world	(Beck	2009)	does	not	account	for	the	regulatory	response	that	has	been	mounted	to	address	the	perceived	biosecurity	 risks	 posed	 by	 synthetic	 biology.	 The	 technical	 challenges	 associated	with	 calculating	 risk	 estimates	 linked	 with	 arbitrary	 sequence	 information	submitted	to	DNA	synthesis	providers,	as	well	as	the	uncertainties	that	surround	the	
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unknown	 identities	 and	motives	 of	 prospective	 customers,	 has	 not	 prevented	 the	Department	 of	 Health	 and	 Human	 Services	 (DHHS	 2010b)	 from	 introducing	regulatory	 guidelines	 that	 seek	 to	 establish	 a	 more	 or	 less	 structured	 risk	management	 procedure	 for	 industry	 to	 follow.	 The	 very	 fact	 that	 industry	 has	produced	its	own	(more	rigorous)	guidelines	and	that	orders	for	‘synthetic	double-stranded	 DNA’	 are	 presently	 being	 processed	 by	 companies	 that	 have	 little	 to	 no	‘appetite	 for	 risk’	 is	 a	 testament	 to	 an	 industry	 that	 has	 not	 abandoned	 the	 belief	that	 risks	 can	 be	 known	with	 reasonable	 confidence,	 and	 that	 these	 risks	 can	 be	managed.	 If	 it	 were	 otherwise	 –	 if	 limitless	 precaution	 in	 the	 face	 of	 extreme	uncertainty	had	suddenly	emerged	–	industry	would	shut	its	doors.				 This	observation	is	not	limited	to	the	case	of	the	DNA	synthesis	industry,	but	rather	 it	 extends	 to	 all	 aspects	 of	 the	 ongoing	 regulatory	 response	 in	 synthetic	biology,	 whether	 one	 considers	 the	 case	 of	 ‘dual-use	 research’	 or	 ‘do-it-yourself	(DIY)	 biology’.	 Although	 there	 exist	 worries	 about	 publishing	 scientific	 protocols	that	 could	 provide	 a	 ‘blueprint	 for	 bioterrorism’	 and	 fears	 about	 ‘biohackers’	building	 novel	 pathogens	 in	 their	 garage,	 concerted	 efforts	 are	 being	 made	 to	manage	 these	risks,	with	 the	effect	of	enabling	synthetic	biology	 to	move	 forward.	Specifically,	 new	 policy	 on	 ‘dual-use	 research	 of	 concern’	 (DHHS	 2012)	 has	 been	devised	to	anticipate	and	prevent	access	to	‘dangerous	knowledge’,	and	the	Federal	Bureau	 of	 Investigation’s	 (FBI)	 outreach	 and	 awareness	 raising	 activities	 have	begun	 to	 educate	 ‘non-institutional	 biologists’	 on	 how	 to	 ‘police	 themselves’.	Furthermore,	and	perhaps	of	greatest	interest	to	risk	theorists	who	ascribe	to	Ulrich	Beck’s	 (1992)	 ‘risk	 society’	 thesis,	 this	 will-to-order	 uncertainty	 and	 to	 establish	regulatory	 controls	 has	 occurred	 despite	 doubts	 about	 how	 to	 calculate	 risks	 for	which	little	can	be	known	on	the	basis	of	statistical	calculation.		 To	 date,	 there	 has	 never	 been	 a	 bioterrorist	 attack	 involving	 synthetic	biology,	 and	 thus	 statistical	 data	 on	 the	 ‘likelihood’	 and	 ‘consequences’	 –	 the	standard	metrics	 that	define	 the	 traditional	 risk	assessment	model	 –	of	 a	possible	future	 attack	do	not	 exist.	There	 are	no	numbers	 to	be	 added	 to	 spreadsheets,	 no	probabilities	 to	 be	 calculated,	 and	 thus	 statistics	 cannot	 offer	 a	 window	 onto	 the	future	of	 synthetic	 biology’s	possible	 risks.	 Yet,	 the	 fact	 remains,	 in	 the	 context	 of	
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synthetic	biology,	as	in	other	domains	of	‘science	policy’	characterized	by	“intrinsic,	irreducible	uncertainty”	(Majone	2010,	p.	99),	risk	assessments	are	being	conducted	and	 risk	 management	 decisions	 are	 being	 made.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 “meaningful	statistics”,	 risk	 assessment	 does	 not	 reach	 its	 limit,	 but	 rather	 a	 variety	 of	 other	‘ways	 of	 knowing’	 are	 brought	 to	 bear	 on	 an	 uncertain	 future,	which	 are	 used	 to	inform	and	to	justify	risk	management	decisions	(Erickson	and	Doyle	2004,	p.	18).	In	 this	 light,	 what	 should	 be	 the	 focus	 of	 critical	 attention	 is	 not	 the	 absence	 of	statistics,	but	 rather	 the	presence	of	a	variety	of	alternative	 risk-based	 techniques	that	are	deployed	beyond	the	frontier	of	statistical	calculation	(O’Malley	2004).	If	for	no	 other	 reason,	 one	might	 argue,	 than	 because	 these	 alternatives	 exist,	 and	 they	can	tell	us	a	great	deal	about	the	manner	in	which	problematic	people	and	things	are	constituted	as	‘risks’	to	be	managed,	and	what	is	at	stake	in	doing	so.	In	the	case	of	synthetic	biology,	to	suggest	otherwise	would	be	to	overlook	much	of	the	regulatory	process	itself	and	the	many	risk-based	judgments	and	justifications	that	are	used	to	enable	action	in	the	present,	beyond	‘quantitative	risk	calculation’.	Throughout	my	thesis,	I	have	explored	a	variety	of	calculative	techniques	and	regulatory	 strategies	 that	 are	 used	 to	 organize	 uncertainty	 and	 enable	 choice	 and	decision	(Power	2007),	few	of	which	can	be	said	to	satisfy	the	stringent	conditions	of	 ‘quantitative	risk	assessment’.	 In	 the	case	of	genetic	engineering,	 for	example,	a	regulatory	framework	(Office	of	Science	Technology	and	Policy	1986)	was	designed	to	anticipate	and	control	potentially	‘novel’	risks	that	regulators	sought	to	‘calculate’	not	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 probability	 estimates	 and	 loss	 figures	 associated	 with	recombinant	organisms,	but	on	the	basis	of	inference	to	the	‘natural	templates’	from	which	 these	 organisms	 might	 be	 derived.	 Today,	 synthetic	 biology,	 having	introduced	the	possibility	of	‘non-natural	templates’,	or	‘DNA	sequences	that	do	not	exist	 in	 nature’,	 is	 believed	 to	 have	 removed	 even	 this	 foothold	 on	 scientific	knowledge,	 introducing	new	uncertainties	 and	new	problems	of	measurement.	As	one	senior	biodefense	scientist	expressed	about	synthetic	sequences,	introduced	in	Chapter	 5,	 “without	 a	 [natural]	 template,	 where’s	 the	 risk?”	 Under	 these	circumstances,	 if	 regulators	 relied	 only	 on	 ‘quantitative	 risk	 assessment’,	 there	would	 be	 an	 immovable	 obstacle	 between	 ‘risk	 identification’	 and	 ‘risk	
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management’,	 as	 the	 ‘risks’	 in	 question	 could	 not	 be	 ‘calculated’,	 and	 unlimited	precaution,	one	might	imagine,	could	be	the	order	of	the	day.	But,	 this	 is	 not	 the	 case	 in	 synthetic	 biology,	 just	 as	 it	was	 not	 the	 case	 in	genetic	engineering,	and	not	because	‘quantitative	risk	assessment’	is	not	valued	(in	fact,	 it	 remains	 a	 regulatory	 ideal),	 but	 because	 ‘risk’	 is	 everywhere.	 As	 François	Ewald	 (1991,	 p.	 199)	 reminds	 us:	 “Nothing	 is	 a	 risk	 in	 itself;	 there	 is	 no	 risk	 in	reality”,	yet	“anything	can	be	a	risk”,	because	risk	“is	first	and	foremost	a	schema	of	rationality,	 a	 way	 of	 breaking	 down,	 rearranging,	 ordering	 certain	 elements	 of	reality”.	Risk,	 in	brief,	 is	a	 category	of	understanding,	a	way	of	analyzing	potential	events	in	such	a	way	that	they	might	be	governed.	In	this	light,	one	might	argue,	 if	risk	 assessment	 does	 indeed	 have	 a	 ‘limit’,	 this	 limit	 is	 constrained	 by	 human	ingenuity	 to	 ‘break	 down’	 and	 ‘rearrange’	 diverse	 ‘elements	 of	 reality’,	 enabling	them	 to	 be	 made	 objects	 of	 thought	 and	 action,	 not	 by	 a	 lack	 of	 probabilistic	knowledge	about	the	world.	Therefore,	the	question,	“without	a	[natural]	template,	where’s	 the	 risk?”,	 although	 drawing	 attention	 to	 an	 important	 source	 of	uncertainty,	 does	 in	 fact	 have	 an	 answer,	 indeed	 it	 has	multiple	 answers.	 This	 is	because	the	question	might	equally	be	posed,	‘how	does	one	re-imagine	non-natural	templates,	so	they	can	be	understood	as	risks?’	And,	it	is	the	latter	question,	not	the	former,	 that	 is	most	 characteristic	 of	 the	 thinking	 and	 practical	work	 of	 scientific	and	technical	experts	seeking	‘solutions’	to	the	‘problem’	of	synthetic	biology.	In	 the	 absence	 of	 scientific	 evidence	 –	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 numbers	 –	 other	forms	 of	 knowledge	 and	 modes	 of	 calculation	 are	 used	 to	 ‘break	 down’	 and	‘rearrange’	 the	diverse	 elements	 that	makeup	 ‘synthetic	 biology’	 and	 its	 ‘potential	risks’.	 As	 the	 case	 of	 the	 National	 Institutes	 of	 Health’s	 (NIH	 2011)	 guidelines	 on	research	involving	recombinant	DNA	molecules	can	attest	(introduced	in	Chapter	5),	although	 barriers	 to	 ‘knowing	 the	 risks’	 are	 regularly	 identified,	 they	 are	 also	overcome.	In	this	instance,	the	very	definition	of	‘recombinant	DNA	molecules’	was	redefined	to	include	those	comprised	of	‘synthetic	sequences’,	or	‘DNA	that	does	not	exist	 in	nature’,	enabling	synthetically	derived	molecules	and	synthetically	derived	organisms	 to	 be	 treated	 ‘as	 if’	 they	 are	 natural	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 oversight	 and	regulation.	 	And,	while	 this	 is	 (or	was)	only	one	source	of	 scientific	uncertainty	 in	
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synthetic	 biology,	 it	 underlines	 that	 ‘uncertainty’	 is	 not	 viewed	 as	 an	insurmountable	obstacle	 to	 risk	assessment	and	risk	management,	but	 rather	as	a	call	to	action,	(re)invention	and	adaptation	in	the	face	of	uncertainty.	In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 synthetic	 biology	 regulatory	 process,	 ‘ingenuity’	 is	 not	lacking.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 it	 is	 integral	 to	 the	 design	 and	 implementation	 of	biosecurity	interventions	that	seek	to	‘secure’	and	‘sustain’	an	emerging	science	that	does	 not	 lend	 itself	 to	 ‘quantitative	 risk	 assessment’.	 And,	 while	 numbers	 and	statistical	methods	 rarely	 feature	 in	 the	 risk	 assessments	 discussed	 in	 this	 thesis,	experts	 nonetheless	 appeal	 to	 a	 scientific	 rationality;	 they	 aspire	 to	 technical	mastery	 of	 science	 over	 chance,	 and	 seek	 to	 satisfy	 highly	 instrumental	 aims.	 Just	because	 ‘quantitative	 risk	 calculation’	 is	 absent,	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 ‘calculation’	itself	 is	 absent,	 merely	 that	 it	 takes	 other	 forms.	 Indeed,	 as	 governmentality	theorists	contend	(Dean	1999;	Rose	2002;	O’Malley	2004),	there	is	no	 ‘singular’	or	‘best’	way	to	govern	an	indeterminate	future,	no	monolithic	‘risk	technology’	or	‘risk	rationality’,	 which,	 once	 exceeded,	 relegates	 individuals,	 families,	 communities,	organizations	or	nations	to	a	state	of	epistemological	stasis,	indifference	or	inaction.	There	is,	 in	fact,	 if	one	takes	seriously	existing	sites	of	risk	assessment	such	as	the	one	examined	 in	 this	 thesis,	 ‘no	risk	beyond	risk’.	The	case	of	 regulating	synthetic	biology,	 underscores	 that	 ‘risk’	 and	 ‘risk	 thinking’	 do	 indeed	 take	on	multiple	 and	heterogeneous	 configurations,	 are	 infinitely	 adaptable,	 and	 directed	 at	 achieving	practical	outcomes	that	are,	above	all,	believed	to	be	possible	(ibid.).			
8.3	Managing	risk	management	processes	In	 the	absence	of	numbers,	other	modes	of	 calculation	are	 invented,	which	are	no	less	based	on	a	scientific	 rationality	 that	conceives	of	 ‘risks’	as	objective	 facts	 that	can	 be	 understood	 and	 brought	 under	 frameworks	 of	 technical	 intervention	 and	control.	 Of	 particular	 significance	 in	 relation	 to	 governing	 synthetic	 biology	 is	 the	design	 and	 construction	 of	 risk	management	 processes,	 procedures	 and	 protocols	that	 can	 be	 used	 to	 guide	 and	 to	 justify	 practical	 action	 in	 the	 face	 uncertainty.	Manifest	 in	 federal	 guidance	 on	 how	 to	 screen	 potentially	 dangerous	 ‘sequences’	
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and	 ‘customers’	 (DHHS	 2010b),	 ‘checklists’	 that	 are	 used	 to	 identify	 ‘dual-use	research	 of	 concern’	 (NSABB	 2007),	 and	 ‘table	 top	 exercises’	 that	 seek	 to	 enable	synthetic	biologists	to	become	their	own	 ‘experts	 in	biosecurity’,	risk	management	in	synthetic	biology	depends	upon,	and	is	indeed	defined	by,	its	capacity	to	produce	prescriptive	 guidance	 that	 ‘breaks	 down’,	 ‘rearranges’	 and	 provides	 ‘recipes’	 to	prevent	the	deliberate	misuse	of	biotechnology.	 It	 is	 in	the	form	of	these	visionary	documents	and	blueprints	that	the	highly	uncertain	world	of	synthetic	biology	and	bioterrorism	are	rendered	knowable	and	actionable.	It	 is	by	way	of	deconstructing	the	 ‘synthetic	 biology	 threat’	 and	 refashioning	 its	 constituent	 parts	 through	language,	 embodied	 in	 new	 categories	 and	 concepts,	 that	 risk	 assessors	 and	 risk	managers	 (representing	 federal	 agencies,	 DNA	 synthesis	 companies,	 scientific	committees,	 and	 so	 on)	 lay	 bare	 the	 complexities	 of	 bioterrorism	 and	 make	 it	possible	–	through	a	‘hybrid’	activity	known	as	‘regulatory	science’	–	to	both	assess	and	manage	unwieldy,	seemingly	unknowable,	contingencies.		On	the	one	hand,	documents	such	the	Screening	Framework	 (DHHS	2010b),	which	 break	 down	 biosecurity	 risk	 assessment	 into	 ‘sequence	 screening’	 and	‘customer	 screening’,	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 sites	 of	 creation	 and	 innovation,	 in	 as	much	as	ideas	such	as	‘controlled	sequences’	and	‘restricted	persons’	(and	the	many	sub-components	 and	 descriptors	 that	 go	 along	 with	 them)	 ascribe	 a	 form	 of	materiality	 to	 particular	 kinds	 of	 people	 and	 things	 to	 be	 governed.	 On	 the	 other	hand,	 documents	 of	 this	 kind	 are	 the	 manifestation	 of	 regulatory	 strategizing,	conceived	 by	 scientific	 and	 technical	 experts	 assigned	 a	 highly	 instrumental	 task,	namely,	 to	prevent	 ‘dangerous	tools’	 from	reaching	 ‘dangerous	hands’,	offering	the	essential	methodologies	 and	 frameworks	 for	 biosecurity	 ‘best	 practices’.	 They	 are	programmatic,	 ideational,	 and	 didactic,	 designed	 to	 teach	 their	 target	 audience	(‘screeners’,	(amateur)	biologists,	institutional	biosafety	committees)	how	to	assess	risks	effectively,	and	how	to	become	their	own	risk	managers.	In	 this	 light,	much	of	 the	work	of	 governmental	 actors	 and	organizations,	 I	have	 argued,	 is	 not	 so	much	 to	 assess	 and	manage	 synthetic	 biology’s	 biosecurity	risks,	but	to	manage	the	risk	management	process	itself,	to	enable	risk	managers	or	“processors	of	uncertainty”	(Power	2007,	p.	9)	to	be	responsible	for	the	day-to-day	
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oversight	 and	 operations	 of	 companies,	 institutions,	 and	 (non-institutional)	 lab	spaces.	This	distinctly	modern	 form	of	governing	has	been	described	as	 ‘advanced	liberal’	 (Rose	 2000)	 and	 is	 characteristic	 of	 much	 of	 the	 practical	 work	 of	administering	 people	 and	 things	 in	 the	 twenty-first	 century.	 Michael	 Power	 has	described	this	approach	to	risk	management	as	the	“new	governmentality”	(Power	2007,	 p.	 41),	 one	 that	 prizes	 “the	 organization	 of	 uncertainty	 in	 the	 form	 of	frameworks	which	emphasize	management	process	in	a	field	hitherto	dominated	by	experts	 in	 risk	 analysis”	 (ibid,	 p.	 36).	 It	 is	 in	 this	 new	 regulatory,	 increasingly	‘managerial’,	environment	that	 the	organization	of	uncertainty	 is	mobilized,	not	so	much	with	a	view	to	technical	precision	and	numeric	supremacy,	but	with	a	view	to	the	coherency	and	procedural	clarity	of	technical	frameworks	and	written	guidance.	In	this	context,	as	I	argued	in	Chapter	6,	the	strengths	of	policy	proposals	are	valued	not	only	 for	 their	scientific	 rigor,	but	also	 for	 their	administrative	merits.	 In	many	ways,	 as	 Power	 rightly	 argues:	 “A	 cultural	 ‘trust	 in	 numbers’	 has	 given	way	 to	 an	emphasis	on	systems	and	processes	to	define	governance”	(ibid,	p.	178).	
	
8.4	Pragmatic	policymaking	In	 practice,	 I	 have	 argued,	 the	 regulatory	 process	 in	 synthetic	 biology	 is	characterized	 by	 ‘pragmatic	 policymaking’,	 a	 flexible	 approach	 to	 policy	 design	premised	upon	the	belief	that	biosecurity	risks	can	be	assessed,	rendered	knowable,	and	made	the	subject	of	regulatory	interventions	that	can	be	used	to	satisfy	a	variety	policy	 objectives,	 including,	 but	 not	 limited	 to,	 mitigating	 the	 ‘likelihood’	 and	‘consequences’	of	possible	 future	harm.	 Indeed,	mitigating	 risk	 (the	physical	 sort),	although	 unquestionably	 a	 significant	 source	 of	 concern	 for	 scientists,	 security	experts,	 and	 science	policymakers	 (among	others),	 is	 only	one	preoccupation	 that	motivates	the	design	of	‘optimal’	science	policies.	In	the	case	of	synthetic	biology,	as	in	 the	 case	 of	 genetic	 engineering,	 there	 is	 an	 apparent	 conviction	 that	 it	 is	 not	enough	 to	 prevent	 risks,	 but	 to	 prevent	 them	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 the	 science	 is	protected,	 that	 its	 industrial	potential	 is	 fulfilled,	and	 that	 the	risks	 in	question	do	not	exceed	the	technical	or	administrative	capacities	of	regulation	itself.	
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	 	This	pragmatic	belief	and	apparent	conviction	can	be	seen	in	all	elements	of	the	regulatory	response	to	the	problem	of	deliberate	misuse	in	synthetic	biology.	As	I	have	argued	throughout	my	thesis,	 it	 is	visible	 in	 the	 form	of	recurrent	concerns	about	‘novel’	risks,	risks	that	are:	‘beyond	assessment’;	that	do	not	‘match-up’	with	existing	regulatory	frameworks;	that	are	too	uncertain	to	be	conceived	as	 ‘risks’	at	all.	 Yet,	 in	 each	 case,	 these	 voiced	 concerns	 and	 uncertainties	 are	 overcome:	anticipated	‘dangers’	(for	example,	arbitrary	sequence	information)	are	re-imagined	as	 ‘potential	 risks’	 (for	 example,	 sequence	 information	 describing	 Select	 Agents,	‘sequences	of	concern’)	or	simply	passed	over	on	account	of	the	‘limits	of	prediction’	(for	example,	sequence	information	corresponding	with	pathogens	that	do	not	exist	in	 nature);	 potential	 risks	 are	 made	 to	 ‘fit’	 existing	 regulatory	 frameworks	 (for	example,	the	Select	Agent	Regulations);	guidelines	are	amended	to	enable	‘synthetic	DNA’	 to	 be	 treated	 as	 if	 it	 is	 ‘natural	 DNA’	 (NIH	 2011),	 and	 new	 ‘biosecurity’	provisions	are	grafted	on	 to	existing	 ‘biosafety’	protocols	 (CDC/NIH	2009).	 In	 this	manner,	pragmatic	policymaking	can	be	seen	to	favor	efficiency;	it	does	not	yield	to	scientific	uncertainty,	and	is,	above	all,	ends-driven.	Evidence	 of	 ‘pragmatic	 policymaking’	 is	 equally	 visible	 in	 the	 efforts	 of	diverse	 governmental	 actors	 and	 organizations	 that	 seek	 to	 enable	 a	 ‘secure’	 and	‘sustainable’	science.	Here,	pragmatism	permeates	a	regulatory	discourse	that	self-consciously	reflects	on	the	need	to	balance	potentially	competing	policy	objectives:	weighing	 demands	 for	 ‘national	 security’	 against	 ‘scientific	 freedom’,	 ‘industrial	productivity’	 against	 ‘prudential	 oversight’;	 averting	 blame	 for	 doing	 ‘too	 little	 to	regulate’	 or	 for	 doing	 ‘too	 much’;	 alleviating	 fears	 about	 ‘bioterrorism’	 while	nurturing	 hopes	 for	 ‘bioeconomy’.	 These	 are	 among	 the	 many	 faces	 of	 risk	management	 and	 regulation	 that	 characterize	 the	 regulatory	 process	 examined	 in	this	 thesis,	 and	which	 help	 shape	 the	 design	 and	 production	 of	 risk	management	strategies,	as	well	as	their	visible	‘traces’	(guidelines,	checklists,	articles,	and	so	on).	In	 brief,	 there	 is	 a	 need,	 or	 at	 least	 a	 perceived	 need,	 to	 balance	 (and	 be	 seen	 to	balance)	 sharply	 contrasting	 expectations	 and	 competing	 political	 imperatives,	minimizing	not	only	the	‘primary	risks’	associated	with	‘deliberate	misuse’	but	also	the	 ‘secondary	 risks’	 associated	with	 the	 reputations	 of	 those	 engaged	 in	 various	
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aspects	 of	 the	 synthetic	 biology	 regulatory	 response.	 In	 this	 regard,	 it	 should	 be	recalled	 that	 the	 very	 notion	 of	 ‘risk’	 plays	 a	 functional	 role	 in	 enabling	 and	justifying	regulatory	decisions.	As	Rothstein	et	al.	observe:	“Constructing	 regulatory	 problems	 as	 risk	 problems	 offers	 a	 solution	 to	regulators	by	providing	a	procedural	rationality	for	managing	societal	risks	in	ways	 that	 meet	 bureaucratic	 and	 legal	 demands	 for	 processes	 that	 are	rationally	consistent,	organized	and	defensible.”	(2006,	pp.	100-101)	While	 ‘pragmatism’	of	 this	kind	might	be	dismissed	by	some	as	evidence	of	concealed	interests	or	a	lack	of	honesty	on	the	part	of	various	regulators	who	cannot	control	the	risks	they	claim	to	understand,	a	view	that	would	align	with	aspects	of	the	 ‘risk	society’	thesis,	there	is	an	alternative	interpretation,	one	that	aligns	much	more	closely	with	the	case	of	synthetic	biology.	As	Mitchell	Dean	(1999)	has	argued,	regimes	 of	 government	 are	 characterized	 by	 a	 distinctly	 ‘utopian	 element’	 that	cannot	be	dissociated	from	governmental	processes	and	mentalities	of	government.	To	 paraphrase	 Dean	 (ibid,	 p.	 33),	 ‘every	 theory	 or	 programme	 of	 government	presupposes	 a	 better	world,	 and	 thus	 is	 not	 only	 concerned	 about	 administrating	people	and	things,	but	also	about	leading	them	to	a	better	existence’.	In	the	case	of	synthetic	biology,	understanding	that	 this	 ‘utopian	element’	exists,	and	that	 it	 is	 in	fact	intrinsic	to	how	regimes	of	government	and	administration	operate	(ibid.),	can	help	clarify	what	might	otherwise	be	dismissed	as	evidence	for	a	regulatory	process	that	 was	 decided	 before	 it	 began,	 which	 is	 not	 the	 case.	What	 is	 the	 case	 is	 that	‘governing	 through	 risk’	 is	 about	much	more	 than	 simply	 eliminating	 uncertainty	about	possible	future	harm.	It	is	about	shaping	the	present	in	such	a	way	that	future	objectives	and	aspirations	may	(in	time)	be	realized.		
8.5	Bio(in)security	There	exists	one	further	theme	that	is	equally	apparent	in	my	thesis,	and	this	can	be	traced	 to	 the	 very	 language,	 concepts,	 categories,	 and	 behaviors	 that	 characterize	biosecurity	 in	 synthetic	 biology,	 and	 contemporary	 biosecurity	 practices	 more	broadly.	 Specifically,	 the	 case	 of	 synthetic	 biology	 underlines	 that	 the	 worlds	 of	
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‘national	 security’	 and	 the	 ‘life	 sciences’	 are	 increasingly	 intertwined,	 and	 not	without	 consequence	 for	 how	 biologists,	 science	 policymakers,	 security	 experts,	journal	editors	(indeed,	all	of	us)	understand,	represent	and	 interact	with	modern	biology.	Today,	more	than	ever	before,	advances	in	biotechnology	are	accompanied	by	an	expectation	of	 ‘deliberate	misuse’	and	‘catastrophic	harm’,	and	are	bound	up	with	a	new	set	of	vocabularies	describing	 ‘controlled	sequences’,	 ‘malicious	parts’,	‘dual-use	 research	 of	 concern’,	 ‘denied	 persons’	 and	 ‘prudent	 vigilance’,	 concepts	that	suggest	a	new	orientation	on	life	science	research,	its	 ‘potential	risks’,	and	the	forms	of	‘risk	responsibility’	needed	to	manage	these	risks.	For	 the	scientific	and	technical	experts	consulted	 for	my	research,	 this	new	way	 of	 interacting	 with,	 and	 talking	 about,	 biotechnology	 is	 increasingly	 self-evident.	 In	 the	case	of	 the	Screening	Framework	 (DHHS	2010b),	 it	 is	assumed	that	‘sequences	of	concern’	are	a	natural	extension	of	the	‘Select	Agent	List’;	multiple	lists	of	‘denied	persons’	are	described	as	an	‘administrative	challenge’	(‘they	should	all	be	in	one	place’),	but	lists	of	this	sort	are	assumed	to	be	necessary	and	of	obvious	value	to	 DNA	 synthesis	 providers.	 For	 life	 science	 publishers,	 biosecurity	 oversight	committees,	and	the	World	Health	Organization,	the	concept	of	‘dual-use	research	of	concern’	 has	 (very	 recently)	 taken	 on	 a	 distinct	 meaning;	 it	 is	 recognized	 as	 a	‘potential	 risk’;	watched	out	 for;	deliberated	on,	and	possibly	 (if	not	now,	 then	“in	the	very	near	future”)	 it	will	need	to	be	restricted	to	those	“who	have	a	 legitimate	need	to	know” 	(NSABB	2012,	p.	6).	For	DIY-biologists,	it	is	believed	to	be	essential	to	demonstrate	their	 ‘biosecurity	awareness’,	 to	engage	with	the	FBI,	and	to	guard	against	‘potential	transgressions’	within	their	‘community’.			It	 is	with	 a	 view	 to	 these	new	 interactions	 and	 emerging	 vocabularies	 that	one	can	see	that	the	perceived	threat	of	bioterrorism	is	not	only	reconfiguring	the	defensive	 architectures	 used	 to	 control	 biology	 –	 from	 ‘biosafety’	 to	 ‘biosecurity’;	from	controlling	‘dangerous	pathogens’	to	controlling	‘dangerous	knowledge’;	from	‘self-governance’	to	‘self-policing’	–	but	also	our	collective	expectations	for	modern	biology.	In	the	US	context,	it	is	all	but	taken-for-granted	that	to	speak	of	‘biosecurity’	in	relation	to	synthetic	biology	is	common	sense	–	a	logical	response	to	the	fact	that	the	 science	 could	 ‘democratize’	 bioengineering,	 enabling	 more	 people	 in	 more	
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places	to	participate	in	modern	biology.	In	government	working	groups	and	biotech	company	 boardrooms,	 it	 is	 apparent	 that	 DNA	 synthesis	 technology	 poses	‘biosecurity	 risks’,	 and	 that	 innovative	 ‘biosecurity	 solutions’	 are	needed.	For	DIY-biologists,	 it	 is	 increasingly	 commonplace	 to	 ‘know	 their	 local	WMD	 coordinator’	and	to	engage	with	law	enforcement	and	security	communities.	There	are,	of	course,	many	more	concepts,	categories,	and	interactions	of	this	kind	 that	 I	 could	 revisit,	 but	 what	 I	 wish	 to	 highlight	 here	 is	 merely	 that	 these	concepts,	categories	and	interactions	are	relatively	new,	and	are	increasingly	taken-for-granted.	For	many,	biosecurity,	and	 its	associated	vocabularies	and	rituals,	has	taken	on	a	highly	 specific	meaning	and	a	distinct	 functionality	 –	on	 the	one	hand,	enabling	 the	 communication	 of	 biosecurity	 ‘best	 practices’	 and,	 on	 the	 other,	enabling	these	practices	to	be	made	routine.	As	Ian	Hacking	(1992)	reminds	us,	the	naming	 and	 classification	 of	 new	 ‘risks’	 is	 not	 simply	 an	 administrative	 or	calculative	activity	 that	describes	 the	world	 ‘out	 there’,	but	 it	 is	also	performative,	bringing	new	kinds	of	people	and	things	into	being	hand-in-hand	with	their	naming	(ibid.).	Thus,	to	speak	of	synthetic	biology’s	‘biosecurity	risks’	carries	an	ontological	significance	 beyond	 epistemological	 debates	 on	 risk	 as	 a	 ‘mode	 of	measurement’.	Indeed,	the	very	act	of	naming	new	biosecurity	risks	transfers	material	and	political	significance	to	formally	unspeakable	worries	and	dilemmas.		
8.6	Governing	through	risk	Finally,	given	the	centrality	of	‘risk	regulatory	concepts’	(Fisher	2010),	such	as	‘risk’,	‘risk	 assessment’	 and	 ‘risk	 management’,	 to	 contemporary	 regulatory	 discourses,	one	might	ask:	To	what	extent	 is	 ‘risk’	 (and	not	 just	 the	 language	of	 risk)	actually	deployed	 in	 the	 case	 of	 regulating	 synthetic	 biology?	 To	 what	 extent	 is	 synthetic	biology	 actually	 ‘governed	 through	 risk’?	 Throughout	 my	 thesis,	 I	 have,	 indeed,	noted	that	the	language	of	risk,	especially	appeals	to	the	notion	of	‘quantitative	risk	assessment’	(and	its	components,	the	vocabulary	of	‘likelihood’	and	‘consequences’),	is	commonly	deployed	in	a	manner	that	 is	 inconsistent	with	the	 ‘technical	 ideal’	of	risk,	 traditionally	 conceived	 as	 an	 ‘objective’	mode	 of	measurement	 and	 decision-
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making.	In	other	words,	the	language	of	risk	can	clearly	be	seen	to	play	a	rhetorical	function.	 Yet,	 as	 I	 have	 also	 underlined	 throughout	my	 thesis,	 this	 technical	 ideal	does	 not	 capture	 the	 range	 of	 risk	 assessment	 techniques	 that	 are,	 in	 practice,	regularly	used	to	‘calculate’	the	seemingly	‘incalculable’.	Nor	should	this	observation	be	surprising,	as	the	technical	ideal	of	‘objective’	risk	assessment	and	‘value-neutral’	policymaking	is,	and	always	was,	unachievable	in	practice.	This	is	because	the	future	cannot	be	known	with	 certainty,	 and	 thus	decisions,	 no	matter	how	 ‘rigorous’	 the	assessment,	must	be	made	on	the	basis	of	imperfect	knowledge.	In	 this	 thesis,	 I	 have	 examined	 a	 range	 of	 calculative	 techniques	 and	regulatory	 strategies	 that	 are,	 in	 a	 highly	 instrumental	 sense,	 enabling	 synthetic	biology	 to	 be	 governed.	 And,	 while	 these	 techniques	 and	 strategies	 scarcely	resemble	 the	 technical	 ideal	 of	 ‘quantitative	 risk	 assessment’,	 they	 serve	 a	 very	similar	function.	That	is,	they	attempt	to	impose	order	on	the	world,	appealing	to	a	scientific	 rationality	 that	 assumes	 that	 risks	 can	 be	 known	 with	 reasonable	confidence	and	be	made	the	subject	of	technical	intervention	and	control.	Indeed,	it	is	this	scientific	rationality	that	unites	diverse	experts	–	ranging	from	public	health	officials	to	biological	weapons	experts	–	in	their	individual	and	collective	efforts	to	‘assess’	 and	 ‘manage’	 risks	 that	would	appear,	 at	 times,	 to	not	be	 ‘risks’	 at	 all,	 but	rather	 incalculable	 ‘dangers’,	 for	 which	 one	 does	 not	 have,	 and	 cannot	 have,	 the	“knowledge	 or	 the	 measure”	 (Ewald	 2002,	 p.	 294).	 If	 their	 efforts	 can	 tell	 us	anything,	 it	 is	 that	even	beyond	the	remit	of	scientific	knowledge	and	the	 limits	of	statistical	prediction,	there	exists	the	capacity	–	and	the	will	–	to	order	uncertainty	in	the	face	of	an	unknown	future,	enabling	action	in	the	present.	Of	course,	acknowledging	the	versatility	of	risk,	as	an	adaptive	‘technique	of	government’,	permits	much	more	than	a	general	recognition	of	alternative	modes	of	risk	calculation.	That	is,	it	permits	an	analysis	of	diverse	sites	of	risk	assessment	and	risk	management	that	are	not	only	testing	the	limits	of	human	ingenuity	to	organize	uncertainty,	but	also	(re)fashioning	reality	 in	highly	specific	ways.	Risk	calculation	both	 produces	 order	where	 there	 is	 disorder	 and	 reifies	 anxieties	 about	 possible	future	harms	that	may	never	happen,	but,	once	conceived	as	 ‘risks’,	must	be	taken	seriously;	made	the	subject	of	deliberation,	monitoring	and	management.	Thus,	the	
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claim	that	we	are	living	a	in	a	‘post-risk	calculation’	world	does	not	just	narrow	the	scope	of	what	should	count	as	legitimate	risk	assessment,	but	also	threatens	to	limit	our	sense	of	 intrigue	about	 risk	management	activities	 that	are	having	a	very	 real	impact	 on	 contemporary	 life.	 Thus,	 such	 a	 perspective	 is	 not	 only	 analytically	constraining,	 but	 also	 ethically	 problematic,	 because	 it	 fails	 to	 take	 seriously	 the	pragmatic	 efforts	 of	 diverse	 social	 actors	 and	 organizations	 that	 are	 presently	governing	through	risk,	and	shaping	the	world	around	us.		
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Appendix	A:	List	of	interviewees	
	
1. Volker	Beck	–	Senior	biodefense	scientist	and	biological	weapons	expert	–	Advisor	to	the	German	Foreign	Office	(now	a	freelance	CBRN	expert)	
2. Jason	Bobe		–	DIY-biologist	–	Co-founder	of	DIYbio;	Executive	Director	of	PersonalGenomes.org	and	Director	of	Community	for	the	Personal	Genome	Project	based	out	of	George	Church’s	lab	at	Harvard	Medical	School	
3. Rob	Carlson	–	Synthetic	biologist	–	Principal	at	Biodesic,	an	engineering	and	strategic	consulting	firm	in	Seattle	that	provides	services	to	governments	and	corporations	around	the	globe	
4. Mackenzie	Cowell	–	DIY-biologist	–	Co-founder	of	DIYbio	
5. Malcolm	Dando	–	Biological	weapons	expert	–	Professor	of	International	Security	at	the	University	of	Bradford,	and	co-director	of	its	project	on	strengthening	the	Biological	and	Toxin	Weapons	Convention	
6. Drew	Endy	–	Synthetic	biologist	–	Assistant	Professor,	Department	of	Bioengineering,	Stanford	University		
7. David	Franz	–	Senior	biodefense	scientist	and	biological	weapons	expert	–	Former	head	of	USAMRIID;	Committee	Member	on	the	Fink	Committee	
8. Marius	Grinius	–	Arms	control	and	disarmament	expert	–	Canadian	Ambassador	and	Permanent	Representative	to	the	Office	of	the	United	Nations	and	to	the	United	Nations	Conference	on	Disarmament	(now	retired)	
9. Andrew	Hessel	–	Synthetic	biologist	and	futurist	– Distinguished	Researcher	with	Autodesk	Inc.’s	Bio/Nano	Programmable	Matter	group,	based	out	of	San	Francisco;	co-founder	of	the	Pink	Army	Cooperative,	the	world’s	first	cooperative	biotechnology	company		
10. Iris	Hunger	–	Biological	weapons	expert	–	Head	of	the	Hamburg	Research	Group	for	Biological	Arms	Control	(now	with	the	Federal	Information	Centre	for	Biological	Security	at	the	Robert	Koch	Institute	in	Berlin)	
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11. Stephen	M.	Maurer	–	Lawyer,	educator	and	author	–	Adjunct	Associate	Professor	and	Director	of	the	Goldman	School	Project	on	Information	Technology	and	Homeland	Security,	University	of	California	Berkley	
12. Piers	Millett	–	Biological	weapons	expert	–	Political	Affairs	Officer	for	the	Implementation	Support	Unit	of	the	Biological	Weapons	Convention	
13. Christopher	Park	–	Counter-bioterrorism	specialist	–	Senior	Advisor	for	Bioterrorism	in	the	Bureau	of	International	Security	and	Nonproliferation	at	the	US	Department	of	State	(now	Director	of	the	Biological	Policy	Staff);	contributor	to	the	development	of	the	Screening	Framework		
14. Dana	Perkins	–	Public	health	official	and	biological	weapons	expert	–	Public	health	official	working	for	the	US	DHHS	(now	working	for	the	United	Nations	Security	Council	1540	Committee);	contributor	to	the	development	of	the	
Screening	Framework		
15. Amy	Smithson	–	Chemical	and	biological	weapons	expert	–	Senior	Fellow	at	the	James	Martin	Center	for	Nonproliferation	Studies,	Washington	DC	Office	
16. Edward	You	–	Counter-bioterrorism	law	enforcement	agent	–	Supervisory	Special	Agent	in	the	FBI’s	Weapons	of	Mass	Destruction	Directorate,	Biological	Countermeasures	Unit	
17. Richard	Weller	–	Senior	biodefense	scientist	and	biological	weapons	expert	–	Senior	Program	Manager	in	the	Biological	Sciences	Division	at	the	Pacific	Northwest	National	Laboratory	
18. 	Anonymous	–	Senior	biodefense	scientist	and	biological	weapons	expert,	United	Kingdom	
19. 	Anonymous	–	Senior	biodefense	scientist	and	biological	weapons	expert,	Australia	
20. 	Anonymous	–	Senior	biodefense	scientist	and	biological	weapons	expert,	United	Nations	Office	for	Disarmament	Affairs
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